"Wargaming Russia-Nato 2015: Conceptually too difficult?" Topic

I am starting to wonder what the point of the thread was.

As we've seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other areas, the lack of FACs, ground troops, armor, helos, and CAS, not to mention the overly strict rules of engagement, all lead to less effectiveness on the battlefield, from minor skirmishes to strategic battles.

Doesn't reducing American efficiency then require a similar or even more drastic reduction in Russian efficiency?

Not necessarily, since we've seen from Chechnya and Afghanistan that the Russians don't do restrictive ROE like the US does.

The real question is if the 2015-2016 Capital/Pentagon would still insist on vetting air strike targets in the event of an Article 5 throw-down.

After all their logistics and command and control systems barely worked in Georgia and Chechnya. And they seemed to be suffering a lot of casualties in Ukraine too, despite hypothetical superiority.

American Logistics are not much better. Do you know why the US pre-positions equipment? Because we have no way of shipping tanks en masse!

It assumes Americans learned nothing from Somalia, pretend Iraq 1991 or 2003 didn't happen or that in fact the Americans have no ability to assess threats and respond accordingly.

According to my friend who is a currently-serving US Army Captain, the US Army has in fact learned nothing from Somalia and Iraq 2003.

Instead of changing tactics to deal with IEDs, the US Army built monster half-million-dollar trucks called MRAPs.

Trying to use technology to address a training issue is guaranteed to fail, full stop.

"In all instances NATO has numerical, technical and tactical superiority"

Substitute "Wehrmacht" for NATO and this sounds exactly like the kind of self-delusion that every invader of Russia talks themselves into beforehand. And it never goes well.

" I merely wrote that there is a lack of leadership with the USA. I doubt that anyone would argue against that. This itself, is part of the reason why Putin feels so emboldened."

Thank God. Because what you call "leadership" is that fatuous, naive thinking that got us into a failed war in Iraq and lost the war in Afghanistan for us.

I rather prefer reluctant leadership myself than a delusional charge straight ahead with eyes wide shut. We all saw enough of that a decade ago.

Given the table scale of Force on Force, I would have thought it was fairly easy to make it work. FoF is very much a 'localised conflict area', not really massed battles. There is one scenario that was written for a large (in FoF terms) battle, but even that is only based on two 3x2 tables (in 15mm).

From a FoF "platoon" perspective, the problem is worse.

Russian deficiences in command structure, NCO and junior officer quality, training and equipment are pronounced at platoon level.

As stated you've got:

1. Basic American troops at D8 D10 quality. Russians are D6 D8 with some better units warranting a D8 D8. Elite spetzsnaz units would be as western ones.

2. Russian armour is heavily outmatched by modern NATO tanks – e.g. on defense a T-72 gets from memory 3D12 whereas an upgraded M1 or Leopard II gets 5D12.

3. CWGH gives Russian armour some major initiative/command deficiences to reflect doctrine, command structure and lack of trained NCOs. There has been no real improvement here since 1980s.

4. Russian logistics and command/control structure are not good (as shown in Georgia and Chechnya). This precludes giving Russian numerical superiority due to vehicle breakdowns or inability to reinforce points.

5. Russian units are still often horrifically understrength. They talk of "batallions" or even "regiments" that might have 300 troops in it.

6. Air support – the Russian air force performed dismally in Georgia. They had virtually no coordination with ground forces, failed to perform SEAD until the war was nearly over, did not use precision strike etc. It was basically back to 1941 for the Russian air force.

Hence air support is a no goer for Russians.

So at platoon/company level it really does suck if you want to reflect the actual Russian army capabilities as demonstrated over the last 20 years.

So as I said what is your point? I thought you were asking for a, not too far fetched, option to level the playing field. If not that, what?

I've not see any too far fetched options though.

I'm grateful for suggestions though.

