"On the firing of a line on an advancing column" Topic

There have been several interesting threads here about the interactions of different formations in napoleonic tactics.

• "Arcs of Fire – Why do we do it?"
  
• "incorrect footprint of unit bases"
  
• Ordre en échelon
  

One thing that has impressed me is the great width of a line of battle compared to both the limited effective range of the smoothbore musket and our wargamer's representation by a mere handful of figures.

The distances are something that can be calculated and quantified. As an approximation a 600 man battalion, 200men/rank with 6 30 yard wide companies is used as the model. The 6 companies are further divided into 12 sections and the distances from the front left of each section to an approaching closest front point of an attacking battalion in column of companies is calculated.

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A simple quadratic (d = sqrt(x*x+y*y) is used for each section to construct the following table of the distance in yards from that section to the enemy unit which will just touch the leftmost section at zero yards. Ranges from the line of the line of battle to the approaching unit of 150, 125, 100, 75, 50, 25 and 0 yards are used in the calculations and results are show in rows in the table.

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A first comment about the table is that it is only at 75 yards distance that two and a half companies issue fire at a range of 100 yards or less. (Look at the row for 75 yards). Another comment is that the far end of the battalion is firing at over 200 yards distance and is expected to be of no value.

The second table is the calculated angle from the firing section to the target. (0 degrees is straight ahead, pointing down the line and shooting the noses off people is 90 degrees) I and going to make the approximation that the second rank is not going to be able to fire at targets more than 45 degrees to their front, so they become ineffective in the dark brown area (as does the 3rd rank who are reloading the 2nd rank's guns). At some point, even the firs rank is going to have trouble pointing their guns down their own line to shoot at the attacking unit when it gets real close. Is it 60 degrees or 70 degrees? At 25 yards range notice that only 4-6 sections of the first rank are able to fire at that close enemy unit. (25% of the first rank, 8% of the muskets).

The third chart shows a combination of the first two charts and the clear area is that of the most issued fire with the two restrictions above. Many period sources tell 75 yards as the optimum range for first fire.

Coming later today, I will show results for several other situations.

• A column by division marching directly at the first 4 sections
  
• A column by division marching in at a 15 degree angle and 30 degree angle at the first 4 sections
  
• A column by division marching in at the company wide gap that was usually between adjacent battalions
  
• and at a much later time, the range-modified effective hit rate for these cases
  

In another later submission to this thread, I will also compute the relative effectiveness for a line versus column for various ranges/orientations compared to a baseline of line directly on line.

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Why would a section in the middle of the friendly line be firing at the left-most unit of the enemy line? Why would it not fire straight ahead at the enemy at the shorter range?

No the enemy unit is to the left of the {battalion in line} and there us bi enemy to the front. See the diagram at the top of the link in the just previous post to see the geometries.

Then that sounds like a skirmish fight rather than a proper line to line fight. Not sure a skirmish fight is worthy of a 2nd order mathematical analysis. Maybe put the enemy section in line with the center of the friendly line for a "more average" representation.

But yeah, I agree that a long line firing at a small target is going to have trouble bringing all guns to bear if it stays in line. More trouble the smaller the target is.

The size of the target is not the issue. The purpose is to illustrate that the target (here taken as the closest distance to a column that is just bypassing the line) is far away from much of the line and that much of the line has a poor angle (arc) to fire at that target.

even more, the closer the column comes the worse – the poorer the angle will be

I believe the assertion that fire was withheld until the approaching column was within 75 yards needs to be re-examined.

I think the ability of soldiers in line to shoot at a 45 degree angle is very generous. I would say no more than 25 degrees because of the pan flash and physics. 200 men shoulder-to-shoulder attempting to turn and fire down the line does not allow for much of an angle.

The assertion AND instructions to hold fire to 75 yards only needs to be re-examined if the troops were being asked to fire at an angle and not straight ahead.

Thanks for the statistics, billfan.

The shock of a volley at 75 yards followed by a charge will be great even if most of the shots pass harmlessly to the flanks of the column.

No disrespect meant to the geometric points raised but making noise has always been more important than making kills, especially on the black powder battlefield.

So you have what? 600 muskets going off at once or in succession versus the noise made by 200 or less? I know who I'd wager on.

