"British Tactics During the AWI" Topic

I recently read in a book that during the American War of Independence British line infantry (not lights or grenadiers, but the center companies) fought not shoulder to shoulder, but with several feet between each man in the ranks. This isn't in the woods, but in the open field. Any truth to this? I always thought that they fought shoulder to shoulder. But this isn't a period I know much about.

I believe they dressed right from the extended left elbow with the hand on the hip

Extended files, open order…

Hence the title of the "Loose Files and American Scramble" rules – link

Tarleton blamed his defeat at Cowpens on the loose formation that he had been using for years…

Americans mostly fought in the same formation. At least early on, Hessians used 3 rank close order and that's why they moved slower than the Brits.

Have a read of "With zeal and bayonets only". Matthew H Spring. Excellent book, should answer your questions and more.

Interesting! Were they still doing that by the time of the Napoleonic Wars?

Yes they did. General Howe instructed the entire army in his loose formations, based on his F&I experience in the previous war in N. America. He was regarded as the expert on such fighting, thus why he was choosen for the command over more senior generals (though Amherst declined).

The formation was called "order" – confusingly the same as a position in the manual excercise. It was 18 inches between files (ranks of two, not three as called for in the manual), and could go out further as needed, as directed (order, open order, extended order). In short, they did not usually fight shoulder to shoulder, clomping around to the tune of the fife and drum. The moved fast, at order, muskets at the trail or recover position (as shown in several period paintings).

Come to a re-enactment event at Mt. Harmon Plantation, near Middletown, DE on Oct 25, 26 and I'll show you. :-)

I'll put in a plug for my about to be released Osprey Combat title, Continentals vs. Redcoats…in the book I've provided a summary of the evolution of British tactics and formations. Interestingly by the end of war British units had adopted more open order formations while American continental units operated in close order formations. In 1781 there are examples of British units using extended, open and close order formations in the same battle.

db

Howe instituted the two-rank open order formation.
Initially files at close order were 22" wide, with 6" intervals – in the new order that interval was extended to 18", so each file occupied 40" total.
When first practiced the troops used three-rank depth, but that was altered to two-ranks as the campaigns progressed.
The Hessians, never adopted this formation – from what I understand, the Elector's refused the troops to even adopt two-rank close order.
But I think the British were more sophisticated and could and would use a mix of deployments, including close order at 6" intervals, with one wing, supporting another wing.

Nothing but lies! My middle school social studies teacher told me the redcoats lined up all bunched together (because they were stupid) and the Americans were smart and hid behind trees.

@Historygamer
I prefer your post to mine – but I think we're saying the same thing….

I suppose this is what happens when there's not as much cavalry running around as you might expect in Europe.

Also a good read; "Fusiliers" by Urban, about the 23rd and through it all of Howe's army.

Joe (79th PA),
Thanks!! You made my day!!
John

Well the Brunswickers certainly used a loose order in the Saratoga campaign so I doubt that it was unknown to the other German units either.

I'd recommend 'With Zeal and Bayonets Only' by Stephen Brumwell for a detailed discussion of this issue.

With Zeal and bayonets is written by Spring
My understanding is that those German troops coming from Canada with Burgoyne were largely an exception to the directives aimed at the Hessians. So did use two rank open order.

I suspect von Bose under Cornwallis also used open order as well, since that was what his entire army was using at the time.

db – I look forward to your book. Will it be out by FI?

Having been riding for a bit now, I can assure all that horses – while wonderful creatures – are very high maintenance. I wonder how they could keep any in the field at all for any length of time.

The details of Howe's changes are detailed in his orderly
book. They were instituted not that long after Breed's/Bunker Hill if I remember correctly.

Howe blamed the problems at that battle due to poor training and did everything he could to train his troops.

v/r

Joe

The Margrave of Hesse Cassel forbade the open order to Hessian troops. He had no say over what order Brinswick troops in the Daratoga campaign used. Not the Hesse Hanau troops. Nor the Waldeck or Anspach. ….

Some great info here!

Did Howe's changes remain in effect? Were the British line battalions still using this open order during the Napoleonic Wars?

