"How would you rate the 11th Corps?" Topic

Just finished reading Ralph Peters "Cain at Gettysburg" and he makes the point that most of the 11th Corps failings are due to Howards poor leadership then the men's fighting ability. Kind of always agreed with that, felt the men always got a bad rap.

So would you rate them as trained with the leaders as poor, or rate the men as green with the leaders as avg.?

Men trained and leaders poor.

From memory, the 11th corps was hit on the flank, and their commanders failed to adjust. Men poorly lead will usually fail.

The 11th Corps gets a bad, undeserved rap. At Chancellorsville, they were left in a bad position by Hooker. Howard took the precaution of having a couple brigades refuse the open flank, but I doubt the entire corps could have stopped Jackson. The corp fought very well at Gettysburg, stopping Ewell with only 2 divisions. They fell back only after being outflanked again by Early's corps. The XI Corps held against 2 enemy corps for as long as the I Corps held against just 1.

A few of the regiments in the XI were veteran, having punched Stonewall in the nose at McDowell, and seeing service at Second Bull Run. I would say any regiment that served actively as early as McDowell should be veteran, the others trained, and leaders will vary. See this series of videos before pigeon-holing the XI Corps (who went on to fight very well in the west).

link

Thanks for the link Darryl. I loved this quote…

"Ezra Warner, in Generals in Blue, says of Howard: "His … career must constitute one of the great paradoxes of American military history: no officer entrusted with the field direction of troops has ever equaled Howard's record for surviving so many tactical errors of judgment and disregard of orders, emerging later not only with increased rank, but on one occasion with the thanks of Congress." "

After Gettysburg, when the 11th and 12th corps were transferred to Sherman's western army, they fought extremely well.

Howard's career path is an extremely interesting one …very much like Major-General John H. Forney, CSA a man of no discernible military talent, roundly disliked my superiors and subordinates alike and yet consistently promoted for no reason I have ever been able to fathom?

Sorry, at Chancellorsville, Howard did not take "the precaution of having a couple brigades refuse the open flank". Only two regiments of Von Gilsa's brigade, the 54th New York and 153rd Pennsylvania were refused and facing west, and I'm not sure Howard had anything to do with their orientation. I personally believe the evidence showed Howard ignored multiple warnings about the Confederates moving past his flank, he initiated minimal precautions, and did not oversee that his subordinates did either. There were no picket posts on the far right flank out past Von Gilsa's brigade. Nobody was patrolling the Orange Turnpike. I blame Howard far more than Hooker.

I don't think Howard was "roundly disliked my superiors and subordinates alike." Sherman, Grant, and Thomas certainly got along with him. In the west, while he was criticized by his subordinates for Pickett's Mill, I don't think he was thought of as a terrible officer by all. Some certainly, there's no mistaking that (just ask Capt. George Lewis of the 124th Ohio).

The reason I think Howard did so well is that he was relatively easy to get along with on a personal level. He followed orders, was a competent administrator, and didn't get into feuds. I think Sherman and Grant valued a harmonious command relationship more than tactical brilliance, or at the very least, recognized its value in running a military organization. Pickett's Mill excepted, and maybe Stanley's division being surprised on the flank at Resaca, Howard and the Fourth Corps did fairly well during the Atlanta Campaign. Kennesaw Mountain can't be blamed on him. He did all he could reasonably have done given the circumstances. I think he even got along well with Meade, at least I've never read anything differently, so I think Hooker is the only superior officer he didn't get along with.

The Twelfth Corps gets a bad rap and image being linked with the Eleventh Corps for their move out west. Of course the men of the Twelfth Corps fought well after going west. They always fought well in the east as well. Antietam, Cancelorsville, Gettysburg. Sorry, not to up on how they were organized in the Valley and 2nd Bull Run. The point being, they were never overrun or stampeded, at least not once they became organized as a corps, and should never be held to a lesser light than any other corps. In fact, the majority of the new Twentieth Corps was made from the two divisions of the Twelfth Corps, a few individual regiments of the Eleventh Corps sprinkled in, and a new division from the old Army of the Cumberland's Reserve Corps. So most of the Twentieth Corps was the majority of the old Twelfth Corps anyway.

Looking at Howard's ordinary record (less bad than sometimes presented) does make one understand the end of Hooker's army career – "THAT guy? Promoted over ME?!"

I will perhaps court controversy (perhaps not), but even with the significant overcaution of Chancellorsville marring his record, Hooker was consistently a more enterprising and competent commander than Howard.

(But a far worse man…)

I'm pretty sure one of the main reasons Sherman gave Howard the Army of the Tennessee was that it would provoke Hooker to resign.

As for your original question: The troops were as good as most. Leadership was poor. Not just Howard, but some of the division and brigade commanders as well. At Gettysburg, they were put in a very weak position, out in the middle of nowhere. They were not, however, hit by two Confederate corps, just two large divisions -- still probably about 2-1 odds against them.

Consider what the soldiers of the AOP thought of the 11th Corp.

