"Experience versus tactical competency " Topic

I agree – a volunteer, long service army is preferable but I don't think the evidence is clear cut that it's massively more effective in the long term.

During peace time you get a lot of good human material wanting to join the military – less so in war time and very much less so if the war is unpopular. You still get some good material joining up but you inevitably have to lower the bar and allow in people who would not normally make the grade. Some of these shape up well and make useful soldiers (or marines if you insist) but a lot do not.

I'm sympathetic to the argument that everybody should do their bit and that all levels of society should serve in equal measure – not just the poor and marginalized. But equally forcing people to serve against their will is not ideal from any standpoint.

There is no perfect solution to this. The best idea I have is for the military to be a high status career job and if those who serve do so honorably there should be considerable post service benefits that make it a sought after career. Free education/training and health care for life for example.

True … no prefect solutions … but again based on my experiencs … I want to train and have volunteers by my side in combat …

Legion, good one and a nice historical source.

Thank you but I'm not sure what you are credting me with ? May be you mean Just Jack ?

… in less than two minutes two of the tracks were burning after a wave of RPGs hit them; they were heading west to our outpost, and the third track sped up then cut south, getting separated from the rest of the company, before getting hit by another wave of RPGs.

Very Sorry to have hear that Jack … 3 PCs KO'd, KIAs & WIAs … a very bad day … But regardless … the troopers did their duty and took on the enemy. God Bless them …

I'd quantify "training" in the same way that Jack kind of quantified experience. I was in Marine Infantry at the end of Vietnam. We mainly trained and drilled Fire & Maneuver Assaults and responding to ambushes. We did a lot of patrolling type training and exercises that involved a lot of coordination between Fire Teams, Squads and Platoons. It's very difficult attempting to keep a Skirmish Line intact moving through uneven wooded terrain. Coordinating movements and flank communication is a lot more than just a command and control range check in a game. The role Squad Leaders play is not very well represented in many games I've seen. I think training is really based on doing drills over and over again until they become second nature and you do them when commanded. A Squad can become very proficient at doing this after a few months of working together, especially if at least some of the training was in a combat type experience. Since training is uniform it works wherever you get transferred to. I think the real factor is experience of the Squad Leader and lower level NCO's. The Privates may know what to do but the Squad Leader is the one to get the timing and coordination right. This can really increase the effectiveness of a unit. Many Marine units hitting the beach in WWII had a pretty high percentage of new guys that were trained but going into their first combat. They were successful because of trained and experienced NCO's had the knowledge of telling them when to move, shoot and most important keep your head down. However, I doubt if an experienced NCO or Squad Leader could get new guys to do something they were not trained and drilled to do. This gave Marines a problem at Hue when no one had urban combat or training.

In a scenario you need to give each player an overview of the bigger picture. I think too many games have scenarios that are like isolated fire fights. For example, when we would conduct an assault the Squad Leader would designate a Rally Point at a specific terrain feature. If things didn't go right we'd meet up there and plan a new assault. That was training. One order needed and no "activation" along the way. The Squad knew what to do and did it. I'd say that would be different than a morale check and for sure no one routed off the board.

Another area is strategy when defending. What are you defending and why? What support do you have? Do you have alternative fall back positions planned? Is there a planned counterattack you can count on? How are you coordinating with mortars? What Company and Battalion level attachments do you have? I don't like the "random" reinforcement type games. There are better ways to simulate the FOW. However, I really wouldn't mind a random B-52 Arc Light strike showing up or a fire mission from the USS New Jersey.

One of the most important roles for a Squad Leader is coordinating suppressive fire. In engagements of over 50m most likely you are not going to have a specific target unless the enemy is surprised or moving. The Squad Leader coordinates fire and maneuver with the other Squads, ensures proper coverage on the target, ensures ROF is not too slow or not too much, observes enemy and return fire and ensures suppressive fire is lifted and/or moved for assault team. That's his training and responsibility. In this case even if the rest of the unit is trained and experienced without someone coordinating it's going to be very ineffective. This is where training AND leadership are needed. I think poor training and lack of experience can be overcome with good leadership. Poor leadership of an experienced unit can be catastrophic and a morale killer. It is much more than a die roll modifier. Unfortunately many skirmish and squad based games with 1:1 ratios are more like Wild West shootouts with individuals picking out their own targets.

The most important part of an engagement is the first 5-10 seconds of contact and how you'll respond. This is why we use a Mutual Small Arms Fire Segment in games rather than an IGOUGO. We were trained that when ambushed 75% of the total causalities happened in the first two seconds. If you survived and did the drill you'd most likely survive the ambush. Hitting the deck "suppressed/pinned" in the kill zone only ensured you'd be killed. The drill was if you were in the kill zone you assault INTO the ambush at a fast walk firing from the waist (sounds crazy but the best way to survive)and shouting URRRAAAAHHHH helps too. If not in the kill zone and unengaged outflank them. There is no check for "activation" or a morale check. In an ambush you should not even need an order or Squad Leader coordination. There is more but that's the basics. Rather than the minutia of moving each figure and "activating" they should be performing a drill without orders or activations depending on their training. Also in the opening stages of a firefight it's building up firepower superiority with volume regardless of seeing a target or not. Squad Leaders play a pivotal role here too. If you can win that initial 5-10 seconds of the fire fight by putting out more volume than the enemy you'll gain the initiative. If not pull back and try again. Again, training and Leadership come into play. My opinion would be leadership would raise the level of training or improve a units effectiveness.

Wolfhag

Wolfhag-- isn't that what "roll to activation" sorts of games actually represent?

If your troops are good (solid teamwork, proficiency in drills, good leadership, etc) they are more likely to activate and do what you (the leader) want-- be that follow the proper response to an ambush or fall back to a rally point or coordinate suppressive fire and assault teams.

The flaw in that system is if a player has no idea what they are doing then their troops (who in reality would be independent soldiers who might be capable of overcoming a bad leader) inevitably perform just as poorly-- some games try to compensate for this a bit, for example Chain Reaction, in which good troops responding to an ambush will sort of naturally fire back if they are being fired upon while the others will be able to move (which will lead players to naturally try to flank with them).

(EDIT: The other big flaw is that it doesn't really represent communication and pre-planning in much detail, but its better than systems that allow perfect control).

RTJEBADIA,
I've only played Bolt Action a few times but not the others mentioned. I'm not saying that "activation rolls" are entirely unrealistic. However, they do not give players a chance to really portray small unit tactics, leadership and carry out orders in many circumstances.

