"The U.S. Army Wanted to Replace the Bradley 38 Years Ago" Topic

"In 1977, Congress wanted to know if the new armored personnel carrier could survive a fight against Soviet forces in Europe. By that time, the Army had worked on the Bradley—while repeatedly changing its requirements—for years.

"The Army requires an infantry righting vehicle [and] the design of the IFV is acceptable," concludes an Army study, which the Pentagon declassified in 2003, and recently released online at the Army's Heritage and Education Center.

The Bradley would enter service. But now legislators wanted plans for a better design that could be ready within the decade…"
Full article here
link

Amicalement
Armand

Ah … yeah … we'll see … Are those legislators today looking for having those new vehicles to be built in their district(s) ? Call me jaded …

(smile)

Amicalement
Armand

Armand,

This article is not very truthful. The Bradley was not in full scale issue in 1978. I was at the home of the Armor and Cavalry School, Fort Knox in 1979; at that time the Bradley was just entering full scale production. The article says the Army wanted to Replace the Bradley. You cannot replace something you don't already have. In the case of the Bradley there was considerable discussion of whether it could fit the bill as the Army's new personnel carrier and scout vehicle. The M114 scout vehicle that it would replace was much smaller and easier to conceal than the Bradley scout vehicle that would replacement. It was armed with a light cannon and could kill BMP and BRDM vehicles if it had to. It was of course no match for a main battle tank. The talk was that the addition of a TOW launcher would give the scouts a real anti-tank weapon. The argument against that was that having the TOW would encourage the Scouts to fight it out with Warsaw Pact tanks, when their real mission was to track the advance of the enemy and to mislead the enemy of the location of the main line of resistance and not to actually fight the enemy.

The personnel carrier in service at the time and my mount was the M-113. The M-113 was and is a fine vehicle but it is a battlefield taxi and not an infantry fighting vehicle. The 113 could provide infantry fire support with its heavy machine gun but could not survive fire from heavy caliber guns such as the Dshk machine gun, or the main guns of the Soviet armor, and it could destroy them only in the most favorable of circumstances. The Army at that time wanted a vehicle with more punch than the M-113 could provide the real discussion was whether the Bradley was actually that vehicle. In the end the Bradley was selected because it had an actual anti-tank capability, and could keep up with the M1 tanks; something the M113 could not do. The Marder while a good vehicle did not have the capability of the Bradley and the Dutch vehicle was only an upgraded M-113.

The Army had already had spectacular development failures in the Sergeant York Division Air Defense Gun to replace the aging Vulcan, and the conversion of the French/German Roland system. It was loath to have another failure as gigantic as an armored personnel carrier. So while there were concerns as to its survivability versus Soviet armor it was clearly more survivable than the 113 which could only rarely hurt them while the Bradley could kill them at all ranges.

The rank and file in the Army clearly wanted an upgrade in their means of getting around on the battlefield. The Armor School and the Infantry School the two most influential branch schools also supported it. The Pentagon Papers focused on the test officer who was concerned that the vehicle could not survive being hit by anti-tank weapons being fired at point blank range at a standing Bradley which was not even attempting to defend itself. Very few tanks in service at the time could have survived being hit by an anti-tank weapon under those conditions.

I participated in the testing of the High Mobility Anti-tank Gun, HiMAG, that your article mentioned. It had nothing to do with personnel carriers and was not part of a family of modular designed vehicles, one of which could have been made into a personnel carrier. It was an impressive gun, firing a Hyper velocity round but it was a specialized vehicle and the Improved TOW was even more capable of killing armor at long range than it was, and was much easier to maintain. The Armor school was not interested in giving up tank numbers as the M-1 was being fielded and the Infantry School was more than satisfied with the improved TOW vehicle. The working groups on the modular concept met in 1987 at the Tank and Automotive Command in Warren Michigan. I attended that meeting as well as a representative of the Air Defense School, Directive of Combat Developments. We agreed that having common repair parts would improve the supply system but the sticking points were the unique performance of the different branches. Perhaps the Field Artillery and Armor could use the same chassis for example, but Infantry, and Air Defense did not need a chassis as heavily built as the other two branches.

Eventually Stryker came from that concept, and it has shown itself a good vehicle.

To say that the Army wanted to replace the Bradley is far from the truth.

