"Napoleon - Options for Marshalls 1815??" Topic

I have read a few books recently that talk of the mistakes that Napoleon supposedly made in choosing various roles for his available Marshalls in 1815. e.g. that Davout was wasted as Minister of War, that Soult could never replace the incomparable Berthier as Chief of Staff, that Ney was unsuited to command the Left Wing and that Grouchy was overpromoted to be given the responsibility of the Right Wing.

But that does leave me to wonder, could Napoleon have done better with his choices? Given that many of his best Marshalls had died or retired?

So who SHOULD Napoleon have chosen for:
1) Minister of War
2) Chief of Staff
3) Commander Left Wing
4) Commander Right Wing

I doubt there is a "right" answer, even with benefit of perfect hindsight. But just a lighthearted bit of "what-if" fun……

My choice:
1) No clues….
2) Somebody from the old Berthier staff
3) Soult (the best tactician of Europe, acquainted with the English from Spain)
4) Davout

1) Davout was the right man to organise the training the new armies being raised.
2) CoS should be someone who knows how to do that job. ie NOT one of the Marshalate
3) Ney was probably fine for the job if N had communicated what he wanted correctly. It would be impossible to give him a lesser post anyway.
4) Soult would probably have been better as the other wing commander as someone able to both follow orders and capable of independent command.

I think he made a grave error leaving Davout in Paris. If you don't beat the Anglo-Prussian armies, it doesn't mattere a tinker's cuss how many recruitment/training/equipping plans you have.

Napoleon's selection was not just based on ability, it was based on who he trusted. He needed Davout in Paris as there was still plenty of Loyalist still in Paris. No one was going to over throw the government with Davout in command. I do agree that the Chief of Staff should have been given to a Genral who had plenty of experiense as a staff Officer, and Soult should have commander the left wing and Ney the right wing.

I have no idea, other than saying what a profound question and what superb answers so far. Sometimes this site is better than any textbook.

Fascinating, from the many who have no idea but are happy to learn.

I've long considered this very dilemma, and have commented on it in other similar posts through the years.

Davout was absolutely necessary in Paris, as has been stated above. His iron-fisted rule would not allow the Loyalists to stage another coup as they had in 1814.

An officer with previous staff experience would have been much better suited to the task of CoS. Surely Berthier had an understudy or two that would have been up to the task.

Grouchy was certainly over-promoted as has been discussed ad-nauseum in various threads. Perhaps by giving Soult command of the left wing, and retaining Grouchy as the Reserve Cavalry Commander, the fateful cavalry charges executed under Ney's orders would not have come to pass. Soult had intimate experience with Wellington and his tactics from the Peninsula and would likely have interpreted the Anglo-Allied withdrawal behind the ridge line as a tactical event, rather than a strategic withdrawal.
Ney would have likely excelled in command of the right wing, as he had always been at his best as a vangaurd/rearguard commander. In my opinion, he may have literally interpreted Napoleon's order to 'keep his sword in Blucher's back'. I think he certainly would have brought the Prussians to battle earlier in the day on the 18th, possibly even driving them towards Liege on the 17th. Any pursuit would have been better than Grouchy's lackluster effort, and Ney would have certainly marched towards the guns at the very least.

Of course, we are all acting as Monday morning Quarterbacks…. these are just my opinions, and subject to debate/scrutiny, etc. The point is, you have to make due with what you have at hand.

Aye Deadhead- that's why I asked the question. We can't solve or change anything but the discussion itself is enlightening enough.

Agree with Soult as left wing commander. Ney was no longer – if ever – able to run a major battle single-handed. I would use Ney as a figurehead, perhaps as commander of the Garde with Napoleon controlling him.

Grouchy gets the cavalry reserve. I have no idea who to use for the right wing. In the past, Napo would have given that job to Massena or Davout. Both were unavailable, as D was indeed necessary in Paris. Other candidates? – Marmont was clearly not interested or available. Suchet? MacDonald?

There was really not that much top level army command talent around.

The problem goes right down the line though. D'Erlon and Reille were not that effective either. Corps commands normally went to marshalls who had proven themselves. D'Erlon and Reille were simply not in that class and did not run their parts of the battle well either.

Hence the lack of effectiveness of l'Armee du Nord throughout the campaugn.

Ah the great old "what if" – as the 'Merkins say "couldah, shouldah, wouldah."

1) Minister of War

Davout is probably the right answer, trustworthy and a good administrator.

The Bonapartists love the idea of giving this to Suchet – pointing out his record in Spain.

2) Chief of Staff

Most of my library is in storage currently. Both Great Uncle Archie Becke and Kevin Kiley makes a great case of one of Berthiers staff and I can't recall his name.

3) Commander Left Wing

Soult, because he'd fought Wellington before according to one school of thought. The fact that Soult had failed to beat the British under Wellington does not seem to be taken into account by the Bonapartists.

