"Cavalry v. squares – determining factors?" Topic

I have two questions really concerning this for you to muse upon.

The first question is in the topic title itself:

What were the factors determining the defeat of infantry squares by cavalry?

And secondly:

How should this be represented in our games – how much should "luck"; that is, how much weighting should there be upon the dice?

Cavalry against formed squares would find it very difficult to make any progress without supporting infantry/artillery or a bit of (extreme and rare) luck when a horse accidently falls over the edge of a square.

What were the factors determining the defeat of infantry squares by cavalry?

Cavalry can only fight when they close to contact. So it stands to reason, if the cavalry can't close on its target with sufficient numbers to cause significant casualties, then it can't break a square. If it can, the infantry square is probably done for. There should be a sufficiently small chance of an unsupported cavalry unit of actually breaking into a square.

How should this be represented in our games – how much should "luck"; that is, how much weighting should there be upon the dice?

Should the cavalry close, it still must rely on getting on the flank. Against a square, there really is no flank so the fight should be rather even if a fight takes place. If the cavalry cannot close, it should swerve away reform and have another go. This will probably take two or more turns before the unit is ready to charge again.

I seem to remember reading of a French cavalry officr who had the opinion that cavalry were improperly trained to charge home on a square.
His opinion was that by charging at formed squares and then swerving away in training the horses were conditioned to do exactly that in battle.
His solution was to have the horses charge through gaps in a formed square so the horses would continue at the gallop into the square's face. I believe Waterloo happened before his ideas were fully implemented.

Other than that I can think of only a few examples of a square breakling. One was after Salamanca when a dead horse slammed into the face and the square panicked. Then the refugees from that square tore apart a second square with cavalry close enough to exploit the disruption. The commander of a third square saw what was happening and fired into the refugees approaching his square to prevent that happening to his.

David

you should read Kriegsspiel by Reißwitz published in 1824 and revised edition in 1828, seemingly a translated version is available by TheFatLardies.

Reißwitz argues that the more attacks – one after the other are followed in sequence the more likley it is that the square will brake – also horse artillery fire directed against a square will make attacks more likley too succeed.

As long as a square kept fire control it was very unlikley to be broken.

Usually the troopers were afraid just because of that to close to critical distance

I think the two determining factors would be time and training. It takes a certain amount of time for the threat of cavalry charge to be noticed, orders given and the actual maneuver to be executed. Given the distance of the charge does the unit have time to form square?

Then there is the matter of training/experience. Even raw recruits repeatedly practiced the maneuver until it was second nature. I'm sure that both shouting and hearing the phrase "To Square!" during battle came with a sense for fear or panic. Veteran troops will of course react to stressful situations in a more cohesive manner. Disordered troops regardless of experience will have a tougher time.

Bruce Quarrie in his "Napoleon's Campaigns in Miniature" gives a very detailed (including national characteristics and formation variables) analysis of both factors and a way of modeling. For myself, based on my readings and years of playing experience, there should be no luck involved in a trained unit with ample time to form square when threatened by cavalry charge. Dice should only become involved when there are questions or modifiers in play such as timing or unit integrity. A formed square was almost never, ever, broken. The few rare times it happened were dutifully recorded. In my opinion these anomalies are not worth modeling and only serve to slow and complicate the game. (even though the extreme range of a musket was 200 yards and 800 men in line firing at a unit might cause one or two casualties at that range do I really want to spend the time to roll and see if it happens just because it is/was possible?)

A more complicated question remains of what is the cost for the cavalry unit to force infantry into square, also know as "baiting the square"? I have seen many variations from forcing the cav to complete its charge and melee the square and a huge disadvantage and take causulties if the square forms in time to allowing them to rein-in with no penalty thus freezing the infantry into perpetual square. I, of course prefer to take the middle road as the interaction between infantry, cavalry and artillery is what makes Napoleonic gaming so interesting to me.

In direct contact, the square would have three to six men facing one cavalryman because of the size of the horse.

The only way to come up with a reasonable concept of the 'chances' of cavalry breaking a square would be to collect a lot of accounts of cavalry attacking squares and start counting. The same is true of determining the factors that led to a successful cavalry attack. Winterfeldt has mentioned a few noted by Reißwitz. The second best option is to go with the opinion of military contemporaries making their own wargames.

Its all about bottle. If the infantry stand then the cavalry have to stop.

If they fail to form the square properly it could cause a fatal drop in confidence. If they were poorly trained or under artillery fire it could also lead to them breaking.

