"Sickles Salient" Topic

The point is, the battle DIDN'T end on July 2nd,…

Well, in talking about Sickles move and it's impact on the battle--up to the end of July 2nd--, it is the point.

and the Union Army was still occupying every bit of the line that Meade had designed for it that morning.>

Actually, they didn't still occupy every bit. They had to 're-establish' a new line, occupying terrain both further back at some points and much further south to the left flank because of Longstreet's attack.

Lee certainly made some serious mistakes, some from dealing with a new army organization with new men in position, others made because of his own command failures. Never-the-less, The adage to never interrupt the enemy when they are making a mistake certainly applies to the Confederate response to Sickle's move.

Taking a look at The Maps of Gettysburg it appears that had Sickles stayed put he still might have been hit in the flank if not for Vincent. Hood is shown as facing an ENE direction with a portion of McLaws facing the same direction with about a quarter of his troops facing due East on the left end of his line. If these maps are correct it is unlikely that Lee's attack, while planned to move along the Emmittsburg road, was ignored by Longstreet who sent at least two brigades into the Devil's Den, Little and Big Roundtop area. Longstreet may have ignored Lee's plan because he was sure that he could sweep around Meade's line on that flank. Longsteet's actual movement conformed more to his idea than Lee's.

The problem I have with most Gettysburg debates, especially the "what if" variety, is that they rely on information provided after the battle or even the war was decided.

Lee did not know how far south the Federal line extended, and his plan was apparently assumed a shorter line farther forward (to the west) than the actual Federal deployment. Even so I think Longstreet was far to good of a commander not to have adjusted the plan (as far as he felt he could get away with) to deal with Federal threats to his flank. Once the fighting started he would almost certainly made whatever adjustments he felt were necessary to deal with threats as they developed.

So in the hypothetical I think you need to not only say where Sickles was deployed, but what Longstreet knew about that deployment.

If these maps are correct it is unlikely that Lee's attack, while planned to move along the Emmittsburg road, was ignored by Longstreet who sent at least two brigades into the Devil's Den, Little and Big Roundtop area.

Actually, that isn't it. The maps show what happened--partly. Hood moved too far towards the round tops. As a consequence, Kershaw and Robertson were stretched apart trying to hold on the the two flanks they were ordered to. Semmes' and Anderson's brigades in support of Benning and Law came out of the woods too far to the west, not behind the front line of Hood's Division, but behind Kershaw and Robertson. Semmes ended up supporting them along with parts of Anderson's brigade.

The map shows the postions taken by Hood and McLaws AFTER they discovered Sickles deployed on the high ground where they had been intended to deploy themselves. Had Sickles not advanced, they would have deployed on the ground around the Peach Orchard and advanced up the Emmitsburg Road. (Unless Longstreet could have convinced Lee to alter his plan because there were Federals on his flank -- if he could see them.)

I am with TKindred, why Sickles was given low ground to defend, not good, If the CSA had gotten artillery at Peach orchard then he would have been shot to pieces for little gain, the claim that Gen Meade did not know is wrong he did know but the message confirming the move went awry.
As my US is based on III corps I am convinced he was right to do what he did.
The biggest mistake though was Lee's and Longstreet's, Pendleton, Oates, Law and Hood all wanted to swing around the Round Top, but due to time and worry the attack went ahead as planned by Lee (mistook the US Skirmish line for main line).
So yes I believe Sickles did right and may have even saved the army because of this advance, the South Carolian's suffered greatly because of this and the gun lines new positions.
Who would not want the Round tops, the Devils Den and the Stony Hill as part of their defence line?

> Elcarto: I was referring to a statement in the Pfanz book on bottom of page 63 and top of page 64 where he stated the 2nd Corps line started at the Cemetery. I remember it confused me at the time, (twenty + years ago), and after rereading it again last night I remain confused. It seemed to imply, to me any way, that at some point the Right of the 2nd Corps line faced North across the above mentioned terrain. This could all be my misinterpretation of what Pfanz intended. I do not believe there is a map showing this. Thanks, John Miller

John, I just read the same passage, and can't understand how you got that 'implication.'

" The new Second Corps front on Cemetery Ridge extended from Cemetery Hill, where it is crossed by the Taneytown Road, south through Zeigler's Grove, by the Copse of Trees, and south along the ridge crest toward the George weikert House…."

That sounds to me like a perfectly accurate description of Hancock's line, starting at that spot on Cemetery hill (where the Ttown road crested the ridge) and going south. to about where the Statue of Father Whatshisname is now.

Mr. Bhgboogie – your phrasing is a little bit disjointed, but I'll do my best to answer you….

> I am with TKindred, why Sickles was given low ground to defend, not good, If the CSA had gotten artillery at Peach orchard then he would have been shot to pieces for little gain,

Okay, Sickles was NOT given 'low ground' to defend; he just had his troops camped in low ground the night before. Sickles' ORDERED line was far more defensible than you seem to think. It was anchored on its left on Little Round Top (you know, where Geary had been the evening before, whose position Sickles had been ordered to take over…), has a great arty position on high ground at Munshower's Hill, follows the high ground around Weichert's Knob and then ends on the high platform picked later that day by McGilvery for his gun line, which dominates anyone approaching through the Trostle Thicket.