Further we have accounts from Salamanca and Waterloo showing the companies to either side wheeling to bring fire onto the flanks of the column when the tactical situation called for it.

Bob

Bob, yes the wheeling of flank companies or even wings as for the 52nd at Waterloo would make a significant difference. The 52nd could only do this because they had space to use when performing a change of front and support from another brigade (Halkett I think) moving forward to protect the flank of the 52nd.

I would suggest that only experienced troops with capable officers should be able to do this. Most rules however give a benefit in combat to troops of greater experience Veteran versus Trained and so on so would it make sense not to represent such micro-level activity as wheeling the odd flanking company.

Now that I have figured out how to insert pictures let me share some computations. First, the situation for a close colunm of divisions approaching the end division of a line, "square on".

I have divided the defender into 12 sections and calculated both the distances from the front center of each section to the nearest point (minimum range to) the attacker. (the distance from contact is from the front left edge of the section) Each row in the table corresponds to a range of the attacker. The second table is the angle from "straight out" to that point.

For the top table, the greened areas have ranges greater than 100 yards. Note that the right end of the defender is often out of effective (100yard?) range and from the lower table, they also have very difficult oblique angles to shoot at. Maybe 60 degrees might do for the front rank and 45 degrees for the 2nd rank. It is not full firepower of the battalion.

Here is the case where the attacking division column hits the very center of the defender.

A much better situation for the defender. Quite interesting is that the line battalion is just about the right size to most efficiently handle such an attack. A bigger unit would have screened and less efficient longer range from the ends of the units. Also the lenght in line is about a much as a single center point could comand with voice and bugle. (Does anyone remember a Spanish theather battle where the British were on a reverse slope with a hidden lateral road and were able to greet each French column with a balanced middle of the battalion line?)

By the way, if you cross-hatch the firing distance and firing angles it looks like 75 yards is the sweet spot if you are going to fire only one volley. A good compromise between short range (and the smoothbore is just under supersonic and still flat shooting at 75 yards) and no screening of the second rank's firing arc. (assumed at +/- 45 degrees)

Now to some more interesting stuff. Why would anyone ever think of every using a colummn against a line? The world is not a drill ground and battles were not fought with parallel lines. Consider the experienced French field officers. My view is that they exploited the terrain and features. Consider the following deployment.

Wouldn't it make sense to attack this at one or both sides of the point if it offered less defending fire. If the difference in elevation made most round go over the attacker's heads. ("LEVEL MUSKETS!!!! FIRE !!!! poof)

What happens if the attacker uses dead space to approach and attacks a static line at an angle?

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The British seem to be very good at that lateral movement to "cross the T", ie get across the head of the attacking battalion.

There are Waterloo letters that describe being in open column and wheeling up into line which suggests to me the battalion placed side on to the front and able to move forward a little then wheel into line. The use of paired battalions as a form of double column provide similar flexibility for lateral movement.

Ever though it strange that Foot Guards were in the right place at Waterloo.

Here is the situation for a line which is 15 degrees inclined away from an attacking division column

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and at 30 degrees

Notice in both cases, the center and rightmost defending divisions are pretty ineffective in shooting. For 30 degres, when the attacker is 75 yards away (the usual prime spot for a killing fire), those divisions are 119 to 232 yards away and also screened from a proper firing angle.

Yes, small scale tactics are more important then most of our rules tell. Very few units in Napoleonic armies were good enough to wrap around attackers or march forward to improve their angles. That is what light calvary loved to see. Maybe columns, used by experienced officers were not always a bad idea?

(throw grenade, duck to bottom of foxhole )

Very useful number-crunching. Thanks.

I suppose the question is how much of the low level tactics should be "black-boxed" and how much represented by the figures on the table.

I really don't think that noise was the thing that caused soldiers to die or run away. A relentless approach by the attackers and seeing multiple buddies fall was what caused people to run away. Although smoke often hide things firing and seeing no effect and the enemy with those pointy thingees on the end of the musket still coming on with purpose- that was what was effective. Also, experienced soldiers and unexperienced soliders with sense could often tell if they were in for a hard time and this would also motivate the "feet do your thing" moment.