I think I recall reading (probably De Brack) that the best way to attack a square was for cavalry squadrons, or half-squadrons, to charge simultaneously on two adjacent sides of the square. In that way the horses on the adjacent sides cannot deflect out to the side as they reach the square. They may rear up as they are stopped by the other squadron (or half-squadron), but the resultant confusion could well cause a break in on the corner of the square.

I would therefore allow a greater chance of breaking in to a square by a player using this historically valid tactic. It would also encourage cavalry operating by squadrons, also historically correct.

Rod

I thin the main factor in whether a square broke or not was the infantry's faith in itself. If they thought the cavalry could break their square, then they could.

The best example of this would be Dresden, where several squares (Klumpen?) of Austrians surrendered because it was raining and they couldn't fire their muskets. They thought their formation was vulnerable so they gave up when approached by cavalry.

One thing I've always wondered is why 7 Years War infantry didn't form square, yet cavalry in that period wasn't noticeably more effective than during Napoleon's time. I suppose it had to do with the faith thing – they felt they could handle cavalry charging from the front, so they did (Minden is an excellent example of this).

So the factors seem to have all been covered above;

Training, morale, self confidence in the infantry.
Enough time to form a complete square.
Functioning firearms not all fired off in a single volley(wet powder or out of ammo does not help).
Luck (not having a dead horse or two career into you as it falls)
Whether cavalry have supporting skirmishers or artillery involved.
Type of cavalry might be added? The rumour is that the square had more to fear from the reach of a lancer. But I get the impression they rarely came close enough for that to count.
Type of attack? Echelon was said to encourage the square face to fire off and face the second echelon unloaded. The hedge of bayonets seems to still have kept them at bay.

Cavalry against a formed square…….needs some unusual circumstances for success

Need to consider…
low level tactical play and higher grand-tactical.
This can have a big impact on what the dice will impact and the need to abstract to simulate much mention above or present in the play mechanism ( IE in tactical). many rules and probably yours as well cover this withing most gamers expectation.
The other is fatigue, moral level and ammunition in addition to troops experience/training.
Most do not take this into account at tactical level. C &G probably does it best.
Some other notable examples…
The Russian conscript infantry of the 28 th DIV ( IIRC) held off Murat in its retreat to Smolensk. Then there is a very veteran infantry French unit breaking in the vineyard at Austerlitz after several charges by the Chevalier guard Cuiras IIRC)

MG

Just remember pikes kept off cavalry just as well as muskets. One could say that the bayonet revolutionised firearm warfare by making the pike pointless, and thus doubling the number of muskets. As has been mentioned before it is "bottle", "cran" etc. that keeps the square together and what drives the charge home or not. Don't forget about the Glosters rear rank about facing and seeing off some French cavalry trying to take them in the rear. Wellington himself was thinking that a four deep line would keep off cavalry, at least in front.

I think there is too much thought and theory put into this. Very simply consider the empirical evidence. Name 3 times during the expanse of the Napoleonic Wars that a square was completely bowled over by a mass of cavalry? Not improperly formed squares but good solid squares. I think you can count the Penninsular war example as one. Can you come up with 2 others? If no or if you are hard pressed to find examples, your answer should be self evident.

As for training, no amount can be given to a horse to make him ride willingly into a hedge of bayonets. Horses have a much higher self preservation instinct even than humans. In short it's tough to make horses kill themselves.

Michael, maybe the focus on breaking squares could be shifted to the effect of a division of cavalry charging the line of battle. The key issue would be – can enough infantry form square to hold off the attack or will the cavalry catch enough of the division not in square – think Quatre Bras. Essling and Eylau feature massed cavalry attacks, not necessarily breaking squares but certainly disrupting the attacks of the infantry. Of course once committed the cavalry will be disrupted and fatigued for a good while after the attack.

I agree that horses have a self preservation instinct, but even more so the troopers.

Now that I am less sure about. There is much evidence that, on 18th June, some of the riders were determined to drive their horses into a line of four men all armed with bayonets, on the side of a square. The idea may well have been that the horse was more expendable than they felt they were, but also more likely to be killed in the mayhem.

No, logically, you do occasionally get suicidally brave soldiers, but not animals.

Then, I must admit, the riders were more likely to write their memoirs than the horses….and exaggeration of one's prowess and achievements was much more acceptable back then.

The story is often told of the Soviet soldiers facing cavalry in the filming of Bondarachuk's Waterloo. The riders' paths were carefully marked out with the usual white tape. The safest thing was for the infantry to stay in tight formation. But, over and over, they broke and ran once facing a host of horses coming at them, even though they knew there was no real threat. A half dozen police horses will break most demonstrations (except for the lunatic Geordie who tried to punch a 16 hands horse on the jaw…legendary nutter).

