"How RN have responded to a KM and/or RM CV in 1940-41" Topic

In researching other Axis carrier possibilities, I always had it in the back of my mind that all of the RN carriers with their well drilled air crews would have easily held either option above at bay before the US entered the war. After reading David Brown's book on Royal Navy carrier operations, now I am not so sure.

I realize the actual build schedules of the Graf Zepplin and the Italian projects left little or no possibility of operations before 1942-43 but lets assume someone saw the light and we had one German (Graf Zeppelin) and one Italian (early Ansalado proposal for the liner Roma).

Early in the war, FAA aircraft were quite inferior or at best on parity with anything the Axis carriers would carry. You would have air groups of BF-109s/JU-87s/Fi-167s or RE-2000/CR-42/ BA-65 (?) squaring off with what appear to be fairly small groups of Skuas, Swordfish, Sea Gladiators and if they are lucky Fulmars. It also appears that FAA air crews were not trained in torpedo tactics to a great degree before the war which led to a number of failed torpedo attacks. I believe it goes without saying that Skuas and Swordfish may not fare well against regular fighter opposition. For all the faults pointed out on the Fi-167 and JU-87, the two FAA aircraft I just mentioned were not exactly Firebrands and Spitfires.

So what say you all? I am interested in learning. What did the FAA or RN have in the pipeline that could have been brought to service early if they had to face a carrier threat? What would they have done differently?

Submarines.

Land Based Aircraft if the Germans operated in the North Sea.

Ok, but what? Blenheims? Besides the Skua strike on a docked cruiser in Norway, most British air attacks on German naval units were pretty ineffective at this stage of the war, even when unopposed by fighters.

I would assume that the RN would have shown a bit more urgency in updating aircraft if they had felt there was a chance of 2 German carriers. Later on, for example, there was a carrier version of the Spitfire.

The FAA did do pretty well against those same adversaries which were land based in the mediterranean, defending the Malta convoys and Fleet. They upgraded the fighters to include Martlets, but even Skuas accounted for a fair number of planes which outclassed them.

Just because the Germans and Italians had the ability to launch a carrier there is no evidence that they knew how to operate one. The build up to efficient carrier operations, including the training of aircrew, can take a very long time before all are combat capable The Italians may have had an easier time in the sheltered Med but the German would certainly have had problems in the North Sea and Baltic.

The time delay between launch and the beginning of operations would give the RN enough time to come up with a solution.

As some have already suggested land bombers would have been used as well as subs. In addition they would have had the time and the need ,to convert Spitfires and Hurricanes to carrier aircraft Another alternative would have been to acquire carrier aircraft (F4f ?) from the US. So when the Axis carriers went to sea they would have been confronted by the same aircraft that they faced overland.

It also appears that FAA air crews were not trained in torpedo tactics to a great degree before the war which led to a number of failed torpedo attacks.

I'd be curious to know where you got this from.

MH

I'm also at a bit of a loss as to what a few axis carriers would have accomplished. I've been involved of considerations of this elsewhere. I can conceive of ways in which they might have been reasonably strong commerce raiders, but they would have been hampered by logistics and that's a very very expensive target to risk for the gain of a few dozen merchant ships. In concert with surface and submarine raiders, I can see a carrier being quite fearsome, but I don't foresee a long career for a lone carrier in the Atlantic with the might of the world's largest fleet arrayed against it.

While the RN had lost it's carrier lead in 1940 to Japan, and ran neck and neck with the US in carriers and battleships, I believe it still retained supremacy in all other categories into 1941. And it was hardly out of the fight in big ships: the IJN advantage at the beginning of 1940 was one carrier or about 40,000 tons, depending on your preferred metric. (The IJN and US both held significant airwing advantages by then, due to RN aircraft handling practices, but that could have been easily remedied, as late war adoptions of USN methods proved.)