Example: A T-34 company of 10 tanks, only one with a radio, is given orders to move down a road 2 km to a road junction and to secure and defend the junction until relieved. All tanks in the company know the orders and what is expected. They've been through this before. Of course any number of things can happen after the shooting starts. From what I've read historically the T-34's would attempt to accomplish their mission even if the one with radio is knocked out and even if they moved out of an artificial command and control range. They would attempt to move as quickly as they can to get through enemy zones of fire. If the "activation" is to see in what sequence they move compared to everyone else I'm OK with that, big improvement. If the activation check is to see if they can do anything, and if fail, do nothing I'm not OK with that (but could happen under certain circumstances I admit). Explanations that they did nothing such as they stopped because there might be a minefield, didn't get an order to move, etc are the game mechanics detracting from realism. My opinion.

So maybe I should clarify: Activation to see if the unit can do anything in a turn and if fail, do nothing, don't make it for me. Activation to see in what sequence units perform works for me. Overall depending on the game scale and turn length all troops are going to do pretty much what they are told when told to do it – unless the enemy interferes by firing upon them or there are communication problems. Changing a units orders or mission after combat starts should be hard to do.

What our group is working on is breaking a combat turn down into smaller firefights, assaults and flanking movements attempting to "fight" them simultaneously with initiative/activation given to the player moving his units or attacking. This way you don't have units activating at different points around the table. This eliminates the need for unit by unit activation. If three enemy units are firing at your two units there are five units in the fire fight.

In a Fire Fight or Assault each sides "Firepower" is compared. During a fire fight assume both are in an Improved Position (taking advantage of available cover). Having superior firepower can force the opponent into Full Cover (suppression) which severely reduces his firepower and observation (cannot shoot at units over 50m away)and force a causality check. We try to keep causalities low during firefights where units are in IP or Full Cover. To come out of Full Cover the unit needs to pass an Aggressiveness Check (based on their training/experience). If they fail then the player gets to have his leader intervene to "motivate" the troops by rolling on his leaders Aggressiveness Factor. However, by performing these leadership actions the leader exposes himself more to enemy fire and must take a causality check. Most leaders are KIA when performing leadership actions, not random enemy fire. Excellent leaders have high Aggressiveness Factors enable poor units with lower Aggressiveness Factors to perform better but endangers the leader. This gives a pretty much interactive turn but a moving player can still get shot at by an enemy unit not involved in the fire fight if it is in a mutually supporting position or the enemy comes into LOS while moving. Leaders can also perform other actions like "Set Fields of Fire" which improves fire power effectiveness, conduct "Personal Recon" helping the Assault Team, etc. Unengaged units can pretty much move at will.

I hope I didn't get too much off the topic of "Experience versus Tactical Competency" but I'm trying to give you an idea of how we are trying to differentiate between training/competency and more detailed leadership. How the fire fights are "activated" or in what sequence so far we leave up to the attacking player but I admit it's pretty subjective and could use a Bolt Action type activation method.

Wolfhag

This is a very interesting thread.

One thing that popped into my head as I read it is an account of a British army officer who served in Sierra Leone when that was still rumbling on. He said that, though the insurgents / West Side Boys might have spent years fighting their bush war, they had never received any formal weapons training: and thus their marksmanship was absolutely atrocious.

Not comparing apples to apples by any means, but when these 'hardened bush fighters' came up against the well trained but probably not very 'experienced' British troops (this is late 90s), there was no contest.

Similarly, I remember lots of stories pre-Gulf War 1 about how the Iraqi army was 'battle hardened' by the long years of the war with Iran – but this simply proved untrue.

I'm not really answering the question here, but just throwing out a few ideas. I think training is more important than we might initially think, as we posting here on TMP are pretty much all from a 'western' / developed background and perhaps take a reasonable level of training (and education) for granted? A child soldier or a illiterate peasant (for example) will perhaps not gain as much from their years of experience as a trained 'western' soldier might.

Training (pertinent to the battle) combined with experienced leadership and motivated troops is normally a winner. A good example is Guadalcanal. Marines with no combat experience but good training were led by veterans, some with experience in the Banana Wars and WWI. They had mostly WWI equipment too. Springfield rifles and M1917 mg. They defeated combat proven and hardened Japanese troops who used tactics that had defeated every army they faced. But they never faced a combined arms defense with a planned Final Protective Fire by troops trained to do it.

Good leaders are going to know what their troops are capable of and know which tactics to pick from their "tool box". Lets take how the Marines plan and perform their final protective fire. The Platoon Leader sets up the perimeter. Probably two squads up and one squad back as a reserve or to seal penetrations. The Squad Leaders set up two man fighting holes and each occupant puts aiming stakes in the ground to designate his field of fire (especially at night). One of those stakes is to be the one to put his weapon against to deliver flanking fire on the attackers when the fire FPF signal is given. The Company Commander gets his weapons platoon to sight in their 60mm mortars just in front of the perimeter and for the machine guns to be positioned to deliver oblique crossing fire covering the front of the perimeter. The CO also ties in with the units on his flank and coordinates signals. The order to fire FPF will most likely be a shot from the CO's flare pistol. Probably green or red. Battalion and Regiment would designate the most likely assembly areas for an attack and start hitting them with H&I artillery. When an attack starts the Battalion and Regimental artillery support would put down a barrage about 75-100 yards in front of the defenders to interdict reserves and other attack waves or maybe to cover an open flank. A battery of four 75mm pack howitzers could put out about 50 rounds per minute, almost one per second, and keep that up about as long as they had ammo. You could have up to four batteries firing at once. After the battle of Bloody Ridge Japanese prisoners wanted to see the Marine "automatic" cannons, so heavy was the fire. You can see there is a lot more than rolling the dice to hit.

Another variable is the initiative of a single soldier that can turn the tide of battle. At Guadalcanal it was John Basilone, Chesty Puller and Al Schmid. Also the initiative of the Raider Battalion to take the battle into the Japanese rear areas.

A more detailed (and complicated) rule might be that rather than a general training factor the troops have a rating on how well they can use tactics from their "tool box" that they have trained for. Japanese could be rated high for infiltration, ambush and human wave. Marines for defending, fire & maneuver, initiative and combined arms.

Wolfhag

Holy cow have I missed a bunch! Let's get to work.

Milites – "If you don't mind me asking, what morale state were you in, when you relieved the trapped platoon?"
When it all kicked off I was kinda dozing, to be honest. I'd been part of the push that seized the OP (that was taking fire) at about 0230, and we's spent the bulk of the day back-clearing the neighborhood between our line and the OP, so I was racked out in the garage containing the CP. I heard all the radio traffic and sat up, smoked a couple cigarettes as the QRF was sent out in the in the tracks, then BAM! the tracks started getting hit. The 1st Sgt started looking for bodies and I hopped up, got a quick SITREP, and really I just remember my head being clear, focused on what we needed to do, primarily worried about how we were going to find the last track that had taken off on its own.

