"What would have happened if Napoleon had won the..." Topic

… Battle of Waterloo?

"Alan Forrest: He would certainly have taken Brussels and he might have tried to advance toward the boundary of the Rhine and Schelt. But there was no possibility of long-term success. He would surely have gone on to lose within weeks or months, because although the British, Dutch, Belgians and Prussians were involved at Waterloo, neither the Austrians nor the Russians were, and they had armies of 150,000 to 200,000 waiting in the wings. In particular, the Tsar wanted Napoleon destroyed: he didn't believe Europe could remain at peace if Napoleon remained at large.

Mark Adkin: I wouldn't have thought [that Napoleon would have enjoyed success for] more than a few weeks. If he had won the battle, Wellington would have withdrawn what was left of his army and Napoleon would have had to hurry back to Paris. The Allies would have waited until the Austrians and Russians had arrived and the British and Prussians had recovered, then would have teamed up together. Napoleon wouldn't have had much chance at all.

Why did Napoleon lose at Waterloo?

Adkin: Napoleon had a big problem because he was surrounded by various countries desperate to get rid of him. There were four main threats once he established himself back in Paris: The Anglo-Dutch Army under Wellington in Belgium, the Prussians under Blücher in Germany, the Russians under Barclay De Tolly, and the Austrians under Schwarzenberg. That's nearly half million men under arms and they all planned to converge on Paris. The only way he could possibly win was to make the maximum use of the time it was going to take Russians and the Austrians and so on to get there. While they were marching, he had to deal with the others, in particular Wellington and Blücher. He wanted to defeat the Prussians at Ligny, while Wellington was held off by a smaller force. Once the Prussians were defeated, he could turn the combined strength on Wellington. He succeeded partially at Ligny – his strategy worked and he split the two Allies, turned on the Prussians and defeated them, but he didn't crush them. He let them withdraw and recover. That was a mistake. Napoleon allowed them to withdraw north instead of east, and by withdrawing north they were able to turn and then rejoin Wellington's forces…"
Full article here
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Amicalement
Armand

Seems fair enough. He had managed to unite all europe against him, and by this time it was only their disgust with the Bourbons that had a element (granted a large element) of the French on his side. Any victories would only have prolonged the pain, not resulted in a Napoleonic dynasty ruling France rather than the Bourbon one.

Does not much depend on how he won the "Battle of Waterloo"? A decisive defeat of Wellington, basically the historical outcome, only reversed, might have been enough to drive a very war weary and broke Britain out of the Alliance. Would it have held together without? Austria might well have seen an opportunity to have an Austrian prince as heir apparent to France.

Had he instead forced Wellington to fall back beyond Brussels, before Blucher could intervene, their two armies would have separated and would surely be weakened and side-lined in the coming campaign of invasion. The outcome would still have been inevitable defeat for Napoleon…..if the Alliance held together. This is so like our current exchange on squares vs cavalry. Will power is everything, but it can be exhausted.

Was not his only realistic hope largely extinguished long before the Campaign in Belgium, by the Alliance declaration to outlaw him rather than offer any negotiated settlement?

As noted, it would depend on HOW he won the Waterloo Campaign. Napoleon began the campaign brilliantly, catching Wellington and Blucher off guard. But from that point pretty much everything went wrong for Napoleon. But what if everything had gone right?

Suppose the British are a bit slower getting to Quatre Bras (certainly could have happened, it almost did). Napoleon's whole force falls on Blucher and smashes the Prussians a whole lot worse than historically. As a bonus Blucher is killed or captured (as he very nearly was historically). The Prussians, badly demoralized and very annoyed with the British, fall back and keep falling back and are out of the campaign for the rest of 1815.

Wellington, no fool, sees that he's in a very bad situation and retreats. Brussels falls and his Dutch-Belgian troops begin to melt away. He takes refuge in Antwerp and ultimately is evacuated by sea. Thoroughly humiliated he's relieved of command with the public saying that his reputation was won against Napoleon's second-team. When faced by Napoleon himself, he just couldn't handle it. So British ground armies are out of it for 1815 now, too.

Meanwhile the Austrians and Russians are invading eastern France. But they are none too happy with what's been going on in Belgium and are understandably cautious. Napoleon marches east and manages to keep the Austrians and Russians at bay until winter.

1816 would probably be a very difficult year for Napoleon except that 1816 was the "year without a summer", due to a big volcanic eruption in Indonesia. Crop failures , famine and probably a lack of forage for horses might well curtail campaigning.

