"Tactical Factors in Combat Systems" Topic

Paddy Griffith makes the following comment in his rules:

…it had often been found from experience that a single line of battalions was a very weak formation, and required some sort of reserve. Putting one brigade behind another was damaging to morale, since the men of the front line brigade would be unfamiliar with their supporting line, and would feel uneasy.
So at least one eminent Napoleonic historian and gamer has explicitly made that link.

Well, there is no argument with unsupported lines being weak. It would be interesting to know where Paddy got that information. In many cases, during the Napoleonic and ACW, different brigades did support one another, [Such as Talavera--both sides--and the CSA on the second day of Gettysburg, so I'm not sure. In Paddy's example, the result is a negative effect.

He means relative to the effect of having other units from the same brigade provide the support i.e. no support = worst, support from another formation = better, support from another unit in the same formation = best.

But I don't know the chain of thinking which led him to this conclusion.

Well, there is no argument with unsupported lines being weak.

No, but I thought there was dispute about whether they were weak in and of themselves (for morale reasons) or whether they were tactically weak (because you have no supports doing what supports are supposed to do).

No, but I thought there was dispute about whether they were weak in and of themselves (for morale reasons) or whether they were tactically weak (because you have no supports doing what supports are supposed to do).

I was noting the difference between supports being a benefit simply by existing,[giving the front line a +1] but doing nothing, and supports being a benefit by the 'supporting' actions they can carry out.

So, I would say tactically weak. They may have been 'morally weak', but I haven't seen anything to suggest that was a reason for supporting lines or that military men of the black powder period saw that as a specific or significant benefit… though I would imagine it *could* be a psychological comfort to those in the front lines.

As much as I respect Paddy G., I have to doubt his conclusion when so many battles see different brigades in front and supporting lines. I have read military men discussing the command issues behind different brigades in supporting lines as opposes to one brigade in two lines. They were done both ways.

HAPPY HOLIDAYS TO ALL.

But ideally the top 2 or 3 will be the things that seem to have the greatest effect in real life, similarly the next 17-18. I imagine it is quite rare that out comes are determined equally by 10,000 things: certainly the outcome of combat appears to be mainly influenced by fewer.

Depends on the goal right?

I find usually you can pick out one or two things a game is "about".

Crossfire is "about" seizing initiative, exploiting success and defending your flanks.
Chain of Command is "about" the difficulty in leading a platoon and coordinating multiple units on the field.

Both have pretty pedestrian morale systems even though if you asked people, many would say that morale is one of the most important aspects of combat.

So, I would say tactically weak. They may have been 'morally weak', but I haven't seen anything to suggest that was a reason for supporting lines or that military men of the black powder period saw that as a specific or significant benefit… though I would imagine it *could* be a psychological comfort to those in the front lines.

It is conceivable that the morale effect on the commander of an unsupported brigade was actually even more pronounced than the tactical effect. If so, this might well be best represented by a direct factor.

As much as I respect Paddy G., I have to doubt his conclusion when so many battles see different brigades in front and supporting lines. I have read military men discussing the command issues behind different brigades in supporting lines as opposes to one brigade in two lines. They were done both ways.

Yes, it would be interesting to know where he got the idea that being supported by a different brigade was a distinctly second best solution. I wonder if it is an idea ported back from more recent experiences or from roughly contemporary sources?

@Weasel,

I certainly take your point. It may be that games work best when they ruthlessly focus on (say) 5 factors and ignore all of the others.

Whirlwind – I think that's how it tends to work out in practice from a GAME perspective though I would be happy to be proven otherwise.

Though Advanced Squad Leader seems determined to prove me wrong :)

It is conceivable that the morale effect on the commander of an unsupported brigade was actually even more pronounced than the tactical effect. If so, this might well be best represented by a direct factor.

Yes, it's conceivable, but lots of things can be imagined as possibly relevant. Only the historical record can tell us if it was significant or an actual effect on a regular basis. There is evidence and a lack of evidence.

Personally, I can only justify including the 'possible' when I am fairly confident that there isn't any evidence that moves it towards something more definite than possibility.

For the player, I know from my gaming experience--depending on the rules--simply having an unsupported brigade facing more enemy troops has its own psychological effects.

But since the published statistical evidence for Napoleonic Warfare does not appear to be strong, then the 'conceptions' of the designers are pretty much all there is.

For the player, I know from my gaming experience--depending on the rules--simply having an unsupported brigade facing more enemy troops has its own psychological effects.

Quite.

Player psychology is an amazing thing. A player will absolutely win a game they shouldn't have, because they didn't know any better or alternatively defeat themselves.

But since the published statistical evidence for Napoleonic Warfare does not appear to be strong, then the 'conceptions' of the designers are pretty much all there is.

Whirlwind:
Actually, there really hasn't be any strong statistical Published efforts concerning Napoleonic warfare. John Lynn's Bayonets of the Republic is the only one I am really aware of concerning tactics and not weapon effectiveness like Hughe's Fire Power

It's a shame because there are any number of methods that lend themselves to such efforts. Historians don't use them and Military Men and researchers apply them to almost exclusively to modern warfare.

John Curry wrote a history of wargaming and provides quotes which describe the difficulties WWII analyists had and their response:

The answer, given by scientists, was that war was too complex, too beset with 'unknowns', to lend itself to purely mathematical analysis. Like biology and economics, it contained "areas where a limited amount of numberical data are available, and such data can extremely useful in research. Biologists are accustomed to study living organisms, which means dealing with many factores simultaneously when very little may be know about individual factors. To do this they evolved a special kind of statistics, enabling them to make generalizations in a field where generalizations are often theoretically impossible to extablish."

In other words,

"They were trained to get down to the fundamentals of a question-- to seek out broad underlaying principles through a mass of sometimes conflicting and irrelevant data."