Deadone,

As others have said you are too fixated. There are several reasonable scenarios that would limit America's involvement.
US airpower is not assured given ranges, basing rights and logistical issues.
Getting a M1 tank there is not assured given few in Europe, transit rights, logistics and the fact that air transport would give you next to nil.
The russian's would have a huge numerical superiority and are working with short supply lines.
Remember CWGH supposes Russian attacking. You are asking for a true expeditionary force to move and attack. We can do special ops well now but expeditionary armor? Not so much. Just presume america/NATO don't have 4 months to build up forces. also assume we are still committed in Afghanistan and Iraq. We don't have that much stuff anymore.
I think it would be easy to game.

Joe

But the US wouldn't get involved without at least the basing, transit rights etc involved.

They wouldn't get involved if air superiority isn't obtainable – last time actual US troops regular were bombed from air was 1953 and that was Po-2 biplane that blew up a tent. There was another incident of spec ops being bombed by a Vietnamese An-2 in Laos but this was a covert action.

Again the permise you're suggesting:

1. The US can't get it's troop and especially heavy equipment into Ukraine.
2. They can't provide air support or air superiority.
3. They would have problems supplying troops on the ground.
4. They don't prepare for the war at all and just send stuff without ensuring any build up of forces, any logistics, political support and clearly no plan.

Is this realistic? Who wages war on those odds? Certainly not the US – remember how they didn't bomb Syria just cause the politics weren't conducive?

If any case the US would sooner let the Russians rumble through Ukraine then launch a counter offensive to push them out.

And the other assumption is a wunderwaffe Russian army who deploys all their units without problem and doesn't bother keeping any reserves in Western Europe, Caucasus or Asia.

Is this realistic? Who wages war on those odds? Certainly not the US

Again, given the table size of Force on Force, I'm not sure it really matters. Even on an 8x4 table, the ground scale is a few hundred metres. It's a snapshot conflict which may or may not reflect the wider strategic or political situation.

My approach when dealing with qualitatively mismatched forces is to use the scenario to to balance the game. As Geoff points out, an FoF game represents a slice of the battlefield, not the entire battlefield.

Focus on some interesting scenario, possibly drawn from other wars, that limit the NATO advantage – for instance, maybe a US convoy has gone astray and gotten itself encircled behind enemy lines – it has to try to extricate itself before it's destroyed, because there's no way a QRF will be able to find them in time, let alone arrive in time to be any help.

If you play a toe-to-toe battle between two paper-strength platoons, the NATO advantages are likely to telling – but if you play the sort of smaller, chaos-ridden engagements that are more common to history, I think you'd have plenty of grist for the gaming mill.

Best,

Shawn.

I think people are right; at the scale of platoon plus it shouldn't matter.

Perhaps a logistics convoy of National Guard reservists has been hit by Spetsnaz and Naval Infantry?

Perhaps a recce unit has been ambushed by two platoons of Russians?

Perhaps some Polish troops have run into a bunch of Ukranian seperatists with Russian tank support?

Perhaps a NATO foot patrol has hit a minefield and are now under fire and need to survive for the air support to come and pull them out of the fire?

Or, given that WWIII is a fantasy anyway, why not go the whole hog and say that the Soviet Union never fell and the Red Army is uniformly equipped with good gear and reasonable training?

I know several US infantry men who would have given a lot to have the sort of permanent tank and air support in every engagement that the OP seems to assume.

@PMC317: Precisely! Those are some great scenario kernels!

Shawn.

Wow, lots of "interesting" assumptions/conclusions in this thread. Talk about rose-colored glasses…

But the US wouldn't get involved without at least the basing, transit rights etc involved.

They wouldn't get involved if air superiority isn't obtainable

This has a lot to do with the higher-level strategic/political issues of the conflict. The US has always been in a position where it can take its time to "shape the battlefield". There is never any strategic immediacy to our expeditionary operations. So come up with a scenario where US/NATO is *forced* to act without preparations. For example, the 2015 winter could be brutally cold (because of global climate instability), and Russian-backed Separatists (or maybe a fully pro-Russian central government) manage to completely cut off gas supplies to the EU, leading to thousands freezing and dying. NATO moves in to "restore order" and get the gas flowing again ASAP before Europe is sitting on millions of popsicle citizens. The pro-Russians call for overt protection from Russia. Now you have a scenario where the US would have to go into the fight half-cocked. And fighting in a brutally-cold Ukrainian winter further plays to Russia's natural advantages and limits the combat effectiveness of US forces (who are now thoroughly acclimated to desert conditions but don't get nearly enough cold weather training).

