"La Haye Sainte at Waterloo - really so important?" Topic

Hi all,

Most narratives of the battle credit the farm complex as having been a crucial element of Wellington's centre.

They therefore imply that the repeated French failure to capture it, until late in the battle, played an important role in the battle's outcome.

Really?

Why was it so very vital that the farmhouse fell? Could not the French have simply ignored it, advancing past it to make frontal attacks on the Allied centre? Did its capture late in the day materially assist the French in making their final, unsuccessful attacks on the Allied centre? Had it been taken earlier in the day, how would this have assisted similar French attacks, improving their chances of success?

I am scratching my head over this one, so would appreciate any help.

Cheers,
redcoat

La Haye Sainte acted as the bulwark for Wellington's centre. Its continued occupation caused both D'Erlon's attack and the great cavalry charges to have to take particular precautions or shy away. However, for me, the key thing is what happened when it fell. The French were able to bring forward infantry and artillery that almost collapsed the centre. But by that time, Wellington could bring troops from the left where the Prussians had arrived and the French no longer had the reserves (apart from the Guard) or the momentum to push through. If this had happened earlier in the battle or Napoleon had committed the Guard when Ney asked for it the result would have been different for the allies though I think the Prussians could still have held Napoleon to a stalemate at the very least.

Hi Artilleryman,

The French were able to bring forward infantry and artillery that almost collapsed the centre.

May I ask, which attack was this? What time, and where did it go in – to the west or east of the farmhouse, or directly north of it, or a combination of these? And where was the French artillery posted, in support of this attack, and at what was it firing and with what success? Did Wellington's centre really nearly collapse?

Cheers,
redcoat

Really redcoat? 11 questions in one reply? A bit snarky I think.

Artilleryman was just giving his opinion and not writing a freaking thesis. Drop the British pride nonsense.

And yes, by Wellington's admission it was a very close battle for a time.

I dont think redcoat asking questions is snarky.
Drop the british pride nonsense!-dont know where you get that from im afraid.

Anyway….., all national pride aside , there is still some research going on about the detail of what happened after 6 o'clock and La Haye Sainte fell. What we are sure of is that Napoleon refused to send reinforcements as he was concerned about the Prussians in Plancenoit. Around the farmhouse, the skirmishers swarmed forward and there was apparently at least one battery of horse artillery that came forward to the north of the farm and played upon the centre. At least two battalions of Hannoverians and KGL were badly mauled in trying to retake the farm which shows how importantly it was perceived. There was also an attack to the west of the farm by the remnants of one of Reille's divisions. There was a lot of damage to the allied line. This is when the Inniskillens were practically shot down in their square, the Prince of Orange was shot, some colours were sent to the rear and what remained of the cavalry was lined up to stop the infantry falling back/ cover their withdrawal etc. However, the French support was lacking. The gunners were shot down, Reille's attack was stopped and the skirmishers countered to a great extent. Many historians refer to this as 'The Crisis' and Wellington himself said that he was never more concerned. I believe that this is a generally held view and I have never heard it questioned before. But pointed questions do keep us on our metal.

My bad then. I just started Testosterone Replacement Therapy and am about ready to blow up at somebody on the drop of a hat. Stuff will make you rage at the littlest things.

My apologies redcoat, I will give you the benefit of the doubt. Carry on.

Redcoat,

I am certainly not a Waterloo expert but I would surmise that the farm house became a natural focal point for the French. Without knowing what was beyond it this naturally drew in French troops around this point as they were fired upon and repeated assaults on it failed to dislodge the British.

Ever played a wargame where due to combat erupting in a certain place it slowly sucked in reserves as players focused on that single point? I have several times. Sometimes to my advantage of keeping my opponent preoccupied until its too late.

I would answer your question about its later capture helping the French. I would argue it probably seemed to the French that the fall of this bastion and the subsequent pounding of British lines left the door open to a successful assault. How would Napoleon see it from his vantage point?

