… in World War II.
"How extensive and effective were German espionage and sabotage activities against the United States in World War II? To make generalizations is always dangerous, but certain broad conclusions may perhaps be stated at this time, subject to minor corrections in the light of future data that may be uncovered from enemy sources or that is still closely held by United States or Allied agencies for security reasons. On the side of the enemy's activity it is well-established that from a period before Pearl Harbor until the very end of the war Germany engaged in intensive efforts to obtain military, economic, and political information from the United States. In furtherance of this effort she recruited numerous secret agents to operate within the United States and established extensive espionage networks in other countries of the Western Hemisphere. In the field of attempted sabotage the activity was not comparable; the failure of the large-scale mission entrusted to the eight saboteurs who landed on the East coast in June 1942 appears to have discouraged further efforts in this direction. The German record of accomplishment did not measure up to the effort expended. As far as is known there was no enemy inspired act of sabotage within the United States during the war. On the espionage side, while Germany did from time to time obtain information relating to war production, shipping, and technical advances, it was almost always too late, too inaccurate, or too generalized to be of direct military value. It is possible that in early 1942 Germany did obtain some information that assisted in locating submarine targets, although this has not as yet been finally determined; but on the whole, after Pearl Harbor, German espionage against the United States failed to produce the information required by the High Command. This failure was due to a combination of Allied counter-measures and fatal weaknesses on the part of German intelligence itself.
The secret intelligence requirements of the German [Armed Forces] High Command [O.K.W.] under the Third Reich were served by a separate branch of the O.K.W. called the Amt Auslands und Abwehr (commonly referred to as the Abwehr) independent of the three service commands–Army, Navy, and Air. Each of these three maintained its own intelligence staff for the evaluation and dissemination of information obtained from both open and secret sources; but these staffs conducted no secret intelligence activities themselves. Rather they maintained liaison with the Abwehr to which their special needs for information were made known. These requests the Abwehr endeavored to meet, at the same time being engaged in the task of collecting on a world-wide scale all manner of information which could be of interest to the High Command or the individual services subordinate thereto.
The Abwehr was divided into three basic groups (Abteilung). Abt I was charged with offensive intelligence, including espionage; Abt II with sabotage and subversion; and Abt III with counterintelligence and security. Of these our principal interest lies with Abt I. This was broken down into sections having cognizance respectively over military, naval, air, and economic intelligence, plus certain technical sections. The sections were further broken down into geographical subsections, dealing with particular countries or areas. In addition to the headquarters organization in Berlin the Abwehr maintained field offices in Germany and abroad staffed by Abwehr officers. In Germany and occupied countries these field offices were referred to as Abwehrstellen (Asts) with branches thereof called Nebenstellen (Nests); in neutral countries the Abwehr office was called a Kriegsorganisation (KO) and usually acted under cover of the diplomatic mission. Organizationally the field stations reproduced the functional division at headquarters. Both headquarters and the field stations recruited, trained, and dispatched espionage agents for missions abroad. While in theory there was a rough geographical division of responsibility between the various Asts, in practice there was a great deal of overlapping. Thus while Ast Hamburg, and its subsidiary Nest Bremen, had primary responsibility for espionage against the United States there was nothing to prevent Ast Cologne or KO Spain from sending an agent to this country if it happened to recruit one it believed well fitted. This factor alone led to a good deal of confusion and inefficiency in the operations of the Abwehr. Personnel of the Abwehr included officers of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, both active and retired or reserve, and civilians recruited and commissioned directly…"
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Amicalement
Armand
