"Poor Prussian artillery command" Topic

I've been poring over the OOBs for Ligny mainly using Hoffie's which I hope are trustworthy?

At any rate, the Prussian corps-level artillery commanders are listed as lieutenant- colonels, and as such were out-ranked by most of the infantry and cavalry officers they were supposed to be supporting. Their French equivalents are generals & often barons of the empire.
This would imply that in the Prussian instance it was difficult for them to deploy their own assets other than in the manner prescribed by those non-technical superiors. Conversely, the French seem to have an in-built flexibility.

To reflect this in our up-coming mega game of the Ligny battle I was thinking of removing the Prussian artillery commanders & putting their guns directly under the command of their Corps commanders which will limit their flexibility of these weapons.

As always this may be a little crude but in a large wargame you do need to keep things as simple as possible.

Comments?

This is a common comment on their Command capability. Why not? limiting any transfers to a general reserve.

Using Shako 2 rules we do the same in our large games. Assign them to Corps, or make them an army gun so that they can support any unit.
Usually the army commander will assign them to a corps or division anyway. Once assigned because of the heavy guns limited movement, they usually stay in one area anyway.

However they still have the ability to fire on anyone they want rather than the corps or division they are with.

I've been poring over the OOBs for Ligny mainly using Hoffie's which I hope are trustworthy?

Hoffie is generally regarded as a reliable source. I'd trust Hoffie on the Prussians over Little Scotty Bowden who do not seem to understand German.

Isn't Hoffie under some sort of cloud or shouldn't I heed forum gossip as to his present whereabouts?

It's a bit more than gossip. His arrest and imprisonment are a matter of public record (not to mention a hundred lunatic conspiracy-theorist blogs) and they don't have to be read in the original German…

I still like his books though… :)

@ Jemima Fawr

Any primary sources to back this up?

link

I'll believe owt now.

Still I guess it doesn't change the accuracy of his Ligny OOB.

Indeed not!

Though I wouldn't want to see photos of his Lieb-Husaren…

At any rate, the Prussian corps-level artillery commanders are listed as lieutenant- colonels, and as such were out-ranked by most of the infantry and cavalry officers they were supposed to be supporting.

This was the situation with the British and Austrians. Even in the French Army, artillery commanders were under the Corps or Divisional commander. Even artillery General Sénarmont had to ask for permission from General Victor at Friedland to use the corps artillery in his famous 'artillery charge.'

You might chek this OOB
PDF link

This was the situation with the British and Austrians.

But not the French. The British, as always, produce an unusual twist. They tended to avoid stodgy artillery tactics because the Iron Duke was micromanaging the placement & use of guns.

It would seem, Senarmont's famous charge notwithstanding, French artillery was handled by artillery officers of sufficient rank & prestige to carry weight even with Marshals of France. Note: Senarmont was given permission for this unorthodox tactic.

I remember reading (I think an indirect quote from Clausewitz) that the Prussians didn't think that much of the quality of their artillery. Tended to fire off its ammunition too quickly and then retire. The French batteries were thought to use their ammunition more carefully and so last longer.

Prussians generally are using lower ranked generals in equivalent posts in 1815 – though I would hesitate to use this as evidence that leadership was weaker – just that the Prussian war machine was stingy with promotions.

Ochoin is correct.

When the corps artillery commander is a general officer, it is much easier to deal with a corps commander, who would usually, but not always, be an infantry officer.

The French also had an army artillery reserve under the command of the army artillery commander.

The Prussians in 1813-1815 had an army artillery commander, but no artillery reserve.

The Prussian artillery was reformed and reorganized after 1806, Prince August being put in charge of the reorganization. A new reglement was written and issued, but it only covered battery operations and not artillery operations at the higher command levels. Frederick the Great had neglected his artillery and engineers and that was one of the reasons that the Prussian artillery didn't do too well in 1806-1807. The reorganization helped, but they had a long way to go. They only had their first artillery school in 1791 and it was abolished in 1808. After the wars, the situation changed gradually, first with actually adopting in total a unified artillery system. The hard-earned experience of 1813-1815 and having to face the French artillery arm taught the Prussian artillery officers that they had a lot of work to do to improve their arm. What they accomplished would show definite positive results in 1870-1871.

