"Poor Prussian artillery command" Topic

On the other hand, the British didn't have artillery generals and the artillery wasn't even part of the British army, it was part of and administered by the Ordinance Department.

That is a consequence the English Civil War and the general dislike of standing armies and a professional officer class not vested in the country – the reason for the purchase system.

Does he have a tinfoil feldmutz…?

From The Bombardier and Pocket Gunnery by Ralph Willett Adye, Seventh Edition, 1813, pages 20-21:

'Battle of Talavera'

'At the commencement of the battle, the British artillery were stationed by brigades of 6 guns, with the divisions to which they were attached; a temporary redoubt, unfinished, was thrown up at F, in which was posted a brigade of 3-pounders; on the hill at A, the most commanding point, were two brigades, one of heavy 6-pounders, the other light sixes, and two Spanish guns afterwards were added to them.'

'The French had a battery of 14 guns in the center at K, and others at G and H, independent of others which were brought up during the action. On the second day, when the columns at M advanced, supported by artillery, to the attack of the British right, which appuyed on the unfinished redoubt, the three brigades from EEE were formed in an oblique line from L to E, as represented by a dotted line, and took the columns in flank, whilst the redoubt kept up a direct fire in their front. It must be observed, that when an oblique line is formed with the artillery, as at LE, it should be directed without the extremity of the enemy's flank, otherwise the guns would be exposed to be enfiladed.'

'Artillery should never fire against artillery, unless the enemy's troops are covered and his artillery exposed, or unless your troops suffer more from the fire of his guns, than his troops do from yours.'

'Never abandon your guns till the last extremity. The last discharges are the most destructive: they may perhaps be your salvation, and crown you with glory.'

The upper case letters refer to the attached diagram and clearly demonstrate the oblique position that the British artillery maneuvered to in order to fire on the advancing French infantry.

There is no indication that there was any artillery 'charge' by the British artillery either in the diagram or in the narrative. The position of the three British artillery brigades was stationary and met the French infantry attack. This is very similar to the action of the Austrian cavalry battery commander, Josef Smola, against an advancing French infantry column at Neerwinden in 1793 with a reinforced (14 guns) cavalry battery.

This action at Talavera was not similar to Senarmont's action at Friedland in 1807 or Drouot's action at Lutzen in 1813. In both of these cases the French were attacking. At both Talavera and Neerwinden the British and Austrians, respectively, were defending.

Van Gogh's art is a matter of opinion and Turing's work was checkable.

Yep. But I have never read that van Gough's work was dismissed because he cut his ear off and committed suicide or Turing's work debunked because he was a closet gay.

Key Hoffie claims have been checked – and debunked. If you want to assume that everything else he's written is meticulously accurate, and that he only made up the stuff about Wellington ignoring a letter from Zieten at 9am, that's fine.

I was suggesting that 'assuming' anything wasn't a good approach to judging any historical work. I certainly wasn't making a judgement of Hoffie's work one way or another, only pointing out the most effective approach to determining its historical quality wasn't by judging the author's/artist's personal life outside of that arena.

If you feel you've done made an analysis of Hoffie's works based on his research and writing, terrific. I haven't read any of his books. All I know of him is his writing in some wargame and historical journals from the 1980s and 1990s.

There is no indication that there was any artillery 'charge' by the British artillery either in the diagram or in the narrative. The position of the three British artillery brigades was stationary and met the French infantry attack.

Kevin:
Whatever. They had to move out to that position 20 degrees off the perpendictular to the opposing lines, at least one hundred yards past the British lines and the left flank of the gun line just as close to the French lines from Elliott's diagram.

The History of the 46th "talavera" battery [Sillery's battery] calls it a charge. You are free to define that word in this context anyway you want to. As far as I know, the notion of an artillery 'charge' was not a term applied to any such advance of artillery including Senarmont's at Friedland until much later.

The point being is that guns from several organizations were massed and advanced well beyond the battlefront by a British artillery officer with the authority to do so. The British did have a higher system of command specific to artillery.

On the other hand, the British didn't have artillery generals and the artillery wasn't even part of the British army, it was part of and administered by the Ordinance Department.