Now, about some of the lower-level specifics:

And then they're still being swatted like flies by F-22s, F-15s or F-16s and PAC Patriots guided by modern AWACS and supported by modern EW aircraft.

1. The F-22 is not a magic wunderweapon as radar stealth doesn't grant blanket immunity to detection. Research the capabilities of modern Russian IRST sensors. I've spoken with an F-22 pilot at Nellis during a familiarization tour. We talked about how Raptors like to supercruise at high altitudes (thinner air, more fuel efficient, high altitude/speeds gives the aircraft lots of potential energy). This also makes it perfectly vulnerable for being spotted at tactically-significant ranges by an IRST. However, the pilot seemed even more concerned about off-boresight missiles in a "turn-and-burn" situation. How would a Flanker even get that close? Maybe NATO ROE requires visual ID of any targets before engagement? Given the MH17 fiasco it makes sense for some paranoia about shooting down the wrong aircraft.

2. Ukraine is a sizable country. Achieving sufficient AD coverage requires a considerable allocation of assets. I've served in a Patriot battery, it is not an easily-deployed, expeditionary weapon system (the launchers might be, but the radar definitely IS NOT). Why are you assuming that Russia is just going to allow a battalion (or more) of Patriots to set up coverage of the AO unmolested? Spetsnaz attacking a Patriot battery would be a good scenario (and trust me, the Army ADA's physical security measures are pretty abysmal).

3. While AWACS/EW craft are great force multipliers, the US is loathe to use them in a hostile air environment. I've worked on real-world exercises out here in the Pacific (aviation command & control, specifically close air support) and no one takes the Chinese or North Korean IADS lightly. And these are considered 2nd only to Russia's own IADS. The S-400 is probably the most advanced SAM system in the world. The USAF is not going to rule the skies over Ukraine unmolested.

And Russian AD is easily neutralized by American EW, SEAD and DEAD assets.

This is just LULZ-worthy. I'd really like to see a cited source for that. Especially since the Pentagon is saying "we need hypersonic missiles because Russian IADS is so advanced." link

Here's another reasonably-authoritative source. I wish I had more DoD material on this issue though…

link

And they seemed to be suffering a lot of casualties in Ukraine too, despite hypothetical superiority.

Actually, the Ukrainian army possesses the superiority in men, armor, artillery, and air support. The Separatists/Russian "volunteers" have consistently demonstrated competent small unit tactics and unit cohesion but are woefully outclassed otherwise (as of June 2014, at least…I haven't been following the war closely since this summer).

The other irreconcilable problem is that of infantry quality. The Russian infantry has constantly proven to be ineffective by modern standards.

This talks about VDV lessons learned from Georgia:
PDF link

It concludes:
1. VDV would be the first troops deployed/encountered in large numbers in any op outside Russia's borders (note: its now know that some VDV troops have been KIA in Ukraine).
2. The first-line VDV battalions are roughly on par with Western troops.
Personally I suspect they are lacking in night vision gear and tactical radios, but are otherwise professional, aggressive, and competent infantrymen.

So if you are gaming platoon/company actions, running into a fresh VDV unit is certainly a realistic and balanced option. Maybe a good match for an Army Stryker unit.

Most Russian T-72s are not upgraded to any standard – they're standard 1980s variants. Upgrades as they stand have been applied almost ad hoc. T-90s were also built to varying standards.

Meanwhile USA has had 20 years of tank development incorporated into the Abrams.

