"The Enduring Myth of the Fragile Battlecruiser" Topic

" The repetition of the myth of the fragile battlecruiser continues even as the greatest victory of the class is now just over 100 years in the past. This particular capital ship has been on the receiving end of the naval world's harshest criticism since three of their British number met untimely ends at the May 31-June 1, 1916 Battle of Jutland. In fact, the battlecruiser was a hybrid, cost saving platform designed specifically to support a mature British strategic concept of seapower. Its heavy losses at Jutland were more to do with early 20th century capital ship design and poor British tactical doctrine than the thickness (or lack thereof) of its armor belt. That particular myth was constructed in the wake of Jutland for good reasons of operational security, but there is no reason to continue to repeat it in the present day. The experience of the battlecruiser still has important lessons for contemporary warship designers. Every warship is a compromise of weapons, protective features, speed, and operational range. Operational employment is as important as physical design and construction in determining a warship's vulnerability. Time marches forever forward and today's invincible front line combatant can become tomorrow's proverbial fighter with a glass jaw if not modernized to reflect technological change. Warship designers seeking lethal, high speed and survivable platforms on a limited hull would do well to consider the battlecruiser's performance in their deliberations on how much of these qualities can be achieved in a single class. Sometimes operational employment and tactical doctrine can be just as deadly to a ship in battle as its lack of speed, armament and robust construction…"
Full article here
link

Amicalement
Armand

Ummm, it's no myth, since the Hood went down very quickly in WWII, confirming the theory of fragility.

It's more complicated than that. In all four cases of outright loss (Indefatigable, Queen Mary, Invincible, Hood) as well as the near miss involving Lion, the proximate cause of loss was massive deflagration of their cordite propellant. Remove that single factor from the equation and the picture changes dramatically. Of the German battlecruisers at Jutland – Seydlitz and Derfflinger absorbed very heavy damage and made it home; Lutzow only sank after somewhere between 25 and 30 major caliber hits. The difference is that the German ships were carrying safe propellant. Going back to earlier battles in WW1, Gneisenau, Scharnhorst and Bluecher – all ships with protection more along the lines of the British I Class BCs – only succumbed after large numbers of heavy caliber hits. The difference again was that none of these ships suffered propellant explosions.

What caused Hood's loss? – once again, propellant explosion.

Had the British battlecruisers been carrying stable propellant, it is unlikely that any of them would have been sunk (IMO).

B

Indeed, there are many myths that surround this topic. Armour thickness and its "obvious" importance being one of them., despite evidence form Jutland and other actions that showed that the difference in armour thickness between 9for example) comparable British and German BCs was not tactically relevant. Subdivision is another aspect where it is "obvious" that one design style was "superior", whereas a closer examination looking at the full range of technical and operability aspects shows this is not the case. However, as with the myth of aluminium superstructures in the Falklands it is a subject where fact is generally overridden by what people "know".

From what I understand, the BCs would not have been so vulnerable had it not been for improper storage of the cordite bags in the stairwell of the turret silos. Apparently the elevators that brought the charges from the magazines up to the guns were not fast enough to satisfy the RN's desire for high volume of fire, so doors designed to protect against deflagration were propped open and cordite was stacked up high to allow for rapid fire. I have to wonder how the BCs at Jutland would have faired if they had followed proper fire-prevention and charge-handling procedures.

Mako11:

According to recent analyses, most importantly the Jurens article in Warship International (also on the Internet), the Hood most probably was destroyed by a lucky (very low probability) shell hit. Assuming that this was the case, the typical Denmark Strait General Quarters (game) result is historical, in that the Bismarck is usually sunk (2-versus-1), while the Hood usually survives.

In particular, the hit probably occured in a 4" AA magazine added in the 1930s forward of the main 15" magazines. The forward edge of this magazine extended up to the boundary of the magazine deck armor, such that a shell coming in at an angle from forward could enter through the much thinner machinery spaces deck armor. Since the Hood was probably hit during her final turn, she would have been vulnerable to such a hit. Had the Hood received her major upgrade as planned, the deck armor and magazine arrangement would have been rationalized to fix such gaps. IMHO, such a hit would probably have been fatal, regardless of the type of propellent. For example, although USS Boise survived a magazine hit at Cape Esperance, it was an underwater hit which brought extensive magazine flooding in with it. In contrast, Hood's was above water.