> …the claim that Gen Meade did not know is wrong he did know but the message confirming the move went awry.

Meade definitely did NOT 'know' that Sickles was actually going to be moving forward, and certainly didn't send any message 'confirming' that move that somehow 'went awry. You're just making things up now, sir.

> As my US is based on III corps I am convinced he was right to do what he did.

It would help if you would define what your 'US' is, but perhaps you need to do a bit of wider research beyond the III Corps if you seriously believe that Sickles' move had any merit or 'rightness' to it.

> The biggest mistake though was Lee's and Longstreet's, Pendleton, Oates, Law and Hood all wanted to swing around the Round Top, but due to time and worry the attack went ahead as planned by Lee (mistook the US Skirmish line for main line).

Off into fantasyland a bit here. I'll admit that both Longstreet and Hood sincerely wanted to move 'around the right (Longstreet operationally, and Hood tactically), but they weren't calling the shots, and Longstreet had already failed to convince Lee that his original plan needed/had to change. Hence Longstreet three times refusing to allow Hood to try such a thing. Even so, Hood made a major alteration just by going in in the direction that he did.

> So yes I believe Sickles did right and may have even saved the army because of this advance, the South Carolian's suffered greatly because of this and the gun lines new positions.

You haven't said anything to convince me or anyone else to date. Sickles 'saving the AOP' by his advance is the oldest lie of the battle, and one that our Man spent the rest of his life promoting. In reality, his insubordination destroyed Meade's very solid defensive plan, causing many more Union casualties than needed to happen otherwise, and leaving the whole army hopelessly splintered and with its sub-commands mixed, making any offensive action by Meade impossible.

> Who would not want the Round tops, the Devils Den and the Stony Hill as part of their defence line?

Absolutely agree with Little Round Top (BRT is useless as it's completely wooded and has no LOS to anything!!) But there's no reason on Earth to want to occupy Devil's Den and the Stony Hill if you already hold the far stronger position to their east, which is nicely tied into the rest of the Army's solid defensive line………

Totally agree with Elcarto. Hood and/or Longstreet did alter their attack from what Lee had ordered, after seeing Sickles' position, whether they admitted it or not. They pretty much had to, otherwise they would have exposed their right flank to Birney's division, which was not in a line facing southwest but in 3 successive brigade lines facing west and echeloned to the SE.

I just ran across what Horace Porter (of Longstreet's artillery) had to say (Military Memoirs of a Confederate pp. 392-4). He calls Sickles' advance "unwise," and says, "He probably had in mind the advantage given the Confederates at Chancellorsville in allowing them the occupation of the Hazel Grove plateau. But it was, nevertheless, bad tactics. It exchanged strong ground for weak, and gave the Confederates an opportunity not otherwise possible. They would be quite sure to crush the isolated 3d corps. If their attack was properly organized and conducted, it might become possible to rush and carry the Federal main line in the pursuit of the fugitives."

He adds that "There was not during the war a finer example of efficient command than that displayed by Meade on this occasion. He immediately began to bring to the scene reinforcements, both of infantry and artillery, from every corps and from every part of his line. … On the other hand, it must be said that the management of the battle on the Confederate side during this afternoon was conspicuously bad. The fighting was superb. But there appears to have been little supervision, and there was entire failure everywhere to conform to the original plan of the battle, as it had been indicated by Lee. Offensive battles are always more difficult of control than defensive, and there were two special difficulties on this occasion. First, was the great extent of the Confederate lines, about five miles -- and their awkward shape, making inter-communication slow and difficult. Second, was the type or character of the attack ordered: which may be called the echelon, or progressive type, as distinguished from the simultaneous. The latter should be the type for any battle in the afternoon. Battles begun by one command and to be taken up successively by others, are always much prolonged. We had used this method on four occasions, -- at Seven Pines, Gaines Mill, Frazier's Farm or Glendale, and Malvern Hill, -- and always with poor success. Our effort this afternoon will be seen to be a monumental failure. General instructions were given to each corps commander, but much was left to their discretion in carrying them out. More than one fell short in performance."

Lee would have won if he had more troops.

Lots of battles can make that claim. napoleon at waterloo the texans at the Alamo, many many others.

Lee had enough troops, had he managed to exert the 'control' needed for the 'concerted effort' he later bemoaned not happening. That echeloned attack fell apart literally in front of him (Posey and Mahone), but neither he nor AP Hill, who was right there with him, did a damn thing to keep things moving.

Sickles' move forward presented Lee with an incredible opportunity that he wouldn't have otherwise had (like the unplanned arrival of Ewell on the Union flank the day before), and it was a failure of the Reb command structure that it didn't turn into a total disaster for the AoP. Meade and Hancock deserve every bit of praise for the way they handled the rolling crisis, Meade sending troops forward and Hancock telling/showing them where to go. Gettysburg may well be the worst command performance by the ANV of the war – all the problems had been there all along, but were usually covered up by the even worse things going on in the AoP. AT Gettysburg, the Union command structure really came into its own, with the right men in the right positions for once.

