"Did Soult betray Napoleon at Waterloo?" Topic

Marshal Soult was renown for his strategic and tactical skills and experience as a Chief of Staff including exposure to the imcomparable Bertier. Soult was influential in all these mishaps: Vandamme gets orders a day late and moves only on June 15: De Erlon's Corps would have been decisive on June 16 but marches in circles, for two days the Chief of Staff has no idea where over a third of his army or the Prussians are, no orders are given to artillery and infantry to support Ney's cavalry attack, Lobau would have blocked the Prussians had VI Corps defended the Bois de Paris Road instead of Plancenoit,and the French don't know that Hougoumont the topography of Mt. St. Jean nor how Wellington is deployed.

England cheered Soult at Wellington's funeral, I think they should rename London's Waterloo Station after Nicholas Soult.

that's soult on the wound.

Soult had a knack for keeping his brioche buttered, no matter who was in charge of the butter. He was just a smooth operator, unlike many of the Marshals, who were too flamboyant, too stubborn, or too dense to play politics.

And of course... the British love a worthy foe.

I am not that familiar with Soult and his career. But I have seen an awful lot of incompetence and "having a bad day" blamed on treason. Maybe Napoleon committed treason too, or did he just have a bad day?

Did Soult have experience as Chief of Staff (Insert Dave Hollins 'scribe' testimony here!)? I'm not up on all the biographies but pretty much everything I read said he wasn't up to the job at Waterloo. Of course, that could just be propaganda from Napoleon apologists.

D'Erlons wandering can't be fully attributable to Soult I don't think (except maybe through ultimate responsibility) since he did receive conflicting orders and reports about where he was most needed.

As for VI Corps and Plancenoit, I've seen that before and, well, the French really didn't know where the Prussians were at first and were hoping against hope for Grouchy to take care of them. VI Corps (as it turned out) was needed more for the Anglo-Allied force than to take on the Prussians (who really shouldn't have been there in the first place)

There's enough blame to share for everyone at Waterloo. Pick your snafu, and it seemed to occur.

Soult was a poor chief-of-staff, but that fairly obvious fact reflects as badly on Napoleon as it does on Soult - Napoleon chose him. The orders to Grouchy were poorly-worded and delivered late. Grouchy could have exercised a little intelligence and personal initiative (though one could certainly argue that fostering his subordinates' initiative was not in Napoleon's interest). Napoleon's judgment on 17 and 18 June was cloudy and disorganized - the list goes on and on.

I don't believe Soult committed treason at Waterloo. Soult was badly used, Grouchy was promoted over his head, and Napoleon was well past his prime. What Napoleon might have given had Suchet been commanding the "pursuit column" following the Prussians, and Grouchy left defending the Alps.

I don't think Soult committed treason, either. He was not experienced as a chief-of-staff so much as he was an independent field commander (in Spain). And certainly Nap had a style all his own that would take some learning. Soult had what, a couple of weeks? Certainly he would have been better used as a field commander against Wellington, but Nap had to keep him close by because he didn't trust him. Hence, chief-of-staff. And I'm not sure who else was really available for the job at the time.

Whoever pushed Berthier out of that window did as much to defeat Napoleon as Wellingont or Blucher.

Thank you for your comments, I especially enjoyed the humor. According to Duffy, Soult was exceptional at the non battle manuver and his quarrel with Ney overrode his concern for good advice. Give me Davout or Suchet or I'll have to go with Wellington and Blucher.

Berthier re-worded, translated, corrected, spelled out and most importantly, understood clearly the orders that Napoleon would issue. Working as someone's chief of staff for that long, Berthier obviously could read what Napoleon's wishes were, and Napoleon knew that Berthier would see what he was meaning to do. Soult, trained under Berthier or not, obviously lacked this kind of rapport. His actions alone are not to blame, and it is rather unlikely for him to have been treasonous. He didn't exactly jump into bed with the Bourbons in 1815.

And as MDriessen alludes to, if Davout (even Suchet) had been in command of the Armee du Nord, Waterloo would have ended up much differently, if occurring at all. They both grasped a strategic element that Ney, for all his bravery, never could.