4) Commander Right Wing

We he could have given it to Vandamme ;-)

If you can get Davout, then Davout. If Davout gets Paris then Suchet.

There was really not that much top level army command talent around.

Look by 1815 Napoleon was short of good commanders, or, more importantly, commanders he could trust. He's employing the staunch republican Brune, who he had refused to employ for all the the Imperial period.

Grouchy was a good cavalry commander and should have had the cavalry reserve.

By 1815 commanders were burn out, (Massena), chose to sit on their hands (st. Cyr), should not have been promoted in the first place (Oudanout).

Minister of War should have been Lazare Carnot, the organizer of victory. I can't find the actual quote but Napoleon once said his biggest mistake was not employing Carnot, who had fallen out of favor for a time after the Revolution. During the Hundred Days Carnot was Minister of the Interior but he would have done well as Minister of War.

All thing considered Davout should have been at the front.

I like the idea of Carnot as the Minister of War. A good organizer who simply worked for the government, whoever they were.

I would love to have seen Davout vs Wellington on one wing.

Vandamme or Suchet versus Blucher on the other wing.

Grouchy was a solid, if uninspiring cavalry commander. How about a name from left field: the man we know Napoleon would never bring back? Murat as commander of the reserve cavalry ;)

Of course, that leaves the vexed question of who should have been CoS, and damned if I have a clue about that. Berthier had made that particular position his own. It wasn't just that Soult wasn't a logical or obvious replacement, it was that there was NO logical or obvious replacment at all! Pluck a name from your bicorne, tell him that if they win the campaign he'll be promoted to marchal and see how things go…

Late thought: Jomini for CoS ;)

Davout could have been both Minister of War and Major Général – as Berthier had been at one time. The concerns of Paris could have been quelled by someone fanatical about Napoleon.

The concept of army wings did not exist before the campaign. When Ney met Napoleon on the afternoon of the 15th he was given command of II Corps, I Corps, and III Cavalry Corps – so arguably that is the emergence of a wing commander. This was cemented with the orders of the morning of the 16th with Grouchy getting the right wing and Napoleon retaining the central reserve.

But here is a point many miss – Soult's willful manipulation of the concentration orders, rearranged the right and central columns of advance and delayed IV Corps' arrival. Others point to the missing reserve cavalry corps orders as a big mistake, but that was easily repaired.

The Campaign was to start on June 14th, anniversary of Marengo, but Napoleon had to delay one day. How important was this? How important was the delay?

On the 14th of June, Bourmont tipped off the Prussians of the advance via Charleroi – he then went over on the morning of the 15th. However, Rillet de Constant saw Bourmont in Namur on the 14th… so, maybe one witness is wrong. But Clouet, Bourmont's chief of staff, is also clear that they went to Namur on the 14th. Lettow-Vorbeck then delineates clearly how late in the evening a group of riders including a French general arrived at Namur and spoke to Gneisenau, and within a half hour at approximately 11:30pm on June 14th, the Prussian army was ordered to concentrate at Sombreffe. At least a 12 hour head start.

So point is, take away Soult from Major-Général role and what does one get?

French cross frontier on June 14th, but slightly farther back. (this is debatable, Napoleon may have closed on frontier on the 13th). Vandamme is still on the right at Philippeville, and Bourmont now has one less day, twice as far, and a whole corps of French to maneuver himself, his staff, their servants, and baggage (that's what the trip for the 14th also was for, to get those things safely across the frontier without raising suspicion – remember, after Soult, Bourmont is the vanguard of the right wing at Florennes).

Yes, Prussians knew a lot – but on 14th orders had been sent to be ready to move – but not to concentrate. The concentration orders were directly a result of the intelligence provided by French traitors.

At the end of June 14 without Soult, II Corps is at least to Frasne, I Corps at Gosselies watching Mons, VI Corps aroudn Bry, III Corps is beyond Fleurus, IV Corps is across the Sambre, IG and HQ are north of Charleroi.

Prussian I Corps may be mauled or destroyed. The farthest any Prussian Corps has gotten is slightly west of Namur.

On June 15th of this new campaign, the Allied armies are effectively separated. The French have teh Nivelle-Namur road in strength. Without Prussians and fighting in their rear, the Left under anyone's command and without hesitation seizes Quatre Bras and pushes to Genappe. French right pushes as far as the Gembloux-Mazy line. The allied armies have to fall back or be destroyed, and that evening Napoleon force marches to Brussels with the guard and the left – just as he wanted per his orders of the 16th.

No Battle of Ligny, no Battle of Waterloo, very few casualties, and a thunderclap throughout Europe. The King flees Ghent, and much of the royalist spying and intrigue flees with him.

So you see, you can't take Soult out of this campaign and relive it at all. All Napoleon needed was a average, loyal Major-Général and he achieves exactly what he planned.

The requirment for Davout in Paris was not so much his "iron fist", but his ability to organize. In fact, the "iron fist" was never needed, but could have been supplied by Savary if needed. But even for Davout, the organization task was too great – so I divide up the duties a bit ….

