"Blutarski Special Sneak Treat - German WW1 anti-tank tactics" Topic

This is for all you gamers who are not happy unless there are great big British tanks lumbering across the battlefield. It is excerpted from a translation of the German "Training Regulations for Dismounted Troops in Time of War, January 1918", which I was fortunate enough to have acquired some number of years ago – complete with numerous india ink diagrams pasted into the carbon copy pages. I'm not certain it has ever been published. Keeping in mind that what went on in the field was not always in accord with the dictates of the manual, this does give a good idea of German late war tactical thinking.

One introductory point of interest was that every heavy machine gun was to have at hand at least 1000 belted armor-piercing cartridges and every light machine gun at least 500 such cartridges stored near the gun for use against tanks and aircraft.

Anyways, here we go -

416. Anti-tank defence. Tanks are used by the enemy to pave the way for his infantry. Their application is limited. They are not capable of defending captured ground on account of their limited ammunition supply. It is primarily a task for the artillery to combat them, but infantry can also put them out of action with the means at their disposal.

417. The infantry must be made familiar with the method of attack to be expected on the part of hostile tanks, and educated to the conviction that, with the proper use of its means of defence, it is superior to the tanks. Thorough instruction is necessary to accomplish this aim.

418. Machine gun and rifle fire with armor-piercing ammunition, light trench mortars and hand grenades serve to combat them, the latter especially in the form of bombs.

The most advantageous targets for armor-piercing ammunition are the low-lying gasoline and water tanks, as well as the side walls. Success may also be expected with ordinary ammunition against the aperture for observation and the loopholes.

The contact shell of the light trench mortar is almost as effective as the artillery shell. A flat trajectory increases the accuracy of fire.

Hand grenade bombs must explode close to the tank. They are most effective against the treads of the tank.

The individual soldier can also attack the tank by slipping in diagonally under its angle of depression, and utilizing this dead space for throwing hand grenades through the openings. (Blutarski note – The Germans of WW1 fielded a variety of hand grenade types during the war; while the "potato masher" was the most common, they also used small "Eier" (egg) grenades, discus grenades for scaling longer distances, and percussion grenades that would (presumably) explode when striking the ground).

Maybe some interesting ideas for a skirmish game here … Have fun.

Gott mit uns!

B

I would urge significant caution in translating these German training regulations into skirmish gaming. There are two clues in what has been quoted above (and thank you very much for taking the time to present the information by the way). The first clue is in the sentence: 'It is primarily the task for the artillery to combat [tanks]…' German artillery was by far and away the biggest killer of British and French tanks.

The second clue is found in the need to bolster the confidence of the infinity: 'The infantry… must be educated to the conviction that, with the proper use of its means of defence, it is superior to tanks'. This theme appears time and time again in German manuals and communiques. It is a clear reminder that tanks had a powerful influence in lowering infantry morale, not least because tanks supported by infantry were relatively impervious to the non-artillery measures described above with the exception of the Minenwerfer.

The armour-piercing ammunition referred to was the Patrone Spitzgeschoss mit Kern or SmK, known as the K bullet. It had a hardened steel core. The Germans also reversed the bullets of standard Mauser round, inserting the pointed end into the cartridge. The problems with both types of anti-tank round, apart from limited availability, was that the later marks of British tanks were almost impervious to their effects. Even the lightly armoured Mk II tanks that took part in Bullecourt were put out of action by artillery and Minenwerfer fire, not by the fact that the K ammunition could actually pierce their thin mild steel armour. There are numerous accounts of Mk IV and V tanks taking multiple hits from machine guns, indeed turning towards the fire and then driving down the MG cone of bullets before running over the crew.

Hand grenades were only useful if, as the text notes, they exploded '… close to the tank'. This meant the thrower had to be close to the tank. Georg Bucher illustrated the problem in his biography. His best friend attempted to attack a French light tank with a grenade. The tank ran him down and killed him. The text refers to '…bombs'. This is most likely a translation of Geballteladung, which is the bundle of stick grenades tied together. These were very effective if you had them to hand and could get close enough. They could blow a track, immobilising the tank. Supporting infantry would stop this happening. The one exception was tanks operating alone in built-up areas. This rarely happened but it was the case during the Battle of Cambrai. German infantry were able to defend the village of Fontaine Notre Dame when British tanks entered the narrow streets without infantry support.