And it should be noted that the Prussian army at least from after the summer armistice in 1813 did not serve together under Blucher in the Army of Bohemia. Blucher also had Russian subordinate corps in his army.

Senarmont had to ask permission to mass the corps artillery at Friedland because he worked for the corps commander-that was his immediate superior.

Regarding ammunition, the French resupply system pushed the ammunition forward so that the gun companies were not withdrawn from the gun line and remained in action. In combat, each field piece had only one caisson with it. The rest were with the division and corps parcs and moved the resupply of ammunition forward while the empty caissons went to the rear to be refilled.

And each foot artillery company assigned to an infantry division also had four caissons full of small arms ammunition.

K

I'd be very wary of believing the reports from York. Peter's a friend of mine and there's much more to this than the media has released. In the wake of the Jimmy Saville (sp?) revelations it is very easy to fit someone up for paedophilia, especially if you work in social services. With his computer in his home in Austria, how did they find all those supposed images? There's no mention anywhere of them going to Austria to get his computer before he was arrested.

Can I be 100% certain Peter has been fitted up? Of course not. But it's not coincidence that Peter was seized before a court appearance that had to be undertaken in York.

As for his ORBAT information, both Stephen Summerfield and Oliver Schmidt will hopefully confirm that it is accurate as any. So is Bowden's, for that matter (an order of battle is easy to read despite the language). Details vary even between the official histories and unit histories.

Cheers.

Dal.

PS JF I pick up your slumpy and the poppies tomorrow. We still right to meet?

Courts sometimes get things wrong it's true. Equally gaols are full of innocent people; if you ask the inmates.

I don't wish to know any more about this sordid affair. We should probably stick to wargames/history & leave these matters for lawyers to sort out.

I'm sorry I inadvertently brought the matter up.

Did any of the esteemed contributors did read any of substance on the Prussian artillery and how it performed in the liberation wars form 1813 – 1815?

Reading the standard references like Malinowski and Bonin, or the account of some batteries by Vogel, or Strotha leads to the conclusion that the Prussian artillery performed not worse than the French and had commanders of very high initiative.

The Prussian army – so weakly lead – smashed the French again and again in battles like Großbeeren, Dennewitz, Katzbach, Wartenburg, Wachau etc., etc.

I'm discussing Ligny.

Did the Prussians win that?
Sorry, I must have missed the memo.

The only problem with studying Prussian successes in 1813 is, that again, Blucher did not commande a 'Prussian' army. It was made up of both Prussian and Russian units. And Bulow on the Berlin front was technically under the command of Bernadotte.

And in 1814 in France, Blucher was badly defeated 'again and again' in the February battles-Champeaubert, Monmirail, and Vauchamps with Blucher's army being 'smashed' and nearly destroyed.

Back to the topic at hand, Ligny-the Prussians were in a strong defensive positions and outnumbered the French 83,000-67,000 and were routed out of their defensive position and lost three times the number that the French did-34,000 against 11,500-and that included 12,000 Prussians who deserted after the battle.

And it was the French artillery that dominated the field-not that of the Prussians.

As a more direct answer to Ochoin's opening posting, the French system of artillery command and control was set up in order to give maximum flexibility to the French artillery arm.

That is the reason, to my mind, that the French corps and army artillery commanders were general officers-to give them the ability to act when they needed to without getting into a losing argument with the corps commanders because they were only senior field grade officers. Being a general has its perks as well as its responsibilities, and talking one general to the other (artillery commander to corps commander) would give the artillery officer an advantage as the corps commander was more inclined to listen to an experienced general than a lieutenant colonel or a colonel.