Minister of War : Carnot
Minister of Police : Réal (replacing Fouché … who should have been confined to a rural estate out of communcation with anyone)
Prefect of Police of Paris : Pasquier (instead of Minister of Bridges and Roads, replacing Réal)
Military Commandant in Paris : Suchet (replaced by Vandamme in command of the Army of the Alpes)
Chief of Staff of the Military (overall) : Belliard (from the end of May, when he returned from serving the kingdom of Naples … the position did not exist, but should have …. he would need to be created a maréchal for this)
Commandant of political security forces (gendarmes, pompiers, imperial guard depots, etc.) : Savary (he was inspector-general of gendarmerie, but should have been given a broader and potentially more active remit)

With the army ….
Chief of Staff of the Army of the North : Bailly de Monthion (Berthier's preferred deputy, and had held the position until supplanted by Soult)
Deputy Chief of Staff : Jomini (if he would take a deputy position)
Guards : Ney
Left Wing : Soult
Right Wing : Davout
Cavalry Reserve : Grouchy

- Sasha

"No Battle of Ligny, no Battle of Waterloo, very few casualties, and a thunderclap throughout Europe."

First Prussian army backs up to the second one and is joined by the first Russian army. A battle like Borodino somewhere in central Germany in late August. No matter who wins, a second Russian army comes up for a winter campaign to Paris. The Prussians and Russians were not going to make any deals (except perhaps one for carving up Austria if she tried to make a separate peace).

Knowing this, the British could keep control of the seas, and assist the Prussians and Russians. The latter really liked the Brown Bess and could easily conscript more than 1 million more men, if necessary, and if the British could make enough guns and uniform clothe for them.

Actually, Wellington's force was not even needed at all, except perhaps to prove Britain's loyalty to the Prussians and Russians.

Just my opinion, of course.

- Sasha

"Wellington's force was not even needed at all".

I have often wondered that, strange as it all turned out. Britain's traditional role had always been finance and supply of Central Europe forces against Boney and, of course, absolute control of the seas. I would not dismiss Spain as a sideshow, but I wonder if British strategists appreciated how significant it would become, when they first committed to it. Mission creep is not solely a 21st Century phenomenon.

Everything depended on splitting two armies and then defeating each in detail. Would Blucher have been safer on his own? First sign of a French attack, no question, he falls back on his supply lines and "uncovers" Brussels (capture of which is very hollow victory for Boney now)

Apologies, slightly off subject of deploying Marshals.

I had always thought Bourmont's desertion in practice provided very little useful intelligence to the Allies, even if a morale blow to the Army of the North and especially its staff.

Thanks Sasha – that was the kind of well-thought out response I was hoping for. A good start to the week. All interesting what-ifs that I doubt would be possible to factor into any re-running of the 100 Days as a camapaign.

It's why this campaign and it's climatic battle retains such a fascination for me, the best part of almost 4 decades of first reading about it.

Considering his own less-than-stellar performance at Waterloo, I don't think it would have made much difference how Napoleon shuffled his subordinates around. Perhaps his best bet would have been to make himself Minister of War and to put Davout in command of the army.

"Britain's traditional role had always been finance and supply of Central Europe forces"

I agree, Deadhead.

If one looks at Russia's track record, alliance or negotiated peace with neighboring land powers has presented some real problems :
- Mongol Khans
- Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth
- Swedes
- French under Napoléon
- Germany in the late 1930's
- maybe we will some day in the future add China (it is the current declared policy of the Russian Federation)

In general, despite agreements to the contrary, the neighboring land power always seems to get around to invading Russia.

On the other hand, alliance with British (later Anglo-American) sea power has been uniformly fruitful.
- 1810 to 1815
- 1905 vs. Japan (Anglo-American dictated peace terms were mostly better than the losing position that the Russians had acheived on their own)
- 1914-1917 (note, however, gross mismanagement of the late Russian Empire undermined the benefit from the alliance, as did late US entry)
- 1941-1945 vs. the fascists

Failing to achieve such alliance has proven, on the other hand, unfruitful for Russia.
- 1807-1810
- Crimean war
- Cold War
- currently

Some say that there is a first rule of geopolitics :
- Never invade Russia – or – Never wage a land war in Asia.

I think there is a second rule :
- It is impossible to over-estimate the financial, technical and productive capability of the Anglo-Americans, and very easy to under-estimate that capability.

- Sasha

" Would Blucher have been safer on his own"

Well, absent or isolated from Wellington's Anglo-Allied force, he would have been like Mack in 1805 …. but would not not not (repeat not) have made the same mistake. He would have just stepped back.

Indeed, if after falling back to central Germany, the Russians and Prussians felt the least bit disadvantaged, they would have just stepped back again to the next upcoming Russian force (as Bagration and Kutuzov had wished in 1805 just before Austerlitz). They had, in 1812 and 1813-1814, figured out how to more or less assuredly defeat Napoléon : use strategic depth or distance and wage a long campaign of attrition.