Flat trajectory Minenwerfer required a special later war mount. Not all light MW were set up this way.

The article does not mention the T-Gewehr anti-tank rifle, which appeared after January 1918.

Robert

Hi Robert,
I fully agree with what you wrote – and did not intend to imply that knocking out a tank back then would be child's play by any means. I was browsing through the manual last night and was struck by the similarity of the German approach to WW1 infantry anti-tank tactics to that of WW2. Having played more than a few enjoyable games of "Panzerknacker" and "Cross of Iron" back in the day, it struck me that the motif could easily be back-dated to WW1.

Good point re the T-Gewehr AT rifle. My impression is that it was not in service at the time this manual was written and printed.

B

The big difference from WW2 is the power of the anti-tank weapons that infantry could use, particularly at distance. Also there was more fighting in built-up areas in WW2, which favours infantry only anti-tank tactics. WW2 infantry could be more brave and determined against tanks. In WW1, the exhortations by higher command for infantry to be brave were seen as hollow, based on experience.

The T-Gewehr didn't really start making an appearance until the late spring and summer of 1918.

Robert

An extract here from the history of Minenwerfer Kompanie Nr. 27. It relates to the Battle of Bullecourt, one of the first accounts of Minenwerfer being used against tanks (well, one tank but who's counting):

"From mid-March to early April [1917] the company participated in exercises with 27th Infantry Division south of Valenciennes. The men stayed in Gaulzoir. On 6 April the 27th Infantry Division relieved 26th Reserve Division stationed near Arras. The company took over 226th Minenwerfer Company's guns and immediately began improving the positions, mainly with tunneling. A few days after the company took over the position the British launched a major attack on Bullecourt, which had been incorporated into the Siegfried Line against the advice of the local commanders. Minenwerfer were emplaced in pairs (Doppelständen). There were two sets of Minenwerfer emplacements near Bullecourt and one near the Sansouci mill. All of the guns were manned as the British launched their infantry attack at 0530 hours on the 11th April. The enemy artillery fire had grown throughout the previous night to become a violent barrage of the heaviest caliber, whose effect was increased still further by gas shells and gas discharges. The following notes from the NCOs provide a summary of what the Minenwerfer crews experienced near Bullecourt:

Unteroffizier Maier (Heinrich), who was based in Doppelstand I (code-named Samiel): "At around 0630 hours, the artillery fire reached its peak as a violent barrage. About this time the enemy attack began… The two medium Minenwerfer, numbers 1691 and 1692, each got off one shot. Then, however, one of our infantry sections fell back from the first line and called out to us, encouraging us to pull back as well because the British were following in droves; it was impossible to hold the front line. Fire from our infantry on the right flank passed over us. We were cut off from behind and from our left flank by the British. The heavy artillery fire prevented us from mounting any sort of defence from our emplacement with the carbines."

After consulting with my observer, Unteroffizier Vollmar, I ordered the team to get away to the right… Vollmann and then I blew up the gun … As we left the emplacement, Vollmar was shot in the neck and severely wounded. I managed to get him to a nearby underground shelter where he received medical attention… " (Unteroffizier Vollmann succumbed to his wound on 14th April 1917.)

