"Successful charges vs gun lines?" Topic

Hi,

I was just pondering whether there were any successful charges against massed guns in the ACW? By "massed guns" I mean at least 12 guns massed together in a firing line, their position being the target of a charge. I know of several instances where charges on a brigade level were mounted against infantry supported by "numerous" artillery, and a few abortive attempts at trying to charge massed gun lines, but no successful ones.

Cheers,

Christopher

Would you count the charge up Missionary Ridge at the Battle of Chattanooga, the Battle Above the Clouds? Of course there were special circumstances that allowed that particular assault to work. There would have to be, wouldn't there? A regiment charging a well-served battery over open ground just doesn't work, starting about 1700.

Masses guns no, and supported guns for sure not, but there certainly are examples of infantry chargers over-running unsupported individual batteries – I am traveling but will check my library when I get home

I can't even off the top of my head think of many attempts even…

I'm sure they would have heard of the Charge of the Light Brigade, just twenty-odd years earlier, and knew how well that went…..

By the terms of the OP's question, the Charge of the Light Brigade was successful. Possibly the most impressive cavalry charge of the modern era.

re ACW:
There were multiple supported batteries in the Union lines on day 1 at Bentonville, though not massed
In fact, the AOT was similarly successful against multiple supported (but not massed) batteries at Perryville, Murfreesboro, and Chickamauga.

Not that it did them much good in 3 out of 4 of those battles…

Thanks guys. The background for the question is for larger scale ACW games, i.e. where an infantry unit is usually the brigade and where an artillery unit is usually at least 12 guns. It seems to me that in almost rules at this scale, artillery units don't seem to have as much punch as they should have. Usually easy to tweak in most cases, but I was just pondering the larger question.

Cheers,

Christopher

I suppose the other side of this question is how often artillery was massed together and in what position and circumstances.

There were 32 guns deployed along Wheatfield Road at the start of the attack on the Peach Orchard but as they were covering for a lack of infantry in the area and were attacked from front and flank, they ended up being fragmented and forced to retire.

In fact the whole of that action showed how hard it was for batteries to stop determined infantry. They caused a lot of Confederate casualties but they needed a number of fall back positions and reinforcement from the rear before they were able to establish a supported gun line and stop the attack.

At Brandy Station in 1863, the 6th Pennsylvania and 6th U.S. Cavalries charged the center of the line of the Confederate horse artillery(16 guns) supported by two Confederate cavalry brigades. The Federals suffered high casualties even though they got in among the Rebel guns, before retreating. They accomplished little.

To modern historians, the charge looks like idiocy. Oddly, there is not one Union criticism of the incident.

Later in the same battle, the 1st Maine Cavalry charged those same guns after the Confederates deployed on Fleetwood Hill.
Apparently losses on both sides were minimal.

The Confederates broke two gun lines at Chickamauga. One on Sept. 19th at Brotherton Field. The line had haphazard infantry support at best, and was flanked from the south.

link

The one on the 20th was in Dyer Field. It had very little infantry support, and it to fell because of a flanking attack.

link

A dozen guns isn't 'massed' artillery, particularly if it is a wargames model representing a couple of batteries which irl may well be somewhat dispersed.

Such a small concentration, if unsupported, can be outflanked and overrun.

Massed artillery were the sorts of concentrations seen in the FPW, several batteries grouped together, 50, 60 70+ guns. Completely devastating and unassailable, particularly as they were breechloaders. Individual batteries were still overrun on occasion though.

Hmm, is not the Battle of Gaine's Mill one massive successful charge against a supported gun line? Mnay of those compilers of lists of largest infantry assaults in the ACW treat it as such.

Within the context of tabletop play, it is common to represent about a dozen guns with a unit about 150 yards wide – or slightly less than regulation deployment distance – which is what I meant by "massed", and why I didn't refer to non-comparanda such as FPW grand batteries or something of the sort. Usually, these artillery units are about half the width of infantry units, so that two artillery units representing two dozen guns on a dense frontage isn't an unusual thing to see on the tabletop in larger battles. As remarked above, questioning the "how and why" they got there in that fashion is one part of the equation, but what I'm looking at myself right now is their simple combat effectiveness. Outflanking the gun line is always a great idea, of course, but often on the tabletop a frontal assault is a good option "by the rules" – which is what had me scratching my head as I delve into the larger ACW battles.

Cheers,

Christopher

Possibly a useful rule to simulate infantry support would be that batteries in "contiguous contact" (ie either directly or via other batteries) with infantry are significantly tougher prospects to charge than unsupported batteries.

(I suppose the point being that a 300-500 yard line of 24 unsupported guns might actually be a *relatively* easy proposition; bloody, but doable. The same line seriously supported by infantry would be nigh impregnable.)

is not the Battle of Gaine's Mill one massive successful charge against a supported gun line?

More like a series of piece-meal attacks that were driven off and finally one that broke through. Confederate losses were extremely heavy and only partially offset by large numbers of Union prisoners taken after the line broke.

Another case: McGilvery's gun line (18 guns?) on the second day at Gettysburg. It was unsupported, as the Union infantry was running away. It was created to delay the Confederates. It did do that but was driven off, losing some guns.

McGilery's actions are well worth reading in detail to appreciate the success and failure of artillery v infantry be it supported, unsupported or partially supported.

The overall action, first with the III Corps and then in plugging the Line after it disintegrated, covers pretty much every permutation of activity short of the 30 – 40 battery in carefully prepared positions with full infantry support scenario.

Gottfried's "The Artillery of Gettysburg" gives a very readable account of the mayhem and of the overall problems faced by the artillery on both sides. Including the Confederates having to leave guns in the rear for lack of sound positions and the major disadvantage they faced in having so many howitzers, when faced by Union batteries in good positions that out ranged them.

Thanks for the suggestion – that sounds like a great book on the topic.

Would you count the charge up Missionary Ridge at the Battle of Chattanooga, the Battle Above the Clouds?

The Battle Above the Clouds was Hooker's assault on Lookout Mountain, not the Army of the Cumberland's assault on Missionary Ridge.

Longstreet's attack on Sickles' 3rd Corps salient, 2 July '63, included some assaults on unsupported batteries -- mostly successful.

Its also worth thinking about your definition of success. Unsupported batteries often would pull out of a position before being overrun. So, if you take the position, but not the guns, is it a successful charge? But, even leaving the semantics out, I think being supported was key.

BY

How about the Confederate charge against the open knob (sometimes called the bald knob) at the Battle of Perryville? Parson's guns were supported, but the Union infantry were green and barely trained.

The Confederates took the hill but the guns were dragged away by hand by Union troops.

Were guns "massed" on Malvern Hill? They supposedly did quite a number on the poorly coordinated attacks by the Rebs.

At Malvern Hill the "massed" gunline was 28 guns in line with batteries relieving the forward ones at intervals.

Also at Stones River the Union massed over 40 guns to break up Breckinridges attack on January 2nd. The Confederates suffered over 1500 casualties making the assault and never came close.

Kim

The Confederates took the hill but the guns were dragged away by hand by Union troops

One of the interesting things I noticed in Gottfried's "The Artillery of Gettysburg" book I mentioned above was, that most of the time, it appeared relativity easy to get guns away even in the face of a determined attack. Only exceptions to this, unsurprisingly, were where horse teams had been shot down, generally by opposing artillery, beforehand.

There seems an excepted point where battery commanders decided to just get the hell out of it. A quote from Gibbon's "The Artillerist Manual" the standard pre war text book advised.

"Artillery cannot defend itself when hard pressed and should always be sustained by infantry."