After commanding an active duty M113 Mech Co '87-'89. I'd have gladly traded them for the M2 … Even the newer version they are talking about making, a turretless M2 …

The Pentagon Papers focused on the test officer who was concerned that the vehicle could not survive being hit by anti-tank weapons being fired at point blank range at a standing Bradley which was not even attempting to defend itself. Very few tanks in service at the time could have survived being hit by an anti-tank weapon under those conditions.

I remember this, we were all saying the same … Very few tanks could survive that type of hit. Let alone an IFV …

Brad Jenison and Legion 4 beat me to the punch.

Although the M113 was a good platform it was designed to be a "battlefield taxi" not a Infantry Fighting Vehicle, as a result it was not intended to be exposed to tank fire. The operational concept, was that the infantry would be transported, to the front lines in the M113, where the infantry would disembark, at the line of departure, and attack the enemy position on foot. Theoretically the only direct combat an M113 should have been involved in, was providing fire support with it's 50 caliber machine guns, for the infantry assault, from concealed or cover positions at or near the line of departure. Taking in M113 into close combat with the infantry or tanks is paramount to suicide.

As I remember the controversy during the late seventies (using my grouchy old man "good old days" voice), the basic controversy was not that the Bradley was better than M113, the question always seem to be if the Bradley was sufficiently armored or over armored. One side was always claiming that the Bradley was under armored for the cost, while the other side claimed that the Bradley too armored and expense and would be better off with a less armored cheaper vehicle like the Russian BMP. I don't remember any serious discussion about not replacing the existing M113.

Regards

Yes, you'd dismount under cover that was closest to the OBJ. And keep the track under cover to provide fire support with the .50 cal. But as we all know, sometimes easier said then done. The best armor on the M113 was in the front … because that is where the engine is. The thin flat sides had no ballistic qualities. However the M113 was very mechanically reliable. In many cases I preferred a dismounted night attack if the situation allowed it …

The Pentagon Papers focused on the test officer who was concerned that the vehicle could not survive being hit by anti-tank weapons being fired at point blank range at a standing Bradley which was not even attempting to defend itself. Very few tanks in service at the time could have survived being hit by an anti-tank weapon under those conditions.

Can any tank survive in that situation? Whether today's top-line or 1970s vintage?

I mean, we've had Abrams penetrated in similar situations, the Brits have had Chally 2s ventilated, the Russian tanks tend to make a fireworks display…

The only tanks I can say that haven't brewed up from a close-range hit are those that haven't taken a close-range hit from major-caliber AT, like the LeClerc, K2, or Type 10.

Thanks for the explanation my friend.

Amicalement
Armand

I'd say the Israelis know a thing or two about this sort of thing.

They do have the Merkava after all, with the rear compartment. So it can carry troops as well.

Why don't more armies do that?

Oh and make very heavy APCs based on the same hull, like the Namer:

Why not more of that sort of thing too? Mind you, I'm pretty sure none of those vehicles will take a hit from an ATGW either (without defensive action) and still be fighting fit.

the Brits have had Chally 2s ventilated

I wasn't aware of that.

John T

At least in the case of the Merkava, it's very narrowly designed. It is awesome in the Bekaa Valley. It's pretty damn good in the Sinai.

It would suck ass in Europe or Korea. Deploying those beasts anywhere outside of Israel is virtually impossible (the US has borrowed a couple Merks and Namers for exercises, they pretty much filled the entire cargo ship weight-wise with lots of empty volume).

Namers started because the Israelis had Merk 2 hulls that could not be upgraded to Merk 3s, and the Israelis cannot afford any casualties. So they can afford a 70+ton APC that will destroy any city street it drives on and can't travel more than 120 miles from it's home base.

The American military needs a tank that can perform in Europe (and both in the forests of southern Germany and the steppes of Poland), in the Middle East, in Korea, etc. American tanks and APCs need to be deployable (which the current Abrams and Bradley are NOT).

@John T: from Wikipedia: "In August 2006 in al-Amarah, an RPG-29 damaged the underside of a Challenger 2, detonating ERA in the area of the driver's cabin. The driver lost part of his foot and two more of the crew were also injured but the driver was able to reverse 1.5 mi (2.4 km) to an aid post. The incident was not made public until May 2007;"

Ta, Lion

John T

The rear hatch on the Merkava was a design feature born in the '73 War. The IDF needed a quick way to upload ammo and get back into the fight in the Golan or Sinai. The MBTs in the IDF's inventory at the time did not have that feature. So the IDF designed their own MBT with that and other features. However, that being said, the rear hatch had also been used to recover WIAs under fire. The Namer APC was a great idea. The US is thinking of making an M2 Brad without turret as well …