"Tank deficiencies not covered by rules" Topic

Here is what the New Weapons Board Report of Apr 1944 had to say about the fire control apparatus of US tanks -

"Fire control.-(1) Because of the excessive dispersion which occurs with the M4 periscope, firing of tank guns is confined almost entirely to the artillery method of sensing and locating bursts and giving corrections in mils to the gunners. The average dispersion which occurs as a result of slack in the periscope holder and linkage extends 4 mils in both planes. This dispersion is so great that guns do not stay bore-sighted with the telescope after any operation. The modification consisting of a spring between the periscope holder and turret will be greatly welcomed. The officers who saw the M4A1 periscope liked it extremely, but all were emphatic in saying that only one reticle pattern should be used and that if these new periscopes are used the telescope mounted on the gun mount should have the same reticle.(2) There is very little use of the coaxially mounted telescope; the dispersion which results from its use is even greater than that experienced with the M4 periscope. In addition, the optics of the M55 telescopes are unsatisfactory, resulting in unsatisfactory light-transmission characteristics. Furthermore, most gunners report that it is very difficult for them to get their heads into proper position for sighting through the coaxial telescope. When tanks are operating in combat, the crash helmet is always worn; in most cases, the steel helmet without liner is worn over the crash helmet."

It was the light gathering deficiencies of US sighting optics that were complained about by US tankers when interviewed in late 1944. Still looking for my file.

B

It is always interesting to see some of the high speed manouvres carried out by tracked vehicles without fear of losing a track!

Tally Ho!

mkenny/67t wrote – "What is being claimed is that a Sherman 'burned' more easily than other tanks. I mentioned a survey that found the same burn % for Tigers & the Pz IV. If the Sherman was a 'bad' then any other tank that has the same burn rate is equally 'bad'. Or this % is the norm."

The 'same people' means it is the same OR people who did all the tank casualty surveys in Normandy. Endless repetition of the Sherman casualty data goes unremarked whilst mentioning the other surveys that show the high German tank burn rates raises hackles. Many of the OR Reports can be found in Copps 'Montgomery's Scientists.

The data from Table VIII of the report on AP penetrated German tank casualties June 6-Aug 31 1944 shows that of 32 German tanks 22 (69%) burned. The Sherman figures showed 33 of 40 (82%) burned. 69% v 83%, not quite what most people expect."

- – -

….. I am familiar with Copp's work. I thought you were referring to some other OR report. One must be careful reading the OR reports, however. Re the OR evaluation of German tank casualties, for example, the report is clear that the average number of actual armor penetrations required to "brew-up" a Sherman was 1.89, whereas the figure for a PzKw VI (Tiger I) was 3.25 and for a PzKw Mk V (Panther) was 3.24. Only the PzKw Mk IV was inferior to the Sherman, at 1.5. Hence the Sherman WAS materially more likely to catch fire in comparison to the Mk V and Mk VI.

It is also worth noting the attached comments of the researchers -

"18.(a) From Table VIII it would appear that the percentage of brew-ups for the Panther (PzKw Mk V) is materially less than for the Sherman. Too much importance, however, must not be attached to this difference by itself since British and German gunners may differ in their tendencies to fire.

(b) On the evidence of Table IX it is urged that the causes of brew-ups in tanks are due for detailed research. As shown, the types of tanks studied vary greatly in their susceptibility to catch fire as a result of any single penetration, and this is considered of great importance. This susceptibility depends upon both the tank and the projectile and it does not appear that it can be elucidated by further observation on the battlefield but requires detailed research."

That research did take place and life did improve somewhat for Sherman crews after it was determined that it was ammunition rather than gasoline fuel that was setting the tanks alight. See Zaloga for further details on the remedies applied (such as wet stowage).

B

One must be careful reading the OR reports, however

Only, it seems, when it gives a bad review to German equipment. I have yet to see anyone claiming the Sherman report needs to be 'carefully' evaluated……………..

See Zaloga for further details on the remedies applied (such as wet stowage).

By far and away the most detailed report on tank casualties is

link

which breaks down tank losses and crew injuries in far greater detail than any other report.

The whole of it was posted here

link

and by following the links in post no.1 you will get the entire document.