If anything, the Russians benefit from greater continuous tank R&D. The Abrams plateaued at a "good enough" level so early, and our focus has been away from massed armored combat for so long, that most advancements have been COIN-related (remote weapon stations) or digital command & control systems. Meanwhile Russian advancements in explosive reactive armor and active defenses have brought the total survivability of a T-90 to rough parity with an Abrams/Leo2/Chally2….while weighing ~15 tons less, giving it greater strategic and tactical mobility. And speaking of mobility….how were you expecting a bunch of Abrams to get to the fight? A Marine Corps MEU only has 1 tank company, and to arrive by sea the Amphibious Ready Group would have to survive crossing essentially a Russian-controlled lake defended by diesel-electric subs. Not likely. Flying in a tank battalion requires a huge allocation of strategic airlift. The mostly likely scenario is whatever heavy armor we have remaining in Germany would be sent by rail to join German/Eastern European Leopard 2s. Rail capacity limitations come into play there. So in all likelihood the balance of forces in Ukraine will numerically favor the Russians (who already have significant forces deployed along Ukraine's border). You are likely to end with trained-but-inexperienced (Iraq is long over and few tankers have fought in A-stan) Western crews, in slightly-better-protected but roughly as lethal heavy MBTs against mediocre-trained but combat-experienced Russian/Separatist crews in decently-protected but lethal and highly mobile medium-weight MBTs.

In fact NATO forces could move relatively quickly through a friendly Ukraine seeking assistance and much quicker than Russian units that need to smash through Ukranian forces

The Russian-Ukrainian border isn't defended like the Korean DMZ. There are huge stretches of ground with nothing but a border fence even in the immediate vicinity of the "Donetsk People's Republic" which is an active warzone. More than sufficient space for significant armored forces to penetrate relatively unmolested.

Russian systems are fine for smashing poorly defended Ukranian or civilian aircraft, but the Americans pretty much got to have a look in at how systems like S300 work through NATO partners like Slovakia, Greece and Croatia and clandestine means. Hence Russian AD is compromised from outset.

Sorry, I just have to harp on some of these IADS-related comments. Can you describe, explicitly, step-by-step, how US aircraft would negate Russian IADS just because they've pulled apart an S-300?

Kopp's article above mentions that jamming low-frequency radars is difficult due to antenna size limitations. Here's another article about low-freq Russian radars:
link

and some interesting (but slightly unrelated) statistics about SEAD missions, compiled in 2005:
PDF link

Indeed the FOF rules for both Cold War Goes Hot supplement and basic ruleset indicate a massive imbalance between even more basic M1 or Leo 2 compared to a T-72/-90. And once the current advanced versions are taken into account, it's a turkey shoot for NATO armour.

I'm not familiar with this ruleset but it sounds like part of the problem is that your rules are built on some deeply flawed assumptions about Russian hardware/combat effectiveness and this has colored any additional research you've done on your own.

Actually, Force on Force is a tool box game, so it doesn't make any assumptions at all about fighting in the Ukraine or a WWIII that takes place in the roughly here & now.

The scenarios in Cold War Gone Hot are set in the 80s, not in 21st century.

If I were to use Force on Force (and I'm likely to, as one of thie authors ;) ), I'd design my scenarios with this assumpton:

Western crews, in slightly-better-protected but roughly as lethal heavy MBTs against mediocre-trained but combat-experienced Russian/Separatist crews in decently-protected but lethal and highly mobile medium-weight MBTs.

Sound familiar? ;)

Best,

Shawn

(Sorry for the edit – left out a key bit of info the first time.)

If anything, the Russians benefit from greater continuous tank R&D

The Russians have never implemented any radical upgrades of T-72s or T-90s. They have built a few prototypes here and there but none of it's been adopted en masse. Most of the upgrades have been pretty basic.

And most Russian tank crews have no experience.

Abrams upgrades have been maintained.

In terms of numbers of modernised tanks, the Russians have less than the Americans (800-ish T-90s and maybe 300 T-72s).

Of course the Americans aren't going to use all of theirs. But I doubt the Russians will use all of theirs either!

