"Hobart's Funnies" Topic

I'm reading a pretty good book on the 79th Armoured Division &, in passing, the author wrote that US losses on Omaha Beach would have been far less if the Americans hadn't rejected using Hobart's Funnies.

A fair enough statement?

Fair enough or not, it certainly gets mentioned often enough.

I was under the impression the US didn't reject the idea. I seem to recall it was more a matter of getting the funnies to the US, which wasn't possible by the day of the landings.

If anyone has solid info on this correct me if I'm wrong.

Add that there was not enough time to get them to the US and give the crews trainign on them. not to mention the British did not have enough of threm for themselves.

Sure it would have been great to have them, but with the time schedual the way it was, it was not going to happen.

Owen

Why send them to the US when theyre going to be used in France?

I see no validity in the suggestion.

The US Army's problem on D-Day was getting armor TO Omaha beach. The Shermans on Utah provided very effective support, eliminating resistance points by direct fire and rallying the troops to advance.

The one item from Hobart's Funnies that was adopted and used was the Dual-Drive amphibious modifications approach, pioneered on Valentine tanks but for D-Day applied to the DD Shermans. The problem for the US Army was that the great majority of DD Shermans scheduled to land on Omaha swamped and sank in the waves. Very few made it to the beaches, allowing the Germans to concentrate fire on those that did, neutralizing several before their full impact could be realized.

Even the DD Shermans could not make it to shore at Omaha, so there is no reason to expect that the rest of the "Funnies" would have done anything more than sat off shore in their ships. If the problem was that the AFVs didn't get to the beach, having some number of bobbins, flails and petards on Churchills (or Shermans, or even M1 Abrams!) floating around off shore would not have made any difference.

Or so it would seem to me.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Had been adopted, they would have landed AHEAD of the first infantry wave, just as they did on the British & Canadian beaches. In most cases the AVREs landed ahead of the DDs due to sea conditions.

There was no greater density of AT weapons on Omaha than on any other beach. Juno actually had more 75-88mm AT guns than Omaha.

The problem on Omaha was that infantry were trapped in the killing zones with no exits. AVREs on the beach would most likely have provided those exits earlier.

The reason that the DDs didn't make it on to Omaha (bar two) were that a. they were launched too far out and

b. They were navigating by visual references rather than compass-bearing and dead-reckoning. By keeping their bow onto the visual reference points they exposed their flanks to large waves which collapsed their flotation screens.

Had been adopted, they would have landed AHEAD of the first infantry wave, just as they did on the British & Canadian beaches.

Only if the British or Canadian armies had landed on Omaha … which they did not.

US Army landing plans called for the DDs to land first. Giving them flails or petards would not have changed this. Two tank battalions were assigned to the assault wave. Each was to launch two companies of DDs, timed to reach the beach 5 minutes before the first wave of infantry landing craft. Landing craft with back-up armor (the 3rd companies of each battalion) were NOT in the first wave, much less ahead of the first wave.

If the US Army had been willing to send in landing craft with AFVs first, they would have landed Shermans first. They did not. Giving them different armor does not change that. The "funnies" would have sat off shore.

The reason that the DDs didn't make it on to Omaha (bar two) were that a. they were launched too far out …

The DDs were indeed launched too far out. Omaha had high points of land projecting out to sea on both sides, and cliffs behind. The result was a sort of cove that retained morning sea-mist and smoke.

The doctrine for the DDs was to launch about 2 miles off shore. This came from the British. This is how the DDs proceeded at Sword beach, with great success. At Gold beach the sea state was higher, and the DDs began launching only 7-800 yards from shore. Even so, 8 DDs sank. So the remainder were landed on the beach.

But at Omaha the shore was not visible to the boats coming in. In addition to this, Omaha had a higher sea state than the other beaches, and a strong cross-current. So when the US 741st Tank Battalion launched 29 DD Shermans into the water they were actually more than 3 miles out, and 27 of the 29 did not make it to shore.

The seas at Omaha were so high that 10 of the landing craft in the first wave swamped and sank in the high seas. And the great majority of landing craft that did make it to shore landed in the wrong place. So the DDs, tested in seas only up to 1 foot, really had no chance.