On the whole if captured earlier in the day perhaps it would have been the British committing reserves to take it with serious man power loss and the weakening of their lines. Maybe it provides a valuable staging point for attacks against the British lines which already weakened by failed attempts to recapture the farm house allow the final attack to be more successful. All speculation but fun.

Cheers.

Redcoat – Napoleonic tactical thinking was not what it is today. Napoleon was not a Patton or Rommel. Bypassing and screening off would have been possible but the range and accuracy of rifles made a good 100 meters on either side of the farm too difficult for any Frenchman.

Peter Hofschroer, describes in his book about Waterloo how Cuirassier's stayed away from the farm for this reason.
Taking the farm meant that there were no troops firing at your back if you are on the other side.

There were three infantry assaults on the farm, before it was finally taken, attacking both sides. Each defeated in detail. The first went in at the same time as D'Orlon's.

D'Orlon's troops were so disorganized and disheartened by their defeat they really did not partake much more in the battle.

Having finally taken La Haye Sainte the French could freely maneuver guns and troops past it to take on Wellington's centre, free of any attack in their flank or rear.
French guns now on the back side of the farm then rapidly reduced or destroyed a number of allied battalions with canister. This is when Napoleon decided to send in his guard. He could not see the Allied troops on the reverse slope, only those being reduced by his guns.

La Haye Sainte is not just a farmhouse. It is a walled farm, a small fortress. Once La Haye Sainte fell so did the sandpit northeast of it where the 95th Rifles had held sway. A French horse battery got up onto a knoll near the sandpit and worked the center over with canister. It was a bad time indeed for the Allies.

Good thing for them that Napoleon was busy watching his counter-attack at Plancenoit. When he told Ney's messenger that he had no troops, he had three brigades of Old Guards waiting. But his attention was on his threatened flank. By the time his attention was back to Wellington's army, troops from the Allied right had been brought in to bolster the center. You must remember that losses from long range French artillery were constantly mounting, since the Allied infantry spent a lot of time in square. The shots skimming over the crest were doing damage.

Go read Brendan Simms new, quite short and very good book on the defence of LHS – The Longest Afternoon.

Hey, this is marvellous – many thanks all. Certainly not intending to be snarky (whatever that means), and apologies all round if that was the perception.

I suppose it does boil down to the question of whether the farm really was important as the French seem to have considered it to be. i.e., did 600-odd rifle-armed troops with a range of 100m (when they could see that far through powder smoke) *really* make it so very impossible for the French to mount assaults past the complex? Could they really have prevented French forces from bifurcating around it, deploying in the ground north of it and, from there, assaulting the ridge above it?

It's easy to say 'yes' to all these questions. How might we test any of these assumptions, I wonder?

Well to test assumptions you should use something complex enough to factor in morale, weather, fatigue, ammo levels, line of sight etc. In a wargame setting id suggest using Carnage and Glory II rules. It can factor everything you asked to test in a game setting. Fast and fun to use. Little work on your part.

Link:

link

What a marvellous exchange. Clearly both sides felt possession of LHS was the key to the centre of the field, especially after d'Erlon's attack had failed. Every history since says this but it has always puzzled me.

Stand in the north garden of LHS, where the guns were posted after its fall and the crest is not visible today. Back then the ridge was even higher, so it has always baffled me that a few guns were said to have wreaked such havoc on the reverse slope (till the 95th got them!).

LHS is very hard to get into (impossible today alas) but must be just as hard to use as a fire base without firing platforms. Of the 600 or so defenders (let's remember the majority nationality as well, when we talk of British pride) how many could fire that 100 yds at any one time? A few on the piggery, a few through a (far too big for any sense) loophole and some through holes in the rooftops.

Any salient is a useful diversion of the enemy, for a defender. The poor KGL and Guards and Nassau etc, who held the buildings, created a valuable distraction and bought time. They protected the main line. But, if Hougoumont, LHS, or the Papelotte complex had fallen, not sure possession of any one site itself would have given Boney any huge advantage.