Back to your original question, mate, which I wrongly neglected. As H-K says, the Prussian artillery didn't do that poorly before 1815.

But! The reorganisation and expansion of March 1815 affected the artillery as it did the other arms and services. As well as having a lot of new men to be trained, there were also horses for the limbers, caissons, etc, that had to be trained. Horses take longer to train than (most) people, and that plus the dearth of suitable hoses at the end of the wars meant that some batteries were short of trained horses. Some batteries could not even take the field because of the lack.

Accelerated promotion, to fill new NCO and officer positions, would also have had an effect- though I don't know if anyone has ever tried to quantify what the effects were and how much they were felt. Generally though there would be a dilution of experience at all levels, and that must have meant that fire was less accurate, loading took longer and the guns may not have been sited as best they could. So dropping the the higher-numbered batteries (ie those formed in March 1815) a class might reflect what was happening.

As for the issue of rank of the Commander Corps Artillery (CCA), I don't think it mattered that much. The good and average Corps Commanders would trust the CCA to do his job- or replace him if didn't. Poorer ones and micromanagers would over-ride his decisions, no matter what rank he had (as long as it was subordinate). So while the artillery was looked down upon in the Prussian army, so it was in most of the other armies as well. That may have stopped it reaching its full potential, but I doubt it made the Prussian artillery worse than the European average. After all, for all their artillery generals and the favour bestowed by Napoleon the French artillery didn't always shine, either.

Cheers.

Dal.

Prussian artillery officers were very ingenious, some mounted their foot gunners on the ammunition limbers and train horses and created driving batterie – just to give an example.

As to

"Generally though there would be a dilution of experience at all levels, and that must have meant that fire was less accurate, loading took longer and the guns may not have been sited as best they could. So dropping the the higher-numbered batteries (ie those formed in March 1815) a class might reflect what was happening."

On what sources and information do you base your conclusion?

On what sources and information do you base your conclusion?

On modern experience, H-K, that probably applies to any army at any time. As I said there I haven't seen any written study looking at the effect on the Prussian reorganisation. The clothing and nation changes, but the basic human generally remains the same.

There have been quite a body of studies on the problems experienced with other rapid expansions and reorganisations, such as those in 1860 (American Civil War), 1899 (Boer War), 1914, 1939 and (for Australia) in 1965.

Having been through a major rapid expansion of the Australian army in my service (1980 formation of the ODF), and seen the same effects when the army was reorganised since 1998, I'd say that the human factors remain the same- they are consistent with those mentioned above. Rapid expansion and reorganisation means that some people who aren't ready (nor will some ever will be) are promoted into vacancies, while new recruits are rushed through the mill to get the numbers up. All of which happened in the March 1815 reorganisation.

(And I'll bet the regimental commanders didn't send their best officers, NCO's or squadrons to help build the new units. In fact, many of them probably saw a way to be rid of problems. It is, unfortunately, human nature. And only a few people would have the personal ethics not to take advantage of the situation to move their problems along.)

Do you believe the Prussian army was impervious to the dilution of experience and erosion of efficiency that such a reorganisation/expansion would and has caused in other armies? Do you have access to a study that looks at the general effects of the March 1815 reorganisation on the experience, performance and efficiency of Prussian units? If so, please share it.

Wouldn't dropping the new artillery batteries (and new cavalry and some infantry regiments) a class in a particular rules set reasonably reflect the problems we can expect to have been encountered/anticipated by the commanders?

It's not a criticism of the Prussians- nor would I care if it was, as no army is above reasonable criticism. It's answering a question with the best information available, based on historical and experienced precedents.

If you have better, let's see it.

Cheers.

Dal.

Back to your original question, mate, which I wrongly neglected. As H-K says, the Prussian artillery didn't do that poorly before 1815.

Well, I never said it was a basket-case, did I?