An analogy might be the way that early Panther tanks (prior to model G) could be penetrated frontally by bouncing a shell off the bottom edge of the curved gun mantlet. This "Achilles Heel" doesn't mean that we consider those tanks fragile overall.

Mark H.

Plus – any claim that the Battle Cruiser was a totally useless type is biased if you just consider one fleet's version of the type.

The German WWI Battle Cruisers proved quite tough since they sacrificed some firepower for better protection and somewhat better speed. Generally, better balanced as faster, lighter battleships instead of larger and more powerful armored cruisers.

Interesting discussion… I just picked up the new book on German battlecruisers of ww1…

…and somewhat better speed

IIRC, the ability of the German constructors to obtain good speeds in their BCs, despite the much greater armor protection, was primarily due to the small-tube boilers they used. The contemporary British BCs didn't use them yet, due to a (possibly overly conservative) decision of the British in favor of greater reliability.

<quote from "Battlecruisers" by Roberts>
The saving made was considerable. Comparing Indefatigable with Moltke, the length of the boiler rooms were 172 ft and 134ft respectively and in the case of Lion and Seydlitz, 190ft and 152ft 6in respectively. This represented not only a saving in machinery weight but a substantial reduction in hull and armour weight which the Germans utilized to great effect to enhance the armour thickness on their ships. German vessels also had their boiler rooms more closely subdivided than British ships with fewer boilers per room and greater use of longitudinal bulkheads. D'Eyncourt was particularly keen on adopting small-tube boilers and eventually managed to get them into large ships by employing them in the large light cruisers which were classed, despite their size, with other light cruisers. This at least provided a precedent and when it came to the designs which led up to Hood he was able to convince the Board that the enormous savings possible in such large ships more than compensated for any loss in reliability.
<end quote>

Mark H.

A number of British Battlecruisers took a heavy pounding and kept on dishing out damage to the Germans. Heck even the old Warrior took 15+ heavy rounds, and steamed away from the scene under her own power. Fragile, no. Poorly handled, probably.

Campy – I think you're being a bit kind to the old Warrior. She did shoot up the Wiesbaden in conjunction with Defence before coming under the fire of Hipper's and Scheer's leading ships, but that was about it. I know of no hits made by Warrior upon the German BCs or BBs, which were barely visible to her.

Warrior did suffer about 15 heavy caliber hits within about 25 minutes of action. Fortunately none appear to have hit in her turrets or ammunition lobby. But there were severa underwater hits and both engine rooms were reported disabled by 6:33pm. The engines did continue to revolve with sufficient revs for about 10-12 knots for about an hour and a half. Both engine rooms at this time were already filled to within 10 feet of the main deck. By 8:00pm, Warrior was DIW and under tow by Engadine at 8 knots, but she was unable to control the flooding. By 7:00am next morning towing speed was down to 6 knots and Warrior's stability situation was such that she was abandoned by 8:00am.

I think it was a small miracle that Warrior got away at all (thanks to the diversion of German attention to Warspite).

B

It has aways samed to me that the problem with Battlecruisers is their tactical use. They are to attack and destroy smaller Cruisers (all classes) and Destroyer using their big guns and speed. When faced with Battleships they are to use their speed to get away. The Admirals seem to forget that and use them as if they were a Battleship. I think their best use is as in the 1914 Faulklands or even the old 1812 USS Constitution. Move fast and hit hard then run away for another time.
Rich

When faced with Battleships they are to use their speed to get away.

But that is the myth. Note that WWI German BCs were able to stand up to opposing battleships fairly well. Apparently, British BCs could have done the same (though a bit less well), had they only been using safe ammunition handling procedures. So far as I can tell, the period during which they didn't do this was from after Dogger Bank through Jutland.