Of them all I think the neglected complex on DoW's left flank may have been the only crucial site! Great, if you can stop those French short of my line, but French holding Hgmt or LHS does not increase the threat to those on the ridge. Stand at either and the ridge top, let alone reverse slope, is not visible, even with the top taken off.

Redcoat:

link

Here is what Wikipedia has to say re the Waterloo position, it seems sensible enough to me. Being hit with enfilading fire as a bad thing, even if it is only a few hundred guys with muskets:

"This position presented a formidable challenge to any attacking force. Any attempt to turn Wellington's right would entail taking the entrenched Hougoumont position; any attack on his right centre would mean the attackers would have to march between enfilading fire from Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte. On the left, any attack would also be enfiladed by fire from La Haye Sainte and its adjoining sandpit, and any attempt at turning the left flank would entail fighting through the streets and hedgerows of Papelotte, and some very wet ground.[25]"

and the result of the fall of LHS:

"Ney then moved horse artillery up towards Wellington's centre and began to pulverise the infantry squares at short-range with canister.[79] This all but destroyed the 27th (Inniskilling) Regiment, and the 30th and 73rd Regiments suffered such heavy losses that they had to combine to form a viable square.

'The banks on the road side, the garden wall, the knoll and sandpit swarmed with skirmishers, who seemed determined to keep down our fire in front; those behind the artificial bank seemed more intent upon destroying the 27th, who at this time, it may literally be said, were lying dead in square; their loss after La Haye Sainte had fallen was awful, without the satisfaction of having scarcely fired a shot, and many of our troops in rear of the ridge were similarly situated.'

—Edward Cotton, 7th Hussars, [93]

Along with this artillery fire a multitude of French tirailleurs occupied the dominant positions behind La Haye Sainte and poured an effective fire into the squares. The situation was now so desperate that the 33rd Regiment's colours and all of Halkett's brigade's colours were sent to the rear for safety, described by historian Alessandro Barbero as, "… a measure that was without precedent.[94]"

French holding Hgmt or LHS does not increase the threat to those on the ridge.

It does provide dead ground for French troops to approach the ridge and get ready for a rush. They can't see the crest, folks on the crest can't shoot them.

Could they really have prevented French forces from bifurcating around it, deploying in the ground north of it and, from there, assaulting the ridge above it?

Infiltration tactics were developed in 1917. Close-order tactics didn't have such concepts.

Infiltration tactics were developed in 1917. Close-order tactics didn't have such concepts.

What I meant is: why couldn't a division of French troops march past La Haye Sainte – one brigade to the left, one to the right, and re-form north of the complex for a final assault on the ridge?

@Redcoat:

"This position presented a formidable challenge to any attacking force. Any attempt to turn Wellington's right would entail taking the entrenched Hougoumont position; any attack on his right centre would mean the attackers would have to march between enfilading fire from Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte. On the left, any attack would also be enfiladed by fire from La Haye Sainte and its adjoining sandpit, and any attempt at turning the left flank would entail fighting through the streets and hedgerows of Papelotte, and some very wet ground.[25]"

Emphasis mine.

Given that the largest cause of shots not hitting their target is range error (even today), having a mass of troops covering a good 100m away from you makes hitting SOMEONE in the unit a lot more likely.

Also, since there aren't a lot of firing positions at La Haye Sainte, I'd imagine that the defenders went to the typical Marine rotation: One man firing, and several more loading for him. So now we're not talking about 2-3 rounds per minute, even from the rifles, but 6-10.

Even today, enfilade fire will annihilate troops in a great hurry.

So if contributors are convinced that the rifle fire from LHS would have been too destructive to ignore, could it have been masked? Did the French have the ability to set it afire or to fire carcasses into the complex to wreath the place in smoke?

Recently finished reading "Waterloo The French Perspective". The author brings up a good question: The French Army was very experienced so why didn't somebody think to turn some guns on the place earlier? Round shot could break down the gates and shell could have set the compound ablaze (like at Hougoumont). Just another example of the poor management of this battle by Napoleon and Ney.