The actual Cent Jours had (initial) battles which Napoléon might have won. But if even if he did win all of them, he was doomed to lose the 1815-1817 campaign (and his army, and his empire).

Again, just my opinion.

- Sasha

Wellington believed Brussels was important.
Wellington believed Napoleon was on the verge of winning in 1814.
Was Wellington wrong? And if so, what to speak of his conduct of risking a battle before Brussels?

No one knew better than the importance of the allied presence in Belgium and the active subterfuge it allowed within France. Napoleon achieving stability and the ability to ramp up the country's resources was of tremendous concern, at least to those that actually opposed Napoleon. The allied intelligence from within France was as much concerned about the economic and political state as it was the military.

Wellington deserves credit for his recognition of the need to save Brussels and the King at Ghent, and it is a great disservice to his memory to dismiss his defense as an unnecessary sideshow in an event with an inevitable conclusion. When treason slowed the advance of the French, Wellington pounced and made sure it could not be repaired.

Napoleon was not doomed at all in 1815 and beyond. Had he remained in France after a victory in Belgium with an army twice the size+ as 1814 and growing, he could have easily defeated the advancing allies, especially if Davout had an army in Paris. He had demonstrated repeatedly the ability to achieve superiority on the battlefield.

This is why contemporaries feared him, apparently far more than many today.

Blucher actually made as big a mistake as Mack. He decided to concentrate in front of Napoleon's advance. He only escaped destruction at Ligny. I missed the memo that proved Blucher was predictable and would always take the prudent/safe action. Maybe that bump on the head he suffered leading that charge at the end of Ligny? Because the supreme army commander that leads a cavalry charge is clearly the cool headed strategist who retreats even when numbers are roughly equal? Sorry for the sarcasm, but I would like to be pointed to a source that describes this Blucher. The guy I read about was aggressive and imprudent, and lost a fortune at the Palais Royale during the occupation of Paris. Just an anecdote, but at least one consistent with his actions. Of course, this is not to undermine Blucher – his aggressiveness in 1815 ultimately led to his victory.

Napoleon _was_ doomed to lose the battle against death, sometime between 1815-1900… but in 1815 in Belgium in June, a brilliant plan could have worked if not for treason.

Soult could not be involved. The plan would have worked without the appointment of wing-commanders. Napoleon certainly did not think to appoint wing-commanders prior to the crossing of the Sambre despite the three columns of advance.

@S.Beckett
Michael Leggiere's Blucher. Also see the Katzbach campaign, especially the combats leading up to the battle. I'm with deadhead, I do not believe the sources agree that Bourmont's defection provided much useful intelligence.

Excellent thread to follow. Soult on the left wing would have been interesting.

Stephen Beckett,

More just my opinion, OK ?

Resisting making any comment about serving the memory of historical persons ….

You wrote, "He had demonstrated repeatedly the ability to achieve superiority on the battlefield."

So what? I mean that without any sarcasm. exactly how did Napoléon's battlefield success win any campaign after 1809?

Kevin Kiley has argued that Napoléon won essentially every combat of 1812. While I would not agree in detail, even if this were true, he still lost the campaign, his army and risked losing his régime (the Malet affair might have been a bit more serious than it really turned out).

The campaign of 1813-1813 was the same. Brilliant battlefield performances by Napoléon, but he lost the campaign, another army, and his régime.

How could battlefield successes in 1815-1817, no matter how great, bring a different result? If he fights in central German he is over his limit of supply in a few weeks. If he sits around the French border near the Rhine, the Cossacks and Native cavalry and German Freikorps start tearing into France. Either way, just as in 1814, the Mongol Kalmyk tribesmen ending watering their ponies at the Fontaine du Palmier.

It was all just plain impossible. Too little money and too little industrialization compared to the British. Too few men compared to the Prussians and Russians.

No British prime minister could advocate negotiation. The Russian Emperor thought that God himself was telling him to cleanse the world of the devil's minion (Aleksandr was beginning his crazy/religious phase). The Prussians were by then defining their national identity by their opposition to the French. So no deals were available, except perhaps with Austria, who had all the Prussian and Russian armies more or less sitting on or around their territories.

The First Empire was indeed doomed from the start of the Cent Jours.

- Sasha

P.S. About Blucher's aggressiveness during the actual Cent Jours : it was predicated on Wellington's solid promise of support, and would have been stymied anyway had the French not made a false move in the pursuit after Ligny – a contingency that the Prussian staff had as a Plan B. Not interposing a pursuit force between the Prussians and Wellington was likely the key element in the French defeat at Waterloo.

This error was (i) the result of direct orders from Napoléon that (ii) Grouchy followed instead of ignoring, with both of these errors being more likely due to (iii) insufficient fresh light cavalry.