An often quoted remark from common soldiers in the other Corps of the Army of the Potomac was:

"They may have fought mit Sigel, but in the Army of the Potomac they fought like S#!T".

I think that pretty much sums up their performance in battle.

KIm

OCEdwards, I agree with you. Hooker has probably the best corps commander in Sherman's army group, with the possible exception of John Logan. I think it was unrealistic of him to think he would ever get another department/army level command again, regardless of his seniority.

I totally agree – good troops, but poor command

Howard was apparently quite a decent fellow although entirely unsuited to high command – and he was one of the few Civil War generals to have a university named after him!

Cleburne 1863 – I largely agree (and yeah, Logan was very good – Sherman benefited from very good commanders in '64 and '65). I'd point out the example of Burnside, of course, who maybe frustrated Washington less than Hooker but nonetheless went through a similar process to him, and ended up gaining Departmental command again. Indeed, he only finally ended up getting turfed due to Grant/Meade managing the Crater set-up poorly.

(Also consider the example of Pope, who ended up being given reasonably volatile Indian departments to manage after arguably the most humiliating defeat the AOP ever received.)

Yes, but even though there was some underhandedness in outing Burnside from the AotP, I don't think it was nearly the acrimonious firing of Hooker. The same for Pope or Rosecrans, who each eventually received another departmental command. And I think the key is Pope, Rosecrans, and Burnside didn't rub too many people the wrong way. Well perhaps Rosecrans with Grant.

Thanks for the link!

However cordial their personal relationship, I wonder how much Meade trusted Howard as a commander? At Gettysburg Hancock was sent forward to take over after Meade learned of the death of Reynolds'?

Hooker commanded the Northern Department after resigning his command of the 20th Corps. Sherman complained that he was always trying to get off on his own, out from under Thomas, and pull seniority on McPherson and Schofield. In short, he was not a team player.

At Gettysburg, Meade didn't know Howard well, so didn't know if he was up to commanding a multi-corps wing. (And what he did know was probably not favorable, at that point.) He did know and trust Hancock. I believe Meade later said of Howard, He always votes to attack, or something like that.

According to "The Last Invasion", Meade was one of the McClellan faction and Howard was one of the more radical faction and an abolitionist to boot. Burnside was pro Little Mac, Hooker wasn't, etc.

I'm not that impressed by Hooker out west. He had his good days and he had his bad days. He froze up during the Chattanooga operations but got away with it, first because Longstreet was in a serious snit with Bragg and then at Lookout Mountain because Cheatham was on leave due to a snit with Bragg. Hooker faced the incompetent and cowardly "Mud Wall" Jackson.

He was roundly thumped at Ringgold Gap but then Cleburne did that to people who got near him. Sherman could testify to that.

After one dust-up north of Atlanta Hooker reported he had held off three Confederate corps, which would mean the entire enemy army had attacked him. Sherman was irate and began looking for ways to can Hooker. Promoting Howard over him after McPherson's death was the way.

Howard screwed up more than once. But he did decide to make a stand on Cemetery Hill on July 1 and managed to motivate beaten troops to dig in. Once he got out west he seems to have been a competent corps commander and good enough in charge of McPherson's army. Perhaps he learned form his mistakes.

Going back to the XI Corps, on July 1 some of the troops didn't fight all that hard. I think they still had the rout at Chancellorsville on their minds.

It's called Luck.

War's full of it, good and bad.

When the crap hits the fan you have no choice of what you take in the face.

Vtsaogames – you don't mean Mudwall Jackson, you mean J.K. Jackson (Mudwall certainly wasn't cowardly, though his combat record is mixed enough to make you doubt his competence).

"After one dust-up north of Atlanta Hooker reported he had held off three Confederate corps, which would mean the entire enemy army had attacked him."

Actually, Hooker WAS technically correct. This happened in the line at Kennesaw during the battle of Kolb's Farm. His northernmost division was opposite Cheatham's Division of Hardee's Corps. He was attacked by two divisions of Hood's Corps, and his flank (and Schofield's) was being patrolled by Red Jackson's Cavalry Division, which was part of Polk (Loring's) Army of Mississippi. Now, I'm not certain if Hooker said he had held off three Confederate corps, or was merely facing them. Still, he was, in fact, in contact with elements of all three Confederate corps, though admittedly, not strictly their infantry components.

I have always wondered about the so called German units in the 11th Corps. Were there really communication problems as a result of the language or were these over exaggerated? I think when the 11th and 12th Corps went west, the mixing of the two Corps did a lot to stiffen the old 11th Corps units with their much more successful 12th Corps comrades. By the time Howard was appointed to command the Army of the Tennessee, the troops were so experienced, that they pretty much knew what to do by themselves to the point where Howard couldn't relly mess things up even if he tried. That and Sherman usually decided where the armies would go and when, so Howard was pretty much a figurehead by that time.