Mserafin, at Dresden the Austrian infantry kept the French cavalry at bay even when their muskets were wet. Then a French lancer squadron slaughtered a square since they could walk right up and spear the infantry. The neighboring squares gave up after seeing that.

From my perspective, cavalry cannot beat a formed square. While there were the very occassional success in actual battles, it's too rare to factor in a game. Cavalry should force foot into square so artillery and other foot can kill them.
So, for a game, test to see if foot form square. If they do, cavalry lose and take damage. If they fail to form square and make a ragged square, cavalry still lose but square takes some damage as well. Extra damage if lancers to represent them poking at the sides.
Maybe oversimplified for some, but pretty much covers what happened historically.

As a horse owner and rider, I would argue that they can be pretty robust when playing together and they can be encouraged to use their body weight aggressively, be it against people on foot or other horses. Indeed we do just this sort of thing to prepare mounts for use in medieval style melee events at tournaments.

In case I remember correctly at Belle Alliance the French cavalry stopped at about 50 paces distance from the square, certainly a very human factor, simply afraid of the musket fire, in case infantry was under control of it, it was indeed suicidal to get closer.
Otherwise I recommend reading Reißwitz's reflection on that and how he solved this in his game.

I always thought the horse's issue was with the wall of bayonets pointed menacingly at his head, neck and chest.

If the infantry can adequately maintain that threat, then the horse and rider will typically tend to bounce.

Having said that, the idea that the 'only' squares ever to break were at Garcia Hernandez, following Salamanca, is pretty ridiculous. The reality in that statement is that those were the only squares broken by Wellington's forces in either the Peninsula or Belgium, and that's why we've heard about them.

I've come across many examples of squares being broken by cavalry, in the larger European theater of the wars, and those episodes were often a matter of 'bad luck' in the case of the foot, or 'good luck' in the case of the horse and rider. Of course there will always be tactical factors or the relative morale, relative fatigue, weather, or a well timed blast of canister from a supporting horse gun, which could have an effect on the outcome.

Co-incidentally I was discussing this with a equestrian at work.

Horses, it appears, are basically scared of everything. While you can train them to get used to loud noises (gunpowder, battle etc) they take one look at a hedge of sharp things and go "begger that for a game of soldiers"

This is why you have horse artillery.

"I always thought the horse's issue was with the wall of bayonets pointed menacingly at his head, neck and chest."

This is the a wrong concept in my view, you have to take into account that on the horse sits the trooper, he stops the horse 50 or more pages before the square – a horse would not necessarily stop so far away from an obstacle, it could move around.

In case cavalry managed to come to a square at sabre striking distance – then the square is in danger to get broken, there the thread by the musket fire was overcome.

Stand in front of a horse with one yard distance and the horse is moving, quite menacing.

I was in square at the 175th anniversary of Waterloo reenactment and I felt very comfortable, knee to knee next to my buddies with a long bayonet on a musket pointed out, butt solidly on the ground.

The police horses used by the French cavalry reenactors were inadequately trained, and spooked at the sound of cannon, dragging their riders. Oh, how we laughed.

"In case cavalry managed to come to a square at sabre striking distance – then the square is in danger to get broken, there the thread by the musket fire was overcome."

I don't see how cavalry could get within sabre striking distance, not with 2-3 muskets pointed up and out.

I don't see how cavalry could get within sabre striking distance, not with 2-3 muskets pointed up and out.

It's a difficult thing to load and shoot from a tight formation like a square. Even in my ACW re-enacting days, I found it difficult to load shoulder to shoulder in line. You are not going to get the 3 rounds per minute rate you might otherwise get in ideal conditions. I'd bet a round per minute. Then you just bring many many of your friends and their horses.

That said, empirical data says it is not an easy task for the cavalry, especially left unsupported.

A point often forgotten is that a battalion square was exceedingly small. This must have had an effect on how cavalry dealt with it.

A 500-man battalion would have had 125 men per face. Deployed in 4 ranks that's 31 men wide on each face. At 2 feet of front per man, that means a 500-man square was twenty yards long per side.

That is tiny. Trying to hit that at horse artillery ranges, without hitting your own cavalry milling around it, cannot have been easy. So far as the horses were concerned 500 men packed into 400 square yards was effectively an obstacle as solid as a building.

I've also read that horses have slow reactions and poor depth perception. If so, a rider aware of this would be taking his life in his hands trying to execute subtle manoeuvres on a horse surrounded by other horses in proximity to a square. This might explain why few horsemen got that close to a square if they could avoid it: they cannot have had a good idea of what the horse might do.

The guys at the front don't need to fire. The horses are not going to get into a formed line.