@Malefric – The sources that speak of Bourmont's defection the morning of the 15th, _after the concentration order_, do not give Bourmont's treason any credit.

FEW sources speak of the intelligence gained on the evening of the 14th. Lettow-Vorbeck is quite clear that the Prussians themselves believed it was Bourmont who provided it, though it may have been a surrogate. Even FEWER sources mention the eye witnesses who claim Bourmont was across the frontier on the 14th of June… around Namur no less.

Quoting Vorbeck:

"Indeed, these orders made it possible to unite three Army Corps at Sombreffe, on the 16th, still before Napoleon's attack. The IV. Corps could also have arrived there on time, had the order it had received been executed. However, it must not be overlooked that this was only possible because of the special messages received in the night leading up to the 15th. If the orders had only been given on the 15th, at 9 AM, after receipt of Zieten's first message, a timely gathering so far frontwards would have been impossible and would have had to happen further behind. Without this treason committed by members of the French army*, the surprise intended by Napoleon would have been successful to an even stronger degree than was the case now. The serious ill-preparedness of the Prussian headquarters is also shown by the fact that the transmission of the orders to Liège took an unreasonably long time. The first order arrived at 5 AM, after 17 hours, and the second order arrived on the 15th at noon, after 12 hours. Taking into account the distance of 53 km and ordinary relay services, these orders should have arrived after only 6 hours."

And the footnote:
"From the arrival of the horsemen at the right bank of the Meuse, Major Ritz concludes that they belonged to the IV. Corps and were probably related to General Bourmont who, as is known, crossed the river the following morning with his staff. The likelihood of this assumption made by the Major is increased by details given by a certain Monsieur Marcellin who left Paris on May 4th and who reports to the Prince of Orange on the 11th, amongst other things, that from a conversation with Bourmont's adjutant, he draws the conclusion that the latter had only entered the service to supply the king with soldiers, as soon as he was given the chance. Now he was only commanding a division near Besançon, trying to attract officers of whom he knew that they served Napoleon only reluctantly."

Major Ritz was part of the guard of the Meuse bridge at Namur that was confronted by the party of riders with the urgent message that came from a French general.

I've never found a source that both acknowledges the events of the 14th _and_ discounts Bourmont. For many, it's just too fun to discredit one of Napoleon's excuses.

Immediately after the campaign, everyone was in credit and blame mode. For the Prussians, this meant that it was Zieten's observations and the lights of the fires against the sky that triggered the concentration. See Battle of Lake Trasimene – I doubt that was the reason. Lettow-Vorbeck wrote at the end of 19th century and early 20th, and was very even handed. Ritz's information came to light in 1861.

One thing is sure, no account speaks of Bourmont's baggage and servants, nor those of his staff. Where did they go? Would he have left them behind? Very doubtful, how would he dress – on the 14th he took them to Namur, gave his intelligence, and returned to his unit that was marching north of Philippeville. He knew that once his defection was known, it would spread like fire. Rumigny's first hand account of the immediate aftermath of the defection proves this.

Some more command changes ?

Augereau, who was 57 and would die within a year, made some offer of service, but was declined by Napoléon.
Compans refused to serve in the active field army. But both should have been tasked as special inspectors for manpower, recruiting and training.

Verdier and Dessaix (Joseph-Marie) likley could have taken Rapp's assignment on the Moselle, and Rapp would have made a great IIIe Corps commander (I sent Vandamme away to the Alps in my comments above, when I brought Suchet to Paris).

I think that the better horses and horsemanship of the British cavalry, esepcially when supported on the defense with artillery and infantry fires, needed larger French cavalry formations – very large massed charges.

Instead of having the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 7th light calvalry divisons assigned to infantry corps, I would have grouped them into two more light cavalry corps under Piré and Pajol – and Domon and Maurin really needed the supervision anyway. This would have given the French 3 light and 3 heavy cavalry corps.

I also would have had Kellerman as commander of the Guard Cavalry (1 division each of heavy and light). Promote Blanchard to command the 12th heavy cavalry division and d'Hurbal to command the III reserve cavalry corps.

And while we are at it, replace L'Héritier (11th heavy cavalry divison) with Guiton and replace Guiton as commander of the 2nd brigade with the colonel Planzeaux of the 2e dragons. Send L'Héritier to organize remounts or to his (considerable) estates.

Oudinot, Macdonald, Gouvion St.-Cyr and Victor all sided with the Bourbons. Amazing, actually.

- Sasha

How could battlefield successes in 1815-1817 bring a different result?

Easily.

They could be decisive.

Next question…

You speak in absolute terms of what numerous/hundreds of living people as opinionated as you and me would have or would not have done. That is a great fallacy. The Allies were not brothers in arms, and had they faced a devastating defeat, you have no clue what the outcome of the finger pointing could have been. Now how about another? I don't think those putting their lives at risk back then would have been quite so won over by your spreadsheets.

Political winds are fickle. With the Waterloo victory, Britain's government seems resolute. How about a few reverses?