"Was the noise and presence of the CAS the reason for boosting morale, it's efficacy or both?"
The F-18 itself was a reminder that we were the big dogs, and the brief pause in firing following the gun run was enough for us to get our marbles back. The only thing to keep in mind is the cautionary note that this is how I felt, not necessarily how everyone felt, though I think they did. I just mention this because you can ask any two guys for their version of the same fight and may come up with totally different stories.

"Do you believe training allowed the relieved platoon to recover so quickly or were other factors involved?"
Training and returned confidence I suppose, just kind of a collective deep breath, a second to think about what needed to be done, and then moving out to get it done. At that point those guys' job was simply CASEVAC to get their wounded out of there while we provided security.

On a separate note, I agree that these concepts apply equal to WWII (and others), as 'capability' and morale are going to be relative between the two antagonists, i.e., if you say WWII 'regulars' are not the equal of modern 'regulars,' I'd say it doesn't matter because that's not the matchup, it's (for example) it's WWII Brit regulars vs. WWII German regulars.

Skarper, Legion, and Imperium – For me there is a tremendous gap in capability between professional regulars and anyone else, it's really night and day. Insurgents don't use IEDs and indirect fire (only) because that's their preferred way of making battle, it's because it's their only option to 'fight' without being decisively defeated, and I agree wholeheartedly with the Sierra Leone and Gulf War Iraqi examples.

Wolfhag and RTJEBADIA – Holy Crap that's a lot of stuff! First off, Wolfhag and I come from the same 'school,' so of course, as usual, I agree with all Wolfhag's salient points. Whether that is because it's the ground truth, or simply because of our shared bias, I don't know, but I will say the emphasis on battle drill (what we call immediate action drills), overwhelming firepower, and violence of action works.

I agree with Wolfhag's concept of immediate action to orders/situations, but I still don't know how to best represent it on the tabletop. Going with Wolfhag's 'near ambush' scenario, the immediate action is correctly mapped out, but there still needs to be some sort of game mechanic to determine:

1) if the troops in contact do the right thing, i.e., form skirmish line and advance through the enemy while non-contact forces envelop. What if there are so many casualties, key casualties (leaders), and/or overwhelming enemy fire superiority that the troops don't do what they know they're supposed to? Can the small unit leader get them up and moving, or if he's down, does someone pop up to take his place, and is he successful in getting them moving.

2) If the troops not in contact do the right thing? What if the terrain is thick enough that troops not in contact can't get a good read on the situation, or they don't recognize the situation for what it is, or a higher echelon leader (PC or CC) misreads the situation and holds them from flanking? Maybe the CC thinks it's a far ambush and puts these guys on hold while he starts working up supporting fires, or he refuses to commit 2nd Plt until he's got a SITREP from 1st Plt (who's PC is down and is being wiped out)?

I think this is where RT's 'activation' roll has its place, but I don't know how to make it work, because I agree with Wolfhag that a 'failed' roll shouldn't result in just 'nothing,' and the player gets to make up a story for why the unit didn't do anything. But the only option I can think of is something like, roll a D20 for the platoon in contact:

1-2 – PC is down, platoon breaks and runs suffering 30% casualties.
3-4 – PC is down so platoon seeks cover in place and returns fire ineffectively, takes 15% casualties.
5-6 – PC is down so platoon conducts fighting withdrawal to nearest terrain feature blocking LOS to enemy positions, takes 10% casualties.
7-10 – PC misreads situation as far ambush, platoon builds base of fire in improvised cover, takes 10% casualties, enemy takes 2% casualties.
11-14 – PC/platoon conducts immediate action for near ambush, forms skirmish line, close assaults through enemy position, enemy repels assault, takes 30% casualties, enemy takes 10% casualties.
15-17 – PC/platoon conducts immediate action for near ambush, forms skirmish line, close assaults through enemy position, enemy stands, sides locked in combat, takes 30% casualties, enemy takes 20% casualties, fight continues next turn.
18-19 – PC/platoon conducts immediate action for near ambush, forms skirmish line, close assaults through enemy position, enemy stands and is eliminated, takes 40% casualties, enemy takes 60% casualties (unit taken off board, the non-casualties are routers).
20 – PC/platoon conducts immediate action for near ambush, forms skirmish line, close assaults through enemy position, enemy yields ground, takes 25% casualties, enemy takes 15% casualties, withdrawn to nearest terrain feature blocking LOS to platoon.

Note that I weighted the die roll slightly to reflect what I think was most likely to happen, with the 'perfect' solution being a damned 20! This is because I think that if you get ambushed at less than 100 yards by a covered and concealed enemy you're doing pretty well to take their position with only 25% casualties, inflicting 15% on them.

In any case, my point is that this is very impractical as I don't know how you could make a similar table for every possible situation you're likely to encounter on the tabletop. And of course there are so many more things to take into account.

Ugh… There's so much more to write, but I need to hit the rack! In any case, there's my 2 cents as usual. I'm dying to see Milite and Wolfhag's gallant attempts to bring us the wargaming gold! ;)

V/R,
Jack

I'm not saying and would not say that well trained professionals are not far ahead of everyone else. It's pretty clear why they would be and what evidence we have is very strongly in agreement that they are much more effective.

However – well trained professional armies are very rare in history. Big long wars just cannot sustain that level of training and the quality of the intake inevitably goes downhill fast.

I have read somewhere that the effectiveness of the US military peaked around GW1. Thereafter it declined and while there was an uptick in the quality and range of recruits post 9/11 this declined quickly in the reality of the ongoing war on terror.

If we step back into less recent history to WW2 – then there are no full time professional armies – maybe not even many full time professional units. The few units that start the war as full time regulars with a leavening of experience and effective training just do not last very long in combat – maybe they last a bit longer than the average and a lot longer than the worst units but they still become casualties at a rapid rate.

WW2 is full of excellent units [some all volunteer but many all conscripts] that performed incredibly well in combat environments more intense than we have seen since and I sincerely hope we never see again.

Other wars since have had their hot spots but there has been nothing like that since WW2 in terms of scale and duration.

My point is do not discount troops just because they were drafted/conscripted. People adapt and once 'in' most people understand the best way to survive is to learn as much as you can as fast as you can.

In the end we are going to be assigning factors some units will be +1 or +2 while others are +0 or even -1 or -2. So I see JJs point about like with like.

There is a limit to how subtle we can make the mathematical model without having differences so small they have no impact.

Is a unit with a moderate level of proficiency, but with combat experience equal to, or more effective than a unit with no combat experience but a higher level of tactical proficiency.

I would say that through my experience having been deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduringn Freedom, that units with moderate or good training that have actual downrange experience are better, at that point than an untried unit that has a higher level of training. There is no substitute for the real thing.