Not an expert on post-AWI Brits, but my reading of Spring and Houlding would indicate that the peace time British army regressed with the Duke of York's fascination of everyting Prussian. I seem to recall the Brits getting their butts kicked during the early French Revolutionary Wars and General Howe and others coming out of retirement to re-teach the army in the two line fashion and open files – when needed. I believe that is covered at the end of Spring's book, more so than Houlding's Fit for Service.

Howe's reforms were mainly used in the New World. Back in Blighty, Dundas wrote the drill book and he was enamored of Prussian drill, culminating in the annual Prussian 28 battalion oblique order advance that took two hours to prepare.

The part of Howe's reforms that stuck was the bayonet charge early in the fight. Urban covers Dundas and his influence.

It in interesting to note that there was a lively debate in England among British officers, many of whom served in America, during the 1780's about the impact of British tactics during the war. As has been pointed out Dundas and others challenged the premise that open order tactics were effective. Tarleton even touched on the topic in his description of Cowpens, claiming that the open order formations used by the 71st Royal Highlanders and 7th Fusiliers disordered them during their advance and left them vulnerable to the counter attack of the Continental line, which was formed in close order.

db

Dave:

I suspect the young Tarleton was looking for reasons (excuses) why he was defeated. Note he was never given an independent command after that (and he was very young). I suspect the rush to battle, fatigue and quality of his troops had as much as anything to do with what happened.

The use of open order was effectively demonstrated by both Howe and Cornwallis in other battles. Whether those tactics were appropriate to Europe is another matter, but they certainly worked here where the British won most of the field battles while using them.

Riedesel, a Hessian by birth but OC of the Brunswick forces, describes in his journal the "tree fighting" tactics he had ordered his men to adopt, and how he demonstrated them to Burgoyne and Fraser in a "field day" in Canada.

Dundas and Cornwallis both attended the last field day overseen by Fred the Great; Dundas was impressed, Cornwallis went, "Meh – my boys could take them, any day." Dundas got to write the book, Cornwallis went off to command in India. Whilst Dundas is often slated for doing away with the "loose files and American scramble" it should be borne in mind that his views were based on the presence of massed cavalry on European battlefields which, in fairness, was a perfectly valid point to consider. The only European nation to adopt two-rank line as standard for its line infantry was Bavaria, whose Minister of War was one Count (von) Rumford, a former American Loyalist who had served in the AWI.

Everyone should read Spring's book, and in conjunction with Urban's "Fusiliers", as the two together give the most complete picture yet of the British Army in the field during this conflict.

I would also add that another "must read" is O'Shaughnessy's The Men Who Lost America – at least for a very good strategic look at the conduct of the war from the Crown side. I found the Chapter on Rodney worth the price alone. :-)

The British went to 2 ranks in the Napoleonic Wars, but close order (though open order was certainly know and even practiced).

I think the regs still called for 3 ranks, but nobody did it that way.

There's a great anecdote from an officer of the Guards at Waterloo talking about how they did things in the field v. the drill manual that is instructive, commenting on how "Old Pivot" would be scandalized by the way they were forming square from 4 ranks in a manner not outlined in the manual.

Same thing happened during the F&I and AWI periods. Drill manuals were developed for training in peace time, advanced war camps usually taught what would be used in combat. This is covered in Houlding's Fit for Service book. :-)

I'm not really an expert on AWI issues, but, reading this thread I somehow miss to understand what is so important about this open order. Opening files was done if moving through rugged terrain. It was done also in Europe well before the 1770's. Example would include the Hannoverian brigade turning the French flank at Hastenbeck July 1757. The troops advanced through an open wood on this occasion. Deployment in 2 ranks was also done before. The Hessians did so at Sandershausen 1758 in order to increase frontage to oppose the superior French. Also the Prussian general Wunsch ordered his infantry to form in two ranks at the combat of Zinna, September 1759. The cavalry deployed in a single file, really. Again, it was done to oppose a superior enemy in open terrain in the attempt to avoid being outflanked.
Also I don't see what would make an open order battalion move faster then a close order one if not forsaking good order. In rugged or wooded terrain – no question – you get on easier, but otherwise whats the point. Avoiding casualties? I understand, the Continentals musket fire wasn't really much dreaded, even that of the riflemen. A Hessian account states the poor men needed about 15 minutes to reload which gave you all the time to fall upon him and pin the poor lad with your bayonet to the very tree he was hiding behind. You'll rush a mile in 15 minutes.