An attacking force could absolutely judge the resolve of a defending opponent by the discipline and ferocity of the volley delivered.
The louder the crescendo of musketry, the more resolve being presented.
So, noise had a lot to do with it.
Naturally, the louder the bang, then potentially the more bodies would fall at the head of the column – those in the column knew precisely what to expect – what they wanted was for a desultory and sporadic response from the defenders, which meant their discipline was probably lost and there would be little to no resistance when it came to charge bayonets.
IMHO

I am not disagreeing, Mollwitz is the classical example of this.

The more fire discipline, the greater the impression (on morale).

I have to find the quote how a veteran French regiment was impressed when they did hear the first time British infantry fire, they were impressed how well nourished it was, noise effect.

Still, do we really have an idea when infanry USUALLY opened up or are we just only accostumned by the close range disciplined volley firing, but what was the standard?

Desultory fire is one thing. Agreed that would encourage the other team. But almost any unit could fire all their muskets at one time or the proper times and they make about the same noise whether a bumpkin or Sharpe is firing them. Lead slapping into people might be more important. A steady, oncoming attacker with no gaps or wavering might be more important. Seeing an attacker coming from a place where you are at a disadvantage might be more important. ("Eyes to the front!!) Just making noise……….? Ever hear of an attack "l'arme blanche ".

link

Here it is

Girod de l'Ain, général baron: Dix Ans de souvenirs militaires de 1805 a 1815. p.139 [Paris 1873]
'c'était la première fois que le bruit d'une fusillade anglaise venait à nos oreilles, et je puis dire qu'il était de nature à faire sur nous une certaine impression; jamais, en effet, nous n' avions entendu un feu roulant aussi nourri que celui-là; il ne dura, au surplus, que peu de temps, et l'ennemi fut forcé à la retraite.'

heh? My French is sorta limited to:

'Voulez-vous coucher avec moi ce soir?'

I can try to speak French and it makes Frenchmen cringe, roll their eyes and insist that we get along in English or even German. That is saying something!

Just tell me what I need to roll…

It was Napoleon who said

"An army's effectiveness depends on its size, training, experience, and morale, and morale is worth more than any of the other factors combined", and

"The morale is to the physical as three to one"

A unit with poor morale equates to poor fire discipline, and men breaking and running to the rear at the thought of being skewered on an enemy bayonet.
A unit with good morale equates to destructive fire discipline and more dead and wounded opponents, which leads to a stalling of their impetus and a failure of them hitting home.

Both actually might result in similar casualties, at the head of the column, but the noise would have been distinctive – obviously, it's not the governing factor, but it shouldn't be ignored. In the heat of battle, when, as an individual, you see very little beyond the few paces to your immediate front and flank, amidst clouds of swirling black powder smoke – the sound of 500 muskets being fired with great discipline and control would have dominated your senses, and given much pause for thought.

Given that we see very few accounts of actual crossed bayonets, and those mostly feature defended obstacles, consider the following.

The column marches up. The enemy falters and gives way.

The column marches up. The enemy fires and charges. The column gives way.

In the former instance it might well be that the line was beaten before the column approached, either by having very low initial morale or having what resolve it started with sapped by artillery and snipers.

The column just made plain that it was time to go.

Did the column defeat the line, (EDIT Well "yes" obliviously but) or was it a case of good timing by those in charge?

In the latter instance, the enemy has not been properly prepared and it is the column, either not expecting, or not prepared for great resistance, finds it is time to go instead.

In both cases morale is to the physical as 3 is to 1.

Horse and Musket combat is a great game of chicken with the side with the higher resolve winning. Noise is certainly a factor here. The attack "l'arme blanche is doomed if the enemy fires a close volley and itself charges. Noise plus charge trumps charge sans noise :)

To move a well formed enemy line, only a line of your own will do. Then it becomes a matter of whoever thinks they are losing eventually taking off.

No, I remain unconvinced that the attack column is a good formation for charging home if the enemy stands.

Bob

As regards to the effect of the volley most rule sets I have used take the casualties off the whole battalion, possibly 2 or 3 figures at 1:20. This tends not to stop the charge. I have read that the British shot the head of the column, (first company) Now take the same 2 0r 3 figures off the 6 figures of the first company now becomes 50% casualties and will generally get the rest to run back through the follow up companies. Net result, end of charge.