And an Abrams is certainly not a Tiger in terms of maneouvrability.

And speaking of mobility….how were you expecting a bunch of Abrams to get to the fight? A Marine Corps MEU only has 1 tank company, and to arrive by sea the Amphibious Ready Group would have to survive crossing essentially a Russian-controlled lake defended by diesel-electric subs. Not likely. Flying in a tank battalion requires a huge allocation of strategic airlift. The

So according to you the Americans would have virtually no forces on the ground because they've not spent any time building up their forces

I doubt you'd see any Eastern European Leo IIs. Only Poland operates them and I don't see them being packed off to Ukraine.

Your scenario seems to imply following:

Obama"Hey new Def Sec. I'm going to war with Russia. What assets have I got in Europe?"

DefSec #7: "We've got an Army brigade and some F-16s in Poland and a destroyer in the Black Sea."

Obama"Sounds good. Let's send them in."

Really?!?

Especially given that even for air campaigns like Kosovo, the US spent months getting prepared. They prepared for months for Iraq both times.

"Oh but how are you going to get all them tanks to Iraq? And Iraqi troops have mediocre training but are combat experience in highly mobile tanks."

The S-400 is probably the most advanced SAM system in the world. The USAF is not going to rule the skies over Ukraine unmolested.

Actually most advanced are THAAD, Patriot and Israeli Arrow.

The S400 is a variant of S300. Another designation for it is S300PMU-3.

S300 was compromised due to several operators of advanced versions joining NATO or in case of Greece, obtaining S300PMU-1s originally destined for Cyprus. Croatia and Slovakia both obtained Soviet/Russian grade S300s – the Croatian ones never entered service and are assumed to have gone to US.

Can you describe, explicitly, step-by-step, how US aircraft would negate Russian IADS just because they've pulled apart an S-300?

The same way they negated Iraqi and Yugoslav air defence systems. The same way the Israelis shut down the Syrians in 1982.

It means that the US understands the guidance mechanisms, the radar frequencies etc etc.

Hence the US can jamp the network with E/A-18s and EC-130s (and whatever other stuff they might have but aren't telling us about). It means HARMs etc can be finely calibrated to radar frequencies from S300 radars.

Also the S400 is not in widespread service and most of them are assigned to ABM duties in St Petersberg, Moscow and Kaliningrad.

Kopp's article above mentions that jamming low-frequency radars is difficult due to antenna size limitations. Here's another article about low-freq Russian radars:
link

You're quoting Kopp? Hilarious.

Kopp is a man with an agenda. That agenda is that Australia needs to buy F-22s and that F-35 needs to be cancelled. That's been his agenda since mid-1990s when he was harping on about the Chinese Flanker threat and how Australia needed F-22s to counter them. Even when F-22 went out of production, they didn't change their story.

He and a bunch of his cronies actually went to a Senate committee with a load of this tripe and was laughed out. Several members of the committee actually walked out.

He actually hasn't updated his website since.

He has no standing in the aviation/defence world and is seen as a bit of a nutter.

Noble713,

I do have to thank you on the article azbout the VDVB though.

Was not aware of changes made to VDV. Most assessments about Georgia focused on Russian military as a whole.

Indeed a lot of the assessments of VDV in Georgia highlight the general picture – lack of C3 (Communications, Command, Control), lack of reconaissance capability etc.

Other problems highlighted were irrelevant – lack of laser designators was not the problem when the Russian airforce didn't use virtually any guided weapons in the war.

It also doesn't highlight the logistic issues or the lack of reliability of equipment and especially vehicles.

It should be noted that generally the professional Russian soldiers (kontraktniki) did not perform any better in Georgia than conscripts. The assumption was poor training, poor pay, lack of professional NCO class and engrained brutality of Russian military system contributed to this.

The article does mention the "1 year conscripts" that make up the vast bulk of the Russian army as well as the VDV. These will never make good troops simply due to lack of time for proper training.