Poor old Hans-Karl has told us, over several years, that the Prussian choice of ground at Ligny was superb, Blucher's leadership was sublime, the Prussian soldier was without peer, the organisation (& re-organisation) of the army caused no problems & now their artillery was superior.

So, clearly Ligny was another Prussian triumph in the Napoleo….sorry, Blucherian Wars.

Apologies for getting a trifle hot under the collar but if we actually allow the Prussians were soundly thrashed at Ligny (& lucky not to suffer worse) WHY were they beaten?

I do not believe the French arty was greatly superior, just qualitatively superior in a few, key areas. I think it possible that it may well have one of a number of French superiorities on the day of battle. Oh & if you want to flip the concept that newly promoted Prussian OBLs were adequate, why did the French habitually use generals of some prestige & much experience?

Or should I just chalk Ligny as another notch on the inexorable Prussian march?

The Prussian army – so weakly lead – smashed the French again and again in battles like Großbeeren, Dennewitz, Katzbach, Wartenburg, Wachau etc., etc.

Only with numerical advantage or a more effective ally on the field, or preferably both.

Where the numbers were even and they fought alone, they lost.

"Do you believe the Prussian army was impervious to the dilution of experience and erosion of efficiency that such a reorganisation/expansion would and has caused in other armies?"

I don't know, for that reason I am not daring to just use pure speculation from modern day experience to what happened in 1815, at least I don't dare to do that.

In case there isn't any worthwhile research on that topic, I am very reluctant to form an opinion.

Just out of fun – the same could be said about the French army as well.

Despite all this speculation on dillution the Prussian Army of 1815 prooved to be very resilient and more than a match to the Armée du Nord.

'Despite all this speculation on dillution the Prussian Army of 1815 prooved to be very resilient and more than a match to the Armée du Nord.'

Not on their own they were not, as witness the outcome of Ligny.

With the assistance of allies they did very well.

Prussia on their own never defeated Napoleon or the Grande Armee…and during the spring campaign of 1813 they also lost major battles twice when allied with the Russians.

Not on their own they were not, as witness the outcome of Ligny.

With the assistance of allies they did very well.

Indeed. If you look at the armies in the 1815 campaign, they were all, to some extent, the B team. This, for me, is part of the problem with the claims one sometimes sees for this or that contingent deserving the credit for the campaign's outcome. Essentially, it's a dispute over who had the best second-best army.

Wellington's army was not the Anglo-KGL-Portuguese force of Peninsular renown;

The Netherlands forces were considered politically doubtful *by all sides*, a doubt not of their fighting abilities but of their loyalties. That this was a valid concern is underscored by the country's fission into two countries less than 15 years later;

Napoleon's army was distinctly brittle and had a number of poor command choices through political or other considerations ;

Blucher's army likewise wasn't that of 1814, and he had had to detach an entire army corps that mutinied.

The argument that the Prussian or German contribution was somehow the most important is usually based on how far they marched and how many of them were. It overlooks how many of the enemy they overcame, and that they did so at all only when Wellington was on the field.

I'm not the biggest Wellie fan, but I think you have to look a long way to find a better performance as a battle captain than Wellington's at Waterloo.

Hoffie latterly made a bit of a career of traducing people's reputations, whether it was that of other historians, of the police, of police complaints investigators, or indeed of the Duke of Wellington. Where he has now landed up is unfortunately likely to colour the perceived reliability of a lot of his otherwise valid work.

Or on the 18th at least, allies with the assistance of Prussians did very well…

OK here's Barbero's summary of Clausewitz:

"We keep too much artillery in reserve, and we replace a battery whenever it has used up its powder and shot; as a consequence, many batteries try to get rid of their ammunition quickly." The result… was that the French artillery, with fewer guns, regularly caused much more damage than its Prussian adversaries managed to inflict.

Clausewitz was there in 1815, of course, though he no doubt had an agenda of his own. Incidentally another choice quote via Barbero, this time from Hofshroer:

The armed forces fielded by the kingdom of Prussia in 1815 were, in terms of quality of manpower, equipment and coherence of organisation, probably the worst employed by Prussia in the entire Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.