So if breaking a square was nearly impossible for Napoleonics cavalry, why did cavalry charge infantry in battle after battle?

Is there something about the interaction of cavalry and infantry in the Napoleonics period we, as gamers, are not taking into account?

I do not have an answer, I am only encouraging people to think outside the box, as it were.

God, the gibberish that wargamer spelling generates!

Some info from the Napolun.com site, Napoleon, his armies and enemies

David F Brown

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Squares in combat (part 1).
The cavalry-vs-square it was morale thing only.

When cavalry had chosen its objective and was ready to move, it set out at a walk, officers in front, their sabers unseathed. If, at this moment, the infantrymen in the square started to fidget a bit too much, the cavalry officers could risk acceleration the pace to a trot. Should the musket volley be fired badly – too soon or too high – the cavalry could pass to a gallop, and then the infantrymen, in all probability, would lose their nerve, break their ranks and flee. The result would be massacre.

For the squares, the first attacks were usually the ones that came closest to causing panic. "The first time a body of cuirassiers approached the square into which I had ridden, the men – all young soldiers – seemed to be very alarmed. They fired high and with little effect, and in one of the angles there was just as much hesitation as made me feel exceedingly uncomfortable" – wrote an officer of British Royal Engineers at Waterloo.

If the square was broken very many infantrymen were killed and wounded, many lost fingers and hands as they sought to protect themselves from sabers by holding their muskets over their heads. Others threw themselves down. Horses were unwilling to step upon prone body. The excited cavalry usually passed over their heads, they quickly rose to their feet and either run to the rear or fired at attackers' backs. This is what the Russian infantry did at Eylau, the British at Waterloo, and the Prussians at Strigau. Kincaid writes: "[at Waterloo] hundreds of the [alles] infantry threw themselves down and pretended to be dead, while the cavalry galloped over them, and then got up and ran away… I never saw such a scene in all my life.".

However, the infantry square was THE best formation against cavalry. The square presented rows of bayonets ahead of them and no horseman armed with saber would have been able to strike at them without exposing himself and his horse to the sharp points of bayonets. Horses were unwilling to impale themselves on bayonets.

Prussian colonel Muffling mentions that in 1814 three newly raised Russian battalions were attacked by French cuirassiers. The Russians delivered volley at 60 paces killing not a single man or horse. The cuirassiers however turned back and retired !

A British officer writes: "[At Waterloo] No actual dash was made upon us [our square]. Now and then an individual more daring than the rest would ride up to the bayonets, wave his sword about and bully; but the mass held aloof, pulling up within 5 or 6 yards …" (- Mark Adkin)

There were four popular methods of cavalry attacks on the square.
– the attacking cavalry is divided into two troops. The infantry emptied their muskets on the smaller troop, while the other troop charged before the infantry could reload.

– attack in echelons. The infantry emptied their muskets on the first echelon, while the second echelon was on them. In 1809 at Wagram Colbert's 'Infernal Brigade' (9th Hussars, 7th and 20th Chasseurs), rushed against Austrian infantry. The 7th Chasseurs was greeted with musket volley and fell back. Colbert was seriously wounded. The 20th Chasseurs moved against the square that had just repulsed the 7th. Despite having emptied their muskets the infantrymen were standing firm. The chasseurs however attacked and broke the square. Other square was broken by the 9th Hussars.

– part of cavalry dismounted (for better aiming) and approached the square in skirmish order. The main body waited for any sign of weakness of the square. Lewis described how the French cuirassiers at Waterloo fired at his square: "They fired on us with their carbines, then immediately do an about-turn while a comrade at my side collapses with a bullet full in the stomach and blood coming out of him as from a stuck pig."

Squares in combat (part 2).
The cavalryman instinctively "ducked"
under fire becoming smaller target.

It was a horrifying thing for the infantry to see cavalry riding straight at them. Their eyes were popping out of their heads, jaws dropping, alarm bells ringing, hearts beating well out from their chests. In such moment the fire discipline and aiming were important.

According to G.Beskrovniy of Russia; "When cavalry is attacking the formed front, all officers must tell to their men they must not fire without the command, and when the command is given, every soldier must take aim without hurry and then shoot. The regiment's commander allows the cavalry to approach to 150 paces and gives a command to fire." (At Borodino many battalions fired at 50-60 paces.)

Usually there were more horses killed and wounded than riders. The cavalryman instinctively "ducked" under fire becoming smaller target. Horse is a bigger target than man anyway.

- In 1815 at Quatre Brass, one horse was hit with 7 bullets while the rider was untouched.