Could Japan have defeated the USA in WWII? Many now say no for similar reasons. Did Nimitz think that at Midway? Hell no. Because victories are _not_ certain.

Colts by 18. Seriously, if they play that game 100 times, Colts win 99 of them.

Was Carnot, Davout, and the many others that rallied to Napoleon just stupid? Or was the argument not obvious then, but is now? Because now we know that the Allies were going to make no mistakes, get along, muster their resources in perfect synchronicity and Napoleon's defeat was so inevitable that Wellington was simply a glory hound that allowed thousands of his men to be slaughtered because he didn't get the memo that all he had to do was avoid confronting Napoleon and let nature take its course.

What Napoleon accomplished in 1814 was amazing – and look at what he had… to discount what he and France could have achieved had they not been betrayed in Belgium is simplistic.

Of course, dealing with the traitors and royalists was a real issue – one that put Napoleon at a disadvantage until he could at least reduce it with the fruits of a military success.

Please, nothing personal, I challenge you to respond to everything I've said because I am absolutely beyond tired of every interesting debate about the Waterloo campaign getting hijacked by those that squelch it with "defeat inevitable."

It was not, NOT, NOTTTT! (fun movie reference)

So on a lighter note, what portrait hangs above Ruprecht's bed, the imbecile played by Freddy, Steve Martin's character in Dirty Rotten Scoundrels?

Hint, its fitting to this topic.

Stephen,

I do not know the movie, I am sorry.

"Could Japan have defeated the USA in WWII? Many now say no for similar reasons. Did Nimitz think that at Midway?"

I would have said "yes", Nimitz believed in the US/Allied victory as an eventual sure thing. Also the same for Yamamoto before and after the attack on Pearl Harbor. I could be wrong, of course.

I always thought that the British tend to get more steely in defeat, rather than look for a easy way to the negotiations table. Probably a myth from Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain. But it was my impression of them.

I am sorry to be a wet dish rag. I really do think it was inevitable defeat for the French in 1815. But that doesn't lessen my interest in the battles and the overall attempt that Napoléon made. Actually, I rather like the sense of inevitable doom that began to cover over the Empire starting from the very highest point of its splendor in 1810. It is tragic, I think, like in a theatre tragedy.

- Sasha

P.S. "I don't think those putting their lives at risk back then would have been quite so won over by your spreadsheets."
Well, for those 1 million+ Russians, there was no need at all to win them over at all. Feudalism and all that. The Emperor commanded, the Russians obeyed. And fighting French in Germany or France beats fighting FInns in the frozen north or Kavkaz peoples, Turks and Persians in the south, or fighting native tribes in Siberia or Alaska. Russian border zones, then and now, are quite unpleasant compared to western Europe.

"What Napoleon accomplished in 1814 was amazing – and look at what he had… to discount what he and France could have achieved had they not been betrayed in Belgium is simplistic. "

So we are down to betrayal ???

Nonesense in my opinion, the Allies had a much better strategic graps than Napoleon as they ably demonstrated in 1815.

It sounds so easy, just change a few generals, than ultimate prooven success for Napoleon.

But this is the ultimate failure of planning, underestimate and disregard the abilities of the opponent.

Decisisve victories?

Where should they come from on Napoleons side, none in 1812, none in 1813, none in 1814 and none in 1815.

Sasha – I would say that Japan was at a terrible disadvantage taking on the USA in WWII, and for many similar reasons that Napoleon faced in 1815.

However, you take the battles where the USA turned the tide and flip the result, then what? Imagine youthful US pilots getting butchered by hardened Japanese Aces that instead of having been lost, survived to take on USA's replacements. Etc. etc. USA could build ships and planes, but no country can build veterans.

I only speak of possibilities, not probabilities.

The point is, it's why they play the game. Napoleon was at a disadvantage. However, how many decisive – not simple battlefield possession, but army destruction – battles would Napoleon have had to have won before you give him a chance? 1? 2? 5? 10? Note that battles could be shied away from, but they can't invade France and eliminate the possibility of facing Napoleon. Their own plans called for handling 2 devastating defeats… though unlike you, they worried about the impact.

I would not disagree with you that Napoleon faced a huge challenge, and that he was at a disadvantage. However, unless you a) will state that Napoleon could not win a decisive battlefield victory in 1815 and beyond or b) say the number is infinity, then I'm happy to say we agree, it wasn't inevitable.

I think you mind find the period more interesting if you opened up to the possibility of what success could have wrought.

In fact, I don't even believe you. You have given thought to this campaign in some capacity, you have mused over the organization of the cavalry… I just don't believe you have given any of this consideration if deep down in the recesses of your thoughts there isn't a "what if" lingering.

Is there a reasonable counter-factual chance for Napoleon to emerge victorious from his campaign in Belgium in June 1815?

Most Definitely.