Vizefeldwebel Götze from Doppelstand II (code-named Michel): " … From 0500 hours I returned enemy fire with the heavy Minenwerfer 1490 and the medium Minenwerfer 1788. Six heavy and 6 medium shells were fired on pre-determined targets in the valley 700 meters southeast of Bullecourt. The British artillery fire slackened at 0630 hours, whereupon the British attacked our line in force. The overwhelming numbers of enemy soldiers forced our infantry in Sector 124 to retire into the ravine behind our position. The heavy Minenwerfer fired two shells at the enemy firing line. The British established themselves in the second line and threw hand grenades at our position. The Minenwerfer crew defended the emplacement with carbine fire and helped their infantry colleagues to hold the British forces. Meanwhile I made my way to the command post to the north where I updated the local Kampftruppenkommandeur 120, Hauptmann Schaidler, with all of the information about enemy's position as well as the possible use and potential for medium and heavy Minenwerfer to combat tanks. Just then a message arrived that 3 [tanks] were… approaching… When I got back to what had been our second line, 3 shots were fired with the heavy Minenwerfer. I watched the fall of the shells…, two hit the target. At the same time, the medium Minenwerfer fired 5 shells at enemy infantry reinforcements that were moving forward. From K.T.K. 124 (the local command centre responsible for coordinating the defence in the sector) I received a message that a tank had broken into the sector of 4./120. The heavy Minenwerfer was needed to destroy it. The gun was laid. According to the men of 4./120, four shells brought the tank to a halt, whereupon the crew fled… "

Hauptmann Schaidler, commander of I./120, recommended Vizefeldwebel Götze for the Iron Cross, citing his "significant contribution to the defense against the British attack and the recovery of the Sector C". Götze's exemplary personal conduct was particularly highlighted in the citation.

The British attacks became less intense during the rest of April but the Minenwerfer were still called on several times. The continuous British shellfire caused considerable damage to the emplacements but the damage was repaired each time. Miraculously losses remained low. Apart from Unteroffizier Vollmann who died of wounds, the company lost only 3 men lightly wounded."

Robert

Very interesting material, Rob. Did you translate this yourself from the German? If so, a fine piece of work.

B

Thank you. Yes, I did the translation.

Robert

It should be noted that the lone tank was attacked by the heavy Minenwerfer. This means that large calibre shells were lobbed towards the tank. Indirect fire would not have been used. Four shells were fired but the tank itself was not destroyed. The crew 'fled', which means more than one survived. It should not be assumed that the crew bottled because of the MW fire.

Robert

This is for all you gamers who are not happy unless there are great big British tanks lumbering across the battlefield.

Um, OK, so what do the soldats do if they're *French* tanks?

Leland R. Erickson
Metal Express
metal-express.net

Ahhh! Allow me to re-phrase.

"This is for all you gamers who are not happy unless there are great big British tanks … or teenie-weenie French FT17s … lumbering across the battlefield.

;-]

B

Here is Georg Bucher's account about facing an attack supported by Renaults. His unit was facing the Americans in October 1918.

'"Tanks on our right!"

We listened to the din outside and laughed scornfully at the youngster.

"Tank attack! Can't you understand what I'm saying?' The sentry was already snatching up his kit, ready for flight.

Dull, hollow explosions sounded outside. With startled faces we pulled on our gas masks, fitted them to our faces and replaced our helmets. Then we leapt out into the trench, carrying hand-grenades. Tanks had broken through our line on the right of us, although our own sector was still under [artillery] fire and a mist of gas filled the trench. Our own artillery burst into action and the barking anti-tank guns joined in. A thrill like an electric current went through
me as the sergeant-major [of the trench mortar battery] gave the range to his trench-mortars – he had a wonderful target, for six or seven little tanks came pitching and rolling out of the field of rotting corn.

There were no waves of infantry, only those little tanks moving rapidly amid the hail of hand-grenades and trench-mortar shells. They were coming straight for our part of the trench. One of them was nearly blown to bits – smoke and flames belched from it. Our trench-mortars had got right on i. If only we had had armour-piercing machine-gun ammunition and tank defences! Since it was useless to pump lead from our rifles, we snatched convulsively at hand-grenades. Our panic had disappeared. Cold blood alone could help us against that armour-plated foe.

A second tank lay shattered and smoking. The trench-mortar crews were the finest crowd I'd ever seen.

The remaining tanks came on, their caterpillar-wheels biting inexorably over every obstacle. Our cold terror and agitation were a new experience for us – one was conscious of being so defenceless, so preposterously fragile. The tanks, which drew nearer and nearer, seemed to us like the approach of an invulnerable and invincible conqueror.