An Italian carrier might have lived longer, but I don't see it doing anything the RN can't counter. The largest possible effect might have been drawing resources away from the Indian and Pacific, but even in the complete absence of the RN I don't see the Japanese accomplishing terribly much more than they actually did. Geography and logistics would suffice to constrain them and I don't doubt that the RN would have risked even India (which Japan could in no event effectively threaten) to hold the middle east against the Axis.

The short version is this, the RN is, to my mind, sufficient to dominate both the Atlantic and the Med no matter what the European Axis do. There simply is no move the RN can't counter, given it's vastly superior geographic position and overwhelming material lead.

None of this stops me from contemplating what lovely models I might make of German or Italian carriers, if I ever had the time. (And what "what if" responses the US, UK, and Japan might build.) If one postulates a more robust prewar German naval program and a later start date . . . Germany still loses, but maybe it at least gets a little interesting first.

Do not forget that the British were acquiring US aircraft at this time period. The F4F (Martlet) was out and the SBD and TBD were in production and could be ordered. The RN might not have liked using foreign aircraft but the option was always there.

The bigest disadvantage the British cariers faced was there small air complement that they caried. The latest British carrier of the Ilustrious class had an air compliment of 37 aircraft until there hanger decks were extended. Yes, they had armored decks but that doesn't do much good when facing Japanese carriers with 60+ aircraft.

The Seafire could have been ready earlier – Churchill cancelled the first order in favour of more Fulmars for a variety of reasons. The Seafire was a decent, not great, carrier plane – while the Spitfire was a great land-based fighter, the Seafire had trouble with landing and a short range

As noted, the Brits would also have had access to US designs – the Fleet Air Arm had almost 100 Corsairs by war's end, and Canada's last Victoria Cross was awarded to Hampton Grey, flying a Corsair

"It also appears that FAA air crews were not trained in torpedo tactics to a great degree before the war which led to a number of failed torpedo attacks."

They were world class by 1940 though…..

Didn't RN swordfish cripple the Bismark and take out the Italians at Taranto in '41? Doesn't sound like any lack of training was an issue.

The comment on training was right from Brown's book. He cited several battles- two examples are the attack on Sharnhorst June 21, 1940 and the torpedo strike on The Dunkerque in the same month off Algeria. To quote the book after this last incident, "The lack of current practice in torpedo attack continued to plague the "Ark Royal's " TSR squadron and the FAA as a whole, for many months to come." Pg67. It appears that lack of funds prevented the level of torpedo training that other navies performed.

I am simply saying it may not be the slam dunk that many think of. After the loss of the Glorious and Courageous, the RN was hard pressed for a while to have one carrier available in each operational area. Ships need refits. Carriers were used to escort convoys and ferry planes. The RN carriers also seem woefully short of planes- the Victorious having 6 Fulmar and 9 Swordfish during the Bismark hunt and the Eagle having only 4 to 6 fighters July 1940 to March 1941. If you total up the fighter complements of ALL RN carriers in mid 1941, the number is under 60. These are spread over the Med, Atlantic, and the North Sea. Again, they are a mix of Sea Gladiators, Fulmars, Skuas and Martlets.

Could the Seafire have been brought on line earlier? They did not really see service until mid 1943 but it is possible. One must consider the demands for Spitfires for home defense in this period however.

The reason I focus on the fighters is the carnage that even half a dozen ME-109s or RE-2000 launched from an opposing carrier could potentially do to attacking Swordfish

As far as US supplied aircraft, the US Navy's squadrons in 1941 still included biplanes like the F3F and SBC. There were some Grumman Martlets going to the RN in 1940-41 but by no means a flood.

I suggest you read; Warships after Washington--John Jordan, chapter 7 gives a very interesting read concerning each nation's tactical and strategic use for their carriers.
All of them saw CV's in the advanced van of the main battlefleet operating as long range scouting units supplementing the scout cruisers (hence the perceived need for them to be armed with 6-8" guns should they run into the enemy scout cruisers).
In response to your main question above, Italy deemed a CV unnecessary as it would rely on land based aircraft both in Italy, North Africa and the Islands in the east and western Med to perform this scouting function for the battlefleet. However, it did have the Bonfiglietti design (40 aircraft) in place in 1927 and had either the 1928 or 1933 budget allowed, it could have been built by the mid-late '30's, thus allowing its aircrews the necessary training and operations prior to WW2.
IMO,had Italy had a CV or 2 in 1940, the RN wouldn't have done anything different concerning its plane types or operations. Elimination of the enemy CV would be considered necessary only as far as it prevented the enemy fleet from having close air support in the forms of air-search, gunnery spotters and defensive fighters. Which were the same missions the RN carriers had.