So if it is in fact a myth (which IMHO is probably the case), in a game one should adjust the vulnerability of WWI British BCs based on the ammo handling being used at that point in time, and not treat it as an inherent characteristic.

BTW, although British propellent was apparently less stable than German or American, this was IMHO not the main reason for the losses at Jutland. Any ship will blow up if the propellent in a main magazine is stimulated enough. Note Arizona at Pearl Harbor, for example.

MH

Seydlitz also almost blew up at Dogger Bank from a hit on D turret. I suspect why this was a reoccuring problem with the BC's and not the BB's at the time was probably because the BC's saw a lot more action.

Another factor, per D.K. Brown's research, is that the British had actually tested exactly this scenario in pre-war training, and had concluded that such 'backflash' as is believed to have destroyed the Battlecruisers at Jutland was *not* a major threat. Fresh cordite was relatively temperature stable. However, many of the ships in action at Jutland had charges they had been issued a year or more ago, and cordite becomes less stable as it 'ages'. If the charges had been fresh these loses might not have happened.

-Will

Ironically, despite the terrible reputation of (British) battlecruisers, modern warships are essentially modern battlecruisers. They are characterized by heavy armament, high speed and no armor. Presumably the navies of the world have concluded that armor's effectiveness does not outweigh its costs.

Also, my readings of modern works seem to be far more evenhanded in their evaluation of the British battlecruisers. They also are more measured in their evaluation of German designs. The German ships had far less range and were much less habitable than their British counterparts. They also had lighter armament than British counterparts. This freed up considerable tonnage for better armor and compartmentalization, so one should expect them to be better protected.

And from what I've read, the most likely explanation for the explosions of British battlecruisers at Jutland was their ammo handling. To increase rate of fire, Beatty's battlecruisers violated doctrine and failed to close the various flash protection doors to the magazines. Since they also used powder bags that were prone to leaking, a hit anywhere along the path from magazine to gun could cause a magazine detonation.

Through the battle of Jutland, my own set of (private) set of naval rules gives British battlecruisers a higher rate of fire, but higher vulnerability to a magazine explosion.

Had the British battleships used similar ammo handling practices, they would've been as vulnerable as the battlecruisers. Scary thought, really. Had the battleships really torn into each other, the Royal Navy might well have decisively lost the battle. I'm not sure I buy the notion that this would've ended the war, but it would've been bad for the British. If the Americans had entered the war, they could've added 15 dreadnoughts to the fight. But losing Jutland decisively would've been bad bad for the British.

As far as the explosion of Hood, most stuff I've read agrees with the previous posters that it was a fluke hit. Hood was *not* really a battlecruiser. Her belt armor was weaker than contemporary British battleships, but it was decidedly superior to British battlecruisers. Her real flaw, in my opinion was that her deck armor was way too thin (a problem most contemporary battleships shared.) Unfortunately, she never received a refit between the wars, which would have thickened her deck armor considerably. It appears that her captain knew she'd be vulnerable to long range plunging fire and was trying to close the distance so that hits would strike her belt armor. Ugh…closing with Bismarck because that's the *safer* course.