I suggest anyone doubting accuracy of UK gunsight consult the exploits of one one Joe eakins who, as a rookie gunner, despatched 3 tigers with 5 shots over 800 yds on his first shoot in action.
Further examples of hits at ranges of 1-2000 yds + may be found (for example) in APPENDIX 'D' to 21 Army Group RAC Liaison letter No 2. A sgt Dring engaged a Tiger at 1400 yds with 6 shots and observed 4 hits and knocked it out.
The Dring Tiger was extensively photographed after its demise

Case of man-bites-dog?
You do realize they don't take photographs of all the targets missed. The news worthiness would be such a tank hit and KO'd at such a range.

I believe the eakin's event was when he was in a Firefly. And using a 17pdr. That had the best allied sights.

You do realize they don't take photographs of all the targets missed. The news worthiness would be such a tank hit and KO'd at such a range

It is nothing to do with 'news. It is internal documents that give map references of specific engagements (hence range can be calculated) against a number of targets.
The Tiger claimed by Dring is one of 3 lost in and around Rauray and just happens to have been photographed and has a hit pattern consistent with the strikes mentioned in the report. It was not photographed for the report and it is me making the connection to a photo in the IWM Photo Archive. Just like the demise of Wittmann that went entirely unreported or remarked in August 1944. It was just a normal days work for Allied tank crews. 'Wittmannmania' is a recent malady..
Dring also had a hand in knocking out another (confirmed) Tiger in the same area

Thanks for the tank casualty analysis link, 67t. Quite interesting material.

Comment re "careful evaluation" …. I seek to carefully evaluate everything I come across, regardless of topic or source.

B

…. the Centurions could depress their guns further than the T-54s could elevate theirs.

Close, but no cigar. I remember being briefed on this during army training back in 1974: the Centurions could indeed depress their guns more than any opposing tank, but this enabled them to take up hull down positions on reverse slopes of the Golan heights. The Syrians attacking uphill couldn't depress their guns sufficiently to engage them

It is internal documents that give map references of specific engagements (hence range can be calculated) against a number of targets.
The Tiger claimed by Dring is one of 3 lost in and around Rauray and just happens to have been photographed and has a hit pattern consistent with the strikes mentioned in the report. It was not photographed for the report and it is me making the connection to a photo in the IWM Photo Archive. Just like the demise of Wittmann that went entirely unreported or remarked in August 1944. It was just a normal days work for Allied tank crews. 'Wittmannmania' is a recent malady..

The old canard of Allied sights being just as good as German sights never ends. Going on about these battles as if they were 1 on 1 tank duels is priceless.
The German tanks suffered under a hail of shot from squadrons of Shermans. Under the law of large numbers some will score hits. Most were 75mm guns and didn't much penetrate the heavies. But mixed in there were 17pdrs and they did.
According to Stuart Hills the first day Ruaray only one German Tiger was KO'd and it was hit numerous times at 60 yards.

Quote:
The German tanks suffered under a hail of shot from squadrons of Shermans. Under the law of large numbers some will score hits. Most were 75mm guns and didn't much penetrate the heavies. But mixed in there were 17pdrs and they did.
According to Stuart Hills the first day Ruaray only one German Tiger was KO'd and it was hit numerous times at 60 yards

Dring had a 75mm Sherman.
Hill wrote a book and his acount of that day.

Stuart Hill, By Tank Into Normandy.
Cassell 2002 ISBN 0304362166

"It had been a great day. Thirteen Panzer Mark IVs had been knocked out, along with a Tiger and a Panther. The enemy tank force defending Rauray had been eliminated and their infantry overrun. Aggressive tactics had
paid off, and at relatively small cost to ourselves. C Squadron had lost two tanks, with Iwo dead and two wounded. I felt encouraged by the way each squadrbn had performed and this was reflected in the general morale of my troop, in spite of the casualties. We had won a tank
battle against significant opposition, and this gave our confidence an important boost."

The Tiger Hill mentioned was the other Tiger Dring was involved in knocking out. A total of 3 were knocked out. 1 each from 1st, 2nd and 3rd kp. sSS PzAbt 101.

Did the OR study control for German tanks burned by their own crew, on abandonment?