As side points concerning the use of carriers, it's interesting to note that the first purpose built carriers came into being about 1933-34 (Japan and the US) and all the earlier carriers were test beds in a sense and constantly modified. Had it not been for having hulls that otherwise would be scrapped per the Washington treaty, each nation's carrier development would have been even further behind than it was.
The UK were going to use its aircraft as fighters, scouts, battlefleet gunnery spotting and torpedo bombers to pick off cripples. Hence the use of fulmars and stringbags. It was interesting to note that when they realized they needed better fighter defense, the early seafires/seahurries did NOT have folding wings and had to remain topside, not being able to use the elevators to the hanger deck.
The US and Japan saw the need for larger aircraft complements due to the vastness of the pacific (relatively speaking over the atlantic/north sea) and because of this, the US allotted half of its divebombers as scouts. (divebombers were initially to be used as anti-carrier strike aircraft and the torpedo planes were to attack the enemy main battlefleet taking out the cripples for the most part. Another interesting note was that torpedo planes fell out of favor in the US in the early-mid 30's).

Germany wasnt allowed by treaty to build carriers. They weren't deemed necessary until the late '30's when it was in the process of rebuilding its navy and again the purpose was to provide protection for the battlefleet out beyond land based aircraft range. Originally Hitler told his military that there'd be no war before 1946, so they would have plenty of time to rebuild the fleet and train it.

The purpose of the single German and Italian CVs was to each support a surface TF of heavy ships with 1) dedicated fighter cover and 2) aircraft scouting. Air strike capability was very limited. And in this both Axis powers followed British doctrine, which did not propose powerful, independent CBGs until the Japanese proved the concept.

The reason I focus on the fighters is the carnage that even half a dozen ME-109s or RE-2000 launched from an opposing carrier could potentially do to attacking Swordfish

Yeah, that's about what Graf Zeppelin or Aquila could have launched. And that would have provided significant opposition to a typical FAA strike. But it would not have prevented a surface raiding TF, even one built around Bismark, Tirpitz, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, from being tracked down and killed by the overwhelming surface strength of the Royal Navy.

Also, there would have to be a new fuel source, or a radical re-purposing of the limited available fuel supplies, to allow heavy units of the DKM and the RIN to put to sea with their shiny new carriers.

….. Here is a micro-campaign scenario: Work on Tirpitz is suspended and Graf Zeppelin is completed early. She works up in the peaceful Baltic with Stukas and the new FW190A (really the German fighter best suited for carrier ops IMO). First mission is a raid upon Scapa, with GZ escorted by Bismarck, Prinz Eugen and supporting KM cast.

B

I will check out the Jordan book. The Bonfiglietti is one I was thinking of as well as it appeared to be a well balanced design. Positive experience early on could have expedited the early flush deck conversion proposed for the liner Roma, before the much more extensive one done to make her the Aquila.

The Fuel situation is another consideration. That could have been offset in the RM by leaving one of the old BBs home but that is a simplistic and short term solution.

The scenario on the Tirpitz is a good one. I would hope that the barbette guns on the Graf Zeppelin would have been eliminated for something more useful if she was finished.

All good stuff.
All good data. Thanks all!

The comment on training was right from Brown's book. He cited several battles- two examples are the attack on Sharnhorst June 21, 1940 and the torpedo strike on The Dunkerque in the same month off Algeria. To quote the book after this last incident, "The lack of current practice in torpedo attack continued to plague the "Ark Royal's " TSR squadron and the FAA as a whole, for many months to come." Pg67. It appears that lack of funds prevented the level of torpedo training that other navies performed.