Putting different kinds of armor in the US Army's inventory doesn't change any of that. If there had been "Funnies" in the US Army inventory, they would have been assigned to land in later waves, and would not have made their way in until the first wave's circumstances were clarified. Then they would have been out of position, and missed their assigned landing beaches.

How would this have helped?

And even if they had gotten ashore, what was their value to the problems the US forces faced at Omaha?

What the "Funnies" did well was aid in the crossing of obsticals built to impede tank advances. Petards could blow down small sea-walls or blow up dragon's teeth (and other roadblocks), AVRE-launched bridges could provide ramps to climb walls or span ditches, and flails could clear routes through minefields. Those are all good and useful capabilities, but the issues they solve are not the issues that stalled the US Army landings at Omaha.

If the US Army had needed roads off of the beach cleared for their AFVs, that means they would have already had a surplus of AFVs on the beach. They didn't. Their problem was not a bottleneck of AFVs on the beach with no exit, but rather was a shortage of AFVs on the beach.

And once they did get enough AFVs on the beach they had little trouble in opening up paths off of the beach. Firstly because most of the landing force was infantry, which didn't NEED an AVRE bridge to climb a wall or cross a ditch, and secondly because the US Army tank units, once they did land, were well provided with Sherman Bulldozers, which proved fully capable of improving roads and ramps, and clearing low walls and other obsticals.

The key success story of Hobart's Funnies on D-Day on the British beaches seems to have been the success of the flail tanks landed on Gold beach. By the time the DDs reached the beach, the flails (landed in the first wave, as noted) had neutralized most of the defensive positions by the fire of their 75mm guns. In other words, the flails were irrelevant, what mattered was getting 75mm armed Shermans on the beach with the assault wave.

The US Army didn't need any funnies to do that.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

"Only if the British or Canadian armies had landed on Omaha … which they did not.

US Army landing plans called for the DDs to land first. Giving them flails or petards would not have changed this. Two tank battalions were assigned to the assault wave. Each was to launch two companies of DDs, timed to reach the beach 5 minutes before the first wave of infantry landing craft. Landing craft with back-up armor (the 3rd companies of each battalion) were NOT in the first wave, much less ahead of the first wave."

With respect, we're talking hypothetically here and are assuming that the US Army adopted British AVRE support on Omaha. They adopted large numbers of British LCAs on Omaha, after all. If they had done so, they would have been landed in advance of the first assault waves. What you describe above is exactly the same as the British/Canadian plan, minus the AVREs, which were set to land just behind the DDs and ahead of the first assault wave. In the event, the AVREs actually overtook the DDs in many cases, so landed first.

The whole point of AVREs was to use them as siege-engines. They wouldn't be any use sat offshore.

I'd also add that the US Army had no qualms about asking for AVRE support on numerous occasions after D-Day and put great effort into armoured engineering vehicles after Normandy and WW2, so they must have seen the value after Omaha.

"What the "Funnies" did well was aid in the crossing of obsticals built to impede tank advances. Petards could blow down small sea-walls or blow up dragon's teeth (and other roadblocks), AVRE-launched bridges could provide ramps to climb walls or span ditches, and flails could clear routes through minefields. Those are all good and useful capabilities, but the issues they solve are not the issues that stalled the US Army landings at Omaha. "

Er no, that was not their purpose at all. Their purpose was to create breaches in the fixed defences that could be used by all, not just the armour. Being stuck on the beach with no exits through the fixed defences was PRECISELY the problem on Omaha. Creating exits was something that the AVREs did remarkably well on D-Day. Numerous Breaching Teams landed well off their allocated spot but carried on and breached the defences where they landed regardless, allowing the infantry to exit the beach.

Much of the breaching was done by Royal Engineers, who would dismount from the AVRE (through the floor or sponson hatches) to lay explosive charges such as Bangalores from behind the cover of the AVRE itself. The AVRE also provided a handy mobile arsenal of such charges ready to hand.