One effect I have yet to see simulated: when it's raining, electronic gear – particularly radio equipment – goes wonky, and optics get degraded (often by mist on the INSIDE, where it can't be wiped off.

Did the OR study control for German tanks burned by their own crew, on abandonment?

I believed in Hollywoodspeak you have been 'headed off at the pass' The report clearly says it deals only with AP penetrated German tanks.

Stuart Hill, By Tank Into Normandy.
Cassell 2002 ISBN 0304362166

"John Semken was Squadron Leader and as he had already heard from C Squadron that where tanks about, so his gun loader put an AP shell up the spout, just in case. As they cleared Fontenay, they were suddenly confronted by an enormous tank coming around a bend in front. It was hard to know who was more surprised, but John shrieked, ‘Fire, it's a Hun', and they loosed off about ten rounds into the smoke." …
"Although the range had been only sixty yards, not one Sherman shell had penetrated that armour. The fire in the Tiger, we discovered, had instead been caused by a shot hitting the side of the driver‘s observation visor and showering white-hot splinters into the tank."

Maybe Sergeant Dring was Semken's gunner. But it shows the range to be about 60 yards for some of the tanks firing at the Tiger.

Also, not exactly a fair fight when three Squadrons of about 16 tanks each, plus one or more 3 tank HQ sections take on 15.

Some Sherman shells did penetrate the Tiger. The 1944 Laison Letter has much more information than Hills book.

This is the Tiger in question.

link

Note the Panther mentioned in item 4 below in the background.

The extract is of tank actions near RAURAY between 27 Jun. and 1 Jul.

SHERMAN – 75 MM GUNS.

4. Lt. [Neville, A Squadron] Fearn angaged a PANTHER side on with his 75mm and APC
It was moving about 12mph at 80 yds range and he brewed it up with
one hit through the vertical plate above the back bogie

He saw his [A]Squadron Commander [ Major John Semken ]engage a Tiger ( previously
examined by us) on the road. At 120 yds the Tiger was head on.
The 75mm put 3 shots on it and the crew bailed out without firing.
He put in 3 more. The tank brewed up. Four shots had scooped on
front plates.One had taken a piece out of the lower edge of the mantlet
and gone into the tank through the roof,and one had ricocheted off the
track and up into the sponson.

And I am sure the 50 Shermans all bunched up together to gang up on those poor Germans……………..

Maybe Sergeant Dring was Semken's gunner.

Dring had his own tank

link

and Harry Hodkin seen 2nd from left on the above photo can also be seen in the captured Tiger photo on the left behind the ammo box.

It's a good thing that they conducted forensics to determine who shot who.
It is possible to compare events from both sides.
British

He saw his [A]Squadron Commander [ Major John Semken ]engage a Tiger ( previously examined by us) on the road. At 120 yds the Tiger was head on. The 75mm put 3 shots on it and the crew bailed out without firing. He put in 3 more. The tank brewed up. Four shots had scooped on front plates. One had taken a piece out of the lower edge of the mantlet and gone into the tank through the roof, and one had ricocheted off the track and up into the sponson.

German

SS-Unterscharfiihrer Warmbrunn of the 2nd Company
described the events of that day: "On 27 June I drove through the enemy lines to assess the situation, which was uncertain. I had volunteered for this mission with the concurrence of my crew. When I drove over a hill I found myself facing a group of thirty Shermans. They showered me with a hail of shells and all systems went out. We owe our lives to the self-control of my driver, who did what we had always practiced, namely placed the Tiger at an acute angle to our armored foe. The crew and I then made our way back through the enemy to our departure point.

You got me. Only 30 Shermans not 50.
Next day B Squadron takes the lead.

5. Sgt Dring started out south from FONTENOY LE PESNIL with
his 75mm and fell in with a MK IV which he shot through the drivers visor. It brewed up and the crew bailed out.
Next he fell in with a Tiger at 1000 yds. The Tiger fired whilst Dring was traversing but missed. Dring then pumped 5 shots in without further retaliation. The last one hit the drivers periscope and the crew bailed out.
(this tank is believed to have been recovered for shipment to the UK.)