I think the key word here is *current* practice. IMHO, this implies localized out-of-practice incidents, rather than a FAA-wide doctrinal / training under-emphasis, as implied by your first comment. I have books in my library which report similar incidents for other navies at different points in the war (for example, Morison, for the USN). Apparently, naval aviators required constant practice to maintain the maximum level of skill.

WRT overall RN doctrinal focus on torpedo planes, I recall that they planned a ship-based torpedo strike on the High Seas Fleet as early as 1918, and that a strike on Taranto had its origin in plans made in the late 1930s.

Mark

Really interesting thread, playing around with Axis carriers is always fun (I have the Axis & Allies 1/1850 ones to use with 1/600 a/c). My two ideas scenarios are covered above, a pre-emptive strike of Scapa Flow and air cover for the Bismarck, or others.

After my scenario ideas veer into later war what-ifs that are pretty much fantasy (what if Germany had two carriers etc.).

the first purpose built carriers came into being about 1933-34 (Japan and the US)

BuckeyeBob,
The first purpose-built aircraft carriers were the Japanese Hosho and the British Hermes (the first to use the now conventional island design). Hosho was commissioned at the end of 1922 and Hermes, although she'd been laid down in 1918, in 1924. Eagle, a converted battleship not Hermes' sister, was commissioned just a few days later. I believe that the first US purpose built carrier was Ranger commissioned, as you say, in 1934.

Frankly, the German carrier only makes sense as part of the German Z Plan and the resources, nor the necessity, did not exist one the shooting war had started.

Another doctrinal difference was the FAA's reluctance to use dive bombers – a practice the US and Japan had no problem with.

Yours aye,

22nd foote--you are correct. I confused purpose built CV's laid down after the washington treaty (Ranger and Ryujo) and overlooked those two "mini-CVs" laid down before it (Hermes and Hosho).

concerning Italy's CV, it would make a good scenario if there was some reason for the RM to breakout past Gibraltar into the Atlantic. (Assume Gibraltar was taken by the Axis, neutralized somehow, or just that a KM force needed assistance and the RM was ordered to force the strait with a small fleet to assist).

…if there was some reason for the RM to breakout past Gibraltar into the Atlantic.

Panama 1941. The RN loses touch for a few days with a DKM TF of battleships escorting GZ that vanishes in the South Atlantic. Making the most of that distraction, Bearn and her escorts quietly put to sea from Martinique with a load of re-conditioned Buffalo fighters and Helldiver biplanes. Hawk 75 fighters from Martinique transfer to the Secret Luftwaffe Base in Venezuela where teams of German 'tourists' have been assembling a bomber force from the converted airliners of several sympathetic South American airlines; Ju 86s, Do 17s and He 111s.

Suddenly and without previous warning, these forces converge into a dastardly, multi-wave surprise assault on the Panama Canal and on US bases in the Canal Zone! Outnumbered and obsolete USAAC fighters scramble to defend; P-36s, P-26s (!), a few P-40Bs. B-10s and B-18s sortie against the Axis TFs and airbases. Colorful mayhem ensues as the Swastika rises in Central America!

Why not add the RM into the mix with Aquila? Most US carriers are in the Pacific with the main battle line, of course, but Ranger might be available in the Atlantic to mount a counter-strike.

This one has some promise:)

I don't see what a German or Italian aircraft carrier could do that land base aircraft couldn't do as well. A carrier needs to be part of a battle group to do any good.

With the German habit of sending one or two of its capital ships at a time into the Atlantic only to see them destroyed, a carrier would not last long by itself or with a small escort.

Although it would have been interesting to have an alternative scenario where a German carrier would be part of a "Operation Rheinübung". Prinz Eugen, Bismarck and a German Aircraft Carrier.

To be honest, the nest hope for a worthwhile German Naval Battle group with a carrier is in the Summer of 41.

with the British declaration of war in 1939, Plan Z is in tatters. Work on the Tirpitz is suspended in 1939 and the KM concentrate on building a single powerful battlegroup.