We can hypothesise all we want..so I will.
If Napoleon had had the same commanders he had at Austerlitz, Eylau or Wagram then Wellington and Blucher would have been defeated in detail and chased back to Brussels.
Still that wasn't to be and Europe is the place it is. Metternich has a lot to answer for!!

There is always a tendency to shout "treason" as the intent is to shift the blame. Soult himself was a brave and able leader of men - he was badly wounded outside Genoa in 1800.

However, the "fault" actually arises from the mythology. There are the usual claims about how Napoleon wrote "mission-orientated orders" and how the Marshals were so clever that they carried them out with an independence of command. Then into the wargames rules comes "march to guns". There is poor old Grouchy getting the blame for not doing that.

Trouble is, it is a lot of nonsense. “In my campaigns Berthier was always to be found in my carriage. During the journey I used to study plans of the situation and the reports sent in, sketch out my plans for battle from them, and arrange the necessary moves. Berthier would watch me at work, and at the first stopping-place or rest, whether it was day or night, he made out the orders and arrangements with a method and exactness that was truly admirable … That was Berthier's special merit” said Napoleon. Berthier was a simple scribe and sometime bad logistics officer - and no-one pushed him out of the window, not least as it would have been part of a larger campaign.

Soult was a different man all together. He had led troops in combat and certainly played a key part at Austerlitz. He may well have felt that he was something more than a glorified scribe. However, the problem is systematic. Napoleon would whizz out his orders, they would be split up and no-one would know the operational concept behind them. With heir detailed orders, off they would go. If it worked, bingo, N is brillaint; if they failed, it was down to their incompetence and so we have the scapegoating - Bernadotte for Jena and Eylau, Dupont for Baylen and Grouchy for Waterloo. They could not (unlike Ott at Marengo) "march to guns" because they had been told to do something different.

Napoleon's plan for the Waterloo was a good one, but when it came to the battle, the old tactics failed. d'Erlon was a commander in the centre at Jemappes in 1792, when they opened with a barrage (delayed by bad weather in 1815!) followed by a massive column assault taking no account of casualties. Trouble was, it relied on heavily superior numbers, which N did not have that day.

In many ways the failure of the French command generally in the Waterloo campaign (of which Soult has his fair share) derives from the speed by which the Armee du Nord in 1815 was formed. Roles were left undefined and the upper command team never had time to gel. Both Ney and Grouchy were promoted at the last minute and did not have a clear grasp of what Napoleon's intentions were. Compare this to the Prussian army in 1815 which contained essentially the same team as it was present the 1813-14 campaigns. Even the Anglo-Dutch team seemed to have better cohesion than the French.

Beyond Soult's obviously poor performance as Chief-of-staff is the fact that Berthier's staff system had been abolished by the Bourbons as an economy measure. During Napoleon's crash mobilization it had not been re-created. So there was no organization that routinely sent multiple copies of orders and kept receipts for orders delivered and such. On this bureaucracy was built the operational performance of the Grand Armee. And without it the French army stumbled around during the Waterloo campaign like a powerful cripple.

Another side of Soult was his 'eye' for art. A recent major exhibition of Spanish paintings that influenced French artists was held at the Metropolitan Musuem of Art in New York City. A very large portion of the paintings were from Soult's collection. I presume most of these paintings were 'liberated'. In a time of peace he might have made a reknowned museum curator. Of course then he would have had to pay for the artwork.

I don't think Soult was treasonous, but certainly his heart wasn't in it. Napoleon may have had Soult along to keep his eye on him.

"So there was no organization that routinely sent multiple copies of orders". This existed in the Austrian army from 1757, but only existed in Napoleon's to he extent that multiple copies of parts of the orders were sent. Ney and Grouchy only "didn't know" the conept as little as earlier commanders - see Jena for example.

If Soult is responsible for treason at Waterloo then McClellan is guilty of same at Antietam. I am not sure battlefield performance can make a good case for treason. Usually treason aims to win without a battle. See the history on Benadict Arnold and his treason as compared to these guys.