I forget which ACW battle I was reading about, but I remember a participant commenting that 1 particular occasion was the only time in the entire war that his entire regiment (battalion) fired a volley all at the same time. I take this to mean that it usually fired by companies or by files.

Now take the same 2 0r 3 figures off the 6 figures of the first company now becomes 50% casualties and will generally get the rest to run back through the follow up companies. Net result, end of charge.

Depends on how disciplined the next company is -- friendly bayonets are just as sharp and pointy as enemy ones.

My understanding is that, once a column [en masse] was staggered, and it became clear that their momentum was lost, the breakdown of the unit began at the rear – the guys at the front were either dead, wounded, or vainly attempting to defend themselves by returning fire. For those defending themselves at the point, this might continue until the moment escape became more practical as those behind got out of the way, or until things stabilized. If, at that time, the enemy came at you with their own pointy bayonets, it didn't really matter who was behind you. Once halted, the attackers had clearly lost the initiative, and the situation was generally not in their favor.

1968billsfan – my interpretation of all your charts seems to sugest that in a game the maximum angle to allow fire from adjacent stands (those outside of a zero degree angle to the target) seems to be 20 degrees. That is, you would use a template giving you 20 degrees to either side of straight ahead (zero degrees) and, if the middle of the stand touches any part of the target unit, it would be considered "effective fire". This would eliminate fire from adjacent stands as the target unit got closer to the firing unit. Is this your surmise? Or are you suggesting a more rigorous decision on the firing of stands? By the way, the French told me to speak German, too.

I've studied the data and am still unclear whether I get a tax refund or not…

That is what quadradic equations are for?

Sorry 1968, but this appears flawed to me. Excuse me if I have missed anything (quite possible btw) but from what I have picked up, you say the column is by division but is it "at a distance," "open," at a half distance" or "closed in mass' because the depth of the column will affect the choice of target (and hence the angles) for the different sections along the line.

So, instead of aiming at the left hand corner of the column (the "nearest point"), sections further along the line will fire at a lower angle, not at the front rank of the column but at the following ranks.

Second, I do not believe the line feels compelled to stand still (as we are forced to do by war-games rules). For example, if only facing one column, good officers are likely to see the direction of the attack and adjust the facing of the line to ensure maximum fire power is poured on that threat. If facing more than one column (is it likely to be more than two?), it will be ordered to split its fire (another thing many war-games rules don't allow us to do).

BTW I don't think lines had much of an angle to play with. I'm not a 20th Century wargamer but the Stug assault gun analogy works for me. The traverse of the gun was very limited. If you want to acquire the target you will probably have to move the whole vehicle. An 18th/19th Century line is the vehicle for your weapon; massed musket fire.

49th-moutain:

I'm not really sure- right now I'm mainly just working out the numbers to see what they give. Looking at the attacking "division column hits the very center of the defender" (9:42AM) case, it looks like the two peletons to each side of those being directly moved upon fire at almost the same range or at an equally effective range as the center division- except for the shadowing effect when the attacker gets really close. At 50 yards it looks like the 2nd rank is screened from firing and 25 yards on in, even the neighboring 1st ranks are screened off. But if you consider that the column of divisons in close order is a roughly 30 yards deep (so the tail of the column is sticking out), it might be that the only effect is that the second rank of the neigboring peletons would be screened at contact.

What I find most surprising is the big effect of approaching the end of a battalion in line on the flank of a salient with the line angled away from the attacker.(10:00AM post) At 15degree inclemenation the effect of fire of the second peleton over is almost gone and at 30degrees the neigboring peleton to those being marched directly on is almost gone from a combination of much longer range and masked and angled fire restriction.

What this suggests to me is that divisional column attacks should not be considered suicide missions IF the field officers are experts in their craft and can use irregularities in the opponents postioning and terrain, as well as skirishers or distractions to their advantage. It now makes a lot more sense to me that the stories about the French "approaching in column and then shaking out into line if the enemy didn't bolt" might not be the whole story but that deliberate attacks in column would be expected to be successful in a good proportion of cases. The exterior salient, gaps in the line, an area that was obscured from being able to issue fire, the inter-battalion company wide gap, good terrain for the skirmisher to shoot up the line opposite them, curves and points in the line of battle- all these things could be seen by a smart experienced attacking officer and used. If the defenders were unable to or didn't recognize these weakness and take countermeasures (if possible) the attacker would have the choice to select his spot of attack.