All through that long afternoon and evening, you see constant examples of officers at every level, from Vincent up to Hancock and Warren, seeing what had to be done and doing it, NOW! Nothing like that on the Reb side of the field – from the wounding of Hood onward, the whole thing slowly 'went south' and finally came off the rails with Mahone's refusal to move forward. Pender was actually riding across to see what the holdup was when he caught his shell fragment,

Don – I'm not familiar with a Horace Porter; could that possibly be Porter Alexander? He as an Arty Battalion commander in I Corps, given control of the July 3 bombardment over the head of the actual I Corps Divisional Arty Commander. His memoir is probably the best, most detailed and least biased account of things on the Confederate side; he's not afraid to hurt anyone's feelings and points the finger of blame where it's deserved.

Shameless shill – I'm working with Hermann Luttmann on a game called 'Hammerin' Sickles!' (GMT games), which covers Longstreet's July 2nd attack in regimental/battery scale with 150 yard hexes. I only mention that because the rules actually work well with minis, and at least one playtester wants to blow up the map and replace the counters with stands.

Herm also designed a game called 'Gettysburg: The Wheatfield' (Victory Point Games) which uses multi-counter regiments and a hexless map at a scale of 50 yds per inch. Another game that plays equally well with minis, and we're working on expanding it to cover all of Hood's/McLaw's attacks that afternoon.

Oops, my bad; yes, I meant Porter Alexander! Sorry 'bout that! (Horace Porter was a Union staff officer who wrote Campaigning with Grant.)

As for the echelon attack, it seems, at this remove, that all it needed was for Lee to ride north just behind his lines and send each brigade forward as its time came. His hands-off style cost him the battle.

Meade and Hancock deserve every bit of praise for the way they handled the rolling crisis, Meade sending troops forward and Hancock telling/showing them where to go

No question, although I would lean toward Hancock as he was up at the pointed end of the stick.

However, my personal awards would go to Hunt, McGilvery and their subordinates. Without the flexibility and determination of the Union Artillery that afternoon the Infantry formations would never have had time to fix what Sickles had broken!

Elcarto: First, thanks for getting back to me. I see your point. In re reading the passage, (several times), I now see my error. I was thinking of something not intended by the writer, that orignally the 2nd Corps occupied an L shaped line from the West side of the Cemetery through Ziegler's Grove and then an abrupt Rt. turn to the South. Once again, thanks for clearing this up for me. John Miller

Another recommendation for Porter's 'Military Memoirs of a Confederate'. Possibly one of the most balance memoirs of the period and a definite 'must have' in any ACW library.

"General instructions were given to each corps commander, but much was left to their discretion in carrying them out. More than one fell short in performance."

And that is the story of how Lee failed at Gettysburg and the other battles Porter mentions and an overall critique of him as a commander!

Well, Lee ed off Longstreet earlier by directly giving McLaws directions on how he wanted him to line up, so skirting the chain of command and ordering individual brigades wasn't likely to happen. Still, if this was the one big attack that was supposed to win the battle, I'd say that Lee should have spent the afternoon and evening right beside Longstreet, making sure that things were happening.

Jackson took the micromanaging to the other extreme, and that didn't always work out all that well either. Nothing wrong with allowing your subordinates wide latitude in HOW to work out your instructions, as long as there's good enough communication so that all are on the same page. Not once in three days did Lee sit down with all three of his Corps Commanders…….. so later 'regretting' a 'lack of concerted action' rings a bit hollow.

I'd agree that Hunt was the right man in the right place through the whole battle. Hooker divied out all his guns and left him jobless at Chancellorsville, but at least that idiot was man enough to admit his mistake and reconstitute the Arty Reserve afterwards. At the eleventh hour Meade got handed an Army that at last had very competent men at a number of key positions (Buford, Reynolds, Hunt, Warren, Hancock…) and knew to allow them to do what they did best.

Lee would have won if he had more troops.

Guys that was a joke. You know sarcasm? Every commander in history could have won if he only had more troops. Good Grief!

Well, sarcasm and humor often don't travel well in the Internet, especially without an emoticon to show your tongue in cheek! ;-)

I'm not sure that Little Mac could have EVER had 'enough troops' to win a battle – his paranoid mind would just conjust up more rebs to face him.

Jackson and lee's command relationship may have coloured lee's relationships with his other corps commanders? to Jackson a suggestion from lee would have been sufficient to spur Jackson into action. other corps commanders (notably a.p hill and ewell) required a firmer guiding hand than lee was used to giving.

when sufficiently motivated (at Chickamauga) longstreet was capable of organising a devastating assault …

Jackson and lee's command relationship may have coloured lee's relationships with his other corps commanders?

To a certain extent they did but Jackson was no 'plaster saint' either. He royally screwed things up on more than one occasion in the Peninsular Campaign of '62.