If Napoleon negotiated skillfully with a very war-weary Europe he might have been able to hang onto his throne.

Unlikely? Sure. Very.

Impossible? Well, who knows? But he had to win the Waterloo Campaign first, and he failed to do that.

Now that is a very thought provoking scenario (or series of….) We have all read whole books of counterfactual histories tracing out an alternative favourable outcome for Boney. Not sure I have ever read it so well expressed in so few words………..

Reading about Souchet performance with his tiny force against the Austrians, never understand why many historians said that even if Napoleon won his Waterloo Campaign, for sure would lost against them and the Russians.

It would not be so easy.

Imho.

Amicalement
Armand

This would be something worth gaming rather that refighting Waterloo…again.

Armand,

Here's "why" ….

Let us assume, by magic, that Napoléon utterly defeated the Anglo-Allied and Prussian forces at Waterloo, and that his losses in that battle were, magically, were made good instantly with replacements from France. Let us assume that the 200,000 Anglo-Allied and Prussian forces at Waterloo all evaporate upon their defeat. Let us assume also that, by even more magic, the French are re-supplied with all the ammunition and other supplies that they might want. Let us further assume that the Austrians immediately decamp and go home. Let us assume the British also are suitably impressed by the invincibility of Napoléon and decide to cease all hostilities as well.

So, Napoléon is sitting there in Belgium in third week of June with 200,000 men. There are then 450,000 Prussians and Russians closing in (Blücher's 100,000 men were nothing more than an avant-garde) ….

Russian and Prussian forces within 15 days march of Waterloo:
III Russian Army Corps – General Dokhturov
IV Russian Army Corps – General Raevsky
V Russian Army Corps – General Sacken
VI Russian Army Corps – General Langeron
VII Russian Army Corps – General Sabaneev
II Russian Grenadier Division – General Yermolov
II Russian Reserve Cavalry Corps – General Wintzingerode
Russian Artillery Reserve – Colonel Bogoslavsky
North German Corps – Kleist von Nollendorf
--- Total 225,000 men

So, we have to assume that these guys don't wait (completely forgetting about 1805) and go in alone and are utterly defeated and evaporate and that again all of the French losses are instantly made good – and that so Napoléon wins a "second Waterloo".

Russian and Prussian forces within 40 days march of Waterloo:
Russian Imperial Guard Corps
I Russian Army Corps
II Russian Army Corps – Prinz von Württemberg
I Russian Grenadier Division
I Russian Reserve Cavalry Corps
Russian Artillery Reserve
V Prussian Army Corps – von Wartenburg
VI Prussian Army Corps – von Tauentzien
VIII Prussian Guard Corps – von Mecklenburg-Strelitz
--- Total 225,000 men

So, we have to assume that these guys don't wait and go in alone and are utterly defeated and evaporate and that again all of the French losses are instantly made good – and that so Napoléon wins a "third Waterloo".

Then we haeve to assume that the resolve of the Russian and Prussians, after these defeats, does not strengthen, but instead somehow weakens and they sue for peace. The Russians could put in another army for 1816, if they choose to do this. So, the question would have to be about their willingness, not their ability.

Only then does Napoléon not lose. Any other result, any asumption made above that proves to be counter-factual, any lack of "magic", and Napoleeon loses.

Overall, the Austrians and the Biritish and even Blücher's Prussians were not the main effort of the Aliies in 1815. Waterloo is famous because the French were utterly defeated. But from the point of view of the overall campaign, victory by the "avant guard" was hardly necessary (nor even expected).

- Sasha

What if Napoleon had waited 5 more years before coming back? How would the situation been then?

Doug,

Interesting question – for which I have no immediate answer.

But please let me also pose the "other side" of the hypothetical …. what if Napoléon had sued for peace 5 years earlier (spring of 1810, after his marriage to the Austrian princess – and before the large build-up of forces on both sides the Polish/Russian border). The only active hostile major power then was Britain. On what basis might Britain then have made peace with Napoléon, if any?

- Sasha

You most also remember by 1814 Alexander was convinced that it was his godgiven mission to remove Napoleon. He wasn't going to give up. Since this is near the end of the 2nd Hundred Years War the British were going to spend what it took to keep the French down this time.

What would happen if Napoleon was on TMP?

I'm not trying to suggest that a French victory at Waterloo was likely to have initiated a collapse of the alliance, but such situations are usually governed as much by psychology as by arithmetic.