Napoleon's long term prospects for 1815/1816 really depends on Austria, Metternich, and whether Napoleon can secure a separate peace. The strategic calculus for Prussia/Russia only changes if British $$ stops flowing or Austria becomes neutral/belligerently neutral/hostile.

Possible, yes. Probable…who knows, would make a fun wargame campaign, but my gut is "not very probable". That said when we run our campaign this summer, I am rooting for a French victory!

Just my .02
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Re: Bourmont and Sources. The sources finger pointing can go on endlessly in this period. Do they agree? No.
Do I think ~120,000 men were able to concentrate without being seen by anyone? No.
Was Napoleon largely successful in concealing his concentration until his forces were on the border (~13th/14th)? Yes.
Did any information provided by Bourmont on the 14th/15th, likely assist in clarifying the picture? Yes.
Did the Prussians sleep under arms on the 14th/15th? Yes.
The information was acquired (choose your source), and Von Zeiten's plan for concentration upon contact with enemy from May was executed per plan. Yes.
Could Napoleon's plan have cut off Prussian 1st Bde on the 15th? Most definitely.
Could Napoleon's plan have cut off Prussian 2nd Bde on the 15th? Unlikely, even with a very aggressive IV corps and easy crossing at Chatelet.
Would Blucher accept battle at Ligny without meeting w/ Wellington/Promise of Support on the 16th(e.g. assume QB already French, so no meeting)? No.

would Blücher fight

Yes, according to the guidelines of 1813

Would he fight again when defeated

Yes

and when defeated again, whould he fight again

Yes

See his conduct from 1813 to 1814

There weren't any decisive battle any longer – the military art has moved from operational art, to geo – miliatry strategical art, N failed to comprehend this, seeing his disastrous campaign records from 1812 to 1815

Malefric – the sources pertaining to Bourmont's conduct really don't disagree as much as the vast majority do not address the June 14th accounts. Certain themes took hold in the mid 19th century, and despite the gathering of new materials, these themes have been very hard to shake. One of them is that the treason of 1815 didn't matter. Please see Clouet's justification – his itinerary has some flaws, but its also very precise about their being in Namur on the 14th. Just so happens this is corroborated. Find the source that addresses this, and then discredits it. Please, I've been looking for a decade and can't find it.

Also, no one EVER tries to explain the baggage or servants. (This presence corroborated as well.)

Thus, your recounting of the campaign ignores the reality of a June 14th start if a Major-General had been loyal and competent. The premise that I brought up was if one removes Soult as Major-General, then one also removes the sabotage of the concentration, the delay from June 14 to June 15, and most likely Bourmont's defection before the start of hostilities. Bourmont would have defected, as all the royalist under the Kings orders were not allowed to fight the Allies. Hence, like a handful of others, he and his staff would have defected late on the first day or early second had he not been put in the VAGUARD of the right column. Hmm, that was fortunate, don't you think? How did that happen? Oh, just a complete change of Napoleon's intentions, willfully done without explanation… by Soult.

Very often the question is asked, why not someone other than Soult. But then invariably I see everyone start the campaign on the 15th and refight out the historical campaign. No Soult, totally different and more effective French first day. Throw out everything, because Wellington doesn't converse with Blucher, he doesn't even get to Genappe.

Any motivated Major-General other than Soult would have most likely resulted in a June 14th campaign start where the Prussians do NOT concentrate at Sombreffe prior to French occupation.

This thread was not about what could have happened if it was redone, it was what would have been the impact of changes to the major roles, one of which was Soult. Without Soult, bringing up the IV Corps maneuver to Chatelet is not necessary, for now Vandamme's III Corps is on the right, and they are departing on time, and depending on circumstances, maybe they are redirected. IV Corps is at Mariebourg, but is concentrated because they got the proper orders to hustle, as Napoleon said, march as fast as possible in 7 stages, not, stagger your divisions and mosey on over here which is what, you guessed it, Soult had them do until Napoleon intervened and got them moving fast again. IV Corps may have crossed at Chatelet, but the key to envelopment would have been Vandamme… but maybe ol' Favier(s?) breaks his leg again? (Faviers is the orderly listed in the copy of the Registre Grouchy provided) Funny how that happened, yet then he fought at Waterloo and sustained two wounds to the neck per his service records. Yep, that story is crap, we just don't know which part.

The correspondence record is clear – and while parts of it are suspect, especially pertaining to Grouchy, the parts dealing with June 1st – June 13th have never been questioned as authentic. This is largely because they came to light after the July Monarchy and thus were not subject to the fishy games that, you guessed it, (Prime) Minister (of War) Soult could play during Louis-Philippe's entire reign.

But, you know, we learn something new every day… for example, decisive battles were a thing of that past by 1815. Waterloo was nothing more than another Eylau, except the French army was really motivated to get back to France.