Elcarto: I would like to disagree with you. Hooker was probably a lot of things but I don't believe he was an idiot. During his time as Commander of the AOP he made some meaningfull changes, some of them long overdue, in my opinion. Before he was relieved, during the Gettysburg campaign, I believe it is generally conceded that he handled the Army pretty well. At lower levels of command he usually performed creditably. This is not meaning to excuse his mistakes, but I think he is a better General than he is usually given credit for, Chancellorsville not withstanding. Thanks, John Miller

Trajanus …most definitely, Jackson was no all-conquering god of war for all his undoubted talent. for Lee though I think the second manassas campaign made for an awful lot of what had happened on the peninsula

John, perhaps 'idiot' was the wrong term. Hooker was a very good (if untrustworthy and ambitious) Division and Corps commander, when he DIDN'T have the ultimate responsibility for making the BIG decisions. To me Lee's genius cam in his ability to 'read' his opponents, and he 'read' both McClellan and Hooker as men who would fold if enough pressure was put against them – that's the only possible explanation for Lee remaining to fight at Antietam, for example.

Ironically, it was those two – McClellan and Hooker, who were responsible for creating and honing the AoP into the war-winning Army that it was; that withstood all the mishandling they both put it through on the various battlefields. Meade, only in top command for three days, was able to do what he did at Gettysburg largely because of the Army and staff that Hooker had left him.

Lee had it right when he famously said of Meade, upon hearing he was now in command, 'He will make no mistake in my front, and will hasten to take advantage of any I make in his.' Sickles' blunder took away any real possibility of any offensive action Meade might have been thinking of for the next day or so, but Meade was conveniently left on July 3rd to obeying one of Napoleon's Maxims… 'Never interrupt your enemy when he's making a mistake!" Meade was confident that Lee would continue to attack, and that his own Army was capable of turning that attack back. No brainer there…..

Lee's 'hands off' command style is close to today's 'Mission Oriented' model, but it only works with subordinates who are all on the same page and know exactly what they SHOULD do under the circumstances. (That's exactly what the German staff training was all about from the 1870's onward, and led to their armies' abilities and resiliency through two world wars, and was partially copied by our own military.)

Trouble is, it only really worked with Jackson, and even then only on occasion. I have a real love/hate view of 'ol Jack (I'm currently reading Robertson's massive biography.) Jackson was indeed an operational genius, but he was also a paranoid control freak, who set the record for constantly having his own subordinates under charges for NOT understanding/obeying his orders, when he refused to ever explain the overall plan to them, This cost him the full exploitation of a number of his victories, and almost caused a total disaster on others – Kernstown in particular, in a situation that he almost repeated at Cedar Mountain (his last battle in 'independent' command), had Pope actually had his own Army together – something that Jackson had no knowledge of at the time.

Second Manassas is indeed the ANV showing its best, but against an opponent willing to play out the scripted part they may as well have sent him. Something that Hooker repeated at Chancellorsville. I don't think that Grant would have offered them either of those chances, and even Meade, who was more cautions, still never really gave Lee the opening he ever needed to turn things around.

Elcarto: Thanks for getting back to me about Hooker. I think you opinion of him as an army commander is probably about right. I had not thought of him in quite those terms but it sounds reasonable to me. Lee is my favorite American General, (though my heart is on the other side), however I can't comprehend why he gave his subordinates as much latitude as he did. I understand and would apptreciate the "hands off" leadership style if I was one of his corps commanders but he seems to have taken it to extremes in some cases. I don't believe he always got the cooperation that he expected he would. Thanks, John Miller

Well, Lee was a 'Virginia Gentleman', and such tight command control was just not in him; he spent his entire life trying to live up to the ideal of his personal hero, George Washington (who probably would have been a sterner commander….) Lee could not more act like Jackson than he could have stayed with the Union in '61; it simply wasn't his style.

I've read a couple of books that pointed out that a fault in the ANV is that they seldom indulged in any meaningful AAR discussions about WHY certain things went well or badly (they won most of the time, and that's a historical fault in winning armies.) Also, such after-action finger pointing, among those touchy prima donas wearing stars on Gray uniforms could get you challenged to a duel or at least a lifelong enemy. All those 'swept-under-the-rug command problems that had existed all along in the ANV finally came home to roost at Gettysburg, where the AoP stopped giving the Rebs the host of mistakes that usually meant the difference.

Lee didn't get the 'concerted effort' he needed to win there because the ANV never actually had been capable of it, and he personally, with his comparatively non-existent army level staff, was simply incapable of forcing it to happen.

Meade's AoP was able to survive Sickles' colossal mistake because it had the systemic resilience to absorb and respond to it. Had a reb commander made the same blunder at say, Antietam, the ANV might well have been destroyed even with McClellan at the controls….

In overly simplistic terms, almost all of the defeats of the AoP in the first several years of the war were caused by mistakes made from the top level of command down (usually Mac or Hooker), and not by the lower level officers screwing up; in contrast, the failures of the ANV were almost always due to lower level problems (that lack of concerted effort' that plagued Lee from the Seven Days onward), and by Lee's own inability to force his will to be done.

When things worked well for Lee it was often due to a happy accident of timing on his army's part, coupled with a really command failure at the top of the army he was facing. Even Sickles couldn't derail the superior performance being put in by the rest of the AoP commanders at Gettysburg.