German

28 June 1944. Amselgruber of the 3rd Company remained in his
old location during the night and the entire day, repelled probing English infantry, and was attacked by a superior number of English tanks. Amselgruber was able to knock out two Shermans before his tank was disabled by several hits.
Amselgruber's left leg was badly injured as he abandoned the
tank"

Still Dring

Next he took on a Tiger at 1400 yards just outside Rauray. He fired 6 shots of which 4 hit and the last one brewed it up. Tp. Cmdr. thought he had missed it and only hit the wall behind. Sjt. Dring's next shot brought the sparks and the remark "You don't see a brick wall spark like that".
This tank has been seen and is much shot up. It now has one scoop in front vertical plate, five penetrations in rear, four strikes with no penetrations in rear, plus a scoop and one plate of engine hatch smashed.

German

SS-Hauptsturmfuhrer Mobius of the 1st Company of the Tiger
Battalion recalled those days of constant action: I lost one tank after another to enemy action and had three left, one of which had its barrel shot away. I myself stopped an advance by the English through a defile by destroying six tanks. I then attacked an armored column with another tank (Ustuf. Amselgruber) and knocked out three tanks; my gun jammed and I was shot up by ten tanks. I bailed out; Amselgruber had already done so."

Hills says that there was only 7 Shermans of B Squadron servicable at the end of the 27th so B Squadron lost 9 that day. But his time-line seems a little off as there is nothing mentioned of the events of 26th of June.

Problem 1.

Warmbrunn was in 2nd kp. The tank in question is '114' from 1st kp.

There is another knocked out Tiger in the area from 2nd kp.

link

Bolt Action has the Ronson Shermans, fortunately my Canadian First Hussars drive Sherman V's and Vc Fireflies — those M4A4's pay a few more points to buy off the 'catches fire easily' feature.

I didn't realize that was true of the Sherman V.

Would the same rule apply to the Sherman III, which ran on diesel?

Laison Letter again:

Next he [Dring] took on a Tiger at 1400 yds just outside Rauray. He fired 6 shots of which 4 hit and the last one brewed it up. Tp. Cmdr. thought he had missed it and only hit the wall behind. Sjt. Dring's next shot brought the sparks and the remark "You don't see a brick wall spark like that".
This tank has been seen and is much shot up. It now has one scoop in front vertical plate, five penetrations in rear, four strikes with no penetrations in rear, plus a scoop and one plate of engine hatch smashed

If you look closely at the photo above and the one below you can see 'one scoop in front vertical plate'

[URL=http://imageshack.com/i/kmPZLrf1j]

[/URL]

Hills says that there was only 7 Shermans of B Squadron servicable at the end of the 27th so B Squadron lost 9 that day. But his time-line seems a little off as there is nothing mentioned of the events of 26th of June.

The tank states for the entire 8th Armoured Brigade (3 Regiments) for June 26th show 10 tanks as 'fit in under 24 hours' and 15 KO and/or 'fit over 24 hours'. That gives a total of 25 tank casualties of which a max of 15 would be lost.

27th June gives 5/23 and 28th 4/7.

29th 5/7
30th 13/2.
Tank totals shrink from 133 on 26th to 109 on 30th.

Both Hills and The laison Letter mix things/dates up a bit.
For instance your:

He saw his [A]Squadron Commander [ Major John Semken ]engage a Tiger ( previously examined by us) on the road. At 120 yds the Tiger was head on. The 75mm put 3 shots on it and the crew bailed out without firing. He put in 3 more. The tank brewed up. Four shots had scooped on front plates. One had taken a piece out of the lower edge of the mantlet and gone into the tank through the roof, and one had ricocheted off the track and up into the sponson

And:

Next he fell in with a Tiger at 1000 yds. The Tiger fired whilst Dring was traversing but missed. Dring then pumped 5 shots in without further retaliation. The last one hit the drivers periscope and the crew bailed out.
(this tank is believed to have been recovered for shipment to the UK.)

are in fact 2 garbled accounts of the same event.

No, you got that wrong. That account is A Squadron, on the move with C Squadron supporting. Both engage the first Tiger as it comes over a rise. Dring is not involved.
The next day Dring moves up with B Squadron and engages two different Tigers.