Everything depended upon keeping the alliance together after the trauma of a defeat of the British at Waterloo.
Would Great Britain have kept its check-book open to continue financing the Russians and the Germans?

Also, with Wellington putatively driven out of Belgium, it is possible that Metternich might have gotten nervous about a large Russian army marching through Europe; Russia and A-H were traditional rivals in central Europe.

Napoleon, being the shrewd diplomat, might also have attempted to influence events by making conciliatory gestures to selected members of the alliance.

FWIW

B

British financial support to Russia was "nice-to-have", but by no means necessary to keep them equipped and fighting.
The total Russian cost of land forces:
1808-1812 : 36 million GBP
1813-1814 : 11 million GBP
Of British subsidies, there were none delivered in this period until 1814 and 1815, essentially after the peace in 1814, and for a total of only 5.4 million GBP. A good portion of this "British gold" got into the private hands of major noble families, as the bulk of the military expenditures had been made before it arrived.

Russian military expenditures were not very onerous really, about 0.15 GBP per person per year. Far, far less than any other nation. Well, the people were poorer.

Of course, much of this "spending" was quite optional : the Russians could just not pay troops or domestic supply and equipment costs as long as there were food distributions to the soldiers and workers. They were doing more and more of this with assignat rubles instead of specie. It was not like someone could refuse the paper money without risking arrest by the internal security apparatus. Irregular troops (Cossacks, Native cavalry, opolchenie milita, labor units) were indeed not even supposed to get salaries. Fuedalism and state ownership of manufacturers had some advantages.

Actaully, I think the Russians could even have replaced the British support to the Prussians, in kind if not in coin.

As to the Austrians being pursuaded somehow to challenge the Russians crossing through Prussia and the north-west "German" states …. Well there was yet another Russian army sitting in west Ukraine and Belarus which could have immeditely invaded Austrian terrritory. So, if they did switch sides, I do not see the Austrians being able to stop the 450,000 Russians and Prussians from continuing on to Paris.

- Sasha

Napoleon would have no change at the worst for the Allies – the 1814 campaign would be repeated – it is completly irrelevant what Suchet did, it would depend on Napoleon.

Even battles won, they would have been very costly for Napoleon who couldn't replace his casualties as quickly as the Allies would have done.

The days of easy victories and walk overs were gone, and gone were the good days of Napoleon was well, see his inactivity before and during the battle of Waterloo.

Why should the Austrians switch sides, they took away Napoleon's wife and his legitimate son – and when the future did not look bright in 1813 they joined the Allies, in 1815 the situation was much better than in 1813 for Austria.

A Napoleon left in place would cause for the future instability and war, no European power could endure after the experience of 1812 – 1814 any longer and wasn't up to.

Sasha ….. Interesting commentary on the Russian situation. Thank you.

vW ….. Wasn't suggesting that A-H would have switched sides (unlikely in my opinion), but that it might have withdrawn from the alliance. I agree that things were quite different for both an older Napoleon and an exhausted France after twenty years of ceaseless war, but there is a possibility that Napoleon might have recognized this as well and "recalibrated" his ambitions – perhaps to settle for being the ruler of France within a Europe finally at peace. The other side of that coin, however, is whether Great Britain and the other European powers could have recalibrated their views of Napoleon to accept him as ruler of a peaceful France. I don't know the answer to that question.

At the end of the day, the point I was seeking to make was that a French victory at Waterloo could have given Napoleon some cards to play and created a small chance for a different diplomatic outcome.

B

Napoleon did not recalibrate his ambitions, as statements by himself proove – read Bernard Coppens – Waterloo – les mensonges.
Also – I doubt that a woolve can change into a seep.

Potential conflicts were endless – Austria – holding the wife and legimate child of Napoléon – how could they withdraw from the alliance – Napoléon as he was – would not just sit in Paris and gives that up, he had two aims, domination of europe and become a founder of a new heriteray blood – line.

I cannot see what cards Napoléon could have played, the ranks of his opponents would close even more – and much more troops would be mobilized.

The French Army wished alread peace in 1813 and was deeply disappointed when the armistic was not used to do that.

On what basis might Britain then have made peace with Napoléon, if any?

something like…

Status quo ante bellum in the Peninsular.
Restoration of Hanover with a general settlement in Germany that didn't leave it permanently too vulnerable.
A balance of power in the Mediterranean that didn't threaten Egypt.
A (truly) independent Holland.
An acceptance of French defeat in the West Indies and India.