As to talks of Russian military reform, the 83 brigades are not at full capability even now. There's constant delays or cancellations of new equipment.

In anycase 4-5 brigade sized "divisions" of VDV troops lack the sufficient punch (especially armour, anti- air and air support) and would need support from other less efficient and in fact far more incompetent arms.

And according to that article out of those 4-5 "divisions", only 5 batallions are Western equivalent in terms of capability and even then are lacking in communications divisions.

So a grand total of 5 batallions in the entire Russian ground forces are close to Western troops!

The Russians have never implemented any radical upgrades of T-72s or T-90s. They have built a few prototypes here and there but none of it's been adopted en masse. Most of the upgrades have been pretty basic.

The T-72BM Rogatka features Relikt ERA, supposedly 2-3x as effective as the already-decent Kontakt-5. New fire control, gunner's thermal sight, and an uprated engine with 15% more horsepower. It's been deployed across the Southern Military District/Caucasus. link

In terms of numbers of modernised tanks, the Russians have less than the Americans (800-ish T-90s and maybe 300 T-72s).

Lining up two columns of hardware numbers is a common form of armchair military analysis, but it has almost no meaning. Organizational, logistical, and just plain battlespace terrain constraints (in Korea's case, not necessarily Ukraine's) ensure that you'll never see these kinds of numbers employed in a tactically-significant timeframe. Look at the 2003 Iraq OOB:
link

The US employed 13 tank battalions. Assuming 4 companies of 14 Abrams each (CO, 1SG, 3 PLTs of 4 tanks) that's 728 Abrams total. So even with a 4-month buildup to fight an invasion in perfect terrain for armored combat we aren't seeing numbers that even approach "total inventory" stats.

You have to look at the actual OOBs of the forces on the ground, or likely to be in-theater. So your best resources will be maps like this:

So according to you the Americans would have virtually no forces on the ground because they've not spent any time building up their forces
…Especially given that even for air campaigns like Kosovo, the US spent months getting prepared. They prepared for months for Iraq both times.

All of which were entirely elective campaigns that we could afford to start according to *OUR* scheduling. Hence why I pitched a scenario that demands a time-sensitive response on NATO with some very basic assumptions.

1. Russia has already cut gas supplies to Europe. So by mid-late 2015 strategic reserves will probably be low. link
Maybe in 2015 Russia turns the gas back on, but combat and general instability in Ukraine means very little of it is getting through. Stability must be restored!

2. Climate change could deliver an epically bad winter. Buffalo, NY was hit with 8 feet of snow in 3 days recently. Imagine Hungary/Austria/etc. similarly snowed under in early November. link

3. With no natural gas for heating and debilitating weather, people freeze to death. You can spend 4 months building an invasion force, but by February 2016 maybe tens of thousands of Hungarian citizens have died. The failure to protect the interests of "new Europe" would entirely discredit NATO as a security organization. So the US has no choice but to attack with inadequate preparation…in winter.

You started the thread looking for suggestions on how to fight a plausible Russia-NATO conflict, in Ukraine, in 2015-2016. Other members have given you plenty of reasonably-balanced tactical scenarios and I've painted a strategic picture that forces the US to invade half-cocked, which makes it all possible. I'm not sure what else you are looking for. I'll still debate with you (because I've had a good internet debate in months). But I need to head to class so I'll pick up the rest Re: SAM systems and stealth later.

Hence why I pitched a scenario that demands a time-sensitive response on NATO with some very basic assumptions.

…strategic picture that forces the US to invade half-cocked, which makes it all possible

So we can then conclude that this is a completely implausible scenario because there's no way in hell Hungary or anyone else in Eastern Europe would allow US troops to transit through or base in US at expense of Russia cutting it's gas supplies and their ctizens freezing to death.

They would also not authorise the mission at NATO level, thus leaving the US to a "coalition of the willing." The Germans also probably wouldn't allow it (they were very vocal against NATO operation in Libya).

And without a base of operations, there is no US operation.