Lee didn't get the 'concerted effort' he needed to win there because the ANV never actually had been capable of it, and he personally, with his comparatively non-existent army level staff, was simply incapable of forcing it to happen.

Compared to what? I am not sure how you can say the ANV never gave him a 'concerted effort'. The army would never have lasted as long as it did without many 'concerted efforts.' Whatever faults the army or Lee had, including his lack of staff, I don't see how, looking at the history the battles, 1862-1865, that Lee and the ANV were incapable of a 'concerted effort.'

At Gettysburg, Lee was dealing with a month-old new organization, three corps instead of two, two new corps commanders, several new division commanders. There were certainly command failures all up the chain of command to Lee during the battle. No doubt about it, but that wasn't the entire history of the army.

Meade was also dealing with a "new organization," in that he had only been in command for 3 days, and several of his corps and division commanders were also new to their positions (in their first battle at their current positions).

I'll temper my previous statement and answer both of you.

Lee's most famous 'concerted effort' (in terms of the various formations of the ANV actually working together in a timely manner to a common plan) is probably Second Manassas, but even there it took Longstreet all day to set up and finally deliver his famous attack, and then against the flank of an enemy who had spent the entire day totally ignoring the attack that most of his subordinates absolutely saw coming.

Likewise at Chancellorsville, which most historians consider Lee's 'Masterpiece.' It was, but was also the only real alternative Lee had to simply retreating towards Richmond (Hooker's operational plan WAS brilliant, had he someone else doing the actual battlefield commanding!) It was also against an opponent who, from the first moment Lee said 'Boo!', absolutely went dead at the stick and handed all the initiative to Lee. Lee's own maneuverings weren't all that 'concerted', just far better than Hooker was capable of doing. Jackson's famous flank march, decided on the night before after Stuart provided the critical info about the Union flank, took him ALL DAY to move a distance that he would have managed in half the time in his Valley days. And then it was delivered in a terrible tactical formation that guaranteed the loss of all command control after the first ten minutes in those darkening woods. All due credit to both Jackson and Lee for their aggression and initiative, but they earned their reps against opponents who damn near fell over themselves in providing them the opportunity to use those against them.

It's quite true that Meade and several of his corps/Divisional commanders were new to their jobs, but the structural framework of the AoP hadn't gone through near the changes that Lee's had. The overly aggressive tactics that won Chancellorsville for Lee cost him great numbers of Regimental and Brigade level officers, and to me it was that new 'fragility' in a lot of the Confederate commands that cost them the 'initiative' at those levels that showed so strongly in the AoP, especially on July 2nd.

McClellan created and Hooker honed the structure of the AoP, and with so few of them actually 'pulling trigger' at Chancellorsville, the Army that Meade 'inherited' was a far stronger and more resilient one than what Lee brought to the field at Gettysburg. As with Napoleon at Waterloo, Lee's ANV at Gettysburg was a strong, but fragile weapon, and the AoP there was no longer being commanded by a dolt who would simply fold under the pressure. Meade may have been more cautious and less aggressive than Grant, but he did share the hard-nosed backbone that meant he wasn't simply going to fold under pressure, which had ultimately been Lee's trump card in the past.

Gettysburg, especially on July 2nd, might certainly have been a much more 'near run thing' than as happened historically, but it would have taken a much more deliberate and 'concerted' effort than Lee and company managed there, or had really managed before.

I'm doing a lot of study (towards a possible game) of the maneuverings in the 'Iron Triangle' between the Rapidan and Rappahannock Rivers in Culpeper county in the fall winter of '63, in which BOTH armies are suffering from the horrible officer casualties of Gettysburg (and ultimately sending some of their troops out west.) It's like watching two heavyweights in the late rounds, both battered, bloody and dead tired, trying to find an opening for a knockout blow while avoiding giving that opening to their opponent.

The AoP certainly went thru some structural changes.

First of all, the changes made during Hooker's reign were still pretty new, such as elimination of the Grand Divisions, the addition of the 11th Corps and loss of the 9th, and the collection of all artillery into corps-level brigades plus the Reserve of 5 brigades. (Yes, I know that the 11th Corps belonged to the AoP at Fredericksburg, but it saw no action, it and the 12th being in an unused Reserve Grand Division.)

Second, some of the corps had been reorganized: The 3rd Corps from 3 divisions to 2, for instance. The same for the 5th Corps plus the return of the Pa. Reserves (minus 1 brigade).

Third, the reorganization of some of the divisions, such as the 1st Division of the 1st Corps going from 4 brigades to 2.

Fourth, the arrival of various reinforcements: For instance, the Pa. Reserve mentioned above, the 2nd Vermont Brigade added to the 1st Corps, a brigade from the Middle Dept. added to the 12th Corps.

Fifth, the reorganization of the cavalry from 3 divisions to 2, then the addition of what had been Stahel's division from the Dept. of Washington as a new 3d Division under Kilpatrick, with not only a new division commander but 2 new brigade commanders (Farnsworth and Custer).