Having said that I would qualify my opinion by agreeing with one of the earlier posters, and a combat vet. That ill-trained units seldom survive to come out on the other end. We saw that too downrange with the opposition clearly falling into that category, be they Iraqi soldiers, or Insurgents. So, the three conditions are not the same.

-Tibor

In WW2, just because there was conscription doesn't mean that many men weren't volunteers. That is, they would have joined up anyway.

On the other hand, post-WW2, I "voluntarily" joined the USAF because I would have been drafted into the Army if I hadn't.

Exactly donlowry. Many volunteers are not really volunteers or at least not volunteering to go to war…

And likewise many men conscripted would volunteer anyway and because it is a war for national survival or some other cause that motivates them would be as willing to do their duty as the most professional volunteers in any modern army.

There have I believe been studies that show that motivation in combat is about survival and not letting down your close comrades – and perhaps not letting down the unit reputation.

Another issue I feel is often forgotten is that experience of combat is ultimately extremely demotivating. Bit by bit morale ebbs away and the men start to figure out that they will sooner or later get killed or wounded.

So experience is not always going to make a unit better. There may well come a point when the unit reaches a tipping point and becomes less effective than a fresher unit with less experience.

Everything Don Lowry and Skarper just stated, is all true, of course. But, in the greater context, the all-volunteer military of recent years is far better in training and professionalism than it ever was.

However, since the dissolution of the draft the soldiers of the 90's and 2000's are far superior in the level of training and professionalism, compared to the those who were the dregs left over from the draftee era and the decay mitigated by the Vietnam debacle that pervaded the recently established "volunteer" Army, in particular in the '70's. The rampant drugs, waning discipline, internal corruption, etc. were the embarrassing hallmark that carried on for some years until the military could reinvent itself.

Today's military is the far better, maybe no longer at it's peak as in the war in Iraq/Afghanistan towards the beginning. For, it has now overreached our capabilities at sustainment and the op-tempo has taken it's toll over the last two decades (refering to Yugoslavia, also), especially on the Reserve and National Guard – many Reservists have done 2,3,even 4 or more rotations. It's a military that's a bit weary compared to it's peak 2003 – 2006! But, as a whole probably the best it's ever been, given the waning resources. The US Armed Forces is small compared to what it was in WW2 and over the last couple of decades even less, in particular, since the Gulf War in 1991 doing more with less with no signs of slowing down is starting to have it's effects, too. This is where SKARPER is most correct! Protracted combat and stress ultimately IS a demotivating factor. Though, no matter what, experience, even under these conditions is a superior trait. Survability. Just like the Band of Brothers analogy of Normandy vs Battle of the Bulge. It wasn't that the core members of the unit were any less the soldier, but the invincibility attitude of "piss and vinegar" had lost its luster over time and trauma. And, especially as a war drags on, a certain amount of survability becomes, perhaps, more elevated as a desirable consideration, as many of the best and the brightest have long since been buried.

Look what happened to the Luftwaffe in the final year or half year of the war, or the Panzer forces with their superior and intimidating Panther and Tiger tanks!!! Guess what, they simply started to run out of guys and the ability to train them to adequate levels, because the attrition rate was getting so high and they were liteally running out of bodies to feed into the fire. That's why the SS long gave up Aryan Ideal to fill their ranks and began cranking out what amounted to essentially inferior or less than ideal quality units, in terms of training, espri-de-corps, and all for the same reason, lack of quality individuals. Suddenly, surviving and having skill sets gained from experience to be passed on becomes even MORE important than ever. Hanging on to the last decent soldiers you have so to speak.

If we were confronted with another major conflict today we'd be screwed right now. And, as far as the Middle East is concerned, it too, has become an abject failure, through no fault of our troops, but because, as Patton put it, "the politicians never let us finish the last war" or worse don't let us prosecute the war to fullest it deserves. It hasn't happened now in the Middle East and it didn't happen in Vietnam, and even Korea for that matter. It can't be overstated that we win all battles but lose the war. It's unfortunate but true.

Though, I would say as some posters implied that the overall level to sacrificing troops, and I refrain from using the word courage here, is far less intense than the average Joe experienced in WW2, in both personal sacrifices and leadership willing to sacrifice troops in battle.

Casualties were much higher per capita, and survability was far less in each preceding war. Each subsequent war since WW2 has seen a dramatic improvement in more casualty survability and fewer casualties per capita than the war preceding it. This is primarily due to advances in medicine, technology, and maybe, most importantly, the ability to remove casualties from the battlefield quicker and more effectively which greatly impacts these statistics. It can be said, that even the morale of soldiers have improved, knowing they will be tended to better than in the past or than their enemies are!

Either way, the military leadership, as well as the political climate of the era, is less inclined to put soldiers in harms way than in the past (and, the enemy knows that) which is primarily motivated by social and political considerations. In that context, and, in the broader sense, the battlefield is a less "lethal place" than in past wars. Of course, this isn't true to situations like JJ, who so eloquently and graphically described of the "Battle for Fallujah", that was just as brutal as any war is to those dog soldiers. Dead is dead, and butchery is butchery, anyway you look at it. And, we shall never lose sight of that or the sacrifices they have made despite those who would undermine their courage or dedication.

- Tibor
12th PSYOP Bn
USACAPOC

Regarding conscripts, the Israelis have practised conscription since the day the country was created. And it has been one of the best performing militaries of the modern era. Indeed it has often been a revolutionary in terms of tactics development.

Bare in mind that small professional armies can't withstand prolonged conventional combat in terms of ground coverage, casualties or even sustained combat.

Whilst this is rare, it's still a major concern in large parts of the world and even in some parts of Europe (e.g. Greece and Turkey). Most larger countries outside of Europe still maintain large forces with varying quality in terms of equipment and sometimes training.

Finally in order to create elite professional super well equipped forces, the West has gutted most of it's combat capability.

I'd still rather 10 divisions of medium trained/medium equipped troops backed up by a a couple of thousand tanks and several hundred aircraft of reasonable quality, than a couple of brigades supported by handful of uber advanced tanks and aircraft.

I certainly agree you can't blame the soldiers for the failures (at times abject) of US led wars post WW2.

The soldiers (small 's' so includes Marines etc) did what they were asked to do and it took courage, discipline and self-sacrifice to do it.

The fact that they were asked to do the wrong things or were indeed sometimes on the wrong side [IMO anyway] is not the fault of the soldiers.

I do partly blame the generals for just following along at times, but it takes enormous courage to speak out or act and only a few have. Most just take the money, the medals and move on to fresh fields.

We are drifting off topic but I wanted to make it clear I'm not disparaging or discounting the efforts of the US military personnel.