Once the Norwegian campaign is over the existing ships are husbanded and not sent out in penny packets, and by the summer of 1941 Bismark, Scharnhorst, Gniesenau and Graf Zeppelin plus several cruisers are all operational and set sail as a combined fleet.

The Admiralty would have a blue fit and it would make a fascinating mini campaign.

One thing that has been overlooked is the lack of suitable aircraft for a German (or indeed Italian) carrier.

The requirements for example of a Naval Dive Bomber are very different to that of a land based one. The Skua for example was very much a specialised Naval aircraft and despite the best attempts of the RAF to scupper the design did fairly well.

Naval aircraft need to be sturdier for the deck landings, have a much longer range. The Skua was about 550 miles and could strike from Scotland to Norway, whereas the Stuka was limited to 300 odd miles. In fact the Skua was criticised for its limited range.

As for torpedo bombers, the British, Japanese and Americans had fine single engined torpedo bomber. To my limited knowledge the Germans only had twin engined torpedo bombers, which are not renowned as carrier aircraft.

Of course there is no reason to say that the Germans would not be able to produce the appropriate aircraft but they did not have the experience to do so. Also I could see a German fleet air arm being severely interfered with by Goering much as the RAF messed about with the fleet air arm aircraft before the RN took direct control in 1939. I have recently read Skua: The Royal Navy's Dive-Bomber(on Kindle only 99p link )which is horrifying in the utterly ill informed interference by the RAF.

The 109T and the Stuka would have had well developed naval versions by '41 if they had been continued with, and there was a TB in development as well – The Fi-167

link

If they had set sail in the summer / late '41 – before the US joined the war – they would have been quite a threat.

The Skua for example was very much a specialised Naval aircraft and despite the best attempts of the RAF to scupper the design did fairly well.

"The Skua is a bird that folds it's wings and dives into the ocean."

The Skua and the Fulmar, and the remarkably small numbers of fighters present on RN carriers, reflect not only the shortages of available aircraft types, but also doctrine and priorities.

In the event of air attack, RN carriers were expected to strike all on-deck aircraft below into the hangar, to fight the attackers off with AA fire. That was the whole purpose of the armored deck. Air ops were seen as a lethal hazard once the fighting started -- the avgas lines were purged and re-filled with inert contents the moment an inbound attack was spotted.

The purpose of fighters (and the Skua was seen as both a dive-bomber and a fighter) was to chase away pesky scouting aircraft, more than to defend against attacking aircraft.

Panama 1941. The RN loses touch for a few days with a DKM TF of battleships escorting GZ that vanishes in the South Atlantic.

A little backwards there … actually, it would have been the GZ that was escorting the battleships.

This is the issue that is seems to be so hard to see when we look through the lenses of hindsight. Aircraft carriers were SCOUT assets (which might also be used for raiding, as any good recon asset might). They were not HEAVY COMBAT assets.

That's the way EVERY navy that even thought about aircraft carriers approached them in the inter-war and early war period.

Ever wonder why the USN came to designate carriers CV? C = cruiser. L = light, A = armored, and V = aviation. Aircraft carriers were cruisers with planes.

The purpose of the carrier was to FIND and FIX the enemy's heavy fleet units, so that the battleships, the boats operated by real men, with real guns and real armor, could close in and sink them.

That's exactly how the RN went after the Bismark in 1941.

Even with all the experience that (only!) the USN and IJN had in carrier fleet operations, as late as June of 1942 that was the plan that the IJN came up with for their Midway operation. And in November/December of 1942 it was still in the backs of everyone's minds during the naval battles of Guadalcanal. Hey, it was even STILL the IJN's primary plan at Leyte Gulf in 1944!

Yes today we can see that the carriers were in fact the primary fleet combat assets. But no gold-star-and-braid wearing naval officers saw that before maybe (maaaaayyybbbeeee) mid-1942.

Making the most of that distraction, Bearn and her escorts quietly put to sea from Martinique with a load of re-conditioned Buffalo fighters and Helldiver biplanes.