As Dave said, vagueness of operational and battle plans was not uncommon with Napoleon. He said it better than I did, but it was certainly Berthier's "talent" to take what were often vague and incomplete orders, and tailor them to the needs of the Grande Armee. Couple that with a group of senior commanders that were often afraid or incapable of taking the initiative, and often sought to usurup one another, and you had a system that would inevitably exhibit breakdowns, as seen at Ligny/Quatre Bras and Waterloo. It was incredible that the Grande Armee's track record was as impressive as it was, and a major tribute to Berthier's role in it.

Auerstadt could have been a disaster if it was anyone but Davout in command (I would still say that Bernadotte should bear the brunt of responsibility for not being there, even considering poor communication). He was one of the few marshals, along with probably Suchet, Massena, St. Cyr and sometimes Soult, that could conceive and implement strategic operations without the guiding arm of the Emperor. In fact, the hesitancy and timidity of Napoleon's commanders overall was as much a cause of many of the mess-ups listed as orders/communications were. Many of them flat out were afraid to make the big decision without Napoleon's approval.

But of course, treason is a subjective term, especially when it comes to Arnold. I'm sure the British histories regard him as a patriot and loyalist...

Sometimes, it isn't anyones fault. Wellington was just a better General who was rolling 6's that day.

Arnold, never incompetent, sold out his country for coin and sex. This isn't even in the same class as an overwealmed General. I think that even the British regard him as a traitor.

The comparison of Waterloo with Jena is only half true. Perhaps the biggest difference was that Napoleon, instead of fighting against Brunswick and Hohenlohe, was up against two of the best Allied commanders of the Napoleonic period, Wellington and Bluecher.

Soult briefly understudied Berthier in 1813. He was probably chosen as chief of staff for Nord because Napoleon needed a tough, senior marshal in that position. He was an able staff officer, but was not energetic and thorough enough for the position assigned to him. Also, the worst fault was the staff he assembled was in no way like the staff Berthier had organized and led.

Berthier has been given short-shrift from too many authors and historians, and too much of that has been taken from Jomini's 'malice.' Jomini was a failed staff officer, was a terrible chief of staff to Ney (especially in 1813) as well as a deserter and a renegade. Additionally, too much of his written history is unreliable. There is an excellent sketch of Jomini in The Superstrategists by John Elting.

Berthier was the premier chief of staff of his day. He was the organizer and trainer of the staff that developed into the Grand Quartier-General Imperiale. His was the first general staff organized into definite staff sections, and he defined what a chief of staff was supposed to be. Much of his work in this area still survives, and he was the first great chief of staff in military history. Further, no other staff organization of the period, of any army, operated as efficiently, or served its commander better, than Berthier's. His organization was used not only at army level, but at corps and division, albeit smaller.

Much staff work is office work, and in many ways Berthier was Napoleon's collaborator. Napoleon certainly couldn't do without him, as he himself stated after Waterloo.

Berthier was also with Napoleon and the Grande Armee's advance guard on campaign, and Berthier demonstrated his gallantry in action on more than one occasion. It was he that coordinated the final tactical movements at Friedland in 1807. He planned and executed the movement of the Army of the Reserve over the Alps in 1800. The planning for the movement of the Grande Armee from the channel into Germany in 1805 and the unprecedented concentration for the invasion of Russian in 1812 was his doing. He was content to work in Napoleon's shadow and didn't put himself forward. He was also unquestionably the senior marshal and was obeyed by all of them on campaign.

The errors at the beginning of the campaign of 1809 were Napoleon's fault, because he was trying to command from Paris by letter and telegraph, and Berthier was never the commander of the Army of Germany-a point that is usually overlooked.

I have read some of the orders and correspondence for Jena and cannot agree with the assessment that Napoleon didn't inform his corps commanders what was going on. I believe that to be an incorrect assessment.

Ah, yes, the terribly well organsied Berthier - "He planned and executed the movement of the Army of the Reserve over the Alps in 1800." That would explain why theyw ere on half rations within a fe wdays of crossing the Alps then?