I have not studied Ligny in any detail, but I do note Uffindel's analysis that in the street fighting in the town the Prussians burnt through men faster than the French did. That's nothing to do with artillery though. And nothing in the often used quotes from Capt van Reuter suggests any particular weakness. Still, putting this all together I rate Prussian artillery as inferior to their French counterparts (and indeed Austrian and British too) – which in my rules means they have somewhat less stamina.

The French did take most of the Prussian guns and horses when they were defeated. Prussian forces in the wars of liberation were usually given some veteran backbone by Russian units, especially in artillery. Look at the OB's and find that a lot of the Prussian division's guns were Russian units. Note also that after the successful defeat of Napoleon's invasion of Russia, that there were promotions galore within the Russian army. Therefore equivalent Russian/Prussian combined forces might have the Russian offices 2-4 grades above his Prussian counterpart, who was still not promoted from a built-up cadre unit.

Also, the Russians loved their guns, made a lot of them and had the horse resources to pull them around and make more units.

Apologies for getting a trifle hot under the collar but if we actually allow the Prussians were soundly thrashed at Ligny (& lucky not to suffer worse) WHY were they beaten?

The other side bribed the ref (who also needed to feed his guide dog some carrots) and he let them play offside for half the battle?

Seriously- the enemy had a better general and the tactical and strategic initiative. That's usually enough.

I don't know, for that reason I am not daring to just use pure speculation from modern day experience to what happened in 1815, at least I don't dare to do that.

In case there isn't any worthwhile research on that topic, I am very reluctant to form an opinion.

I don't understand that point of view in this context, H-K. With no historical data on which to base firm opinions, all we have left is the probable human dynamics. Large scale change always causes some confusion and decreases team effectiveness. It's why "Change Management" is given such weight in organisations, in an attempt to lessen those effects.

Besides, it's not a PHD thesis we're discussing, it's getting an historical effect from a set of wargames rules.

Cheers.

Dal.

I took the trouble to read the artillery behaviour represented in Malinowski and Bonin about the 1815 campaign, aside from one battery which reveived critics of wasting ammunition too quickly – seemingly the rest did behave "normally".

The artillery re – placement system did work well and prevented capture of guns as well, despite Clausewitz statement.

Reflecting on the behaviour of Blücher's army, despite consisting of some re-shuffled units – the defeat of Ligny didn't cause the same total collaps and disorganisation – as for the French Army at the eve of Belle Alliance.

the defeat of Ligny didn't cause the same total collaps and disorganisation –

I've always thought that Blucher had at least two moments where he avoided catastrophic defeat on this campaign, more through luck than anything else.

Firstly at Ligny, if D'Erlon had of fallen on his flank as intended.

Secondly, with his approach to Waterloo. If the Anglo-Dutch had of retreated in the late afternoon, (as even Wellington thought likey), the Prussians would have been strung out, partly in a defile, with Grouchy in his rear & Napoleon at his head.

Another Jena or Auerstadt? Very likely.

Blucher's poor sense of tactics & the outcome of the campaign seem to bear out the concept of the 'fortunes of war'.

The great advantage that Blucher and the Prussian army had after Ligny is that Bulow's IV Corps was not engaged and was therefore intact after the action.

That gave the Prussians a base to rally on and proceed to Wavre and then Waterloo. That 'happy accident' was the salvation of the Prussians.

And it was Bulow's corps that led the march to and attack at Waterloo.

I've always thought that Blucher had at least two moments where he avoided catastrophic defeat on this campaign, more through luck than anything else.

The luck was with the allies for sure, but on the day they also had better tactical leadership. Look at all the cock-ups the French made:

- they got bogged down in Hougoumont
- they delayed starting the battle for the grand battery, which achieved little to nothing
- they fumbled d'Erlon's attack through poor formation choice and lack of cavalry support
- they fumbled the cavalry attacks in the afternoon
- they fumbled the defence of Plancenoit by not blocking the Prussians further east
- the Guard fumbled its attack also.