P:S. I did have a quick glance at "With Zeal and with Bayonets Only". To me, it is far from being groundbreaking news, but based for most part on outdated secondary and younger publications. No good read to become wiser.

The general impression for a very long time here in the states was that armies fought shoulder to shoulder in classic linear European tactics, or if you buy into the American mythology of the war – that the Patriots hid behind trees and rocks while the British fought like robots in the open in classic British 'Royal Warrant '68 uniforms.

I'm not aware of any books that covered this topic the way Spring's did, so perhaps you can illuminate us on that.

The British army practiced several alternative methods.

As mentioned above Howe had units form in loose order.

The light infantry were trained to form in open order with two feet between files (Order for Light Infantry Drill and Discipline for the Irish Establishment, May 15, 1772 – included in the document linked below).

Then, units practiced, even late in the war (there were newly arrived units in the South); consider this interesting document of orders

Capt. Eyre Coote's 37th Light Infantry Company Order Book, 1778 – 1781
Eyre Coote Papers, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan
Transcribed and Edited by Paul L. Pace, June 15, 2011
(1778 account tables transcribed by Don Hagist)

PDF link

Consider, for example, the use of 2, 3 or 4 ranks in the order for the 4th of April 1781 by Major General Phillips gives the following (the spelling is not corrected in the transcription, nor by me):

That the troops Inder his Command may Practice firing from two, to three And to four Deep, And that
they Should be Accoustomed to Charge in all those Orders, in the latter Order of 3 – &4 deep the files
Will of Course be Closer, So as to Render a Charge of the Greatest force.
The The Majr. Genl. also Recomends to Regts. the practice of Devideing the Bettlions by Wings
or otherways, So that one line may Support the other, When an Attack is Supposed; And when a Retreat
is Supposed that the first line may retreat through the Intervals of the Second, the Second Dubling Up its
Divisions for that purpose; And forming them Up again in Ordr to Chak the enemy Who may, be
Supposed to have pressed the first line –
The Majr. Genl. Would aprove also of one division
of a Bettlion Attacking in the Common open Order of 2 Deep, to be Supported by the other division as a
Second line, in the Charging Order of 3 or 4 deep be ganing the flank of a Supposed Enemy by the Quick
Movement of a division in Common open Order, while the Compact division advances to a Charge, And
to Such other evoloutions as may lead the Regts to a Custom of depending on, And mutaly Suporting each
other So that Should one part be pressd or broken it May be accoustomed to form again without
Confution [confusion] Under the protection of a Second line Orany [or any] Reagular formed Division –

The Majr. Genl. is assured that the Captains of Companies Upon whom the mannovers of a Bettlion in so
meterial a Degree depend Will pay the greatest attention to the orders of the Field Officers; in whos
activity and zeal the Majr. Genl. places the greatest Confidence

See the discussion of Dundas starting of page 50 (note he attributes the open order to the "first" American war)

link

The METHOD almost universally adopted in our infantry, and in ours only, of forming two deep, and at open files, deserves the most serious consideration. It was not produced by the experience of the German war, but by that of the first American. The desultory service there carried on by small bodies of men, and the then deficiency of movement, and want of flexibility in our solid battalions, made us run into the other extreme, and first introduced it as proper for that country; review appearance continued it; and the new military modes, brought into fashion by the light infantry, have.tended to make it the prevalent order of the service. Many respectable officers are satisfied of its propriety; but it seems necessary to consider its operations and consequences, when extended to larger bodies than the single battalion.
Its advantages are said to be,
- That as infantry seldom or never shock with'bayonets, all formations on a great depth are unnecessary.
- That as fire now decides ; the more men that are thus usefully employed, the better.
- That the fire of a third rank is thrown away, and more incommodes the front rank, than it does the enemy.
- That at close files, men have not the use of their arms; and are apt to crowd, double, and get into confusion, when under the enemy's fire.

