"Napoleon's Armies’ Victories and Losses" Topic

Interesting

link

So, the only way to won Napoleon was with a overwhelmed number of soldiers.

Amicalement
Armand

Getting to the right place with overwhelming force, being "the firstist with the mostest" is the height of strategy! :)

Very interesting – it suggests that the French could win even when outnumbered [by as much as 9%], whilst the allies, to win, needed overwhelming advantage in numbers [by as much as 83%].

The methodology has some points that should be noted:
- They got their basic data set from Wikipedia …. many of data points have come from easily available, but decidely pro-French, sources (e.g., Thiers, Elting) as the actual sources
- They have looked at battles from small actions with less than 1000 men engaged to Leipsig, counting each engagement equally
- Sieges and naval engagements are not included
- They used the number of troops actually engaged, not the number present in the area of a battle
- They have measured only tactical victory, not the strategic value or result of the action

Three comments of my own (my opinions):
- They have shown that the Fench had a lot of trouble winning when 2 or more allied nations usefully co-operated in the field.
- They have shown that historians (like gamers) continue to have a greater interest in set-piece "battles" than in campaigns.
- The study neglects completely that kind of asymmetric warfare (Russia, Iberia, Tyrol, Calabria, economic/naval blockade, etc.) that seemed to cause the greatest damage to the French military of the era – damage which was often with forces that were numerically smaller and/or much less costly to form and equip.

To re-state the final comment, by not counting the most effective "actions" or "methods" of the allied forces, we are (once again) looking at a pre-selected subset of the conflict against the French, a subset which when looked at in isolation seems to favor the French. As such, it is not too enlightening. We are left rather unenlightened as to how and why the French armies were destroyed and the régime of Napoléon defeated.

For example, I am sure that the authors counted battles such as Ostrovo, Smolensk, Jacobovo, Borodino, Krasnoï, Gorodetchna, the Berezina and perhaps even Maloyaroslavets and the two battles of Polotsk as French "victories" against larger enemy forces. But we also know that the French and French-allied army was utterly destroyed, almost to a man, in Russia and that two major powers (Prussia and Austria) changed sides as the strategic defeat of the French was completed. Some might argue that the fate of Napoléon's régime was then decided.
All of which would be invisible to the authors' methodology.

- Sasha

This quantifies what a lot of us suspected – that the French were better at winning set-piece battles man-on-man.

It covers 152 battles, and only a few were excluded because there was no result. Rather supporting Sasha's point, they found the fit for campaigns less good!

So what? This leaves entirely open why the French were so successful in this narrow formulation. They just looked at numbers. They needed to bring in other variables to get anything interesting (presence of Napoleon? Presence of British troops?).

One of the annoying tendencies of historians of this era is that they attribute French success to pretty much everything French, from the quality of their leaders, to weapons, to various tactical methods (columns, light infantry, etc.), or (less fashionable nowadays) to some kind of national spirit. Difficult to prove wrong but highly unsatisfactory. Probably there are too few data points and too many variables to get to the bottom of this, and this study doesn't help.

Very well said Sasha.

Not sure these guys are historians – my sense was that they were statisticians.
The level of math involved in their assessments certainly put them into more of a scientific and objective realm than mere subjectivity and opinion.
They did address the fact that Wiki is a probable unreliable source, and identified their check source. They also attempted to account for the less quantifiable concepts, such as Napoleon being on the field of battle, simply because this was impossible to accurately quantify. Wellington is quoted, from Stanhope, as stating Napoleon was worth 40,000 men. Add up the numbers at Waterloo – a near run thing for Wellington, where the allied armies outnumbered the French by close to 40,000 men.
Obviously, there approach is just one approach to qualify/quantify the reason behind French victory – what they considered interesting was the disparity in the field forces engaged, and that the allied powers seemed to require much greater numbers to be victorious, when compared to the French. They did not, in my opinion, offer reasons why the French were victorious when they were – merely that the French won on many occasions when they were outnumbered.

The Grand Armee was "utterly destroyed, almost to a man"…..that's not actually true, in fact there was a sizeable force at the close of the Russian campaign around 100K if I recall and if we were to add depot forces, drafts etc as well, it rises to 150K and with that Napoleon was able to put an effective force into the field for the spring 1813 campaign, however, that's for another time (Oh and I'm no Francophile either!) ;)

I also disagree with your generalised comment – "They have shown that historians (like gamers) continue to have a greater interest in set-piece "battles" than in campaigns."

I disagree with this very strongly – 99% of my boardgames are campaigns, I tend to wargame campaigns rather than battles, I prefer wargaming campaigns and fighting clashes on the table top as and when they occur. I also suspect there are a great number of wargamers who fight campaigns. :) Also Gill has shown in his 1809 trilogy that not all historians are fixated on battles only.

However, I agree with the rest of your exemplary comments.

I also concur with Ligniere, it's a case of an exercise in maths rather than anything else, and, it certainly hasn't changed my view on Napoleonic warfare in the slightest.

Using Wikipedia for definitive information is suspect in itself.

I didn't see either Thiers or Col Elting referenced in the paper.

This paper is an exercise in statistics and not military history. And it should be noted that statistics can be manipulated to say almost anything. It is an interesting paper, but the methodology does not deal with the most important element regarding armies, marching, and killing-the human element.

B

I agree Brechtel198 and nor does it take into account critical factors such as attrition and supply.

Good lord people. No, it didn't account for every conceivable variable possible or encompass the whole of every aspect of the global historical machinations. That wasn't it's point. That would have been a fool's errand anyway. The data that it DID use didn't NEED to be accurate to the man count per company either. Take it for what it is (I find it interesting and don't think it was posited as being anything that was going to change your view of Napoleonic Warfare). Your dismissiveness is unmerited and comes across as peevish.

I cannot agree with your figures Marcus Maximus, the center column of the former Grande Armée was done, it was not in any fighting shape anymore, re-inforcements sent to its help were soon wasted as well, 100.000 left overs – no way – in case of that figure they could have hold the Niemen line.
A lot of those who survived where mere cripples and unfit for duty for quite a while.
It took Napoleon quite a while to come to 150.000 soldiers.

I admit I like campaigns as well and battles.

In case of any interest

Du Niémen à l'Elbe : la manœuvre retardatrice de la Grande Armée
From the Niemen to the Elbe: the delaying maneuver of the Grand Army
Jean-François Brun

Au centre, les rescapés de l'expédition de Moscou ont aggloméré, au fur et à mesure de la retraite, les diverses unités qui assuraient la sécurité de leurs arrières. Ils représentent désormais un groupement de 35 000 hommes, suivis de 10 000 à 15 000 traînards.

Référence électronique
Jean-François Brun, « Du Niémen à l'Elbe : la manœuvre retardatrice de la Grande Armée », Revue historique des armées [En ligne], 267 | 2012, mis en ligne le 08 juin 2012, consulté le 12 octobre 2014. URL : rha.revues.org/7447

@Daler240D
Spot on!

When people count the amount of soldiers of the Grande Armée who invaded Russia, forget the number of Prussians and Austrian contingents.
Of course, they turn coats then.

Amicalement
Armand

@vonWinterfeldt please drop me a line off board to trajanic AT gmail DOT com – thank you :)