Next he [Dring] took on a Tiger at 1400 yds just outside Rauray. He fired 6 shots of which 4 hit and the last one brewed it up. Tp. Cmdr. thought he had missed it and only hit the wall behind. Sjt. Dring's next shot brought the sparks and the remark "You don't see a brick wall spark like that".
This tank has been seen and is much shot up. It now has one scoop in front vertical plate, five penetrations in rear, four strikes with no penetrations in rear, plus a scoop and one plate of engine hatch smashed

I wonder how they got hits both on the front plate and penetrations in the rear plate from 1400 yards? Then scoring 11 hits for 6 shots. I wouldn't expect anything less.

No, you got that wrong. That account is A Squadron, on the move with C Squadron supporting. Both engage the first Tiger as it comes over a rise. Dring is not involved.

I assure you that knowing the names of the men involved (I added them to the report) the location and nature of the reported hits and the fate of the tank concerned ('114') that both accounts refer to the same Tiger and the same incident. No doubt about it.

I wonder how they got hits both on the front plate and penetrations in the rear plate from 1400 yards? Then scoring 11 hits for 6 shots. I wouldn't expect anything less.

Heard it all before. My answer is that if anyone said a 75mm Sherman could pentrate a Tiger frontaly and knock it out they would be told it was impossible-and yet it happened and we have the reports and photos that prove it.

But then you seem to believe the German accounts where a Tiger always has to get surrounded by '40' Shermans before it gets zapped………..

Why do people instinctively believe the German accounts? They invent incidents to cover up tactical errors and have an imperfect memory of events, just like all combatants.

Then scoring 11 hits for 6 shots. I wouldn't expect anything less.

This is considerably better than the rounds per claimed kill for the Flak '88' in N Africa. The Jentz Panzer Tracts book on the gun shows the Russian and N African expenditure as 11 rounds per claimed kill for 'normal' ranges and 20 for 'long range. It is also considerably better than the ammo expended-per-kill-claim for 12th SS PzIV's as given in the book WAFFEN-SS ARMOUR IN NORMANDY by Norbert Szamveber.
I guess that would explains the millions of AP rounds fired through super-accurate high-probability-of-a-first-round-kill perfectly sighted German guns.

My answer is that if anyone said a 75mm Sherman could pentrate a Tiger frontaly and knock it out they would be told it was impossible-and yet it happened and we have the reports and photos that prove it.

I may have missed it, but where's the frontal penetration by a 75mm? All I saw that might be what you meant was the one that "had taken a piece out of the lower edge of the mantlet and gone into the tank through the roof." Was there an actual penetration of the frontal armor by a 75mm projectile or do you mean the attack from the front that deflected down through the thinner roof armor? I can't tell from the picture at link what's a penetration and what's a gouge or if that's the tank or the one at link is the one you are referring to.

The top of the drivers visor was blown off and that is where (it is claimed) the fire was started

So more of a spalling effect than a penetration or am I splitting hairs? :)

I am sure there are those who will pounce on any reason to claim this is 'not really a fair kill' Tiger and should be classed as 'abandoned'!

I assure you that knowing the names of the men involved (I added them to the report) the location and nature of the reported hits and the fate of the tank concerned ('114') that both accounts refer to the same Tiger and the same incident. No doubt about it.

It's just that Dring can't be in both A and B Squadrons. If he was in A or C Squadron and hit the first Tiger, he couldn't be in B squadron which engaged the other two. If he took on the first Tiger at 1000 yds, and A squadron commander was only 60-120 yds away, why was that? Was he actually in overwatch with C Squadron? It really is a bit confounding.

It really is a bit confounding.

Start with the tank ('114') and work backwards. The information in 'both' accounts apply to it. Clearly the details were not as important to the real soldiers as they are to us today. I expect the compiler was working from written records and just took 2 different accounts of the same event and made it 2 different events.

This is considerably better than the rounds per claimed kill for the Flak '88' in N Africa. The Jentz Panzer Tracts book on the gun shows the Russian and N African expenditure as 11 rounds per claimed kill for 'normal' ranges and 20 for 'long range.

Well, claiming that your shots at 1000 yds were the ones that took out the first Tiger when there were somewhere like 31 (by Hills drawing) that would be firing (some within 60 yards) is somewhere near the apex of self promotion.