But it must be recollected,
That if these reasons are good with respect to two ranks, some of them operate in favour of a single rank. That though infantry do seldom mix with bayonets, yet it would more frequently happen if two ranks were opposed to three, and the consequence ought not then to be doubtful. That rank firing, or reserving the fire of the third rank, obviates the inconvenience complained of.
That no general could manage, or position contain a considerable army formed in this manner; even one of twenty thousand men, would occupy five miles in front. That the great science and object of movement being to act with superiority on certain points; it is never the intention of an able commander to have all his men at the same time in action; he means by skill and manoeuvre to attack a partial part, and to bring the many to act against the few; this cannot be accomplished at open files and two deep.

[He goes on]

This from a work published in 1788:

Principles of military movements, chiefly applied to Infantry, illustrated by manoeuvres of the Prussian Troops and by an outline of the British Campaigns in Germany during the war of 1757

>A Hessian account states the poor men needed about 15 >minutes to reload which gave you all the time to fall upon >him and pin the poor lad with your bayonet to the very >tree he was hiding behind. You'll rush a mile in 15 >minutes.

5 minutes, maybe--but 15? Gotta be a typo.

Minimizing time under fire is why the British trained to close with the enemy as fast as possible, open files. Anybody who has drilled in a formation knows that you move a lot quicker in open order than in close order, so there were a number of practical reasons for the British to do this.

As Historygamer notes, the "popular view" in the US for many years has been based on 19th century mythology.

It takes about 30 to 60 seconds to reload a musket. A rifle a bit longer, if using a patch. 15 makes no sense.

P:S. I did have a quick glance at "With Zeal and with Bayonets Only". To me, it is far from being groundbreaking news, but based for most part on outdated secondary and younger publications. No good read to become wiser.

What would you recommend instead?

I'm not saying the book is any bad, I just have the feeling it doesn't contain much that you'll find in earlier publications to the subject. So, in case your library already includes books on 18th C and AWI period warfare, you won't need it. In case you don't have anything yet, then go ahead and buy it.

I don't have a lot of books on the military history of the War of Independence.

I'm relatively new to wargaming the era – I did a little in the 90's, but haven't since then. Although I studied the era in school, that was more of the typical academic/political/social stuff you get in most classrooms than tactics and uniforms. Most of my wargaming is in different time periods – the closest I get to AWI is Napoleonics.

However, I recently acquired a rather large pile – a few thousand – 15mm AWI figures. I'm going to start working on them soon, and I'd like a bit more information before I really dive in. I don't really want to go the "Osprey" route; I'd like something a bit more substantial. I'd love recommendations…?

"I'm not saying the book is any bad, I just have the feeling it doesn't contain much that you'll find in earlier publications to the subject. So, in case your library already includes books on 18th C and AWI period warfare, you won't need it. In case you don't have anything yet, then go ahead and buy it."

????????

Sorry, that reply made no sense. Can you elaborate? Can you give us even one or two books you think covers the same ground Spring's book does for AWI?

Well, regarding English language publications, my library includes Charles Oman, "Wellington's army" which has a lot of British tactics. I also have Hew Strachan's "European Armies and the conduct of War", London 1983. Not to forget a source quoted here earlier: Dundas, Principles of Military Movements, chiefly applied to Infantry. etc. London 1788. The remainder is mostly German Language. Curd Jany being the best read here, really – though not covering the AWI.
But, as I was trying to say earlier, I don't believe most of what happened combat-tactics-wise was substancially so different, still less innovative – seen from a wider scope. To the British army, it may have been, as it was heavily involved – more then during the 7YW and WAS – and, as a result military theory now became much more an issue of debate then ever before. Dundas book serves as a proof here. To the Hessians, not much seems to have changed, besides Hessian, British, and Continental officers all read the same books and have gone through the same war with similar experience. Also with the French, not much seems to have changed. To a Prussian observer of the first campaigns of the French Revolutionary Wars, the Hessian contingent's professional conduct – superior to that of the Prussians, as per his understanding, was the result of the many veterans found with the Hessians that had seen service in America. Far less such veterans were found with the Prussians then. No word on tactics and combat formation here, not to mention whether you'd fire your musket twice or 3 times in a minute.