A very interesting discussion, if – as the OP states – a perennial one. I am quite in agreement that there was in fact no real issue with either the scale of protection or the concept of the battlecruiser as first envisaged. It was, after all, simply a rationalisation of pre-existing armoured cruiser design philosophy, and if we are to follow the previous development of that type, we can more clearly understand the maligned BC.
When Sir William White was designing the series of large, fast first-class cruisers of the late Victorian RN, he was unable to provide any effective vertical armour until the advent of Krupp steel armour. Prior to that, the weights required to armour a cruiser with a belt of either Compound or Harvey was simply too great, and so most cruisers of the time were still deck-protected and thus relatively vulnerable to 6" high-explosive fire. A further misunderstanding on White's part with several class designs (notably Crescent & Diadem) led him to the belief that 6" guns were what was really wanted in a 1st-class cruiser by the RN (it wasn't), and a tussle over suitable gun calibre for big cruisers ran on for a decade resulting in classes like the Monmouths. But I digress.
By the time White designed the Krupp-armoured Cressys in the mid-1890s, the expectation was not only that the ships would have to perform long-range anti-corsair duty, but that they might have to fight second-class BBs or even support the battlefleet directly in major actions, so some form of heavy gun was required (2 x 9.2"). Italy had already started this trend by exporting the hybrid Garibaldi class to three other navies, so the notion of CAs having to defend themselves against BBs was not new. 6" of KC was considered adequate for the short battle ranges then expected.
It took another decade of argument from the pre-dreadnought period through the semi-dreadnought phase to dispense with useless 6" batteries in CAs, and Sir Philip Watts' series of CAs (Black Prince, Warrior & Defence classes) all show steady incremental improvement in this regard. At this time, the results of the RJW demstrated longer battle ranges, and 6" KC was still satisfactory at the ranges experienced. Improvements in fire control were pushing up future battle ranges and, as we know, a single calibre was required for effective employment of the new fire-control technique. In this regard, not only were the CAs incorrectly armed with mixed-calibre batteries, but the twelve-turreted Minotaurs were particularly criticized for a dangerous ammunition supply arrangement. If the results of Jutland show us anything about big cruisers in the fleet, they surely show that!
There is no doubt that the four barbettes of the Invincible class were a marked improvement in that regard.
In as far as the armour itself is concerned, White originally objected to armour on another basis, claiming that external belts would not be proof against heavy shot, preferring sloped armour decks and cofferdam-like coal bunkers in the wings. While this is an arguable point in itself, the proponents of vertical armour claimed that even half-thickness belt armour would act to detonate incoming shells before they could reach deep into the ship's vitals. This role of starting shell detonation is often overlooked by us gamers. Sixteen years back, a good friend of mine (who is in the RN) wrote a fascinating article in the Naval Review (Volume 87 Issue 1) which highlighted the effectiveness of British BC armour over the vitals; even the deck armour was adequate for the time in facing German BC fire according to the sources he referred to. This is at odds with our understanding of the class, but as other posters have noted the BBs had the same level of horizontal protection.
When we wrote our own set of in-house rules (rather grandly named 'Kriegsmarine'), a project which ran on for years and yielded many enjoyable squadron-size scraps, we deliberately included a somewhat detailed set of shell detonation rules for hits wherein armour which did not stop a shell still greatly increased the chance of it bursting in a wing compartment before reaching a vital area. So I do not believe that armour was the weakness of the BC, and nor was it the strength of the German BCs either (British lyddite-filled shells being very disappointing in action).
If the BC of WWI had a weakness at all, it was IMHO the jingoistic influence of men like Beatty and the cult of 'Hit first and hit fast'.

We seem to be using the word "stable" in 2 different ways. One is to indicate changes in chemical composition over time (as in deterioration). The other is to indicate the tendancy to ignite, relative to the propellent used by other navies.

Although I have seen reference to test results indicating that cordite was less "stable" (in the second sense) than say USN propellent, I don't think that either type of "stability" was the primary cause of the BC losses at Jutland (per "wminsing"'s comment above).

I just skimmed the D.K. Brown book on WWI warships, and did not see any reference to the dangerous ammo handling procedures used by some British ships at Jutland. Perhaps I missed it, or perhaps he wasn't aware of this?

Also, FWIW, Norman Friedman, in several recent books, seems to believe that these dangerous ammo handling procedures were mostly a response to perceived inadequate rate of fire at Dogger Bank. If this is correct, then a Dogger Bank wargame should involve a lesser chance of British BCs suffering magazine explosions. The period of vulnerability would be from *after* Dogger Bank through Jutland, basically.