OCEdwards, perhaps there were two called Mudwall. The senior brigadier in Cheatham's division was called this by his men. He spent the battle of Lookout Mountain keeping the mountain between him and the nearest Union troops. So said Cozzens or Sword (re-read both recently, can't recall which one called him that).

Well, if you weren't sure of a Confederate general's name, just call him Jackson or Walker and you'd have an excellent chance of being right.

Or Lee or Anderson.

Surely few Corps on either side, in any theatre had such a run of misfortune as 11th corps? from its first commander Sigel to being on the open flank of the Army of the Potomac in two consecutive battles? Its hard not to feel sympathy for the men in the ranks?

I believe that the 11th got a bad rap because of the perceived identity of the boys being Germans( , a lot of them at least), and the natural American xenophobic tendencies to mistrust foreign influences. Howard was no genius, but he did the best he could given his abilities. Maybe a classic example of promoted over his threshold of talent. They did fight well at Gettysburg, given the difficult circumstances. I had relatives in the 11th corp and in the 9th ohio german regiment. So I may be biased. The fault does not lie with the boys in the ranks, but in the situations and just plain bad-ass luck. That and the corp commander was probably a good division commander, but his abilities may have been eclipsed by his increased responsibility. But true, he could get along with just about anyone and was a good decent man, but he was no Reynolds.

As for Meade and Howard: after Gettysburg Meade recommended breaking up the 11th Corps, sending one division to the 2nd Corps and one to the 12th Corps, and leaving one an independent division to guard his line of supply -- the railroad from Alexandria. And if this was done, to put Howard in command of the 2nd Corps (since Hancock was out with the wound he received at Gettysburg). So Meade evidently thought highly enough of Howard to recommend him to replace Hancock -- although he had already asked for the promotion of Warren to major general and command of the 2nd Corps. The latter is what he got, with Warren moving to the 5th Corps after Hancock returned. One division of the 11th Corps was sent to North Carolina and joined the 18th Corps, and the other two went with Hooker to Chattanooga after Chickamauga.

taken as a single entity, 11th corps was tainted by the reverses at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg …no matter how it might have performed in the campaign of 1864 had it remained with the AOP? By removing the 11th corps itself did it therefore wipe out any stain on the honour of the men who went on to serve admirably in 20th corps?

Maybe it wouldn't have changed matters much in the big picture but does anyone feel that Barlow had some responsibility for this debacle. On the other hand he didn't seem to have too much good to say about his men, when it was all over.
Thanks, John Miller

RE: Chancellorsville:

The Howard papers are ensconced and available to peruse at Bowdoin College, in Brunswick, Maine.

In them are orders Howard received from Hooker telling him to ignore the rumours of CS troops moving towards the right flank of the Army. Hooker insisted that the confederates were retreating, and thus Howard was not to move his corps from their assigned positions.

Howard, a Mainer, was assigned to oversee the Augusta, Maine, arsenal prior to the war. He realized early on the likelihood of conflict and so did his best to reorganize and streamline production of ammunition (both small arms and artillery) as well as the production of black powder at the 11 rolling mills in Maine. Those mills, and the Augusta arsenal, ended up producing just over 1/3 of ALL small arms ammunition used by the entire federal armies during the war. It is no small measure that Howard, for that alone, should be given thanks.

He was the original Colonel of the 3rd Maine infantry, and became a Brigade Commander just before 1st Bull Run. He was an extremely religious man, and it is to that end that the majority of his detractors aim their villainous bile.

Howard was the true hero of Gettysburg. He saw the terrain as he passed by Cemetery Ridge, and recognized it's value should the federal lines be forced back. He deployment of a portion of his corps there, with orders to dig in, provided the safe harbor for troops falling back from the 1st day's disaster. That Hancock stole the credit(s) is more to the shame of Hancock, then to the detriment of Howard.

People forget that Sherman, too, saw Howard's skills and put him into command of the Army of the Tennessee and Howard led them with skill and daring through the end of the Battle of Atlanta, and on through the March to the Sea, and up the coast to Bentonville, and then the grand march at Washington.

Howard fought the Nez Perce after the war, and had a distinguished career. His military service to the nation was rivaled by his work with the Freedman's Bureau postwar, and his founding of Howard University, one of our nation's great institutions of learning.

But to return to the 11th Corps at Chancellorsville, any blame for the disaster that befell 11th Corps may be laid directly to the feet of Hooker, and not to Howard.

"Hooker insisted that the confederates were retreating, and thus Howard was not to move his corps from their assigned positions."

Proof once again of the old adage that the devil always lurks in the details. Thanks for your highly interesting post, TK. I have learned something new – a great way to start any morning.

B

Howard had on-the-ground discretion. He didn't need to "move his corps" in the sense Hooker meant in order to refuse his flank. In history, matters are usually between two extremes (much as your slightly hyperbolic criticism of Hancock obscures his role in reorienting the line and deploying the retreating remnants of I and XI Corps). Howard did not have a good battle at Chancellorsville; neither did Hooker, unarguably. It's both, not one or the other.

Enjoyed reading your post TK, thank you.