Well, not to push too far off track, but … um … why would a French naval unit want to throw in with the Germans?

Vichy France was doing everything it could manage to stay neutral, in spite of the fact that the RN kept attacking it at every turn. The neutrality and independence of Vichy's fleet assets was one of the two primary issues keeping German troops OUT of Vichy France. If the French fleet had allowed itself to fall into German hands, the home government could have expected panzers in the streets within days.

To be honest, the nest hope for a worthwhile German Naval Battle group with a carrier is in the Summer of 41.

…

Once the Norwegian campaign is over the existing ships are husbanded and not sent out in penny packets, and by the summer of 1941 Bismark, Scharnhorst, Gniesenau and Graf Zeppelin plus several cruisers are all operational and set sail as a combined fleet.

If GZ had been completed (and the KM somehow magically found 8 or 10 years to develop and train up on carrier deck ops) then this is probably the most interesting and feasible what-if.

Particularly if the KM hadn't lost so much of it's cruiser strength in the Norwegian campaign (hey, it's an a-historical what-if anyway, so why not add one more what-if?).

Bismark, the twins, and one or two of the heavy cruisers … maybe even with one or two of the Panzerschiffes as well, with GZ to provide scouting and some measure of air cover … it would have been a reasonably dangerous fleet.

The RN would have stopped all convoy ops and concentrated it's fleet. Probably into more than one TF, but still …

Of course the problem with such a large KM fleet is that it would have been easier to find and fix. And then it would have faced attacks by 3x-4x it's strength in RN battleships, battlecruisers, cruisers, and carriers.

Glub glub.

But it would have been a glorious battle, to be sure.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Well I think that calling carriers scout assets until 1942 is a little conservative. After all the RN strike at Taranto was in November 1940, accepted that it was only using one carrier but it was the pioneering operation that led the way.
As early as July 1931 the RN was operating carriers in groups o two or three in exercises at the urging of rear admiral Aircraft R.G.H.Henderson to combat Japanese carriers and Tactical School Planning intended to send 4 carriers to the Far East.

The SKUA was technically a Fighter Dive Bomber with the dual role of air defence and Dive bombing (in fact the first Axis aircraft shot down by a British aircraft in WWII was by a Skua) but it was not great at either role. Whereas the Swordfish was a Torpedo Spotter Reconnaissance role, again the RN trying to cram too many roles into one plane and ending up with aircraft only decidedly average in each role.

I would dispute that Vichy France was trying to stay out of the war. An interesting book is Colin Smith 'England's Last War With France'. Especially after Mers El Kebir and the attack on Richelieu at Dakar the French Navy was furious with the British. After France surrendered, Darlan was convinced Britain would seek terms or be conquered within 5 weeks.

After De Gaulle managed to recruit less than a third of the French troops in Britain to fight on, in Vichy Colonel Rene Fonck an Ace with 75 kills in WWI recruited 200 aircrew to join the Luftwaffe in flying against Britain, but Foncks offer was declined.

It is easy with hindsight to assume that France was desperate to fight back against the Germans, but in reality at the time Britain was seen as finished and French Politicians saw the best way to regain all of France was to end the war and in their view the stupid British were fighting on against all logic and making all of Europe suffer. Under the circumstances I can easily see the French fleet taking on Britain.Even French vessels that fled to Britain were seized by perfidious Albion, the submarine Surcouf being a prime example. The acrimony between the British and French caused by these actions escalated when the British attempted to repatriate the captured French sailors: the British hospital ship that was carrying them back to France was sunk by the Germans, and many of the French blamed the British for the deaths.

Well the Japanese certainly didn't consider them "scout assets." To the Japanese, scouting is what submarines were for.

The SKUA was technically a Fighter Dive Bomber with the dual role of air defence and Dive bombing (in fact the first Axis aircraft shot down by a British aircraft in WWII was by a Skua) but it was not great at either role.

It was not well regarded by the FAA, nor by the aircrews that operated it. Yet, like the Swordfish, it managed to attain an impressive record (given the paultry numbers in which it was operated).