<quote from "Fighting The Great War at Sea", page 163, by Norman Friedman>
…
The British later blamed the explosions on plunging fire. The theory was that German shells easily penetrated British deck armour and then went on to explode in magazines. The problem with the theory is that there were no hits on British machinery spaces, which accounted for a far greater proportion of a ship's deck area than magazines. Director of Naval Construction d'Eyncourt made exactly this point soon after the battle, but it was ignored. The key was Beatty's interpretation of Dogger Bank. He believed that his ships would have sunk the Germans had they only fired more rapidly. He also considered the German shells ineffective. Fire was slowed by congestion in the ammunition hoists due to the earlier practice of overloading magazines. The choice both to overload magazines and to seek high rates of fire made sense given the North Sea visibility problem and a choice not to invest in whatever would be needed to achieve high hitting rates at longer ranges. If the Royal Navy thought it had what was needed to hit at high rates at very long ranges, it would have not worried about wasting ammunition at those ranges and it would also have worried less about evading German torpedoes, because it would have fought mainly outside torpedo range. Congestion (hence slow fire) was inescapable as long as the standard safety measure, keeping cordite charges in special fireproof cases (Clarkson's cases) until they were loaded into the guns, was followed. The cases had to be carried up the hoists and then down again and they were temporarily stowed at the bottoms of the hoists. Once magazines were filled beyond capacity, there were many more cases at the bottoms of the hoists. After Dogger Bank the fleet's solution was largely to turn a blind eye to magazine regulations. Visits by divers to the wreck of the Queen Mary confirmed that bare cartridges were strewn about her turrets, in direct violation of magazine regulations. Bare charges were placed in the turrets, in the working chambers, in the handling rooms below the turrets (placed there to break up the direct path between turret and magazine) and at the bottoms of the hoists. In effect the working chambers and handling rooms became ready-use magazines carrying unprotected charges. This was certainly done in the battlecruisers and apparently also on board some battleships. At least in some ships, doors between magazines and handling rooms were removed so that ships could fire more rapidly.
…
<end quote; footnotes removed>

MH

….. I have argued this in the past on other forums. Lax and over-aggressive ammunition handling practices may have contributed, but at the end of the day the fundamental culprit was IMO the cordite itself.

No German ship during the war suffered any catastrophic ammunition explosion in a gunnery action. That includes Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Bluecher, and Wiesbaden, all of which were shot to pieces and sunk by gunfire. I exclude Pommern on the grounds that she fell victim to a torpedo hit in the way of a wing ammunition compartment rather than a gun hit. No turret/barbette penetrations upon the German ships at Jutland (more than a few) caused any propellant explosions. The most convincing argument to me is a comparison of the experience of Seydlitz at Dogger Bank versus that of Lion at Jutland. About 16,000 lbs of RC/C12 propellant were consumed by fire aboard Sezdlitz without producing an explosion; by comparison, the burning of about 2,300 lbs of Cordite MD aboard Lion resulted in a violent deflagration which – according to later analysis – would almost certainly have ignited the magazine had it not been previously flooded. With the exception of Karlsruhe (which was carrying old RP/C06 propellant aboard) no German ship during the war blew up in harbor; the RN suffered the losses of Bulwark, Natal, Vanguard (off the top of my head).

As an aside with respect to the armoring of the British I Class BCs, Parkes ("British Battleships") cites a commentary from their constructor to the effect that he had been instructed to design an armor suite on the basis of protecting these vessels from 9.2in gunfire at a range of 10,000 yards (IIRC).

FWIW.

B

Blutarski:

FYI, I am looking at this issue from a gamer's perspective. Specifically, in a rule set such as General Quarters, to what extent should we give British WWI ships a greater chance of magazine explosion (I tweak rules to fit my historical perceptions). My current preference is to give them a slightly greater chance due to cordite itself, and a much greater chance during the period where they were following suicidal ammo handling practices (i.e. after Dogger Bank and through Jutland). By default, most rule sets seem to give them this "much greater" chance throughout the entire war, which would seem to be wrong.

Granted that cordite MD was more prone to ignite (per USN tests, etc.), that during the period under discussion it had exposed black powder igniters on the charges, and that the Grand Fleet apparently still had some Mk I cordite (ex: Vanguard 1917). Still, it seems to me that had proper ammo handling been followed (see previous post) at Jutland, this wouldn't have mattered as the flash wouldn't have propagated to the magazines, and the British would probably not have lost any BCs to propellant explosions.