In contrast, the allies fumbled the heavy cavalry's counter-attack and they fumbled the defence of La Haye Sainte. Arguably the first was institutional rather than tactical cockup, i.e. it was not really fixable on the day, in which case that's one cockup compared to the French who cocked up everything it was possible to .

Wellie leaving troops at Hal is often alleged to be a cockup, but then again, IIRC Napoleon left a similar quantity at Quatre Bras throughout the 18th presumably for much the same purpose. The only battle of the four where the French did not leave readily-available troops out of the action was Wavre. Which is ironic, because it was the only battle of the four where the campaign could never have been decided. Had he managed to get d'Erlon into action anywhere at all on the 16th or most of Grouchy to Waterloo on the 18th Napoleon would likely have won.

Wellington was an exceptional battlefield commander but also politically shrewd enough to realise at 7pm on June 18th that the war was now over. It seems Blucher was not alive to this point and went happily pillaging and despoiling his way through northern France in a way that hardened and revived French resistance, but only toward the Prussians.

What has all was struck me during the Autumn campaign of the Befreiungskrieg is the inability of the French to march the 70 miles to retake Berlin.

How could they ? As soon as Austria entered the Wars of the Liberation and fought according to the Trachenberg plan, Napoleon was in a hopeless position fighting the last Ancien regime war against the first modern strategical war. While the Allied had at least three strategical armies – N had only one – and with that he couldn't be at all places at once.

Along the lines of Prussian Artillery Command, Siborne quotes from Captain Reuter's memoirs (1st Corps, 12lber battery No. 6)several times.

I've always wondered if anyone knew of an English translation of his memoir.

v. Reuter Erinnerungen eines preußischen Artillerieoffiziers aus den Jahren 1798 bis 1815: von E. v. Reuter, Premierleutnant im 5. Rheinischen Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 65. Beihefte zum Militair-Wochenblatt, 1890, S. 239-282

I finally tracked down an online pdf of the document, but my (weak) command of German is useless in the face of the gothic script. It may as well be in Cyrillic.

link

Reuter – there is a translation of excerpts in Peter Young's "Blücher's Army" (Osprey).

It is taken from the October 1891 issue of the "United Service Magazine":

"A Prussian Gunner's Adventures in 1815" by Capt. E. S. May, R.A.

Unrelatedly, it looks like the police have finally got fed up with Hoffie's loony blog, and are doing something about it:

link
link

Has Gary Glitter said anything about Prussian artillery command?

As for the unrelated stuff, whatever a man does or did or is accused of having done in his private life, doesn't make him a better historian, nor a worse one.

As I am a native German and can read the sources in the original, it doesn't matter for me, but I believe Peter Hofschröer has done a great service to the English speaking Prussian aficionados, by having translated a lot of source material into English. There is no need to agree with any of Peter's conclusions, still there are the translated texts, so that you can draw your own conclusions.

doesn't make him a better historian, nor a worse one.

Shakespeare has something to say about that; tellingly put in Iago's mouth.

"Virtue? A fig! 'Tis in ourselves that we are thus or thus. Our bodies are our gardens, to the which our wills are gardeners. So that if we will plant nettles or sow lettuce, set hyssop and weed up thyme, supply it with one gender of herbs or distract it with many—either to have it sterile with idleness, or manured with industry—why, the power and corrigible authority of this lies in our wills. If the balance of our lives had not one scale of reason to poise another of sensuality, the blood and baseness of our natures would conduct us to most prepost'rous conclusions. But we have reason to cool our raging motions, our carnal stings, our unbitted lusts. Whereof I take this that you call love to be a sect or scion."

whatever a man does or did or is accused of having done in his private life, doesn't make him a better historian, nor a worse one.