Both are planes that were not well regarded in their time, even though a review of their records shows very productive results. In this they are rather like the US Bell Airacobra (it had the lowest loss-per-sortie ratio of any US fighter in the North African campaign) and the Brewster Buffalo (it had a better kill-loss ratio than the much-vaunted Corsair -- just not with US pilots!).

I would dispute that Vichy France was trying to stay out of the war. … Especially after Mers El Kebir and the attack on Richelieu at Dakar the French Navy was furious with the British.

Yes, well, given that they were trying to withdraw from the war, the fact that their "ally" repeatedly attacked them did cause some hard feelings…

After France surrendered, Darlan was convinced Britain would seek terms or be conquered within 5 weeks.

Perhaps it seems like nit-picking to some, but France didn't surrender. The French negotiated an armistice, which allowed the constitutionally-formed government to continue to govern a reduced national territory (and foreign colonies) SO LONG as the French accepted a drastically reduced home army, their fleet remained in French hands, and they continued to defend their territories against ALL incursions. This allowed Germany to get on with their war without concern of a French threat. But it did not mean France surrendered nor became a German ally.

As to Darlan, he was indeed a right-winger, and found much to admire in the way the Nazi's operated. So also Laval and Petain were right-wingers. Of the three, Laval was the real heart of collaborationist sentiments. Darlan and Petain were much more French nationalists.

But that doesn't mean France wasn't trying to stay out of the fight. If you have evidence to the contrary I'd love to learn more. How many attacks did the French navy sorti against British targets? How many times did French submarines attack British convoys? When did French commandos land in the UK or British colonies?

Or is the case only that when the British fired at them, they shot back? That does not actually make them Nazi allies, it only makes them reasonable.

…in Vichy Colonel Rene Fonck an Ace with 75 kills in WWI recruited 200 aircrew to join the Luftwaffe in flying against Britain, but Foncks offer was declined.

Not quite the real story, there.

Yes, Fonck had a relationship with Goering and Galland. Many WW1 pilots came to know each other in the inter-war period. Just as WW2 adversaries came to know each other in the post-war era. Petain tried to use that relationship to get a meeting with Hitler. So some public statements were made. But in the end Fonck tried to convince Petain not to attend (he did, anyway), and after the Germans overran Vichy France in November of 1942 he (Fonck) was arrested by the Gestapo and interred in a concentration camp for the rest of the war.

In post-war investigations Fonck was cleared of all charges of collaboration when his ongoing ties to active resistance leaders became public.

Yes, French politics were complicated and nuanced in 1941/42. Doesn't mean that the Vichy regime was a German ally. It wasn't.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

My 'Swastika Uber Mittel-Amerika' scenario is admittedly a very far fetch. Did you read the part about the secret Luftwaffe base in Venezuela? You may as well throw Bearn and her planes into the scrum, not to mention Blackhawk, Sky Captain and a beautiful but deadly Axis spy named Sally von Shtup. It's pretty much pulp fiction.

However. Harrumph, harrumph. One of the flaws of German grand strategy in WWII arguably is that they did not do enough to mobilize and support allies. Another is that they over-looked opportunities to win the war by closing the Mediterranean and grabbing the Persian Gulf oil. I'll just say that whenever I sit on Dolfie's throne and direct my minions and legions in a hot game of Axis and Allies or the like, I do my best to bring in the Spanish, bring in Vichy, bring in the Turks, take Gibraltar, take Egypt, link up with the Big Arab Rebellion and blitz straight through to Iran.

And Fraulein von Shtup is often vun uff my mozt effective veapons…henh, henh, henh.

Agreed it was Laval that announced Fonck would assist the Luftwaffe, so there may have been some spin there. Although as mentioned no right thinking person thought Britain could or would fight on. Surprisingly, the Mers El Kebir attack which could have rebounded badly, convinced the Americans (and Spanish who grudgingly recalled in the terms of the Armada 'the actions of the English Pirates' ) that Britain wasn't finished yet.