How much of this should come down to the wargame table may depend up on the scale that is played. If you play at the level were a battalion can be recognized, then surely limited arcs of fire and an effect of oblique attacks on a salient should be recognized by the rules. I think it is worthwhile to at least reconsider the effectiveness of line and column.

my interpretation of all your charts seems to sugest that in a game the maximum angle to allow fire from adjacent stands (those outside of a zero degree angle to the target) seems to be 20 degrees

And that would presumably apply to both infantry and artillery.

I think that your analysis shows that the whole line v column thing is not what many historians from the late 19th C onwards have made it out to be – about firepower alone. I have been convinced of that for some time. You have to seek other explanations for the remarkable success of British infantry.

For me two pieces of evidence made this clear. Firstly that on the few occasions when we can be sure that the French attacked in line (Maida and at least one of the Vimiero attacks) the French fared no better – in fact their collapse was very rapid indeed. Second the ratio of casualties in the great clash between the Fusiliers and the advancing French columns the actual casualties suffered by each side were not as far apart as the conventional wisdom suggested.

But we do know that British officers felt that the line was a far superior combat formation. The flexibility to wheel in on the flanks has already been mentioned – though there was danger in this.

Remember also that the British also felt that the bayonet charge was critical to their tactics, and that long musketry duels were to be avoided, as this would play to the French advantage.

My theory is that maintenance of cohesion was the key. It was more difficult to maintain cohesion in line. But the British managed this through training and a high cadre ratio. Units also (I think) usually stayed together longer than in other armies. For various reasons other armies were unable to follow the British down this path – or thought it was an inefficient use of resources.

Hi Westmarcher,

Thank you for your comments, let me try to answer them to some degree.

I really am not too hung up on the depth of the attacking column (by company, division, or even a line), I wanted to first evaluate and quantify the concept that the if a battalion in line was attacked on the far (left) flank (and that flank not "supported" by a continuation of the line), that the far right flank would have a significantly reduced affect on the conflict. Yes, I did restrict the calculations to concentrating on the nearest corner of the attacking unit. And, Yes, an attack by different formations would have a tail sticking out behind that could be fired at at an less severe angle. (note that you do seem to ignore that it would be at a greater distance- which becomes significant for oblique directions of attack). If you want to consider that "decrease in angle for firing at the tail of the column", well the charts that have been provided will allow you to figure out a system to do that as well. The idea occured to me, but the representation of such data would be very complicated and confusion- there are several posters complaining that the charts are as much as mystery as the tax tables already! Anyway, the depth of a close column of divisions is on the order of 27 yards, which is not that many degrees and with a pas de charge speed of ~ 82 yards/minute would be covered faster than a musket could be reloaded.

A second point that you make is that you feel that the far peletons who became screened by their own troops or saw that they would be firing at a longer distance (actually the more important effect I think), would naturally move out, break their line, stick their flank out in the general direction of the enemy to wrap around the incoming column.

I disagree on several ground. First, I'll challenge to find a period drill manual which details this method. Maybe if the enemy line was far away, completely visible and there was no artillery smoke or woods or hills or valleys or calvary around, the thought might occur. But it would be foolish to leave such a gap in the line of battle for some other column to rush into, or to make the line vulnerable to light calvary or cannon fire. If there was a follow up attack by a second column, could those "wrapping around" peletons get back to reestablish their line in time? If that were to be a defensive method, then, as an attacker, I would be sucker the defender with a first attack and be waiting with a second attack column to exploit the confusion. I believe that the period tactics were that they would await the attack in line, and if it did penetrate, the response would be to use the second line of battalions (usually waiting in columns of division, I might add) to counterattack and restore the line.

I would like such a tactic to flow out of the wargame design and system- right now the only time a second line of battalions is used is when nothing more can be stuffed into the first line!

I think there is much in what mathewgreen writes.

Beautiful discussions of late, and very enlightening to see your calculations, 1968BillsFan!