That is a consequence the English Civil War and the general dislike of standing armies and a professional officer class not vested in the country – the reason for the purchase system.

Well, it was more than that. The Ordinance Department was a separate Royal institution from the army, Royal Engineers and Royal Artillery as with the Royal Navy, unlike the British Army. It had a separate status and a long-term budget, unlike the Army which had to be funded each year. This wasn't just because of the English Civil War. That division was also prompted by the same factors that found most artillery organizations step-children of the army and often associated with the engineers. Artillery manufacture and employment across Europe had begun as a Guild, a professional craft, an occupation associated with engineers and fortification building rather than a strictly military one. Only slowly did the arm supervised and moved by private individuals and companies become fully under the supervision of a nation's army. That transition was only completed by the end of the Napoleonic Wars.

There is no indication that there was any artillery 'charge' by the British artillery either in the diagram or in the narrative. The position of the three British artillery brigades was stationary and met the French infantry attack.

Sounds more like an 'evade' move to me.

you forget poor artillery, poor officers, only colonels commanding brigades, poor musketry, poor equipment, the only reasons Napoleon lost – bad luck despite imbecile Allies, wow that must have been very bad luck from 1812 to 1815 onwards.

H-K, you'll find hyperbole is not an "argument" anyone takes seriously.

The interesting thing about the late-war Prussians is that they were there, despite all sorts of failings, to the end.
Clearly a number of strengths but I think Napoleon himself summed up their power: "In war, three-quarters turns on personal character and relations; the balance of manpower and materials counts only for the remaining quarter."

It was, above all, the determination that ran from Blucher to often even the meanest private that made them a dangerous enemy.
To the question at hand, they sadly mismanaged the Ligny battle, were soundly beaten but stayed in the fight. To falsely ameliorate their failings is to take away from their virtues.

Can I advise you to stick to logical discourse rather than chauvinistic nonsense?

Ochoin, I fear I am to blame vW merely played off of my suggestion that there is an element of 'Lost Cause' apologetics to the wars of the 6th and 7th Coalitions that are reminiscent of that which clings to the defeat of the Confederates.

Neither vW or myself would doubt the courage or determination of the Prussians nor wish to tarnish their accomplishments.

To read some authors you do one how the Allies one give the prowess of the French.

To read some authors you do one how the Allies one give the prowess of the French.

Numbers?

Don't worry about the other thing. I guess we're a pair of grumpy old men….though H-K is obviously a LOT older than me. 87))

Sorry that one does not make sense. My bad. :-)

I meant that some authors denigrate the Allies to such an extent one does wonder how they won against the colossus that was Napoleon….

"I meant that some authors denigrate the Allies to such an extent one does wonder how they won against the colossus that was Napoleon…."

Excatly – and the only reason Napoleon lost was bad luck and incapable subordinates who ruined all campaigns and master schemes.

there is an element of 'Lost Cause' apologetics to the wars of the 6th and 7th Coalitions that are reminiscent of that which clings to the defeat of the Confederates.

So I believe: though I've never come across it myself. I guess some French authors practice this.

My point would be: does he have to go on & on (& on) about it…over decades?

Agree and unfortunately the posted nonsense by VW will continue, ad nauseum.

The 'Lost Cause' nonsense is just that-the comparison with the Civil War is invalid as far as I can see.

Poor Prussian artillery command based on what criteria?

The rank of the corps artillery chiefs in relation to their corps commanders. That demonstrates two things: the artillery was still considered by the Prussian army as being not as important as the cavalry and infantry, and how little influence the artillery chief had with his corps commander. Generals talk to generals quite differently than senior field grade officers do.

The fact that the field army had no artillery reserve under the command of the army artillery chief (who was a general officer). He controlled no guns and was basically in an advisory capacity.

The Prussian artillery command structure was crippled because of these two quite significant flaws.

On the other hand, the British didn't have artillery generals

Yes, they did. Brigadier General Howorth was an artillery officer, I believe, and initially commanded the British artillery in the Peninsula with Alexander Dickson as his brigade-major. He had been sent out from Woolwich to replace Robe in that billet.