P.S. I'm not claiming that any of this would be 'just' or 'fair' and so on, only that something along these lines would be attractive enough for Britain to agree.

Waterloo was the ultimate "bad luck" campaign for the French. If Perponcher had obeyed orders and abandoned Quatre Bras, II Corps could have occupied the place on the morning of 16 June and held off the British all day. If I Corps had marched into the Prussian rear at Ligny, half the Prussian army would have been captured or destroyed, leaving only III Corps to fall back and join IV Corps and retreated back on their lines of communication. If Napoleon had given Ney the Imperial Guard as a replacement for the ill Mortier, Ney would have stayed out of trouble.

Following Ligny, Wellington would have been forced to abandon the continent or be crushed.

With all that accomplished, Britain might have been forced out of the war, but we can figure they still would have paid Austria to stay in.

The real problem was that, for Napoleon, enough was never enough. In this later period, when his armies no longer enjoyed the superiority of the early days, I suppose we could expect him to continue fighting until he was defeated again. A reasonable man could have survived on a negotiated settlement, but Napoleon was not reasonable.

Don't agree that what Souchet has done was irrelevant with the forces he has at hand.
I mean what if Napoleon march to his aid with great part of the Grande Armée and began to fight the Austrians.

About the feelings of the Tzar, by memory, he has said that he don't want again a bath of blood of the Russian Army as in the past campaigns. He wasn't so enthusiastic for a new War.

Reading what Napoleon did with much less forces at 1814, why he cannot managed to made some good victories against the Allied again?

Imagin the moral of his troops before a Waterloo Campaing victory.

Also, maybe he won time to move a more sustancial recruiting in France.

For me, it's an open finale and quite interesting to wargame.

Amicalement
Armand

"I mean what if Napoleon march to his aid with great part of the Grande Armée and began to fight the Austrians."

This would be the same mistake he did in 1814, the rest of the Allies would march to Paris – France was completly broke, from where would be able to raise troops.

Good victories against the Allies, come on, he even lost Waterloo.

What about a French civil war. Napoleon returns but only musters half the army and the others fail to join him? Is this fanciful?

As we all know the French Army of 1815 was not the quality of 1809. The Grande Armee died in Russia. The Allies were not the same quality either, they were new and improved.

Although if you add in the considerable forces the French had defending the frontiers of France and if he could convenience the French people and whatever could be consider a legislature, to continue the war.

I don't think so, France was tired of war. France just did not have anymore to give. The male population of France was drained. Not to mention supplies and horses. It may not seem important but if you don't have enough horses, I don't see how a 19th cent. army could exist.

"Seems fair enough. He had managed to unite all europe against him, and by this time it was only their disgust with the Bourbons that had a element (granted a large element) of the French on his side. Any victories would only have prolonged the pain, not resulted in a Napoleonic dynasty ruling France rather than the Bourbon one."

What disgust with the Bourbons? The only French people on Buonaparte's side were the committed Buonapartists, some of the Army, and, that's it. Even if Republicans didn't want the Bourbons back, they still wouldn't support a Buonapartist monarchy either. Most people in France, admittedly, didn't enthusiastically support the Bourbons, but Louis XVIII was clever enough to not antagonise people; he used the Constitutional Charter to win over the liberals, pretended to be absolutist enough to keep the monarchists and returned emigres on side, and, most importantly, brought peace and stability, which was most of the population wanted more than anything else.

Napoleon may have beaten Wellington and Blucher in 1815 but he wasn't going to beat the stomach cancer eating away at him inside which medicine at that time had no way of treating. That meant he had six years to live of increasing pain and debility. The odds he would have beaten the Austrians, Prussians, and Russians are pretty much nil. Defeat would certainly have meant execution not only of Napoleon but probably of most of the Marshallate and many other political figures. Partitions of France would have been highly likely with either Alsace and Lorraine and other parts of the border going to Prussia, Picardy and flanders to the Dutch, and the complete loss of all colonies, or else perhaps even a resurrected Burgundian kingdom. Not saying these conquests would last, but the results would have been dire.

Interesting article, especially as I can bask in the reflected glory of Alan Forrest, as he was the supervisor for my Master's Dissertation and I have a drink or dinner with him whenever I'm in York. A lovely man, as well as a towering intellect and a fine scholar.