More of them came within range of our hand-grenades, crossing the last three hundred yards with astonishing speed; and to the right of us their machine guns and three-pounders were spitting venomously as they broke across our weak line and enfiladed the communicators [communication trenches]. Our line of retreat was thus cut off as well as being endangered by the concentrated fire of our own anti-tank guns. Before we could adjust ourselves to the situation more tanks could be seen approaching across the rotting corn – long, low, box-shaped affairs which moved so quickly that we were, so to speak, frozen with terror; and as for attempting to retreat, khaki figures with light machine-guns were pouring from the [?Mk V* tanks] in the
ground behind us and occupying the ground behind us.

It seemed that nothing remained for us but to defend ourselves till we were captured or killed. The first waves of the attacking infantry were already moving through the rotting corn. We did not stop to fire at them, for suddenly there was a wild stampede leftwards along the trench – there, where we were still not entirely cut off, was our only hope of escape.

About forty of us were left [by the time the company got back together, this was down to 28]. The little [artillery liaison] officer and the trench-mortar serjeant-major, who were still some distance to our right, surrendered with some twenty men to one of the tanks. The officer, serjeant-major and five or six others were shot down – the poor devils were in the cross fire between friend and foe.'

[Not my translation]

Robert

'We rushed from shell-hole to shell-hole. The wildness of the enemy fire must have been our salvation.

"Tanks!" I spun round when I heard the wild cry. Two tanks were coming straight at us from the right. We were trapped, for an enemy machine-gun was traversing low across the field. The tanks came nearer, blazing away like mad. Lying in the shell-holes we were defenceless against them.

I uncoupled my last hand-grenade from my belt. Then I say someone jump up. It was Riedel: he had brought with him a large bundle of hand-grenades [tied together] when we had taken flight from the trench. He was up out of his shell-hole and rushing to the right through a hail of machine-gun fire – the bullets were knocking up the ground. He stretched his arm backwards and threw – God, those seconds! – threw the bundle of bombs right under the tank. Flames lept up amid the smoke, and shrieks. We took advantage of the diversion to move back a dozen yards – not all of us, for two or three lay screaming on the ground.

There was a wild yell beside me: 'Tanks!' Three more of the monsters were coming straight across from the right, followed by khaki groups of 'moppers-up.' From every shell-hole men were emerging with hands held above their heads. Someone tried to bolt – a bayonet was run into his back and we had a company-commander no longer.

Our machine-guns were silent – the tanks crushed every resistance as they moved forward.

The tanks still came on. "To the left" I shouted to my five [men]. Three of them held up their hands – I couldn't blame the poor devils, for the ground was being swept by a hail of lead. Suddenly Riedel doubled up, his face covered with blood. I saw that he was bleeding from both knees, neck and breast. He had been absolutely riddled with bullets. "G-Ge-orge!" he cried.'

And so died the last of Bucher's five comrades with whom he had started the war.

Robert

Thanks again for taking the time to post the above passages Robert. Excellent material. I was especially interested by the advance of the initial group of 6 tanks without infantry escort. Their job was presumably to "develop" the German position and suppress the supporting MGs?

B

There are (at least) three possible reasons for the advance without infantry support.

1. French (and British tactics) allowed for tanks to lead a break-in when used in large numbers. These were examples, as mentioned in another thread, of infantry supporting tanks rather than the usual perception of tanks supporting infantry in WW1.

2. The infantry became separated for some reason, perhaps coming under fire once the tanks had passed through. This was a defensive tactic used in some sectors, where isolated forward MG teams would not fire until tanks had bypassed their positions.

3. The infantry deliberately did not keep up. This happened with 52nd Division at Cambrai for example. The GOC, General Harper, has been criticised (then and now) for the decision. It was regarded as a prime cause of the failure to capture Flesquieres. Tanks served as magnets for small arms and other fire, as clearly demonstrated in the descriptions above. It made good sense for infantry to not be associated with this.

Robert