Billsfan,

Regarding your request for something from a drill book mentioning wheeling companies to fire on a column's flanks, Captain Abraham James of the 67th Regiment wrote "The Military Costume of India in an Exemplification of the Manual and Platoon Exercises for the use of The Native Troops and The British Army in General" in 1813. This is what he says on the matter:

Oblique firing is not so generally practised as it ought to be, nor are all its advantages duly appreciated; and yet this fire is eminently useful on many occasions. Should the enemy advance in column, or on a front inferior to your own, his flanks will not escape the oblique fire of the out-flanking portion of your force. If he threatens any particular portion of your line, those parts not menaced may cross an oblique fire upon him. To decrease the obliquity of such fractions of your line, they may be wheeled up a small degree, if necessary.

And here's a nice example showing the vulnerability of a column's flanks when outflanked by wheeling up a few companies:

Although written in the third person, this is Colonel Walker's own account of his regiment at Vimeiro, found in the regimental history:

A massive column of the enemy composed of five regiments in close order of half battalions, supported by seven pieces of cannon, and under the command of the general of division, Loisson, made a rapid march towards the hill, and though much shaken by the steady fire of the artillery, after a short pause behind a hedge to recover, it again continued to advance; till Lieutenant-Colonel Robe, R.A., no longer able to use the guns, considered them lost. Up to this time the 50th had remained at ordered arms, but as it was impossible, on the ground on which it stood, to contend against so superior a force, and Colonel Walker, having observed that the enemy's column inclined to the left, proposed to Brigadier- General Fane to attempt to turn its flank by a wheel of the right wing. Permission for this having been obtained, this wing was immediately thrown into echelon of companies of about four paces to the left, advanced thus for a short distance, and then ordered to form line to the left. The rapidity, however, of the enemy's advance, and their having already opened a confused though very hot fire from the flank of their column — though only two companies of the wing were yet formed — these were so nearly in contact with and bearing on the angle of the column that Colonel Walker, thinking no time was to be lost, ordered an immediate volley and charge. The result exceeded his most sanguine expectation. The angle was instantly broken, and the drivers of the three guns advanced in front, alarmed at the fire in their rear, cutting the traces of their horses, and rushing back with them, created great confusion, which by the time the three outer companies could arrive to take part in the charge, became general. Then this immense mass, so threatening in its appearance but a few minutes before, became in an instant an un- governable mob, carrying off its officers and flying like a flock of sheep, almost without resistance, for upwards of two miles. On clearing a wood, Colonel Walker, observing a party of cavalry to be drawn up on a small plain threatening his flank, deemed it necessary to put a stop to the pursuit, as a party of the 20th Dragoons, which had previously joined in it, had already (through getting entangled in a wood) suffered so seriously as to be incapable of affording any further assistance.

Yes, thank you Mr. Snort. What you have described looks to be a full Division attack of 5 regiments and 7 cannon with no other flank support of the attackers. That is a very big attack- is it 5 battalions or 10 battalions (5 regiments?) What was the size of the defending unit(s)? was it just the 50th? 2 or 3 companies but it to flight by a volley and charge. It appears to me that this is a brigade v brigade or division v division dust up and there was more of a flanking attack that did wonders than just a wrap around by a few companies of one battalion.

It was the attack of Thomieres' French brigade of around 2,000 men against the British 50th Regiment, around 900 strong. The rest of this British brigade, all riflemen, had been in the skirmish line and had been driven in by the French light troops and column. There are similar accounts of this incident by Leach of the 95th and Patterson of the 50th, although they do not go into the same detail. Patterson states that nearly all the regiment's casualties were inflicted by the French light troops covering the column.

To the British right of this attack, another similar column was dealt with in a similar manner. Stopped by volleys at 150 yards and charged frontally by the 97th regiment, while the 52nd regiment swept around their flank.

I think this discussion could go on a long time.

It seems to me that there is a lot in what Matthewgreen says and the example that Major Snort gives. If we just take British lines, British battalions did not stay in a nice straight line; they always wrapped around the head of the French column – by wheeling out wings, by companies of an adjacent battalion wheeling out, by adjacent whole battalions wheeling out (defeat of the guard at Waterloo).

Also, although we wargamers do everything with battalions, in practice it was different. (Half) companies from battalions from second line would be pushed forward to plug the gaps as the battalions in the first line closed up because of casualties. At Busaco, firstly several British battalions "split" in order to get a nice line in front of each French column and secondly (half) companies were then fed forward as described above, as necessary. This was done so smoothly it can't have been an innovation on the day.