Sixth, Hunt given more control over the artillery; Pleasonton less over the cavalry.

Fletcher Pratt* offered an interesting quantification of the situation like this:

ANV (2) + Lee (4) = 6
AoP (4) + Meade (2) = 6

I think I'd make it ANV (3) + Lee (3) = 6

* A Short History of the Civil War, p. 263 (Original title, Ordeal by Fire).

Don – I'm not saying there weren't changes in the AoP; just that they didn't have quite the same effect as those in the ANV. Creating three Corps out of two, with two of them now under new and untried Corps leaders, had a major effect on the 'nimbleness' of the ANV…. Ewell did fine in 'independent' command during the early part of the campaign, but Hill may as well as have stayed in Virginia for all he did that whole month. Coupled with the huge number of 'new' regimental and brigade officers, that had pretty much the effect that I mentioned earlier.

> Sixth, Hunt given more control over the artillery; Pleasonton less over the cavalry.

I'd call that a 'win-win' situation no matter how you look at it! ;-) Meade wanted Humphreys as his Chief of Staff (instead of that Sickles Suck-up Butterfield) but didn't want to further jumble up the III Corps after that three-to-two Division reorganization. The III and XI Corps suffered the brunt of the Chancellorsville casualties for the AoP, and needed the sorting out. That actually improved the III Corps, but the XI should probably also have gone from three to two – two-brigade Divisions are just too small to be anyway effective, as you don't have enough strength to both hold your line and have local reserves (why you always want at least three!)

The 3-corps organization for the ANV certainly made sense, the problem was finding 2 good corps commanders, which never happened. This was aggravated by Lee's hand's off command style. As you say, Ewell did well at first, when off on his own and up against Milroy. But for the most part he wanted explicit orders. At the start of the Wilderness he remarked: "Just the sort of orders I like: Go straight down the road and attack the enemy!" Hill apparently was ill throughout the Gettysburg campaign, and probably the rest of his short life. But then, Lee was ill also. I can only assume that is why he didn't take closer control of things.

There was some confusion in the AoP about who commanded what, brought on by the death of Reynolds. As Meade "structured" the AoP, informally, Reynolds commanded the Left Wing, consisting of the 1st, 3rd and 11th Corps; Slocum the Right Wing, consisting of the 5th and 12th Corps, and the 2nd and 6th Corps remained independent. When Reynolds went down, Howard assumed temporary command of the Left Wing. Then Meade sent Hancock to take command of it, even though his corps was not part of it and though Howard was senior to Hancock. Hancock and Howard seem to have agreed to divide the command. Slocum hesitated to go to Gettysburg because he was senior to both Howard and Hancock but did so eventually, after the fight had ended for the first day. When Meade called for all his corps commanders to gather at his HQ, Williams attended as commander of the 12th Corps, since Slocum thought he was still a wing commander. But everyone else seemed to believe the wings had been eliminated once the army was concentrated at Gettysburg.

Anyway, 7 corps were too many for an army commander to control (as well as the cavalry, artillery reserve, and staff). That's one reason Sickles was able to do what he did -- Meade had too many subordinates to keep track of. And where do you find 7 good corps commanders (even if their corps were smaller than Lee's). That's why Meade eventually consolidated his 5 remaining corps (after the 11th and 12th went west) into 3.

Back to the question set.
I recently have been playing Scourge of War: Gettysburg and most particularly the scenario for Sickles salient. The question that comes to mind is what would have happened to Sickles Corp if he hadn't moved forward. His position in the line was lower than the position he advanced to and I can understand his desire to hold the high ground. Would he have been in a much worse position if he had stayed where he was and received the attack?

Yes… is still my answer. Having walked the ground its not a position I would have wanted to defend.

Well, the real answer is, if he had stayed where Meade wanted him, he would not have been attacked there. And any position is easy to defend if no one attacks you!

bgbboogie:

If you've walked the ground, then you probably know that the tree lines today aren't the ones there in 1863, which means the LOS would have been different, regardless of where the high ground was.

Be-that-as-it-may, the suggestion is that Sickles' Corps would have done worse defending a mile further back, a mile closer to support and without both flanks hanging in the air doesn't strike me as tactically sound. Considering the fact that his Corps was destroyed in little over an hour of fighting, exactly where are the advantages Sickles supposedly incurred moving unannounced as he did? In the end, what did that high ground do for him?

He certainly wasn't moving to 'save the army', with the idea of sacrificing his troops to 'buy time' for Meade. He simply couldn't have known enough to come to that conclusion, even if it was one that made sense.

Sickles was the only Politically-appointed, non-West Point graduate among the Corps commanders. He acted the prima donna politician before, during and after the battle, so his actions are more in line with that behavior than any special tactical accuity.

bgbboogie – The ground where Sickles WAS was indeed low, and rather indefensible, but that's not the ground he was ordered to line up on and hold, just where his troops spent the night. If you got your impression from walking that ground, you were walking the wrong ground!