At most the US would be left running a land war in Ukraine out of United Kingdom and hoping to hell that the continental Europeans let them fly transports over their territory. An invasion of Siberia would make more sense.

As stated I'm put off gaming this – it's an exercise in futility. Which means I'm left without a project for 2015-16.

Wrong, you have chosen to look for ways to avoid gaming this, as an excuse for putting out your own political views, especially (as his been pointed out by several people) if you intend to use something like Force on Force which pretty much enables you to write the scenario background almost any way you like, as it deals with a battlefield area of perhaps half a km.

Here's a starter for 10: link

So take a small unit from Lviv and drive them across the country where they happen to bump into 'little green tourists'. Then for colour, throw some Ukrainians into the middle with a third party player (and their own objective) ;-)

Even RT plays that game: link

20 tanks. You only need one or two for FoF. Take 5, a small show of force, and bump it into some professionally led separatists in upgraded T-72s.

Pick one, go with it, stop winging about the political reality of something that hasn't happened, and we all hope never will.

if you intend to use something like Force on Force which pretty much enables you to write the scenario background almost any way you like, as it deals with a battlefield area of perhaps half a km.

Given that it's a fictional event, the background is critical to establishing the platoon/company game level perimeters.

After all we play historical games with actual hindsight built into rules and stats (Tiger crews generally good, T-34 crews generally poor).

Now I wanted to play a full scale conventional war between Russia and USA I wanted armour and aircraft and all that jazz. I had a campaign outlined too with key events.

I was not interested in some half arsed peacekeeping gone wrong or some fantasy stuff whereby Americans go in with 5 guys in Humvee with a case of beer and run into a Russian tank batallion or where no-one wants to help America and they're having to wage a whole war on the basis on airlifting supplies to Ukraine via C-17/C-5.

Given it's hypothetical, the scenario parameters would be critical as we don't know how it would perform.

Historical precedents (e.g. Georgia 2008 or Iraq 2003) are the only thing we can base it on.

And the historical precedents favour America immensely.

The only way the scenario would work in a Russian intervention in Baltic, but that's an Article 5 case and then the Russians are instantly in a world of poo.

The distances don't, and you are assuming that Russia allows America to pre-position to their advantage. Shove the Russians forward, force their hand, make NATO have to react with what it has got, not what it wants. Job done.

"I was going to use Force on Force rules and play at platoon/company level."

"Now I wanted to play a full scale conventional war between Russia and USA I wanted armour and aircraft and all that jazz."

Am I the only one finds those two objectives somewhat incompatible on a larger scale?

Actually I did shove the Russians forward – the assumption was a regular Russian army offensive that destroys most of the Ukranian army.

America's not going to send in units piecemeal to counter a major offensive.

Am I the only one finds those two objectives somewhat incompatible on a larger scale?

Er no. CWGH supplement has quite large scenarios for FoF.

And massive scale warfare does funnel down to platoon/company.

Hence discussion of strategic/higher tactical factors such as quantiatative factors or ability to maintain air superiority.

To use WWII as an example:

1. You don't give Germans air support for most Normandy games cause the Luftwaffe wasn't really present.

Hence your FoF platoon/company level engagement would restrict German air support.

2. Lack of quality manpower for Germans in 1945 would mean your German infantry platoon/company might have lower Skill and Morale ratings than the ones in 1942!

This is due to obviously massive losses in men including trained officers and NCOs by 1945 which meant they were dragging people out of retirement or kids out of school to fill the ranks.

Of course some systems don't bother with this – after all according to the folks at Battlefront, Vietnam was a war fought with NVA tank batallions.

Not my cup of tea. Game the period.

But you are talking generics over specifics.

"You don't give Germans air support for most Normandy games cause the Luftwaffe wasn't really present"

Luftflotte 3

6 Jun: flew 327 day sorties, mostly in the landing area, claimed 19 enemy aircraft shot down, lost 2 planes.

6/7 Jun: flew 217 night sorties in the landing area, claimed 4 ships hit, lost 18 planes.