The man was a bureaucrat and had what the Austrians call a "Beamte" mentality, namely the small-mindedness of a minor government official. Yes, that is fine for pushing little bits of paper around - bit like our former Prime Minister John Major. If you bother to read Montarras on the subject of Berthier, you will find he makes the correct point. France had no permanent staff corps from 1790 to 1816. Young men, mostly unwanted elsewhere, were transfered to the staff. They did not have a clue what to do and so they needed a handbook. That is all Berthier's fabled little book is - it does not address what modern staffs or the then Austrian staff (with its permanent staff) do/did - ops, planning, intelligence and the like. Napoleon showed up and wrote to Paris saying it would be good if everyone adopted this manual. Well, yes, every company has a manual of procedures, but it is not related to making the company product profitably. Then when N took power in 1799, he confirmed it and Thoiebault wrote an updated version.

The claims made about Berthier and his manuals are made by the kind of people, who have not actually looked at its contents nor considered why it was written. When N held his first Council of War after Eckmuhl, Berthier said precisely nothing. Sulkowski's memoirs are also illuminating as he notes Bertheir knew nothing about the spying sytem. He was just a desk clerk.

Did anyone read biography of Marshal Soult by Sir Peter Harman?

Soult matriculated to be a chief of staff under Berthier in the 1813 Spring campaign. Davout could not be spared from Paris for he was one of the few Napoleon could trust.

The play was to make Jourdan CoS. He had rallied to Napoleon in 15. I think he was the senior marshal as he had been promoted to general of division before the others. He had extensive experience as CoS to Joseph and while Napoleon blamed him he never had command and was regularly ignored by the other marshals.

As for Soult, there was no treason but his lazy disposition did not help him as Napoleon's CoS. On the other hand, under Napoleon's command, as a oorps commander, he had always performed competently.

Good gaming.

Bob Coggins

Well, Napoleon kept Berthier as his cheif of staff for many years,and as he was no dummy,Im going to have to go with the opionion that he must have been pretty good at it.As for Soult commiting treason at Waterloo ,he could have undermined the campaign at anytime so why would he have waited till then to do it? He wasn't welcomed back by the Bourbons with open arms so what would be his motive?

Perhaps someone can remember Berthier's understudy, who, I once read, petitioned for the Chief of Staff job in 1815. He knew Berthier's "system," whatever that was. Good, bad, or ugly, it would have been a more efficient move than shoving Soult into the job and starting from scratch.

Try to imagine what Soult would have done as CO of the I Corps on June 16. "Lessee, I got one order from Napoleon, and a counter order from Ney. Which one to obey?"

It was D'Erlon's blunder to counter an Imperial order. He should have proceded to the Prussian rear, from which the Prussians would never have recovered.

For that matter, I have never understood why Ney didn't send cavalry around the Bois de Boissu to scout enemy strength on the night of 15 June. For that matter, Reille, as II corps comander, could have sent his corps cavalry on that mission without violating the chain of command.

All this is my opinion, and it seems to me that Napoleon was kind of on and off through the entire campaign. I have cited the critical blunders I believe decided the campaign, and Soult was responsible for none of them.

Regards,

Bill

I forgot to mention Napoleon's other personel error.

If he was going to wait until the last moment to employ Ney, he should have kept him in hand for tactical use to organize and lead multi-division assaults and such, just as Napoleon had engaged other "spare" generals in the past.

Just my opinion, but with the lack of faith, Napoleon should not have entrusted Ney with an independent wing command.

Berthier was a glorified secretary but he made the trains run on time. Whereas Soult sent one message Berthier sent three.

Ney carried out his orders by engaging Wellington and attempting to capture Quatre Bras. D'Erlon was under the command of Ney and thus followed Ney's order. In the day, Napoleon would have gone over to D'Erlon. Berthier would have sent multiple legible orders and I think so too would have Jourdan.

Soult was a senior marshal and Napoleon would not have subordinated him to Ney. Were he assigned a combat command it would most likely have been as a wing commander. Ney could have commanded the guard. That would have made him subordinate to Napoleon.

The best move would have been to promote Kellermann rather than Grouchy. But given his history with Napoleon that was not going to happen.

Good gaming.

Bob Coggins

Strongly disagree, with respect.