- In 1809 at Wagram, chasseurs of Napoleon's Guard attacked a square formed by Austrian landwehr. The Austrians delivered volley, 10 men and 10 horses were the casualties. It was enough for the guardsmen as the Landwehr stood firm.

- In 1806 at Prenzlow, a small Prussian square (400 men) repulsed 7 attacks of 2,000 French dragoons, each time delivering a volley at 20-30 paces. The dragoons lost only 10-15 horses but the square held fast and it was enough to discourage the attackers.

- In 1813 at Gohrde, the 3rd KGL Hussars lost 98 men and 138 horses.

- In 1813 at Dennewitz, one squadron of Prussian dragoons received volley at 30 paces and lost 28 men and 41 horses.
A fast moving horse when hit and falling required several paces to fall down. Therefore it was unwise to fire at less than approx. 12 paces. Otherwise the square was hit by falling and kicking (if wounded) horses. One horse could make a big gap in the wall of square, bowling and wounding the men. If the volley is delivered at 12-25 paces, it will raise up a rampart of dead and wounded men and horses which will probably suffice to repulse the charge. However an infantry square rarely reserves its fire so long; and if the fire is delivered at any considerable distance, no such effect will be produced.

In many cases the infantry began to shuffle what created the neglecting of firing. In 1815 at Waterloo, Captain Scriba was in a large square formed by two Hannoverians battalions. He heard the pistol-armed commander of one of the squares threaten to shoot anyone who fired before the order was given.

Scriba saw the French cuirassiers under Colonel Crabbe move forward at a trot, take a few losses caused by the massed fire from the squares, and then, still 40-50 paces away, change direction and disappear without even trying to attack.
"Scriba's recruits, most of them boys and young men in their first battle, watched the departure of the French cavalry with relieved shouts of "Hurrah !", but their joy was at the expense of Sir Hew Ross' men, positioned a little farther on … As the cuirassiers came back down from the ridge, they suddenly found themselves in the midst of the battery, and many gunners were cut to pieces before they could run to the nearest squares …" (Barbero – "The Battle" pp 123, 181)

Squares in combat (part 3).
"a cavalry charge against infantry in square
would be thrown back 99 times out of 100."
- Mark Adkin

According to Mark Adkin "a cavalry charge against infantry in square would be thrown back 99 times out of 100." Simple mathematics was against the cavalry when they attacked a square. An average strength battalion with 600 men formed a square 3 ranks deep, this meant that on one side were some 150 soldiers, all of whom could fire and contributed bayonets to the hedge. They covered a frontage of about 25 m (50 men x 0.5 m). The most cavalrymen that the enemy could bring to face them were 50 in 2 ranks (25 men x 1 m).
But only the men in first rank could attack at a time, some 6 muskets + bayonets confronted a single lance or saber. The man with saber could not strike the infantrymen behind the bayonets – he did not have the reach.

A lancer had a better chance although he was still outnumbered by 6 to 1. Either the lancer or his horse was far more likely to be spiked than he was to inflict any damage at all."

It was not easy to break a square even for quality cavalry.
On Oct 16th 1813 at Leipzig, part of Raievski's Grenadier Corps (10 btns. of 1st Grenadier Division) formed themselves near Auenhain Sheep-Farm in one line of squares. On each flank of the grenadiers stood cuirassier regiment. Several thousands of French cuirassiers and dragoons led by Latour-Maubourg, Bordesoulle and others, charged and routed Russian cuirassiers. They also overrun artillery and cut down the gunners. The Russian grenadiers however they held their ground. These lads fired volleys into the seried ranks of heavy cavalry. The Frenchmen rode up to the bayonets, waved their swords about, fired pistols and retired.

Mikhailovski-Danilevski wrote that the grenadiers stood "like a boulder in the middle of the indignant mass." In this combat General Raievski 'The Hero of Borodino' was wounded.

Edward Costello of 95th Rifles writes: "The 14th Dragoons were in the act of charging a body of French infantry, who had, however, thrown themselves into square. The cavalry cheered forward in gallant style, but the French, veteran-like stood firm to meet the onset, pouring in, at the same time, a close running fire that emptied many saddles. Ltn-Col. Talbot, who headed the charge, fell almost immediately together with the quarter-master and from 16 to 18 privates. After the unavailing attempt to shake the square, the cavalry was obliged to retire … An attempt was made to annoy them with our guns … our shots were attended with very little effect." (Costello – "The Peninsular and Waterloo Campaigns" p 31)

In 1815 at Ligny, II Battalion of 1.Westphalian Landwehr formed square on top of a hill near Brye. The Landwehr was charged three times by cuirassiers and heavy cavalry of Napoleon's Old Guard. Each time the Landwehr fired volley and the cavalry retired with casualties. Below several more examples.