"how many decisive – not simple battlefield possession, but army destruction – battles would Napoleon have had to have won before you give him a chance? 1? 2? 5? 10? "
More than 5, less than 10. But the "army destruction" would have needed to be extremely one-sided …. losses less than 15% losses for the French in each. They just did not have the population or the industrial capacity to keep replacing armies at the same rate as the British/Prussian/Russian alliance. And I do not know of any major battle after 1807 where the victor's losses were less than 15%.

"Their own plans called for handling 2 devastating defeats… though unlike you, they worried about the impact."
I have no indication that the prospect of operational defeat(s) was of any concern to the Russians generals, beyond the possible effects on one's own career. In the ministries and at court, operational defeats were really no more than temporary annoyances. If the Allies had suffered 3 operational defeats, they just would have had to make a new plan : raising 2 more Russian and 1 more Prussian armies, train and supply them, move them into contact with the French. The Russians did this kind of thing rather routinely in their wars against the Turks and Persians.

" I just don't believe you have given any of this consideration if deep down in the recesses of your thoughts there isn't a "what if" lingering."
Well, for a game or study of a battle, there are lots of what if's. For a real chance for a changed historical result, it would have required Napoléon to attempt seriously to gain a negotiated peace in 1810 – and this would have required giving back a good part of the Empire or parts being "spun out" as new independent nations. It likely also would have required adoption of a charter or constitution, perhaps similar to the one actually adopted in 1815 during the Cent Jours.
That would have been a sort of clear-eyed realism that the recent conqueror of Europe would have hard-pressed to achieve. It is very hard to look ahead to the problems inherent in your victory immediately upon its being won : examples include the harsh terms for Germany after World War I, the Japanese Empire in the late 1930's, and the Soviet Union's "neo-imperialism" after World War II, the Americans in Iraq (twice so far, maybe a third time in progress now).

"Napoleon's long term prospects for 1815/1816 really depends on Austria"
I think if Austria attempted a separate peace, their Empire would have been partitioned by the Russians and Prussians – which might have given Napoléon an extra 12-18 months.
Not that their consent was really necessary to take out the Hapsburg régime, but I am not sure that the Austrian people would actually mind this too much. Russia had established a sort of protected independence for the Finns that the Hungarians might have actually enjoyed – with far lower taxes and frankly better administration than under Austria. The German-speaking Austrians might have accepted becoming part of a "greater Germany" based on Prussia.

"The strategic calculus for Prussia/Russia only changes if British $$ stops flowing"
Actually the Russians did not need the money, and only got about 10% of their 1815 military expenses via subsidy. And even for that 10% (i) they did not get it until 1816 and (ii) most of the subsidy was more or less legally stolen by a few of the great nobles around the court. That said, the Russians were getting to the point where their ability to provide men was out-stripping their industrial capacity – most noticably for infantry muskets and uniform clothe. So it would be the willingness of the British to make these (even if offfered for sale, instead of by gift or by loan) that would be the requirement. In fact, through 1814, the Russians bought about 125,000 Brown Bess and would have bought more. Similarly, a fair amount of the re-uniforming done for the army in the field in 1813-1814 was done with British clothe. Recall that inside Russia all the manufactories and essentially all the people were in one sense or another state-owned. Actual money was only needed for foreign purchases.

The Russians did prefer to avoid doing all the fighting and giving all the benefit to the British. It was explicitly discussed. As I pointed out above, Aleksandr was going to do this based on his percieved religious "mission". Yet the more the British remained engaged (troops engaged in the fight, naval alliance in the Baltic, supplies even if purchased, some money for the great nobles, diplomatic support for Russian territorial aims, etc.), the less chance of a coup against Aleksandr.

"There weren't any decisive battle any longer – the military art has moved from operational art, to geo–miliatry strategical art, N failed to comprehend this, seeing his disastrous campaign records from 1812 to 1815"

I agree. I think this is the key issue. And, moreover, I think the Russians and Prussians fully realized the change and knew it would be the key to their eventual victory. The development of Prussian and Russian road/water communications infrastructure, recruiting/training and logistics – and the ministerial/staff systems to manage these and deliver armed and rather well-trained men to the "front" in large numbers – were really quite beyond anything that the French ever managed. Similarly, the use of light irregular cavalry and deep penetration raids into the enemy rear and civilian areas was a technique that the French could only envy – or decry as mere barbarism and not "real soldiering".

The British, constrained by their comparatively small land army, had been operating from the "geo–miliatry strategical" perspective essentially from the beginning, though perhaps by necessity more than choice. But the control of the sea and the comparatively huge industrial capacity of the British filled in perfectly for the two potential weaknesses of the Prussians and Russians.

Secondarily, for the Iberians and German-speaking people (and maybe Italian-speaking people, the Dutch, the eastern Austrian empire, the Poles and among noble Russians), I think that we are also seeing the first tendencies toward modern nationalism by 1815. While this might have been not-inconsistent with Napoléon's preservation of his régime, it would have required a profound change in that régime's policies and methods of governance. Absent such change, the French "Empire" proved to be no more than the occupation by the French military of various places.

- Sasha