I don't BTW see or hear a lot of people 'undermining their courage or dedication'. I don't think any politician could do so without committing electoral suicide. I don't hear it from journalists embedded or otherwise.

There have been some appalling breakdowns of discipline and some utterly criminal policies implemented by the US military but that cannot be laid at the door of the average soldier.

I suspect this is more in the minds of the troops themselves or perhaps it's 'bar banter' which is just the beer talking and should be ignored.

Also some on the right politically conflate supporting the troops with supporting the war – but that is utter nonsense.

I think another thing to look at is the overall motivation of the troops. In WWII Army troops in Europe had the reputation of going to ground (suppressed) rather easily but then recovering fairly quickly and moving on. I read one account that the reason for that was that they saw no reason to push an advance using their own assets when they could hunker down and wait for artillery to clear the way. When fighting an enemy using fighting withdraw tactics (common in Western Europe) it pretty much makes sense. Also the American soldier knew they were winning and they were led to believe the war would end soon so there was no reason to make yourself a causality so play it safe. Across from them were troops who were at times putting up a fanatical defense of their homeland and sometimes surrendering en masse. I think a fanatical defender does not need a lot of training or experience if led by experienced veterans. Reference the 12th SS with teenagers led by Kurt "Panzer" Meyer. However, I doubt if they could have performed as well in an attack with the limited training they had. They performed as well as they did mainly because of good hands on leadership by proven leaders they trusted.

Then look at the motivation of the Russians on the Eastern Front. Morale checks for green troops performing a Human Wave attack being pushed along by the NKVD? I don't think so. However, don't expect them to perform much anything else. This is why I like the "tool box" approach where your troops efficiency is based on what they've been trained to do. This can include nationality traits, specialist troops like Rangers, Recon, Engineers, etc. Each tool (tactic) in the box has a rating. Order them to do something they've been trained and drilled to do and most likely they'll do it. Order a platoon of green troops led by unproven NCO's to perform and coordinate a double envelopment expect disaster and high causalities but you should be able to get them to perform a frontal attack.

In the WWII Pacific War company/platoon level game I'm working on I have a response chart for the Marines. When attacked or fired upon there are only certain actions they can take immediately. These are historical and what they were trained to do. I think it injects some realism into the game because the player is forced to perform as in real life but does get a few options. It keeps games from breaking down into a man-to-man shootout.

Here is a link to the chart I'm using: link

Wolfhag

Very interesting approach wolfhag. Genuinely new ideas (to me at least).

Years ago I had a set of rules for Vietnam war Skirmish – squad and platoon level forces. I was trying to get some doctrinal differences between the US troops and the NLF/PAVN and decided that the US stock response was to shoot their way out of trouble while the NVA/NLF tended to move either forward in a rush to close or more likely to break contact and melt away if they didn't have the upper hand.

It tended to produce the desired effects. The PAVN/NLF proved very hard to pin down and the US proved very hard to 'suppress'. Time and again the PAVN/NLF would close with 'suppressed' grunts only to have them pop up and fire at the last minute inflicting gruesome losses. Similarly, the US players would carefully practice fire and maneuver only to find Charlie long gone by the time they closed in for the kill.

It helped that I ran it with all the US players on one side against umpire controlled NLF/PAVN. It could be tremendous fun for me to hold up an entire platoon for half a game while they tried to locate the lone NLF sniper that just nailed their overconfident platoon leader.

Some of my players hated the fog of war and drifted off to other games but a few really got into it (usually ex-army types). It's still the most cost effective fun for effort/cost gaming I've ever done on the tabletop.

Although the toolbox can create a unique atmosphere for a particular theatre, especially if it is well documented, it can also be an unwitting instrument for the strengthening of national stereotypes. Phil Barker's modes, for the second edition WRG modern rules (WWII and Post-War periods) were innovative but overly restrictive and sometimes prone to bias, e.g. the restrictions on US units.

For me there is a tremendous gap in capability between professional regulars and anyone else,

Indeed …

I'd actually be interested in a sorta "toolbox" approach to very small scale skirmish (squad or so a side) that uses a 'reaction system" sorta like Chain Reaction but allows the results to be modified by 'training' and doctrine. This way you could have well trained troops who are trained in the wrong tactics for the type of battle they are fighting, for example.

Maybe some sorta weird matrix that takes into account morale and experience as separate factors as well… I'll need to think on this.

I'd actually be interested in a sorta "toolbox" approach to very small scale skirmish (squad or so a side) that uses a 'reaction system" sorta like Chain Reaction but allows the results to be modified by 'training' and doctrine.

Force on Force does this.

You have a reaction system. Both players roll a dice and highest player wins reaction.

Training/experience is taken into account by type of dice used. Average troops use a D6, inexperiened/poor a D6, spec ops a D10 abd the uber elite a D12.

------------

Other rules like Flames of War have special rules but they're almost universally a benefit even if in real life they were disastrous (e.g. Kommissars).

I like playing games where the smallest unit is a Fire Team of 4-6 men, 2-3 Teams to a Squad with a Squad Leader. Then just one Platoon Leader and one Asst Platoon Leader (Staff Sergeant). Squad Leaders can only control Teams in their own Squad. The LT and S/Sgt can order the entire Platoon. That was my real life scenario for three years.

The way I see it in a small unit fire fight one side or the other will have a Tactical Advantage/Initiative based on defending, advancing, spotting first, etc and will get off the first shots. That would be a unit getting ambushed, fired upon while advancing, etc. Sometimes units will stumble into each other at the same time but I think that is rare. The one getting shot at first "responds" and those first few moments it's training, not leadership that determines how they will react and respond while attempting to build a firepower advantage that will then give you the initiative to maneuver or disengage. If they have an improper response good leadership can overcome that. Trained units that know what to do don't need to rely exclusively on leadership in the opening stages of a fire fight. In the game I'm working on "response" is more of what they will do tactically based on training and experience. It's not about morale, that's more complicated. A breakdown in leadership can break morale as can the fear of being flanked or surrounded. Being pinned down with no firepower advantage can be a morale killer too. That comes after the initial response.

One of my duty stations was the Basic School at Quantico, VA where the newly minted Boot LT's were going through 6 months infantry training. I was part of the "aggressor" unit (bad guys). Almost every day we were in the field playing tactical war games (and getting paid for it) getting ready for deployment to Vietnam (not urban warfare training). One day I was walking point through a sparsely wooded area, visibility about 50 yards. I was coming up on a slight rise when I heard some movement coming towards me just on the other side of the rise about 20 yards away. I only had enough time to sit behind a small tree as laying down would have made too much noise rustling leaves (I was all camo with leaves and face paint). I gave the hasty ambush signal and pointed to the direction of the flanking maneuver. Just then the LT's come over the rise towards me. I waited until their point man was almost right on top of me and opened up triggering the ambush. About 10 seconds later I heard guys from my squad assaulting them in the flank as they were deployed in a column, not a skirmish line. I'll never forget the face of their point man when I opened up on him or the instructors chewing out the LT's for getting their ass kicked by us – again.