In 1809 at Wagram, Austrian Landwehr repulsed
- – Chasseurs of Napoleon's Imperial Guard.

In 1815 at Ligny, Prussian Landwehr repulsed
- – Dragoons of Napoleon's Imperial Guard.

In 1812 at Borodino, French 84th Line Infantry repulsed
- – several charges of Russian Lifeguard Hussars.

Approx. 1 % (10 % ?) of cavalry charges against infantry in square would be successful. Some of the most successful cavalry charges were at Dresden, Garcia Hernandez, Hanau, Fere Champenoise and Mockern (Leipzig.) Below few more examples.

In 1812 at Kliastitzi, Russian Tambov Regiment awaited the cavalry. The French charged and received volley that emptied only "a few saddles". Before the infantry could reload their muskets the cavalry were upon them. The square was broken.

In 1813 in Dresden, Russian Grodno and Loubny Hussars broke square of 5th Voltigeurs of the Young Guard, killing, wounding and taking prisoner 310 guardsmen. The Grodno Hussars broke also another square of the Young Guard. (Source: Plotho – "Der Krieg" Vol II).

[But in February 1813 in Kalish the Russian Alexandria Hussars were unable to break three weak Saxon grenadier companies !]

In May 1813 at Michelsdorf, 15 squadrons of Prussian cavalry> (Silesian Cuirassiers, East Prussian Cuirassiers, Silesian Uhlans and Guard Light Cavalry Regiment) attacked the French 16th Division. The Silesian cuirassiers crushed the partially formed French square, the East Prussian cuirassiers moved between Michelsdorf and Hainau, routing all formed bodies of infantry they found. The other cavalry units captured six guns and cut the gunners. The 16th Division broke and fled in a bloody rout to Michelsdorf.

Few miles north of Leipzig, near Mockern, Prussian General von Yorck attacked with battalion of the elite Leib Regiment, 2 squadrons of Brandenburg Hussars and 1 sq. of horse volunteer-jagers who until now stood in a hollow ground and were unseen to the French. Behind them advanced Brandenburg Uhlans.

Once they came closer to the French infantry the 308 Brandenburg Hussars "wheeled out" and charged. The French formed two squares and fired. The salvo made little impression on the hussars, they broke and pursued the infantry. The frightened infantry ran towards own artillery and thus masking their fire. In effect the entire battery was captured.

Regiment of Wirtembergian cavalry struck the Prussians on the left flank but was immediately charged by 2 sq. of Prussian Uhlans (342 men). The Prussian uhlans and hussars broke two regiments of Wirtembergians and captured 9 guns. During pursuit they met battalion of 1st Marine Infantry Regiment and slashed it to pieces. The uhlans continued their brilliant charge and broke several other squares !
It was a disaster for Marmont's infantry.

Jurgass sent forward 1st West Prussia Dragoons, Lithuania Dragoons and several regiments of Landwehr cavalry. Total of 2.000-3.000 of cavalry flooded French positions. The dragoons attacked French cavalry, broke them and pursued towards Gohlis. They also captured 4 guns and took prisoners. Another group of cavalry, dragoons and Landwehr, attacked battalion deployed in line and broke it by attacking one flank.

Battalions of 1st and 3rd Marine Infantry formed squares and attempted to halt the Prussians. But the Mecklenburg hussars took them from the rear while from the front attacked Prussian infantry. The marines broke in the instant, lost a flag and 700 prisoners. The 2nd Leib Hussar Regiment took 2 French flags and 2 guns, and the Landwehr and national cavalry captured several guns. The 7th and 8th Brigade continued their advance behind the victorious cavalry, but there was little or no resistance from Marmont's troops.

One thing you don't seem to read about much is cavalry using their own firearms to create gaps in the square's walls; the infantry, of course, have to reserve their fire for the "main event". In one of Cornwell's novels (I know, I know….) – I think it might even have been the first one – the Rifles are in a square facing French dragoons, one squadron of which keep back at a distance, and start picking men off with volleys from their musketoons. Rifles being slower to reload, Sharpe and his mates cannot shoot back, and eventually another squadron charges in (or they surrender, I forget which).

I would imagine that any other cavalry could use pistols and/or carbines just as effectively. With the infantry forced to reserve their fire, the constant galling fire of the cavalry would cause morale problems, even before you consider the actual losses.

One thing I've always wondered is why 7 Years War infantry didn't form square, yet cavalry in that period wasn't noticeably more effective than during Napoleon's time. I suppose it had to do with the faith thing – they felt they could handle cavalry charging from the front, so they did (Minden is an excellent example of this).