Think so? I'm not so sure. Hoffie's forum participation has mainly been focused on trashing the reputation of people who disagree with him and his blog is focused on trashing the reputation of his brother and of the social and police services of Yorkshire. His blog in particular makes him look completely unhinged.

Knowing this, it puts a somewhat different slant on his books, I think, remembering that these are largely focused on trashing the reputation of the Duke of Wellington.

Personally I now tend to wonder how much of his other analysis is reliable, shall we say.

Hoffie does one good thing, he puts Wellington's victory in context and does something to remove the element of hagiography surrounding the Duke. If only someone could do the same for the sainted Bobby Lee….

Mind you there does seem to be an element of the "Lost Cause" thinking on some writers over the Befreiungskrieg and campaign of 1814. The Prussians were poorly led, the Prussian staff wasn't that good, indeed the whole German General Staff system wasn't very good right though to 1945. Prussians thrown out of good defensive positions by the good ol' Southern, sorry French boys. The only reason the Allies one the wars of the 6th and 7th Coalitions was superior manpower paid for by British gold……

Taking this a stage further we have Ney as a stand in for Pete Longstreet, and then the whole stabbing the back by Duc de Raguse.

you forget poor artillery, poor officers, only colonels commanding brigades, poor musketry, poor equipment, the only reasons Napoleon lost – bad luck despite imbecile Allies, wow that must have been very bad luck from 1812 to 1815 onwards.

whatever a man does or did or is accused of having done in his private life, doesn't make him a better historian, nor a worse one.

Think so? I'm not so sure. Hoffie's forum participation has mainly been focused on trashing the reputation of people who disagree with him and his blog is focused on trashing the reputation of his brother and of the social and police services of Yorkshire. His blog in particular makes him look completely unhinged.

I would think that judging a historian's work based on his private life or personality isn't particularly meaningful. The work should be judged on it's own merit. If not, what would we do with van Gough's art or Turing's work?

Peter Hofschröer work should be evaluated on its own merits or lunacy.

Poor Prussian artillery command based on what criteria?

Artillery was the step-child of Napoleonic armies for the most part, in the command structure and study after the fact. It makes it difficult to judge what a 'poor artillery command' consituted.

The Russians had much the same structure as the French, with division compliments of guns and corps reserves, and had them for quite a while. They had artillery generals. They could mass huge amounts of guns early in the wars, as they did at Eylau and Friedland. However, no one would say the command structures were equally effective.

On the other hand, the British didn't have artillery generals and the artillery wasn't even part of the British army, it was part of and administered by the Ordinance Department. Yet they had artillery division commanders [two or more artillery brigades] and an overall artillery commander for an army. At Talavera, Robe, an artillery division commander, organized a three brigade [battery] 'charge' out in the open on the flank of attacking French columns [Described and diagramed in Ayde's "The Bombardier and Pocket Gunner", 1813. Yet, in 1815, Mercer reports that during the June 17th retreat to Waterloo that no one [division and corps commanders] could or would tell him where he was supposed to go. He was on his own.

I would think that judging a historian's work based on his private life or personality isn't particularly meaningful.

Agreed, which is why I'm not doing it. I'm judging his work based on his writings – all of them.

He is a serial accuser of bad faith in people who disagree with him, and a serial harasser of such people. When given the opportunity to stand this stuff up in a court, he can never do so.

When Greg Pedlow comprehensively demolished one of his claims about Zieten in 1815, he didn't come back with a reasoned reply. He went berserk, and hurled abuse.

This is wholly of a piece with his reaction to John Hussey and to the police, and it makes me wonder if he's perhaps not quite the full shilling.

Van Gogh's art is a matter of opinion and Turing's work was checkable. Key Hoffie claims have been checked – and debunked. If you want to assume that everything else he's written is meticulously accurate, and that he only made up the stuff about Wellington ignoring a letter from Zieten at 9am, that's fine.

In the meantime I look forward to Rolf Harris' book about the Russian army.