I agree entirely that the Crabs' 75mm guns proved invaluable, but that doesn't mean that the Crabs' flails were useless. I also agree that more Shermans landed directly on to the beach would have been incredibly useful. In the event, a number of British & Canadian DD squadrons WERE landed directly onto the beach from their LCTs due to the poor sea state.

Plus the US had the misfortune to come across a decent infantry division in the form of the 352nd at Omaha, wheres the divisions garrisoning the other beaches were far less battleworthy. As soon at the British and Canadians came up against good troops (21st Panzer) they also had a fight on their hands, though fortunately for them it was not on the beaches.

The 352nd was only 'better' in terms of mobility and heavier equipment such as StuGs (which actually fought the British late on D-Day and on D+1). The eastern half of Omaha was actually still garrisoned by elements of 716. ID (the same division fighting on Gold, Juno & Sword), yet they fought no less hard than the 352. ID on the western half of the beach.

The main issue was that 352. ID was in the process of relieving 716. ID at Omaha, which meant a greater density of defending troops than elsewhere, multiplied by the high elevation and commanding view enjoyed by the defenders of Omaha when compared to elsewhere.

The British & Canadian first waves had an equally bad time of it on their beaches. The difference being that they were able to break out of the killing zone. The poor American infantry were stuck in the killing zone for hours until they finally managed to break out through guts, determination and superb small-unit training and leadership (helped a little by some German units running low on ammo and the eventual arrival of armour). As Mark says, armour – ANY armour – on the beach early enough would have made a massive difference.

Zaloga's book "The Devil's Garden" has some interesting points to make on this topic.

The main issue was that 352. ID was in the process of relieving 716. ID at Omaha, which meant a greater density of defending troops than elsewhere, multiplied by the high elevation and commanding view enjoyed by the defenders of Omaha when compared to elsewhere.

In addition it appears that the Allies were unaware, or only just becoming aware, of 352's presence in the area. Consequently there was no plan to deal with it, or more importantly, its six supporting artillery batteries.

Whilst the DD tanks didn't make it to the beach the deep wading and directly landed ones did. Zaloga lists 54 M4 tanks on Omaha Beach. The problem was that very few of the 16 dozer tanks made it through, and fewer still dealt with the anti-tank ditches. The only exits were the draws and normal M4s couldn't deal with the mines and obstacles there.

And finally, the US Army had asked for 50 Sherman flails, amongst other things, but none were delivered because the British didn't have enough for their own units.

They were certainly aware of 352's presence in reserve at Isigny, which is only a short distance from Omaha (about 15 minutes by car). I've got a copy of a BIGOT-stamped intelligence map here somewhere, pre-dating D-Day by a few days and showing the German deployments across France. It's surprisingly accurate.

There was an air bombardment plan to disrupt 352 at Isigny, but as we now know, around half of it had already moved to Omaha. However, one entire regiment of that division, plus the divisional StuG company (i.e. Kampfgruppe 'Meyer') was sent on a wild goose-chase down to St Lo, chasing 'Rupert' paratroop decoys, so Allied disruption efforts were partially successful with regard to 532. The effect of an entire regimental counter-attack on Omaha doesn't bear thinking about…

As it happens, KGr Meyer was eventually send to counter-attack against Gold/Juno and its StuGs bumped into 4/7th Dragoon Guards at Creully late that evening. Another part of the KGr fought with 7th Armoured Division at Bayeux on D+1.

those dd Shermans that sank on the approaches to the beach
how many of the crews got out before they sank (like a rock?)

Using Avre's and flails to breach defences on the Cw beaches worked because the vehicles were ideally suited to the task, whether they would have been of similar use on Omaha is moot, because the terrain conditions are significantly different, even the admirable Churchill wouldn't have made it up the bluffs on Omaha, where a major issue (for the armour) was forcing the exits in the defilades created by the draws.
Progress was made by infiltrating infantry up the bluffs, where tanks of any description couldn't follow or easily bring fire to bear anyway.
Having said all that, having access to Funnies would hardly have been a hinderance.
The reason Sherman DD's and flails were adopted by the US yet Churchill based vehicles were not was entirely logistical:
The US didn't want to have to train with, or have to re-supply and maintain, a vehicle family that was not already in its inventory.