It should also be noted that the British artillery arm in the Peninsula was small and was 'reinforced' with both the KGL and the Portuguese artillery. There were only five British artillery brigades with the field army at the time of Talavera, and two of those were KGL units.

An excellent reference for the British artillery arm is Battery Records of the Royal Artillery 1716-1859 by LtCol MES Laws.

There might have been no actual need for British artillery general officers in the field with Wellington's army, as it was necessarily relatively small and Wellington kept a close hand on his artillery. Dickson came to be Wellington's artillery chief in the Peninsula with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Portuguese service. His British rank was captain.

Artillery was the step-child of Napoleonic armies for the most part, in the command structure and study after the fact. It makes it difficult to judge what a 'poor artillery command' consituted.

No, it doesn't if you do a little research on the subject.

Field artillery (which included horse, foot, and mountain artillery) got a shot in the arm by the Prussian innovations in the 1740, followed by the Austrian innovations after the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748) where the Prussian artillery arm displayed a definite superiority.

The French, who now lagged badly behind, reformed their artillery arm thoroughly after the terrible performance in the Seven Years' War and also began to develop a definite command and control function for their artillery aided by the Gribeauval reforms as well as the doctrinal improvements by Jean du Teil and others.

Not only did the French have general officers as corps and army artillery chiefs, but those officers had their own staffs to support the artillery operations at those levels. The field artillery quite literally 'came of age' by 1800 and there were now artillery battles where artillery would not only greatly assist in winning them, but also play a prominent part.

Yes, they did. Brigadier General Howorth was an artillery officer, I believe, and initially commanded the British artillery in the Peninsula with Alexander Dickson as his brigade-major. He had been sent out from Woolwich to replace Robe in that billet.

The Royal Artillery did not have any generals. Howorth might have been a brevet brigadier or an infantry officer placed in that command position, but the British artillery superior commander only carried the rank of colonel.

Artillery was the step-child of Napoleonic armies for the most part, in the command structure and study after the fact. It makes it difficult to judge what a 'poor artillery command' consituted.

No, it doesn't if you do a little research on the subject.

Field artillery (which included horse, foot, and mountain artillery) got a shot in the arm by the Prussian innovations in the 1740, followed by the Austrian innovations after the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748) where the Prussian artillery arm displayed a definite superiority.

And exactly how did this effect artillery command?

The French, who now lagged badly behind, reformed their artillery arm thoroughly after the terrible performance in the Seven Years' War and also began to develop a definite command and control function for their artillery aided by the Gribeauval reforms as well as the doctrinal improvements by Jean du Teil and others.

Not only did the French have general officers as corps and army artillery chiefs, but those officers had their own staffs to support the artillery operations at those levels. The field artillery quite literally 'came of age' by 1800 and there were now artillery battles where artillery would not only greatly assist in winning them, but also play a prominent part.

Other armies had artillery general officers and even the British had artillery chiefs and support staff for their artillery divisions. Field artillery may have 'come of age' by 1800--whatever that means, but the question was the relative quality of the Prussian artillery command, good, fair, poor or some similar gradiant. And of course, that is over a twenty-year period, 1792 to 1815, so the quality may have changed for the better in the reforms, post 1806.

The Prussian artillery was badly employed in 1806 and they lost heavily for it. Too much Frederick and not enough common sense. And they didn't listen to Scharnhorst and others who actually began the reforms prior to 1806, but it ended up too little, too late.

There was improvement from 1807-1813, and even though Prince August was not an artilleryman, he was a conscientious officer who did his best for the arm.

However, the junior rank of the corps artillery chiefs and the fact that there was no army artillery reserve hurt the overall employment of the Prussian artillery arm. They were definitely behind the power curve as to tactical development and employment and command and control during operations.

I have found only one Prussian artillery general officer of note during the period 1807-1815. That is Karl Friedrich von Holtzendorf who distinguished himself in 1813 under Bulow and was the army artillery chief in 1815 and was badly wounded at Ligny, losing a hand. He undoubtedly took the lessons he learned to heart and the Prussian artillery arm was greatly improved later.

One of the problems with the Prussian artillery is that they did not have a formal school until 1791 and I believe that it was abolished in 1808.