I am sure there are those who will pounce on any reason to claim this is 'not really a fair kill' Tiger and should be classed as 'abandoned'!

I would call it a kill from a non-penetrating hit. Not that anyone asked me! :)

Well, claiming that your shots at 1000 yds were the ones that took out the first Tiger when there were somewhere like 31 (by Hills drawing) that would be firing (some within 60 yards) is somewhere near the apex of self promotion.

You have your view and I have mine. I am certain the facts posted here were unknown to most. They now have a more balanced view of the Shermans puported flammability and just what it could achieve in battle.

I would call it a kill from a non-penetrating hit. Not that anyone asked me!

I prefer the Allied method of categorising tank casualties. It was very simple. At the end of every day tanks were dived into 3 types. Fit, fit in under 24 hours and knocked out or needing more than 24 hours to fix. A Unit held only the fit & fit under 24 hours tanks on the books and wrote all others off the roster.
The German's seem to have had a myriad of tank casualty types. Fit, in the workshop, awaiting parts, canabilised hulks, tanks abandoned, tanks that ran out of fuel, tanks damaged by aircraft etc.
This makes direct loss comparisons very difficult. Even though not all tanks written off by an Allied Unit were unrepairable at base workshops they are always counted as such. It is very rare to see any German tank not knocked out in a 'fair fight' by another tank included in any loss calculation.
Must be a cultural thing.

Well, 67t, the time hasprobably come for you to once again explain to the great unwashed how Villers-Bocage was not really a dramatic German tactical victory and that Wittmann was an over-rated as a tank commander.

B

Perhaps Schneider's comments would be better:

General Analysis
The action of the 1st and 2nd Companies of the schwere SS-Panzerabteilung 101 was everything but awe-inspiring. SS-Panzerkorps propaganda then gave a decisively misleading account of it. How can this be explained?
First, we have to remember that – unlike the Wehrmacht – the Waffen-SS did not have a experienced tank arm. Compared with the brilliant exploits of the «old» (Wehrmacht) panzer divisions, the Waffen-SS could not hope for similar successes. At a pinch, the II SS-Panzerkorps's action in Russia, in the southern sector, during Operation Zitadelle in July 1943, commands respect. So with Obersturmfuhrer Wittmann, Sepp Dietrich tried his utmost to manufacture a hero. On the Eastern front, the Knight's Cross was awarded for «kills», as were Oakleaves. This is all the more astonishing as, both in the Wehrmacht tank arm and among the tank destroyers, many soldiers had much higher scores
As we know, the legend of the "Second World War tank commander with the highest number of kills" has been kept up to this day. This judgement is completely wrong, in terms both of the actual score and the tactics employed! A competent tank company commander does not accumulate so many serious mistakes as Wittmann made.
1. The company commander knows exactly the technical status of all his panzers. He does not place a
vehicle which has engine trouble at the head of a stationary column; the risk of blocking all the other panzers is just too great.
2. A sunken lane can afford some protection, but it is not a suitable standby base when the enemy's position is unknown. The major concern is for the panzers to be disposed in such a way as not to hamper their freedom of movement.
3. In a concentration sector, all battleworthy panzers are placed in alert positions. These positions and the
roads leading to them have to be carefully reconnoitered. When placed on the alert or when the concentration sector is attacked, upon orders, the crews join them individually. But when the morning alert came,
none of the company's tank commanders knew what to do.
4. After the first intelligence of the enemy, the company should have been placed on the alert at once with orders to ready itself for battle as quickly as possible. Invaluable time would certainly have been saved
and it could have regrouped before engaging the enemy. Such action would have been more effective.
5. As the enemy's position was not clear, it was all the more necessary to work out a well-conceived counter-attack. On the basis of observation relying on an overall view of the situation, valuable intelligence could have been obtained before engaging. Such overhastiness was uncalled for, as the next company (1./SS-101) was in a favorable position further north-east, and it could have attacked the enemy forces when they advanced.
6. The hasty, single-handed attack on the large and powerful British force may seem brave, but it goes against all the rules (no centre of gravity, no concentration of forces, importance of the moment of surprise). The action that followed by the bulk of the 2nd Company and by Mobius 1st Company came up against an enemy who had gone onto the defensive.
7. The carefree advance of a single panzer into a town occupied by the enemy is pure folly.
Thoughtlessness of this kind was to cost the "tank commander with the highest number of kills" his life on August 8th 1944, near Gaumesnil, during an attack casually launched in open country with an exposed flank.