Keep in mind, I was a lowly PFC at the time with only Boot Camp and 90 days basic infantry training. Our squad was mostly guys like me and had been together for a few months and had a close working relationship and a lot of field experience, almost every day training and tactical – but no combat experience. I was trained to take the initiative and while in Boot Camp and Infantry Training I had spent a lot of time as a Squad Leader. I think this is one of the strengths of our training is that the instructors took people that they thought had good initiative and made them squad leaders during training. Just Jack will probably agree. I was confident I could run a squad even though it was a Sergeant billet and I wasn't the only one. In that ambush we didn't need to rely on "Leadership", that was training that pulled it off. Our Squad Leader was a grunt Sergeant with two deployments to VN. Looking back his most important role was making sure we were deployed in the right formations depending on terrain and movement, setting us in on perimeter and ambush and coordinating the reserve Team and any Weapons Company assets we had like machine guns, bazooka or flame thrower. His biggest responsibility was to make sure we didn't get lost!

These experiences helped me differentiate between training and leadership. I had confidence that if we lost a squad leader or NCO we'd still be able to function or at least respond according to our training. Good Leadership can get you to the right place at the right time and get the squad to respond/react to enemy actions. However, at a certain level troops perform according to their training and there is nothing leaders can do about it. In the game I'm working on I'm trying to differentiate and model it and keep it fairly simple (aren't we all). These discussions help.

There are many games to "borrow" from. FOW does have some good stuff. The "Walking Fire" rule is very interesting and could be part of a units "tool box".

Regarding nationality traits. I don't like them. Too generalized. Nationalities trained differently, reflect the difference in their training and what they are allowed to have in their "tool box". Our units had Jungle Warfare, Vertical Assault and Amphibious Assault but not Urban or Arctic Warfare in it's tool box. Elite units get more and varied training having a larger and more diverse tool box than normal troops. You can get ideas for these just by looking at training manuals and see what is covered.

So I guess to attempt to implement this you'd take training that a unit has done and add what they learned to put in their tool box. Jungle Warfare would include deliberate and hasty ambushes, patrolling, camouflage discipline, fire and maneuver among others. Just Jack would know more about Urban Warfare than I would.

Wolfhag

Wolfhag, agree with what you said and it tallies with other veterans tales, especially the effectiveness of training, allowing tactics like the hasty ambush. In essence the toolbox is similar to Fantasy RPG's with traits and abilities tables. Where Gundar has, ferocious attack (rank III), double weapon skill (rank II) and climbing walls (rank I), Gunar's squad has basic tactics (proficient), advanced tactics (developing) urban combat(trained) ),and infantry/armour cooperation(basic). Interesting idea Wolfhag, thanks.

My approach is the opposite, I want to model platoon combat, so that you can play an enjoyable company action or more complex battalion games. The role of platoon HQ's is to allow an initial plan to have an impact, but let the individual squads training determine the actual result. Company HQ's often are represented by the player actions, but with C3 limitations, dependent on current operating morale and proficiency.

Crucial to this is the modelling of the NCO's ability to motivate and direct squads, so that they perform as well as expected, or even exceed those expectations. If NCO's have to intervene too much they raise the chance of permanent morale and proficiency losses, simulating their increased exposure. A units movement and firepower will be limited by a combination of tactical proficiency and morale, with cover giving temporary improvements to the latter but exerting a pull, which simulates the difficulty in re-motivating troops once they go to ground.

Experience is modelled by being the last combat adjustment, hopefully representing it's ability to give an edge to units, but not mitigate poor training. A RM platoon of green commandoes will still eat alive a highly experienced militia unit.

Moving units are at a disadvantage to stationary ones, unless they are close assaulted and or flanking, as these cause additional die to be added to the attack factor (temporary morale reductions are the normal effect of combat), with losing units far more likely to seek IP or retire, not be wiped out. Similarly, friendly movement to the rear even if planned, can add to an enemies combat die, simulating the cascade effect. Cohesion is simulated by a penalty for intermingling different units and a gradual breakdown of morale, I'm even toying with the idea from ancient and medieval games where the very act of initiating combat cause morale losses.

So far it plays out quite well, but there is a long way to go, especially looking at weapon pull, platoon versus company (at the moment numbers trump training, badly) indirect fire, support weapons, and armoured vehicles. Though again, morale will be the prime factor with AFV's 'attacked' if in certain terrain but also 'attacking' enemy units or supporting friendlies, by their very presence, especially movement vector and firing (the effect of noise on morale is often ignored in rules).

I'd just like to finish by saying the contributions, especially by veterans, has made my task easier and have led to some valuable revisions, especially regarding the initial question asked in my original post. Again, if you think this civvy, with experience of combat and its attendant stress, limited to the odd riot. occasional fist fight and death threat, and several years of LURPing, is barking up the wrong tree, feel free to correct him.

Regarding conscripts, the Israelis have practised conscription since the day the country was created. And it has been one of the best performing militaries of the modern era. Indeed it has often been a revolutionary in terms of tactics development.

The Israelis have also been in a near-continuous existential war since the day the country was created, so I don't think it's a valid comparison between the conscripted Israeli army and any other nation's all-volunteer force.

IMO, the general problem with conscription is that the terms of conscription aren't long enough to make it cost/beneficial to do the training that's needed. If you only have Joe Conscript for 2 years, you aren't going to invest 2 years of training in him. You're not even going to invest 1 year of training. You *might* invest 8 months in him if he's going to be a tanker or artilleryman.

I was a Sailor, so my training was quite different. But I still spent 8 weeks in "Great Mistakes" for boot camp, another 6 weeks or so in the Admin school, and yet another 8 weeks or so in Sub School. 6 months in schools (counting some delays here and there waiting for classes to start), and then it took me a year to earn my Dolphins to be considered 'barely trained'. That's a LOT of time to invest into someone that isn't going to stay in the service.

You can teach Joe Civilian how to march in lines and shoot the musket on command in an afternoon, and spend two weeks or so working on the "finer" points of Napoleonic maneuvers and at least be competent should a fight break out. Not great, but competent.

But that style of combat isn't going to be successful with modern weapons. Modern soldiers need to know how to do most of the Napoleonic drill because it gets the mind used to executing orders on autopilot.

I'll ask the grunts on the board this: How long after the new guy arrived in the platoon did it take for him to be at the same level as the rest of the platoon?