McLaddie's got it right on all points. Sickles made up his own mind as to what he was going to do, very early in the morning, and spent the rest of the time simply trying to 'lawyer' his way into doing what he wanted, regardless of what his Army Commander wanted – that's court martial material in ANY army. Evidence? When Sickles' two 'left behind' brigades showed up early on the morning of the 2nd, Sickles already had parties out taking down all the north/south running fences in his front – the exact opposite thing you'd ever do if you're going to be defending back where he was ordered to, but exactly the thing if you're already planning on that move out to the Emmitsburg road.

As to the effects you're running into in a computer game? haven't played that game yet, so have no knowledge of what bias the game's designer may have built into things. I am a game map designer and cartographer, though, and intimately know the ground in question (lived there for 15 years), so I'll stand by what I've said.

It would be interesting to see the turnover in regimental and brigade officers that occurred in both armies between say 2nd Bull Run and Gettysburg. My impression is that the ANV started out with a fine group of officers, who were well trained in military academies or in running agricultural empires that had many similarities to military units. Brave, skilled men who died and were replaced by poorer entitled stuff. On the Union side, the starting point was politicians and businessmen of the industrial revolution, who did not know their new trade. These were gradually replaced by younger men who learned the new trade and were elevated in command by showing the knack and skills. There was also a larger pool of people to draw from. The quality of command therefore became more even as the war continued.

Well, the real answer is, if he had stayed where Meade wanted him, he would not have been attacked there.

At the end of it all, Don is right.

Good ground/poor ground its no matter. The actions of the enemy are always part of the equation for any commander and in this instance they had been given orders to wander across the front of Sickles proper position.

The bottom line is that had Sickles stayed put, he could have flanked them, instead of the other way round!

1968billsfan:

Yeah, those are all things I've read about over the course of the war. Some other issues are:

1. Many of the Union officers were political appointees. One reason the Union army had not only created twice the number of divisions and corps with the same number of men compared to the South, but built 1/3 more new regiments than the South proportionally. That was specifically to provide commands for all the men cashing in political favors. That alone created command issues in both personalities, culture and communication the South did not have in nearly the same degree.

2. The South had a far more limited pool of talent. Attrition is attrition, whether at the regiment level or Senior staff.

A great little book dealing with the Union and Confederate command issues during the campaign is:

Command and Communication Frictions in the Gettysburg Campaign by Philip M. Cole 2006 ISBN 0-9777125-1-6

Sickles 'in position' would have certainly have flanked Longstreet's attack as Lee envisioned it set up. However, with Longstreet being a longtime career soldier, I can't see him actually then moving forward on the axis of the Emmitsburg Road. Even with his day long disagreement with Lee, I can easily see him calling the whole thing off, as moving forward as I just mentioned would have been tactical suicide, redeploying to find Sickles actual flank would have taken hours that they just didn't have (and we know the Sixth Corps would have arrived in plenty of time to simply extend that flank around Big Round Top anyway), and just 'facing right' and attacking Sickles in the available time would have ended up being a direct frontal attack on a very solid line, with plenty of reserves (V Corps) available to reinforce it.

McLaddie – you're quite right in the fallacies that hurt the Union command structure the whole way through the war – for political reasons he couldn't ignore, Lincoln had to allow new regiments and brigades to be created throughout the war, just to give political patronage positions to the folks who were keeping him in the White House. The result was a constant influx of new, large and completely inexperienced regiments filled with green soldiers and officers. Meanwhile, veteran regiments were dwindling away to nothing (look at the Irish Brigade at Gettysburg, which numbered little more than 600 men en toto!), due to an unwillingness in Washington to allow those veteran formations to keep recruiting and filling up their ranks (The original commander of the Irish Brigade, Col. Meagher, resigned over exactly that issue!)

The Reb's system was much better, in that they were constantly refilling their existing regiments with new recruits and draftees, who at least got to benefit from the veterans they were now among. (The Germans in both WW's did things exactly that way, which is one reason why their regiments could keep going under really terrible conditions and casualties…)

On your other point, somewhere in a storage box I have an interesting book titled 'How R.E. Lee LOST the Civil War.' It makes a pretty good argument that Lee, through his endlessly aggressive tactics, constantly beat back Union offensives and 'broke' their commanders mentally, by using up the one really irreplaceable resource the South had, its officers and men. The overall quality of the men in the ranks is very similar on both sides throughout the war, but the supply of really qualified officers was limited, and Lee's offensive-minded (and he really had no choice!) resulted in an incredible loss in the company and regimental level officers that make or break an army.

Lee really had little choice but to do what he did, as he was constantly fending off true disaster! Johnson staying in Command would have meant the loss of Richmond in mid-1862, and IMO, and end of the war that fall.

To follow up on 1968billsfan's point, Chancellorsville was a real killer for the Rebs – Lee did the only thing he could have (shy of just falling back towards Richmond, as Johnson would have and as Hooker was hoping for!) But 'beating Joe Hooker' required a constant attack that bloodied almost every unit in the ANV, and killed a huge number of the officers that gave his army its strength, starting at Jackson and working down. A comparison of the changes at the regimental/brigade level in COnfederate officers from before Cville to Gettysburg is truly eye-opening in that regard. Just way too many 'new guys' in command positions to get as good an effort out of them as Lee really needed for that campaign to work.