7 Jun: flew 139 fighter and 34 bomber day sorties in the landing area, claimed 2 enemy fighters, lost 23 planes.

[Source: [MEHNER, Kurt (ed.). Die geheimen Tagesberichte der deutschen Wehrmachtführung im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945. 12 Bände. Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1984-95. Band 10: Berichtzeit 1.3.1944 – 31.8.1944. ISBN 3-7648-1460-8. 722p. 47 maps. 1986.]

Pick your fight to be ten minutes before the hour and they weren't present. Pick it to be at the time when they were and lo and behold, a viable scenario.

Er no. CWGH supplement has quite large scenarios for FoF

The large Soviet Assault pits 2 x M1 and 3 x M2 against 10 x T-80B and 3 x BTR-80 on a 6'x4' table. I think even the options people have proposed above can find a way to find 2 NATO MBTs…

a viable scenario.

Not a viable campaign or viable enough series of scenarios (FoF is scenario driven) to warrant expenditure of large amount of money to buy miniatures and time to assemble and paint them (I'm a wargamer first).

And it doesn't really fix the basics – Russian troops are poorer in terms of quality, training, have less experience (most have not served in combat, they're on 1 year conscript rotations), have seriously poor C3 and are generally far poorer equipped.

As stated I'm giving up this idea and looking for something else.

Not a viable campaign or viable enough series of scenarios

I think with a little imagination I could come up with half a dozen scenarios that I'd feel viable enough to play. Granted, making them linked into a flowing campaign may require a bit of work on the back story to explain how you get from scenario 1 to scenario 2 (probably looking at a series of separate scenarios linked by theatre, rather than a single linear campaign), but I don't think it is beyond the realm of possibility (by a long way).

I think a wargamer first would find an excuse to make it happen… not look for reasons not to game it.

does it have to be the 'Mericans you represent? why not the Poles, ok yes. the Americans are there (on another part of the Front), but they can't be everywhere, partly for political reasons (it's a coalition).

You then end up with the potential for it to look a little like the Stalingrad counter offensive, not aiming at the tough Germans, but at the softer allies.

Ok, so I am not saying the Poles are soft, but they may not be as top as the range as the Americans.

Also, you are assuming that the US units will not be affected by casualties more than Russians are. In the US, body counts will be all over the papers and media, while in Russia, they will be suppressed. If the Americans have a lower threshold of pain, then it becomes harder for them to win (more brittle units).

Again not saying that US forces are brittle (in fact I reckon they will be the opposite), but what with the media reporting and pressure from politicians, I think it wouldn't be unreasonable for there to be a reluctance to allow them to take heavy casualties which makes your games and campaign a lot more challenging…

I also remember an article in Wargames World, many, many years ago, where the game was set in Palestine at the tail end of WWI. It was set up such that the players were Turkish, turning the game from an exercise in sadism to one of masochism… you could do the same?

Personally, I would concentrate on Poles vs Russians and intended to do that in 20mm. Unfortunately, you can only get 1 correct Polish infantryman in 20mm, which isn't really enough… 8^(

Sorry, another fault, if you are convinced that the US will smash the Russians, why not game after the initial clashes and breaking of Putin's invasion force?

Overconfident US forces pursue into Russia, most of the other Nato forces don't, Russian reinforcements, understrength US on the end of an increasingly long supply line counterattacked…

Must be some milage there for you? Still US-Russia, still all the nice modern toys, just not day 1…

Definitely it seems to me that the easiest way to make this challenging instead of a Turkey Shoot is to play as Russian special forces. (If you really want a struggle you could play as regular Russian troops but that probably wouldn't be as viable for a prolonged campaign). If your brother wants to play with modern Germans you could easily have behind-the-lines actions against Germans (be it in Germany or elsewhere[?]) or you could just happen to be engaging Germany regulars on the front line.

Sure, in the grand scale, you're still pretty much bound to lose, but you could be fighting to make it at least a respectable loss!