Admittedly the French had many competing factions and did not take the final steps to do more than defend themselves. Yet they were capable of defence, it is often forgotten that the British Empire took more casualties taking Syria from the French than in losing Crete. The actions of the French airforce and Navy in Syria was very effective. However the French did play by the rules, after the surrender of Syria they agreed to hand back British/Australian prisoners but some ended up getting shipped back to France via Trains through Austria. But those lucky men were returned by Vichy, much to their surprise having traveled through the Reich!

It would not be unreasonable to use French ships and aircraft in a 'what if' scenario against the RN. Especially if you play that Hitler decides to finish off the Mediterranean rather than go into Russia in 1941. A concentrated effort could have pushed Britain out of Egypt and opened up the Middle East with the Germans granting the French Palestine and Iraq as a reward.

In fact I would be interested to know what naval assets the Spanish might have contributed to an Italian/German/French Mediterranean fleet for a 'what if' campaign.

VERY doubtful that the French would have cooperated in any way with the Germans. Its one thing to defend the remaining French territories; its quite another for them to take offensive operations in conjunction with the Italians (who they loathe) and the Germans (who they also loathe). It would take a long stretch to see that. As for Bearn doing anything useful; her aircraft weren't in any shape to do anything and were outdated. And, as aircraft carriers go, Bearn was not particularly successful (way too slow and far too few aircraft).

The Vichy government in Syria did in fact allow German warplanes to use Syrian airbases to transfer to Iraq, to support Rashid Ali's Golden Square rebellion. There are reports that Vichy Syria also shipped at least one trainload of munitions to the Arabs. Vichy might well have done more if the Germans had acted faster and more decisively, and/or if the Arabs had managed to keep their war going longer.

Counter factuals like this only work if the deviation from history is kept to the minimum, and the Bearn is actually a great deal more probable than the Aquila.

Assuming the war follows the historical course for the first year, the Bearn is in Martinique with a pro-Vichy crew loaded with aircraft she was supposed to deliver to France.

In our counter-factual world, Vichy France is more active, and the fighters the Bearn offloads are used to enforce an 'Active Neutrality' zone around the island. The USN backs off a little and despite the risk the RN reduces the Carribean squadron to reinforce the Home Fleet. Then she might be able to get a couple of squadrons of Helldivers operational by the Summer of '41.

It is possible she could have sortied with her cruiser escort at the same time as the GZ. It makes an interesting strategic scenario, but stoodging around at a max of 20 knots might make her very vulnerable.

Vichy Martinique was lucky that it didn't have happen to it what happened to Lebanon and Syria. And if it had become apparent that Bearn was prepping for any kind of action, the USN Atlantic Fleet would have had something to say about that (in very strong terms). And they would have ended up with an amphib landing to take care of the issue once and for all.

As for the Vichy government allowing German transfers to Syria. Syria was still under the French Mandate and such action would have been interpreted as defending French interests. Semantics, yes. But that's what international hinges on. Now if the Germans launched air attacks from Syria into British Mandated areas, that would be a different issue altogether.

And one more thing: The Buffs that Bearn was transporting were not carrier capable; they lacked the necessary equipment.

Vichy assistance to the Arab Rebels was the reason that British Imperial forces took out Lebanon and Syria just as soon as the Golden Square had been put down. My own opinion is that Rashid Ali posed a very grave threat to the British war effort. What would Churchill have done if the Arabs had taken Habbaniya and the oil fields, if the Italian battle fleet had brought a strong convoy of reinforcements to the Levant, if strong Luftwaffe formations based in Iraq had closed the Persian Gulf? Thrown in more Indians, I suppose, but they were starting to run out of sepoys.

And the French had six months to fit arrestor hooks on those Buffalos in Martinique. Cheese whiz, there was barely a flight of them, why bicker over a few obsolete fighters?

Okay, it didn't happen in our time line, maybe it could never have happened. If you want to play with Axis carriers in the Atlantic, you're going to have to bend reality somehow. Und I tink you vill find dat Fraulein von Schtup can be mozt perzuazive.