Thomas Hobbes- chain reaction is the same in that your results are based on ability.

I'm saying add an additional factor-- doctrine. Chain reaction does have different tables of reactions for different armies-- so one good soldier might tend to take cover rather than make a rushed shot while another with a different "personality" mighty be the opposite even if both are equally skilled.

But what if you had a system to design reaction tables and even to retrain units to new doctrines in a campaign game?

"Phil Barker's modes, for the second edition WRG modern rules (WWII and Post-War periods) were innovative but overly restrictive and sometimes prone to bias, e.g. the restrictions on US units."

I vaguely remember flicking thru this set and seeing something about different kinds of infantry – 'Skilled' 'Dashing' 'Stubborn' but did not read thoroughly and can't remember.

Can anybody summarize what 'modes' in this WRG set were/are or indeed what these morale types (skilled etc) are/were.

The Israelis have also been in a near-continuous existential war since the day the country was created, so I don't think it's a valid comparison between the conscripted Israeli army and any other nation's all-volunteer force.

Yes, they have the [dis]advantage of being surrounded, backs-to-the wall, etc. situation for decades … So that is a good combat multiplier in many cases … Unlike some armies in the region, who drop their weapons and run away … A good way not to become a statistic is to fight !

Skarper

Morale and Combat Skills were the same and were:
Inept, Green, Stubborn, Dashing, Skilled, Thrusting, Fanatic and Irregular.

Modes were types of orders, Attack, Skirmish, Hold, Stalk etc and access to them was limited by the troops Combat Skills. The clever idea was the exigency modes, which would kick in when under fire, so a unit with attack might be forced, under fire, to dash or hold.

Trouble was, WRG listed US Rangers, PIR as Stubborn, which gave them the same battle skills as basic Russian infantry! The morale rules were also far too predictive, suppress x% of stands, in a Green unit, with o orders and a pin, repulse or overrun (depending on the tactical situation) would occur. It was solely based on the results of fire and wholly inadequate, which was a shame as the combat skills and exigency moves were quite ground breaking, at the time.

To an extent, the modern argument for conscription has been that you get a cadre of people who have basic weapons familiarity, so if the germans/russians/americans come kicking down your door, you can bulk up your armies quickly (and more realistically in a small country, go guerilla).

That's why the Danish military maintains both a professional volunteer force, a conscripted force and the "home guard".

chain reaction is the same in that your results are based on ability.

I'm saying add an additional factor-- doctrine. Chain reaction does have different tables of reactions for different armies-- so one good soldier might tend to take cover rather than make a rushed shot while another with a different "personality" mighty be the opposite even if both are equally skilled.

But what if you had a system to design reaction tables and even to retrain units to new doctrines in a campaign game?

That would be really, really cool!

The hard part would be filling out those reaction charts accurately in the first place, as you'd need to talk to veterans from each country and ask about the 'immediate action drills' (or whatever everyone else calls them, IAD is the US name)

You'd also have to factor in cross-training between different countries, to share best practice. NATO constantly send soldiers on secondment, for example, the USMC recently shared their stacking, breaching and VCP drills with the Royal Marines and during exercises participating countries experience different national interpretations of combat drills..

It's always a balancing act between encouraging and implementing doctrine in rules versus giving the player enough free will to make it a fun game.
Though for split-second reactions, they probably rely heavily on practiced responses.

Of course, you'd have to factor in panic and loss of control as well.

@Milites – thanks for that. I remember it struck me as an interesting idea but didn't like how it played out.

You would need IMO a random factor somewhere in addition to any random fire effects.

I adapted the morale rules by setting the trigger point to be equivalent of a 5 on a D6 and higher casualties reducing the number needed. I agree, it was an interesting idea but poorly executed and too prone to national biases.

One of the rule sets I like to "borrow" from is GI Commander by Enola Games. They have ratings for infantry units:
Firepower Strength: Measure of the "volume of fire" it can put out
Tactical Competence: Tactical training and what a unit could have in their tool box.
Staying Power: Ability to sustain causalities without suffering adverse morale.
Aggressiveness Factor: Ability to move under fire
Defensive Strength: Measure of manpower strength

One of the things I want to simulate is "Moving Under Fire" without using traditional suppression rules or IGOUGO. I like to idea of using an Aggressiveness Factor check to see if the unit conforms to it's "order" or if enemy fire prevents them from doing so. It is modified by the defenders firepower volume AFTER the Suppressive Firepower / Defensive Firepower Exchange results. More Defensive Firepower = less chance but during the Suppressive Fire / Defensive Firepower Exchange the Suppressive Firepower can degrade Defensive Firepower. So the Assault Team rolls an Aggressiveness Factor Check with and Defensive Firepower modifiers. If it fails the Leader/NCO can use his "Leadership" to motivate the Assault Team to move but takes a causality check for exposing himself to use his leadership. That's a player decision. Since the SF / DF Exchange is simultaneous each 25m the Assault Team moves each member takes a causality check based on the modified DF. The further they have to move to more causalities they will take. If the SF is effective enough or drives the defenders into Full Cover the Assault Team has a good chance of getting into contact to to use flamethrowers, demo charges, etc. You can make tour Assault Teams move out without suppressing the enemy but don't expect them to make it.

My small arms infantry rules are a WIP so I may contradict myself in earlier posts. I agree the the Aggressiveness Check is similar to an activation check that other games have. However, it is directly related to enemy firepower volume and only applies to Moving Under Fire for Assault Teams and teams maneuvering in a "Fire & Maneuver" tactic. The SF/DF Exchange does not generally generate very many causalities. It's mainly to see if enemy fire can be degraded or suppressed. If an assault only causes causalities and the Assault Team withdraws without destroying the structure the Japanese player gets to automatically "infiltrate" more personnel into the defensive position. If a defensive position is taken by killing all of the personnel without destroying it the Japanese can infiltrate and reoccupy it in later turns.

Ah, thought I recognised some of those mechanics, I used to remember that advancing under fire was almost impossible with the Combat Commander rules.

I'm linking movement rates to morale for maximum movement and tactical proficiency for moving without penalties (additions to the enemy attack factors). At the moment I'm playing around with allowing platoons to divide up their tactical proficiency points, generated by each squad, to attack and defence but am worried it's too precise. The other option is to allow allocation of the die rolls themselves, but the more precise division when allocating fire against multiple targets, if command rolls are made.

This would allow a well trained Western unit, with 4 tactical proficiency and 5 morale, rolling three die, boosted with good NCO's, a chance to generate 3-4 movement points, without tactical penalties and generate 6-8 points of effective fire. A unit with 2 TP morale 5 and below average NCO's (insurgents), would struggle, even throwing three die, either going for 2 FP's and 4 MP's (with two tactical penalties) or 4 FP (only two being effective) and 2 MP;s. The above rolls are averages and I'm experimenting on rewarding a TP throw of six with either bonuses or another die to roll.