"Did the OR study control for German tanks burned by their own crew, on abandonment?

I believed in Hollywoodspeak you have been 'headed off at the pass' The report clearly says it deals only with AP penetrated German tanks."

That doesn't really answer the question. An AP hit can cause abandonment, without necessarily causing a brew-up.

Do you have Schneider's accounts of the action around Ruaray? He does identify Tiger's 114, 331(Amselgruber) and 334 being lost. But then says that two others belonging to Warmbrunn and Mobius were lost as well.

An AP hit can cause abandonment, without necessarily causing a brew-up.

I am lost. What exactly are you trying to say?

Do you have Schneider's accounts of the action around Ruaray? He does identify Tiger's 114, 331(Amselgruber) and 334 being lost. But then says that two others belonging to Warmbrunn and Mobius were lost as well

I have the majority (if not all ) of Schneiders English works. However his information fits so well with Agte's book that it is obvious he takes his info from that book. Schneider however is well out of date. His take is the old way of accepting every German account as gospel. Many mistakes have been found since the publication of TIC I & II.
That said he lists 4 (not 5) Tigers as being lost during EPSOM and gives only 1 number ''331'. This can not be as current research has positively identified the famous photo of a turretless Tiger destroyed on 15.6.44 at Evrecy as '331'.

If you want further confusion 11th Armoured Division War Diary says that Tiger wrecks '231' and '324' were examined on the EPSOM battlefield. Now it is possible '324' is a miswrite of '334' which we know was knocked out in EPSOM but the wreck of '231' is located at Verrières Ridge in late July (ATLANTIC) and thus not EPSOM in late June.

Turret numbers are a minefield and given that during the campaign Tigers were re-numbered this is always going to be an area of confusion.

Anyone interested in the bombing of 3rd kp. sSS Pz Abt 101 should seek the current edition of Normandie 1944 Magazine #12 by Heimdal. It has an article on the Evrecy bombing by my friend Yann and Frederic Deprun

"Perhaps Schneider's comments would be better:"

Schneider reminds me of the old saying: "those who can, do. Those who cannot do, teach. Those who can do neither, criticize." I found Schneider's comment about alleged inadequacies and inexperience of SS armored commanders especially amusing, especially by 1944. Schneider makes it sound like the poor SS armored divisions could barely stay out of their own way after three years fighting on the Eastern Front. Would that include commanders like, say, Von Strachwitz? Not to put too fine a point on the issue of experience, but technically speaking no one in the German armed forces actually had more experience in tanks than Sepp Dietrich, who was one of the precious few Germans with actual WW1 armored warfare experience.

Perhaps Wittman's actions that day failed to follow every provision of the official manual. The same sort of tut-tutting, hindsight and Monday morning quarterbacking has been directed toward Nelson. At the end of the day, however, it is results that count. On that score, you have avoided answering the basic question. Was or was not Villers-Bocage a dramatic German tactical victory against odds?

B

I was hoping to fill in the blank of the missing Tiger number. From the number of named German Tiger commanders only 3 are identified and only 3 Tiger tanks are related in British reports.

It doesn't show anything about the accuracy of Sherman shooting when there are so many tanks involved. They all can claim hits at any range.

Trying to recreate the events around Ruaray from Hills book makes it appear as if a page or two is missing. The text of events on June 26 are missing while Hills includes a map of the start and movement locations of A and C Squadrons for that date.

In tribute to Dring some things come to light.

They were providing armoured support during Operation Epsom near Caen when, as his squadron approached a wood, Dring caught the glint of a Panther tank. He immediately went in for the kill, quickly knocking it out. Minutes later he used his 17-pounder to destroy a second tank, then took out two more. As a result the whole regiment was able to move forward and enter Fonteray. Dring was awarded a Bar to his MM.

Having a 17 pdr he may have stayed back covering the advance and could get hits at 1000-1400 yds.

Mr Dring, however, in his tank – which he had called Akilla – led a charmed life.