Then, a volley or two (often two): the first volley staggering the column, the second – including from troops wheeled out to the flanks – doing the real damage and the bayonet charge before the French had recovered from the shock of that second, deadly volley. The problem was getting the troops to stop the pursuit.

I am also sceptical about the idea that the French always intended to deploy and that all those column attacks (up till and at Waterloo) were somehow "unintentional." Yes, they did just as badly in line (at Maida even the 1er Leger – probably the very best French regiment at the Napoleonic army's peak. Yes they very frequently smashed through Spanish lines in columns of divisions, especially (as Giard's division at Ocana) when the Spanish lines had been softened up by artillery and a first line of troops that had fought in a line volley fight (the German and Polish divisons at Ocana).

But when the French tried being clever and rushing a column to occupy ground or rushing into a gap between British, it didn't seem to work either (Barrosa, Waterloo). Frequently because it wasn't really a gap after all, just concealment.

This goes back to the other thread about +1 for British in line being "silly." Sustained British volley fire was absolutely devastating as Barrosa and Albuhera showed. It just wasn't the preferred British tactic because it led to a Pyrrhic victory. The preferred tactic was the deadly volley and charge, as at Busaco, and nobody could do it like the British.

I haven't studied the British tactics in Spain down to the lower level as much as the people quoting above and until I do I'm willing to agree that the British did follow a institionalized tactic of centering their line battalions around the head of an attacking French column, using strong skirmish lines to defeat the general French advantage in skirmishing and some use of wrapping around. Long serving, well trained troops, often fighting on the defensive against the French 2nd team and smart thinking to counter the advanced (for the time)French tactics. I am a little suspecious of an Anglophilic bias, since English and Americans can most easily read English accounts and have that as a major interest. It seems the French ALWAYS get trounced with their columns. I gotta wonder why they perservered with that horrible, unsuccessful method and how they conquered most of Europe with repeated victories over the continental powers. There has to be some counter balancing information on the successful use of columns. don't you think?

I would challenge the French "second team" comment, but that is not the subject of this topic.

There is no doubt that the French, and other nations, thought that the charge in close column was a viable tactic. Jomini summed it up:

In fact, in real combats of infantry I have never seen anything but battalions deployed commencing to fire by company, and finally by file, or else columns marching firmly against the enemy, who either retired without awaiting the columns, or repulsed them before an actual collision took place, or themselves moved out to meet the advance.

And:

In the later wars in Europe, positions have often been carried by Russian, French and Prussian columns with their arms at the shoulder and without firing a shot. This was a triumph of momentum and the moral effect it produces; but under the cool and steady fire of the English infantry the French columns did not succeed so well at Talavera, Busaco, Fuentes de Onoro, Albuera and Waterloo.

Billsfan,

Regarding your comment: "the British did follow a institutionalized tactic of centering their line battalions around the head of an attacking French column"

I do not think that is true. British brigades would normally deploy with an interval of 6 paces between battalions and on a field such as Waterloo, there would be similar gaps between brigades of different divisions. If an attack hit the point between battalions, brigades or divisions, it would be dealt by the troops that were there on the spot and there would be no need for any lateral adjustments, because there were no gaps of any significance.

A battle such as Busaco was different in that the position occupied was very extensive, and there were considerable gaps in places; between divisions, brigades and even battalions. In this case, it was essential that troops moved laterally to plug gaps or intercept columns, but this was not the normal state of affairs.

Likewise, the French attack at Busaco was not the normal state of affairs either, and consisted of a few concentrated attacks carried out by considerable columns advancing on narrow fronts on the few practical routes through very difficult terrain.

Quick notes:
Paddy Griffith's Osprey Elite on French infantry tactics deals with the question of "what the French really meant to do with those columns," at some length. I picked it up on Kindle last night and read through it.

I would definitely read through the Zhmodikov's "Tactics of the Russian Army.." before concluding that nobody ever used their bayonets.

Also, the description of Vimiero sounds to me like a very arrogant French command showing little to no respect for their British opponents. I would hate to shackle a French player with rules enforcing this kind of approach.

Jeffrey,

So what does Paddy Griffiths say?