No way does Napoleon leave the battlefield to retrieve an army corps. Napoleon's order should always supercede that of a Marshal, wing command or not. D'Erlon should have been fired on June 17.

On the 15th, Ney knew that Wellington had troops at Quatre Bras, yet made no attempt to discover the strength of those forces. Considering that his attack did not go in until noon the next day, observe how many hours he had to accomplish this simple expedient.

I agree, however, that Berthier or Jordan would have made a better job of it. In the event, however, Napoleon's ADC who interupted D'Erlon and then went on to inform Ney, never gave the full extent of the message from Napoleon. He was so put off by Ney's shrieking rant to hand him the message. So it may have made little difference what was written on the order by Soult. Berthier or a better "clerk" might have remedied that with multiple copies of the orders.

Napoleon doesn't seem to have had a clear idea of what was going on at Quatre Bras. (And that Ney was counting on the I Corps for the accomplishment of his mission.) Was that not Ney's fault for not keeping him informed?

I have to agree, with hindsight, that Ney would have been better suited to command of the Guard. But then who, among those present with the Army of the North, would have been better to command at Quatre Bras? Reille? Lefebre-Desnouettes? D'Erlon? Drouot?

The wing commander would have to be a marshal. With Jourdan CoS, Soult would have been free to be a wing commander. While he had his shortcommings he did not have a history of losing track of formations and most likely would have brought D'Erlon to Quatre Bras in a timely fashion.

In the event, Napoleon could have ridden 2 miles to the northeast in under 20 minutes while not losing sight of the battlefield. Afterall the men in the III corps easily saw D'Erlon.

The battle was developing nicely as Blucher and Gneisenau fed more and more units into the French artillery grinder in a desperate attempt to hold the Ligny and St.Armand. D'Erlon's appearance threw a fright into the French causing a slackening of their attacks, buying the Prussians time till night.

Whatever Ney's problems on the 16th with 2 infantry and 1 cavalry corps plus he had no excuae for not putting in an attack at first light on the 17th even though the ill Napoleon did not immediately come to Quatre Bras. Even Grouchy had the understanding to do so at Wavre on the 19th.

Sometimes I get carried away.

Good gaming.

Bob Coggins

>"The wing commander would have to be a marshal."<

During the ACW Abe Lincoln complained about the capture of a general and some horses. He said he could MAKE generals but he had to BUY horses.

My point being that Napoleon could make ANYONE a marshal, as he did Grouchy, for instance.

Bob,

'…Berthier remains the outstanding chief of staff of modern and contemporary times, a professional of the very first order, a highly talented executive, and a powerful worker, endowed with an exceptional sense for grasping the essentials in any given situation.'-Charles Raeuber

To state that Berthier was 'a glorified secretary' is incorrect. That impression has been left by Jomini, who hated him (and who was himself a failed corps chief of staff and an incompetent military governor) and careless English-speaking authors who have done little or no research on Berthier and what he actually did.

It was Berthier who planned and executed the movement of the Army of the Reserve across the Alps in 1800, moved the Grande Armee from the Channel to Germany in 1805, and planned the unprecedented concentration for the invasion of Russia in 1812. Along the way he established the first modern general staff and set the standard for modern staff organization and planning. The Prussians took their cue from him and his staff. Lastly, Napoleon himself stated that if Berthier had been at Waterloo he would have won and he was the one indispensable marshal among the twenty-six, and the one that was obeyed by all, as he was chief of staff and Major General of the Grande Armee.

And as a footnote, he was also Minister of War from 1800-1807. He also managed to pick up a wound or two on the way.

Sincerely,
Kevin

But what has he done for us lately?

Set a good example of what a chief of staff is supposed to be. And if you look in current US military literature for the definition of a chief of staff at the division level and higher, you might as well post Berthier's picture next to the definition.

Sincerely,
K

Bob,

Why promote Kellermann instead of Grouchy? Grouchy fully deserved his promotion to marshal (and I'm not saying that Kellermann didn't)? His record certainly proved he rated it and he possessed rare skill as a cavalry corps commander.

Sincerely,
Kevin