Kittel, C. "The Nature and Development of Operations Research", Sience,cv Feb. 1947

What this means is that there are methods for developing those statistics. Hughes and Lynn come the closest to using the methods, but don't target questions that really utilize the methods.

I agree totally. But until someone does examine Napoleonic warfare statistically to that depth, then game designers will rely on more intuitive methods and no-one will be able to say (convincingly) that they are wrong.

I agree totally. But until someone does examine Napoleonic warfare statistically to that depth, then game designers will rely on more intuitive methods and no-one will be able to say (convincingly) that they are wrong.

….Or game designers could do the work as the questions are theirs instead of waiting, hoping someone will publish the answers to the right questions…but they don't. It is true that a HUGE amount of information has come available on line in just the last ten years, so there isn't any wargame hobby tradition of mining it all, let alone dredging up the methods needed, even with the years that many designers say they devote to a particular set of game rules.

I think a lot of game designers like the intuitive, noone can say they are wrong situation. One of the things about statistics is that it demonstrates how often what appears intuitively to be the right answer is actually way off.

Well we could start the tradition. Personally I do research primary sources where available and only rely on secondary sources which cite their own primary sources.

While we may not know in detail what considerations were in the forefront of the real generals' minds we do to a larger extent know some of the results. Let's take the period 1630 – 1655 in Europe as an example (I know this period best). We know that most of the manuals and or deployment plans show deployment in depth commonly in three lines by the 1640s. Even without written evidence this shows a strong requirement for support lines. So how do we cover this in our games?

We can attempt to build rules that reward proper tactical useage. However we are not constrained by the same things the real commanders were. For example in the 1630s the Catholic League and Imperial Forces used tactics that reflected Spanish military thinking. The soldiers learnt how to operate under those formations. Tilly could have tried to fight using Swedish tactics but was constrained by the need to stick with what his men knew. Our little lead soldiers are not so limited as they are not real soldiers. To reproduce that constraint a minus factor for fighting in a tactical style they are not familiar with could be used. As a designer I don't expect it to come into play but I need a mechanism to prevent use of formations and tactics that the historical counter parts couldn't easily use.

For other issues I want to allow the game mechanisms to reward proper use of tactics. So for a support rule as noted above I want troops to have a limited time in combat at maximum efficiency so that the use of support/reserves becomes useful to the gamer.

What I try to achieve is a system where di adjustment factors represent things that reflect the troops mindset about what they are doing and game design provides prompts to the player about tactical useage and deployment which was under the commander's control. The difference between different game systems is in the designer's ideas as to which side of the divide a factor lies.

Well we could start the tradition. Personally I do research primary sources where available and only rely on secondary sources which cite their own primary sources.

Elenderil:

Yeah, that we could. I've read where any number of designers do lots of research [some claim years], but gamers never see it. They are left to guess where the ideas come from… and sadly for all the work designers do, guess wrong about the history and even what particular mechanics portray. Only designers can provide that information.

While we may not know in detail what considerations were in the forefront of the real generals' minds we do to a larger extent know some of the results.

Well, I don't know all the sources available from your period, but I do know that lots of military men down through the ages made an effort to write down their thoughts on their 'considerations' in battle and campaign.

Let's take the period 1630 – 1655 in Europe as an example (I know this period best). We know that most of the manuals and or deployment plans show deployment in depth commonly in three lines by the 1640s. Even without written evidence this shows a strong requirement for support lines. So how do we cover this in our games?

If we don't have some idea of why support was considered so important or how that support worked in battle, how could we conceivable model it in a wargame?

We can attempt to build rules that reward proper tactical useage. However we are not constrained by the same things the real commanders were. For example in the 1630s the Catholic League and Imperial Forces used tactics that reflected Spanish military thinking. The soldiers learnt how to operate under those formations.Tilly could have tried to fight using Swedish tactics but was constrained by the need to stick with what his men knew. Our little lead soldiers are not so limited as they are not real soldiers. To reproduce that constraint a minus factor for fighting in a tactical style they are not familiar with could be used. As a designer I don't expect it to come into play but I need a mechanism to prevent use of formations and tactics that the historical counter parts couldn't easily use.

That 'proper tactical usage' meant something different for Imperial forces compart to the Swedes. So yeah, that would be a difference interesting to portray, let alone necessary to model period battles.

For other issues I want to allow the game mechanisms to reward proper use of tactics. So for a support rule as noted above I want troops to have a limited time in combat at maximum efficiency so that the use of support/reserves becomes useful to the gamer.

That limited time--is that something you've read about in the primary sources in discussing the need for supporting lines?

What I try to achieve is a system where di adjustment factors represent things that reflect the troops mindset about what they are doing and game design provides prompts to the player about tactical useage and deployment which was under the commander's control. The difference between different game systems is in the designer's ideas as to which side of the divide a factor lies.

I agree, but from what I've seen many designer don't agree on where the divide lies… or if there even is one.

Best Regards, McLaddie

All this makes me wonder about providing morale advantages to troops who *feel* like they are tactically doing things correctly even when they are not.

So maybe a force actually is receiving no advantage from their formation because the technology has developed and it's no longer the most viable tactic. But the troops involved know the formation, know how to fight from it (even if technology makes them less effective than ideal), and feel like they're fighting the best they can, even if in reality there is some other tactic they could be using.

Perhaps an ambitious general can force units into "new" tactics that will make them more prone to mistakes, low morale, etc, should things go poorly, but if they find themselves winning they'll quickly realize the viability of the new tactic.

On the other hand a force trained extensively on Napoleonic tactics may have higher morale going into battle if they stick by what they know, but as soon as they face a machine-gun morale will be reduced so rapidly that any advantage should probably be negligible.