BTW, the new German BC book by Staff indicates that at Dogger Bank, Seydlitz flooded both after magazines in response to the flash fire in turrets "C" and "D"; this "saved the ship from probable destruction" (page 161-162). There is no mention of latching magazine doors open or removing (!) them.

MH

I agree with the above post regarding ammunition handling procedures; even if we accept that nitrocellulose propellants always have been very dangerous (albeit Cordite considered to have been safer than the early Poudre B on the Iena, Liberte, etc), the handling procedures were put into place to account for the known physical properties of the Cordite. The fact that they were, for a period, institutionally contravened points to the real villain as being deliberate human error IMO.

The note about protection from 9.2" fire at 10,000 yds I presume applies to the first two classes (12"-gunned) BCs? I wonder if anyone else smiles at these lovely neat figures (6" belt @ 10,000yds = 9.2" proof; when 9.2" just happens to be a relevant service calibre!) and considers how convenient they are. I wonder what is the real stopping power of 6" KC tested at 10,000 yds precisely? Or at what precise range would a 9.2" shell, striking perpendicular, first pierce the 6" plate?

Re Seydlitz @ Dogger Bank, she was hit at 1043 hrs (German time), but the magazines were not flooded until 1104, 21 minutes later. This is a key indicator of the difference between German and British propellant characteristics under such conditions. All the British ships lost at Jutland blew up and had already sunk within a period of only about 3 minutes.

Re Lion's experience @ Jutland and the utility of correct ammunition handling practices, if his account of his service aboard Lion in "Through the Hawsepipe" is accurate, Grant had already re-introduced proper ammunition handling practices. By doing so, it is possible that he saved the ship that day. But it is also true that, once ignited, even the limited number of only eight charges produced a very violent explosion (deflagration). Had those charges ignited at the moment of the hit, rather than 28 minutes later, it is my conviction that the explosion would have set off an unflooded Q magazine and Lion would also have been lost. Here is Campbell's analysis – "Although venting was increased by part of the turret roof being off and the handing room hatch open, the 8 charges all of which were in authorized positions, ignited so violently that Q magazine bulkheads were considerably buckled and bulged inwards though supported by the flooding water in the magazine. A venting plate admitted flame into the magazine, but no harm was done. If the doors had not been closed, Lion would without doubt have blown up, and she very probably would have done so if the doors had been closed and the magazine not flooded, as the doors were be no means flash tight."

Must run off to the office now. More later.

B

If, as you suggest, Lion was using correct ammo handling procedures, perhaps this is the reason why all charges didn't ignite immediately, giving time to flood the magazine, and ultimately saving the ship. Modern dives on the wrecks of Invincible and Queen Mary have apparently confirmed that they were following the bad practices described in the Friedman quote above.

From a rules perspective, we thus end up in the same place, where using correct procedures allows ships to survive, despite the relative volatility of cordite (which I do not dispute).

MH

"I am looking at this issue from a gamer's perspective. Specifically, in a rule set such as General Quarters, to what extent should we give British WWI ships a greater chance of magazine explosion"

….. By way of fair disclosure, I am a confirmed "rivet counter" and simulationist when it comes to my wargame rules. That having been said, it is not easy to give an exact answer to the above question, since a lot depends upon the mechanics and approach of the rules themselves. In the WW1 Jutland era rules which I have been developing off-and-on over the years, I recall adopting a 1 in 6 chance of a fatal propellant explosion for any penetration of a British turret or barbette, working from Campbell's hit data in "Jutland: an Analysis of the Fighting". But my rules used a system-specific damage model, wherein, for example, a BB main battery represented (very broadly) about a 20pct hit likelihood and for a BC 15pct or thereabouts.

German ships were given zero risk of a fatal propellant explosion from a turret or barbette penetration on the grounds that, despite numerous such hits having been suffered between 1914-1916, no German ship ever blew up.

Any ship suffering a penetrating hit in a magazine proper was officially a goner. But OTOH no such hit was ever suffered by any capital ship of the era (barring Pommern's loss by torpedo).