Regards,

John

Martin Rapier

"Ney then moved horse artillery up towards Wellington's centre and began to pulverise the infantry squares at short-range with canister.[79] This all but destroyed the 27th (Inniskilling) Regiment, and the 30th and 73rd Regiments suffered such heavy losses that they had to combine to form a viable square."

The 30/73rd and 33/69th were brigaded into single squares from the beginning at Waterloo due to the casualties sustained at Quatre Bras, not the ongoing casualties being sustained at Waterloo.

Paul :)

Shelling LHS? Eventually of course they did and started the fire in the barn, hence the tale of the Nassau troops and their kettles. Less certain what round shot would have done to the walls, but, as only brick, I would imagine knock the stuffing out of them. Were the walls and gates really the challenge, was it not justy physically getting close to them whilst being shot down in droves? Would a few dozen more gaps have made a huge difference to that…consider Monte Cassino?

So much of our discussion above has been about LHS being irrelevant and easily bypassed. Maybe the French gun line saw it the same way until after d'Erlon's attack on the Allied main line?

Hgmt a much more challenging target for artillery as so masked by woods.

Hello Redcoat!

"Most narratives of the battle credit the farm complex as having been a crucial element of Wellington's centre."

Absolutely, next to the flanks the centre of a line is the weak point. Anything you can do to strengthen this area will help to defeat frontal assaults. The placement of LHS directly in front of the centre of Wellington's line is a defensive commanders dream. It's the awkwardness of the thing. It will break up any direct assault on the centre. An attacker really can't ignore it or go around it very easily as wheeling large formations in the face of your enemy is asking for trouble. A strong defensive point or even a dug in unit in front of the centre of your line was often used by seasoned commanders for this very reason, to break up enemy attacks.

"They therefore imply that the repeated French failure to capture it, until late in the battle, played an important role in the battle's outcome."

No question. As long as the Allies hold it a cohesive attack on their centre is very difficult to pull off.

"Really?"

Yes really.

"Why was it so very vital that the farmhouse fell? Could not the French have simply ignored it, advancing past it to make frontal attacks on the Allied centre?"

Yes you can, but it will split or divide your attack into two wings. Each wing now has two flanks that become their weak points. There is also the additional problem of having to wheel some units around the obstacle, not to mention flanking fire. These are all complications that work against a strong attack.

"Did its capture late in the day materially assist the French in making their final, unsuccessful attacks on the Allied centre? Had it been taken earlier in the day, how would this have assisted similar French attacks, improving their chances of success?"

It was too late by the time they took it. The real strength of their attacks were spent. If it had been taken earlier it might had made a difference, but in this case probably not as they chose to make separate attacks. However, if LHS was not there it could have been a completely different battle. You have to remember that the dynamics of the battlefield limited Napoleon's options. He also didn't think Wellington's army would stand up against any serious assault.

I think, LHS played a major part in this battle, no question in my mind.

Best regards,

Glenn

I think the fact the the French artillery were able to move North of LHS after it fell tells us that they were unable to take up that position whilst under fire from allied troops in LHS and the sandpit.

That Wellington's centre came under serious pressure once LHS fell tends to support the notion that basing a line on advanced strongpoints carries a big risk if these points fall into enemy hands. The response to the loss of a strongpoint has to be – (1) counterattack (as seen often as a see-saw fight for a location) (2) retreat sufficiently so that the point is no benefit to the attacker or (3) stand in front and take losses. Wellington's counter attack failed, there was no space to give ground so option (3) was the outcome.

Defensive positions are like links in a chain. The art of the tactical commander is to find the link that is sufficiently exposed to allow him to bring sufficient combat power to bear in order to reveal opportunities to deal with other links to reveal…

The line P-LHS-H prevents a cohesive body of infantry any larger than a brigade from attacking any point on the allied centre. Cavalry can come through due to the speed they traverse the deadly space (that area combining the beaten zone and the area where shots are traveling through the air at a height likely to hit a target). But even they are forced to contract – effectively feeding cavalry units into the allied centre piecemeal, or at the very least- at a more containable rate.