This is because of the way armies formed up then – still in the 17th Century manner with foot in the centre and horse on each wing. The infantry tended to form in two lines (sometimes with a third, reserve line in the centre), the ends of which were usually "sealed off" with one or two battalions in column (ready to face outwards when needed). Thus there was no unprotected flank for the cavalry to ride down. There are accounts of infantry lying down and letting cavalry ride over them, then standing up and firing into the backs of the horsemen.

In my home brand rules I make it difficult, but not impossible for cavalry to break a square, the chances vary depending on the quality of the cavalry and the infantry involved.

I found that because it was so difficult, cavalry in a game just wouldn't bother, however we know from accounts that cavalry often did bother if mostly unsuccessfully. So I also now have a restraining test, which cavalry have to pass when within a certain distance of a square to see if they charge it, which again is mostly dependent on the quality of the cavalry as to how likely they are to pass….this of course has led to the tactic of infantry marching up to cavalry and forming square within this distance to try and tempt them into a reckless charge…

A lot is made of the Garcia Hernandez example. There is eye-witness reporting by Captain Marcel of the 69th Ligne.

"Campagnes du capitaine Marcel " link

pp170-172.

Marcel describes the retreat of the French dragoons and the rearguard commander deciding to push the pace of his men towards the higher ground rather than halt and form up. He describes the battalion of the 76th as having been caught out dispersed with the men seeking water in the streams. Many were taken prisoner. As for the 6th Leger, Marcel describes most of the officers having been sent out to collect foragers from outlying villages so that the remainder of the regiment was unable to manouvre.

His battalion of the 76th were unable to form square but were sufficiently closed up so as to prevent the English cavalry from breaking up the battalion. The seceond battalion of the 76th did form square and drove off the attacking cavalry.

This is a rather different narrative for this event which may call into question even this example of cavalry breaking steady formed squares.

From a gaming perspective I think there are (at least) three issues,

1 – How often did cavalry break a square ? – not often

2- cavalry often charged squares anyway, how do you represent this on the table

3- how much damage did unsuccessfully charging squares do to cavalry ?

1 – Hardly ever unless not fully formed or disrupted by artillery.

2 – a fresh and formed cavaly unit becomes disordered and fatigued (for a short while. The infantry rests immobile. Place the cavalry against the infantry, resolve combat as – cavalry repulsed this round, combat sustained till next round. Where the cavalry is repulsed then any reserves may replace them to continue combat into the next round.

3 – it reduces effectiveness later in the battle through loss and fatigue

Q4 – what is the impact of unsucessful charges on the Infantry – A – the infantry is halted or pinned until the enemy cavalry withdraws or is driven off. When pinned the infantry is exposed to artillery fire when forming a dense target.

We all agree it is uncommon for a Square to be broken by cavalry.

We only allow cavalry to go to melee with a square if the square is shaken – there morale is failing and or it is disorganized – an out side factor disorganizes them terrain or some friendly unit routs through them.

We find this satisfactory system.

horses can be trained, Suvarov let charge his cavalry at the end of manoeuvres against infantry, the ranks were opende so that the cavalry could charge in between the gaps – after that the horses were fed and watered.

The Prussians – before 1807 – tried to provoke the infantry to fire prematurly at the first squadron attacking, when that squadron was fired at (usually light cavalry – hussars) the wheeled to the left and right – to let heavy cavarly charge home which was just behind.

Well – that was the idea.

What happend on the battlefield, light cavalry riding into direction of enemy infantry and in case reveiving fire, the horse would automatically wheel to the left or right and they just couldn't charge home or get closer

Re:

As for training, no amount can be given to a horse to make him ride willingly into a hedge of bayonets

This view as a hard and fixed rule is incorrect:

Cavalry did, many times throughout the Napoleonic Wars, close into actual physical contact with infantry squares.

E.G. a quote from the Mecklenburg Hussars in action at Mockern 1813: "The 3rd Squadron charged into the thickest part (of the square) and caused chaos….we later counted 60 horses with bayonet wounds to the chest. And from the same action… "a group of riders crashed into the corner of the square like a battering ram and broke it way from the other infantry".

Some cavalry refused to charge home. Some cavalry swerved around a square. Some cavalry charged home against a faltering square. Some cavalry charged home against a steady square,(and onto their bayonets).

DB

In 1809 at Wagram, Austrian Landwehr repulsed
- – Chasseurs of Napoleon's Imperial Guard.

In 1815 at Ligny, Prussian Landwehr repulsed
- – Dragoons of Napoleon's Imperial Guard.