On a one to one basis the insurgent group is in trouble, it will be pinned (reduction in morale affects TP points) and will quickly lose the fire-fight, with an ever-increasing risk of permanent damage. In this case it will probably be moving away from contact (double MP's generated moving away from enemy forces), either voluntarily or involuntarily. For the Western unit, the danger comes in the slow steady attrition of constant contact, from multiple contacts. In that case the advance will be slow to allow temporary morale loses to be regenerated, though if under fire this risks NCO casualties.

Experience is modeled by being the last combat adjustment, hopefully representing its ability to give an edge to units, but not mitigate poor training. A RM platoon of green commandoes will still eat alive a highly experienced militia unit. – MILITES

MILITES, I agree with most everything you've said to date, and the first sentence is pretty much true (above quote), as well. But, in that second sentence, I think I have to disagree in that it is an incorrect assumption. I'm assuming RM means Royal Marines and, if so, in most cases would play out that way. Whereas, in supporting your claim, during the Mau-Mau Uprising of 1951-1954 in Africa's Kenya, the guerrillas pretty much got waxed in most encounters. And, plenty of other such examples can be cited.

However, having said that, Afghan guerrillas, for example, not a highly-organized military unit, but really, insurgent guerrillas having lots of experience and being innately tenacious fighters with incredible endurance (as pointed out in an interview with an SAS officer, who could barely keep up with these "mountain goats") – have managed to defeat or deny victory towards every foreign invader to date. Lest we forget, an Allied "victory", included, is still in doubt here. And, I might add, is even further away from victory than it was in 2006 – disappointingly, a classic case of "snatching defeat from the jaws of victory". Considering the overwhelming superiority of our military, its weapons, and its excessive technological predominance, and training this is telling. They are far from "licked" yet theirs is mostly a result of extensive experience, and enhanced by fanaticism, courage, daring, and craftiness, which not all such militias possess. They also tend to adapt to our tactics very well – again, experience at work. Where are we after 13 years of fighting – this is rather demonstrative, is it not?

So, green commandoes DO NOT necessarily wipe the floor with seasoned militias, is my point – there are many other factors mitigating this. Even our well-trained Marines, America's shock troops if you will, have had their asses kicked by these Afghan "hillbillies" in their baptism of fire in the mountains to the east of Afghanistan. Training vs. Experience. Failure by a highly-trained French Army and elite Foreign Legionnaires, in French Algeria, 1956 exemplifies this point, too. Or, Batista's standing army rolled-up by Castro's guerrilla forces in Cuba, 1959 – an insurgency, by a militia with no prior combat experience at all, or any substantial training, even. Motivation, excellent leadership, aggressive tactics served Castro's guerrillas well. This one is an interesting example in that, it could be said, neither side had real battle "experience", as the Cuban Army had no real combat experience to speak of either, only conducting political oppression on the populace, yet they were a trained army in every sense – albeit, probably crappy?!?

This example introduces leads us down a 3rd path to another factor in the equation of training vs. experience?!? Or, perhaps, more correctly, as Don Lowry aptly pointed out, trained for the wrong kind of war – where wrong training may be worse than none at all. . . . "i.e. being trained to fight a WW1-style battle wouldn't much help someone caught in an enemy blitzkrieg -- it might even make things worse. That is, you react inappropriately" – D. Lowry

Something to think about, anyway, especially since they probably received some training assistance by the US military. Castro's forces were not a trained army at all, and yet they handily defeated a national standing army in short order! Just sayin'!

- Tibor
12th PSYOP Bn

One thing I haven't seen brought up here yet is how too much combat experience will actually adversely impact the troops aggressiveness.

Say, 7th Armoured Division in Normandy, for the example that immediately comes to mind.

As described by the guys at Battlefront, it was a case of "brave, not stupid." Relatively easily pinned (Reluctant Veteran rating), but if the enemy didn't keep them pinned down with fire, they were slightly more likely to get back up and going again than Confident Veteran troops (5+ with a re-roll is 55% chance of passing, compared to 4+/50%). This made them less aggressive than their higher commanders wanted/expected them to be.

As you can see, the 'too much combat experience' was handled through the morale rules in this case.

But if you're doing something more like Chain Reaction or Chain of Command, where you have reaction tables to work through, I'd want those tables changed for the troops who have seen too much combat.

I only want to say that this is one of the most interesting and informing threads that I have read in a long time. Thanks everybody for your insights!

Thanks for the input, SF12, I think my terminology is at fault probably, given I've never served professionally. The reason I used the Royal Marines was that they have the longest period of basic training (32 wks IIRC) than any other force. Therefore a green RM unit is still a formidable fighting unit, compared to a militia unit (civilians with rudimentary training), simply because the RM unit have so many tactical tools at their disposal.

Now, what might be interesting is if certain factors are tweaked to represent previous combat experience against a given force. So the said militia unit, if battling a unit it has previously tangled with might get a brevet promotion in ability stakes. I'm reminded of a UK unit replacing a USMC unit in Afghanistan, the British CO, briefing his men, said the first few days would be quite quiet, as the Taliban got to 'know' them better. Sure enough, once the UK troops SOP's had been watched, all hell broke loose. Perhaps rating such as basic, developing, advanced and mastery, might be used, In our example, the Green, expertly trained RM unit, might have basic knowledge of the militia unit, which is experienced, poorly trained but with advanced knowledge of the RM unit (having fought similar units before). Replacements could lower or increase this rating, to simulate the effects old sweats or rookies have on a unit, 'knowing it's enemy'. Just a thought, thanks for your input.

Lion, agree 100%, experience breeds caution, I also think another factor is at play, the strategic situation. By 44 it was obvious to most Allied soldiers, Germany was loosing, so why bother risking life and limb (which 7AD had done many times earlier in the war)? If their lives were genuinely threated, by taking a cautious approach, then they'd fight to make sure they saw the end of the war, but if the calculation was, we are safe where we are, it's dangerous over there, they'd move professionally but reluctantly to 'over there'.

Work has been pretty unrelenting recently, so progress has been slow, but another reason is one part of the embryonic combat mechanics is not meshing with the others! This is a PITA, as the other factors work smoothly and compliment each other.

Talking of proficiency, how do the vets rate these guys tactical skills?

link

There's no ridiculous, sound discipline destroying, Allah U akbaring, spacing in the advance looks good and intervals between running men seems ok. The armed pickup is hull down, but the PKM man is posing for the camera or wants his 72 virgins, (unless, that is, the trigger puller is a Kurdish lady).