Was LHS important? Only as important as a tower overlooking a curtain wall, as important as the firing positions placed forward of trenches, as important as the standing patrols that cover main defensive positions…even with infiltration tactics (not sure how they work against men in line) these types of positions are important.

The question is why did the great uber generalissimo of all time (the short fat one not the tall one with a big nose) not take advantage of the change once it fell? My most junior multiple commander would have!

The question is why the great uber generalissimo of all time…not take advantage of the change once it fell?"

The *opportunity* of which you speak here, Adam (and on which others touch elsewhere in this thread), was what, may I please ask?

1. That an attack could now be made on the Allied front *roughly between LHS and Papelotte* on a broader front than it could have been made before, specifically because now there was no enfilading fire from LHS to consider, and because artillery could be pushed up north of LHS to give fire support to this attack?

or…

2. That an attack could be made on the section of the Allied front *immediately to the north of LHS*?

If the latter, what was it about this section of Allied front immediately north of LHS that made it so very vulnerable – more vulnerable than the rest of the Allied line?

"The response to the loss of [LHS] has to be – (1) counterattack (2) retreat sufficiently so that the point is no benefit to the attacker or (3) stand in front and take losses.

Why, Mike, did the French capture of LHS directly result in losses for the Allies? In other words, how did French guns brought up just north of LHS, after its capture, manage to devastate regiments like the 27th Inniskillings in square, if these British squares were on the other side of the crest of the ridge, on the reverse slope? Surely the French guns would have had no direct line of sight? Or am I woefully misunderstanding the position of the French guns and/or the Allied squares involved in this process? Were the French guns pushed up onto the crest, for example?

Again, many thanks for any and all responses – I feel so privileged to have access to such great expertise on this forum.

Cheers,
redcoat

I do agree with your last sentence. So often I have thought how great it is to be able to ask such questions of the experts. I already am dreading post 2015 blight…will we ever read of the battle again after that?

Let me repeat what I said on 14th. If you stand in the area just north of LHS, indeed, you are right. You cannot see the true ridge summit, let alone anything on the reverse slope.

I have tried to work out how Ompteda was so blinded to the cavalry threat: After two or three descents I found the one spot (this is below the excavation for that mound) where there is dead ground. A few feet (metres) is enough to hide even men on horses, esp if smoke drifting around.

Yes indeed, dedhead, do please forgive me for failing to mention yours of 14th, which particularly interested me:

Stand in the north garden of LHS, where the guns were posted after its fall and the crest is not visible today. Back then the ridge was even higher, so it has always baffled me that a few guns were said to have wreaked such havoc on the reverse slope (till the 95th got them!)…. French holding Hgmt or LHS does not increase the threat to [Allied troops] on the ridge. Stand at either [Hgmt or LHS] and the ridge top, let alone reverse slope, is not visible, even with the top taken off.

Forgiveness hardly comes into it, honestly! Your comment about the "opportunity" was better expressed than mine actually. Thanks.

Again let me say how marvellous this forum is for exchanging ideas like this and asking the experts.

Adkin – The Waterloo Companion map 34 on page 378 shows the deployment of French horse artillery with the note that these were driven off by 1/95th. Interestingly there is no mention of this in the Waterloo Letters – always a valuable source.

What we do have is J Leach (1st/95th)in Waterloo Letter 160 who describes the French filling the house (LHS) with skirmishers which they used to drive the 95th from the knoll above the sandpit.

He identifies the French as occupying the knoll and the crest of the hill near it whilst Kempt and some of Lambert's regiments were posted along the thorn hedge.

Leach describes a close and protracted musketry contest and attempts by the French to make advances on the position of the British at the hedge. The 27th were mentioned as being in square behind the 95th with one face directly fronting the Brussels chaussee.

I used to go by every year.

My impression was that the main benefit was not the forces in there but the shelter it gave forces behind. The enfilade was more coming from forces to the rear.

I did attend various lectures years back but I forget the details.

The defenders were pretty busy and not sure what they could have added.

They both slowed everything and more than anything it was a battle for time.