Nota Bene – The 100th Anniversary of Dogger Bank is coming up on 24 January.

B

The 100th Anniversary of Dogger Bank is coming up on 24 January.

Thanks for reminding me. I wonder if I should do something about this, painting-wise.

If I do it, I will probably assume less-Jutland-like ammo handling for the British. Will have to translate that into GQ II.

MH

"If, as you suggest, Lion was using correct ammo handling procedures, perhaps this is the reason why all charges didn't ignite immediately, giving time to flood the magazine, and ultimately saving the ship."

….. In terms of that specific case, I would agree that this is a perfectly reasonable theory.

"From a rules perspective, we thus end up in the same place, where using correct procedures allows ships to survive, despite the relative volatility of cordite (which I do not dispute)."

….. I personally don't believe that "proper ammunition handling practices", as they were understood in 1916, could necessarily reduce the risk factor to zero. A lot of the other problems – poor quality control and contamination in the cordite production process, improving cordite stability, truly flash-proof charge cases, inadequate flash-proofing of the ammunition spaces aboard ships – were still being dealt with through the end of the war and after. OTOH, I'm not sure how to quantify a new reduced risk factor.

B

I personally don't believe that "proper ammunition handling practices", as they were understood in 1916, could necessarily reduce the risk factor to zero.

Remember my previous statement that: "My current preference is to give them a slightly greater chance due to cordite itself, and a much greater chance during the period where they were following suicidal ammo handling practices (i.e. after Dogger Bank and through Jutland). By default, most rule sets seem to give them this "much greater" chance throughout the entire war, which would seem to be wrong."

Thus I would still have some sort of penalty "for the cordite itself", implying than I wouldn't be simulating a risk of zero. The main difference in my proposed approach is to distinguish between different degrees of bad ammo handling practice, probably simplified as described in my quote above.

MH

Didn't intend to sound disputatious. Your approach makes sense. I just do not know how to quantify the post-Jutland risk factor.

B

Same here; hope I didn't sound carried away. Since you clearly have put some effort into researching and evaluating this topic, I was just trying to achieve some sort of consensus. I think the main remaining difference of opinion is whether to reduce the risk at Dogger Bank and earlier, which so far, I have decided to do. One of my main interests is the old SPI game "Flight of the Goeben" played with 1/6000 miniatures, and that time period would be affected. Quantification is easy in General Quarters – just implement die roll / CRT shifts for special damage.

MH

Andy G wrote – "The note about protection from 9.2" fire at 10,000 yds I presume applies to the first two classes (12"-gunned) BCs?"

….. Yes.

"I wonder if anyone else smiles at these lovely neat figures (6" belt @ 10,000yds = 9.2" proof; when 9.2" just happens to be a relevant service calibre!) and considers how convenient they are."

….. My assumption is that, lacking the ability to test against the actual weapons of the foreign navies, use of the closest own service caliber was the most convenient standard by which to judge.

"I wonder what is the real stopping power of 6" KC tested at 10,000 yds precisely? Or at what precise range would a 9.2" shell, striking perpendicular, first pierce the 6" plate?"

….. NAaB, to the degree one chooses to trust it, suggests that an early 9.2in British soft-capped black-powder filled steel AP projectile of 1905 vintage (MV 2778 f/s; SV 1270 f/s) would just be defeated by 6in of early (pre-1911) British KC armor at 10,000 yards. This assumes an angle of fall of 10.9deg and a 90deg line of fire to the plate. Any material inclination of the line of fire would dramatically reduce penetration of these early British projectiles due to the tendency toward breakage of the projectile body at oblique impacts.

FWIW / B

A very interesting thread, which I have only just found.
And of course every WW1 naval fan is interested in this.
For my quick two cents worth.
The British Battle cruiser was concieved by Jackie Fisher to be able to clear Britains sealanes of any surface raiders, armoured cruisers and protected cruisers.
They did do this (eg Battle of the Falkland Islands)
It was only later that the RN decided the BCs should be used as a fast scouting force. And yes poor quality propellant and Beatty's obsession with rate of fire caused the debacle at Jutland.