Crogge:

I think perhaps you missed our point is that the Spring book does a ground breaking job of documenting how the British actually fought in the AWI, not the fact that such tactics had never been used before that, or after. The books you cite are all covering a later period, as opposed to solely dealing with the AWI.

The tactics the Brits used were indeed revolutionary for them, as compared to their manual exercises used in peace time. Even in the F&I war only some units used such tactics (e.g.: the Lights) and while Amherst's army went to ranks of two, Wolfe fought in ranks of three.

I think the low regard the British generally held the Germans in the AWI (with the exception of the Jaegers) was based on their refusal to adapt to looser files and move quickly. There is no sign the Germans in the AWI displayed the kind of tactics you cite used later, or even in Europe in the SYW – other than the Jaegers. Of course le petite guerre was well known to all prior to the SYW and was covered in the many printings of Bland.

From the books specifically on the AWI I would contend that Springs' book is ground breaking. The fact that such tactics were used in later periods does not change that. If you have any examples of other books written specifically on the AWI dealing with this subject I would like to hear about it (and add it to my collection).

Other than a treatise on light troops/partisan warfare in the SYW written by a British officer named Stevens(on?), which was shown to me by Christian Cameron about 10 years ago, I can't think of anything written by British officers that really goes into the fine detail of British infantry tactics beyond the three-rank line.

I agree with <<historygamerr>> that Spring's book is very much a ground-breaker as regards what was ACTUALLY done in the AWI; he takes numerous first-person accounts (from both sides) in order to identify formations and tactics. He was awarded his doctorate for the original thesis, so it must have been original in some way.

In re-reading Crogge's posts, I think he is confusing the subjects that some countries experimented with looser formations with our point that Spring was the first to address this subject and use of loose files by the British in the AWI period. Two different subjects.

I think Spring also did a good job of covering why the British could never really catch Washington, who was no mean general himself.

I would again suggest reading O'Shaughnessy's work, "The Men Who Lost America." His point at the end was that in order to re-conquer, the British would have needed large armies and been ready to sustain massive casualties – just like what happened during the American Civil War less than 90 years later. I thought that a rather good analogy.

I guess I did get something wrong here. If you are saying Spring really draws from some first hand accounts on what was really done, it should be a good read and a real add on. I missed that with my snipped view cross read.
The reason I was so sceptical are based on my below learnings.
A) From the many excellent details I have on Prussian drill evolutions which draw heavily from war and drill journals I learned the official print version regulations are more often of poor value to understand what was really done. I take it, this does not serve for the Prussians alone, but for all others with extensive real combat practise likewise. I just happend to benefit form the extensive research that had been done on Fredericks army long ago.
Other nations history focuses on other periods, such as France.
B) I may have found myself fooled with my personal prejudice of Anglo-Saxon military historians (not all) having a strong inclination to link on technical issues that make the decision, while German historians for long link to human behavior or morale from the decision making general down to the man firing the musket, that decides nearly all. (Sample being Oman on Wellingtons army – with his technical approach to deal with the column vs line issue carried on all to John Keegan's "Face of Battle" – I consider booth Classic, nevertheless). Interesting is the so different German Curd Jany's approach to deal with the war of 1806. Especially for this period in concern, I always found the letter approach more convincing.
Now that leads me to
C) I understood the line of two ranks in open files always as an irregular adaption to the exceptional environment found in America. Such adaptions are found in many's during all of the period. Not so important. A line opposes a line. Who wins? Its not a matter of musket calibre, number of ranks and file width.

But, from the above accounts, I understand Spring's book provides a lot more than that. I consider buying it. Thank you for convincing me – and making me drop some of my apparently outdated weary stereotypes.

Cheers,
Christian
crogges7ywarmies.blogspot.com

"Hence the title of the "Loose Files and American Scramble" rules"

just read the rules summary….

i hate to break this to andy callan, but few americans i know think that we won most of the battles in the war. it's only bunker hill, and lexington/concord, that have the reputation of redcoats being shot down.

otherwise the awi was like the vietnam war or even the pyrrhic war. go ahead and win all the battles you want -- keep em coming! eventually your casualties will become unsustainable and you'll have to leave. :-)