In 1812 at Borodino, French 84th Line Infantry repulsed
- – several charges of Russian Lifeguard Hussars.

The above examples suggest to me that the order of the infantry is perhaps the main determnant for the chance of a square. No matter how good the cavalry, if the square is wellformed in good order, it will not be broken. The risk factors for the sqaure shold be disorder from just moving/changing into square or having just fired.

Sometimes it must just depend on how daft you are, not brave. This legendary Geordie was prosecuted for punching a police horse, not so long ago.

We only allow cavalry to go to melee with a square if the square is shaken – there morale is failing and or it is disorganized – an out side factor disorganizes them terrain or some friendly unit routs through them.

Bruce Quarrie also has this rule, infantry must be shaken.

Do you allow infantry to become shaken as a result of failing a being charged by cavalry test?

What about the idea of rock-paper-scissors theory of combined arms?

Cavalry force infantry into square reducing their firepower, blast the infantry with canister and finish off with infantry or the cavalry.

Horses, it appears, are basically scared of everything. While you can train them to get used to loud noises (gunpowder, battle etc) they take one look at a hedge of sharp things and go "begger that for a game of soldiers"

It is possible that your equestrian friend has limited experience of eventing, Last Hussar, or other more challenging forms of riding. It might be worth digging a little deeper.

Whilst it is fair to say that, as prey, you can generalise that horses are basically scared of everything, they can also be very brave and up for some pretty challenging stuff, especially stallions, which of course were the mount of choice for medieval knights.

The problem in this period is the large quantity of horse flesh required, reduced quality, and the mounts were not trained to effectively charge home in the same way as heavy horse in the Middle Ages.

Mike the Mug's quote about Garcia Hernandez reminds of how often the things look different when reported by different people. It reminds me of another square-breaking episode by the KGL, which nobody has mentioned so far – by the Hussars at Gorhde in 1813. The KGL history gives a fairly conventional account of brave hussars throwing themselves into the square – I forget the details. Then I read Sgt Wilson's account of the battle – he says the French square was hit by a rocket just before the hussars struck. Makes a difference! You have to be more than careful when you try to extrapolate a wargames rule from just one or two reported incidents.

I'm not sure how much basis in fact there is in pinning infantry in square to be then cleaned up by supporting infantry. I've just read an account of Bachelu's division attempting this at Waterloo. The squares were able to beat them off, and the infantry made no impression. Are there any historical examples of this favourite wargames tactics?

There's lots of evidence about bringing up the artillery though. But you have to remember that squares are very compact, and quite small targets. The guns must know where they are – and even then they might get lost in the smoke, etc.

I agree with Mike's assessment that the main benefit to the attacker was attritional – there is evidence of this at Waterloo. That can be quite hard in some wargames systems, where the fashion has been for "fast-play" bang-you-are-dead methods. But attrition was behind many tactics of the era.

But attrition was behind many tactics of the era.

Absolutely – It was Clausewitz who pronounced that battle was composed of multiple consecutive actions, each made up of two phases, the destructive and the decisive.

The destructive element could take hours to complete, the decisive mere seconds.

The destructive phase was the deliberate application of relentless pressure with smallarms fire, in the form of skirmish or close range volley action, and cannon fire, either in mass or close-up, or both.

The decisive phase followed the destructive in the form of shock action in an attempt to charge to contact, either with bayonet, sword or lance.

Providing the enemy had been sufficiently subjected to enough destruction, the outcome should generally favor the attacker, with the attacked breaking before contact. But get the timing wrong, and the attack could fail, with the attacker halting before contact.

This is the same whether it's infantry attacking infantry, or cavalry attacking infantry.

Ligniere:

Would you happen to know where Clausewitz says that in his works?

MaLaddie
It's in his 'Summary of the Instructions given by the Author to His Royal Highness the Crown Prince in the Years 1810, 1811 and 1812'. Specifically in the chapter 'Guide to tactics, or theory of the combat', articles J, K and L.

It starts:
J. The combat consists of two acts – the Destructive and the Decisive act.

Love that quote – it is the guiding principle of the rules that I am trying to develop.

The intriguing thing in this era is that the destructive element was about more than taking casualties – it was about fatigue, ammunition loss and the clogging of weapons. This was how cavalry attacks on squares might have an effect, even if they were unable to inflict many casualties. It also meant that poorly executed attritional tactics could be more destructive on the attacker than the defender – a subtlety of which I'm sure Clausewitz was well aware.

Cavalry was meant to be the weapon of decision, of course, rather than destruction in this sense – but it could have an attritional impact – at the cost of "expending" its own force.