In comparison, in the AoP literally HALF the Army never even pulled trigger in the Chancellorsville campaign, and other than in the III and XI Corps there was very little change in the command structure since Fredericksburg. If anything , they came out of Cville not broken, but ed off for 'losing' a battle that most had not even fought in.

Stalin once told Churchill that 'to have peace in Europe, we need to take every German officer above a lieutenant out in the woods and shoot him.' Churchill thought it hyperbole, but Stalin had done exactly that thing to the Poles in 1939 (and to his OWN army in the mid-to-late 30's, much to his detriment on 1941!) Chancellorsville had roughly the same effect on the ANV – Lee 'went North' with an army that was strong on paper, and certainly very overconfident about its chances of success, but which was very 'fragile' in the all important area of command and control. Against an AoP that finally had a good mix of competent officers in the positions that mattered, that made a huge difference!

Sickles 'in position' would have certainly have flanked Longstreet's attack as Lee envisioned it set up. However, with Longstreet being a longtime career soldier, I can't see him actually then moving forward on the axis of the Emmitsburg Road. Even with his day long disagreement with Lee, I can easily see him calling the whole thing off, as moving forward as I just mentioned would have been tactical suicide, redeploying to find Sickles actual flank would have taken hours that they just didn't have (and we know the Sixth Corps would have arrived in plenty of time to simply extend that flank around Big Round Top anyway), and just 'facing right' and attacking Sickles in the available time would have ended up being a direct frontal attack on a very solid line, with plenty of reserves (V Corps) available to reinforce it.

I other words, about as effective a defense as anyone could ask for -- and without losing a man!

Elcarto,

Agreed, its highly likely that Longstreet wouldn't have been flanked. I think the matter of debate is how long it would have taken his overall command to figure out they were about to be so and then how quickly and in what manner something could be done about it.

Also of course, what Lee's reaction to the developing situation would have been – assuming someone could find him and how this may have changed things elsewhere.

For what its worth, I'm one of those who thinks Lee and the ANV were in a 'dammed if you do, dammed if you don't' position re aggressive tactics. On occasions they most definitely over did things and continually lost more of their best officers and men as a result but at the time a belief that the only way to break the Federal resolve was to win in the field held sway.

There's a telling part in one of Rhea's books describing at one point in the Overland Campaign, a shattered A.P.Hill, realizing at the end of a day's fighting that he has to date, lost more Brigade commanders than he started with!

BTW: If you will allow a nit pick, the Irish put a lot less than 600 in the field at Gettysburg. As I recall the generally used figure is 532.

Does further the point you were making however! :o)

For what it's worth (not much really) I think Sickles screwed up. By moving his men forward he gave a target to the Rebels, something they could see to attack. If he had stayed where he was, the Rebs would have been surprised when they came over the rocky knob to Sickles front. McLaw's would have been subject to artillery fire from the entire Union line. We saw what happens when you do that on the 3rd of July. Also, a couple of questions for you folks that know a lot more than I about the battle. Did Warren order up the V Corps troops because he could see some of Longstreet's men forming up on the opposite ridge? Also, did Sickles line as it was supposed to be cover the area between Cemetary ridge and LRT? Did V Corps or VI Corps troops fill in the gap after Sickles men moved forward? A very interesting and lively debate so far.

> In other words, about as effective a defense as anyone could ask for -- and without losing a man!

I've certainly gamed it in many different rules systems. Meade's plan – as designed- was a pretty solid defense against anything Lee could have thrown against him, while waiting for Sedgwick to bring up his own 'masse de manoeuvre'.

> Also, did Sickles line as it was supposed to be cover the area between Cemetery ridge and LRT?

As ordered, yes it did. His right would have tied into Hancock's left, and his own left was to be where Geary's troops had been the night before, which was right on the northern end of LRT. Sickles' 'confusion' about the latter was just lawyer Sickles trying to find a way to justify NOT doing something he had been ordered to do, but which he didn't WANT to do.

> Did V Corps or VI Corps troops fill in the gap after Sickles men moved forward?

V and II Corps troops were fed in as needed to fill the holes that Sickles terrible deployment provided, and eventually VI Corps troops were pushed into place as they arrived. Sickles insubordination resulted in most of Meade's army being scattered over the southern half of the battlefield, with their command structures hopelessly intermingled. And given how late into the night that action continued, it's hardly surprising that such didn't get corrected.

As a historian and game designer, I can fault Meade for not taking more steps on the morning of July 3rd to 'straighten things out', but the man had only been in command for three days, and hadn't slept much at all in that whole period. Try playing ANY Gettysburg game with the historical situation on the morning of July 3rd, but with the Union VI as a single, combined force, and Bobby Lee's gonna be having a bad day….. As it was, Sedgwick's troops were scattered the whole length of the Union line, from Big Round Top to Wolf's Hill, with Sedgwick himself commanding only a brigade or two of them…

> A very interesting and lively debate so far.

That's what makes this hobby so much fun! ;-)