"Our tank knocked out four of the enemy – a Tiger, two Mark IVs and a Panther, although in the days after the landing, the yeomanry lost commanders.

Trying to recreate the events around Ruaray from Hills book makes it appear as if a page or two is missing. The text of events on June 26 are missing while Hills includes a map of the start and movement locations of A and C Squadrons for that date

Clearly confusion has crept in to both Hill's account and The Laison Letter version. As is usual the more you find out the less you know!

Some detail that reveals more about man rather than machine:

Trooper Edwin James Douglas Riches
July 1944 – Dec 1945 Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry.

"He also used to tell me about Sergeant George Dring MM, who was an older and wilier NCO who developed the habit of actually getting out of his tank and hunting round for German tanks on foot (the material on the web doesn't tell you that), guiding his crew round to positions where the Sherman's 75mm would penetrate their side or rear armour. Apparently Dring was out on foot one day and walked round a corner to find a German Panther he believed to have been knocked out facing him and ready to go. The gunner promptly loosed off a main gun round and took off three fingers from Dring's right hand. Since he was a regimental farrier before the war, this was a grievous loss for the man. The widespread opinion in the regiment, he told me, was that the Sergeant, being a veteran of the Western Desert, felt safer outside the tank than in it. Whether that was fair or not, it's for sure that you can see and hear a lot more once you're away from the noise and confinement of a tank, and whatever the reason was, Sgt Dring proved hugely effective in his tank hunting on more than one occasion."

And:

link

"As a troop sergeant in the reconnaissance squadron after the breakout from Alamein, Dring developed his practice of leaving his tank turret to take "a shufti" over the crest of hills. He was always in the forefront of action. One close shave came when a shell went straight through his turret and wounded him. As he made his way back to the medical officer, his colonel shook a fist at him for taking risks and received a V-sign in response; within half an hour Dring was back in action.
Not long after winning the Bar to his MM, Dring was refused permission to rescue his badly wounded troop commander because there were some Germans facing him in a strongpoint. "A few minutes later," according to a newspaper report, "Sergeant Dring was seen lying on the ground pointing his revolver at eight Germans and beckoning them to advance towards him." When he had searched them and passed them back, he crawled towards the troop commander and pulled him out of his burning tank.
Dring was seriously wounded on the Siegfried line after he had dismounted to do a recce and came face to face with a Panther which he had thought out of action. It fired, and he lost three fingers.
Although considered completely without fear by the regiment, Dring was badly affected by his experiences. A sturdy, taciturn man, he refused for years to talk about his Army career or watch a war film; sometimes he was too frightened to walk alone along country roads at night. Following his discharge he worked with prisoners of war and learnt German as well as French. Later he worked for the Immigration Service at Southwell.
Dring nursed his wife Kathleen during a long illness. He felt that the regiment should have offered some help and, after she died in 1982, put his medals up for auction; the regiment ended up buying them for a much larger sum than he had been seeking from it.
George Dring died on January 12. 2003"

It has been stated that Dring's tank 'Akilla' was 75mm armed and it does appear not to have the long barrel of the 17-pounder.

There are some peculiarities with the photo, though I am no expert on the Sherman.
1. Radio antenna is at rear of turret atop armored box. Most Shermans at this time had the radio antenna at the front hull on the right sponson. Firefly had the radio at the rear turret in an armored box while the sponson and radio operator area was used for 17-pounder rounds.
2. Smoke mortars on turret side.
3. Rain gutter on turret side like some Fireflies had.

Oh Wait! There are 5 guys in the crew. That should of been a clue. Doh!

On that score, you have avoided answering the basic question. Was or was not Villers-Bocage a dramatic German tactical victory against odds?

Is or is not your mind already made up on that score?
I leave you with the myth of 1 tiger knocking out 25 tanks whilst I continue with research that sets the record straight.
Again I would plug my friend Yann and Fred. They have a book coming out in December that I am confident will not be to your liking.

There are some peculiarities with the photo, though I am no expert on the Sherman.

The Sherman is a standard 75mm model. Dring did not have a Firefly in June 1944. The photo was taken during EPSOM. Film of it can be seen here at 2:11

YouTube link

The knocked out Panther mentioned in the Laison Letter is at 2:56