"Sickles Salient" Topic

I recently have been playing Scourge of War:Gettysburg and most particularly the scenario for Sickles salient. The question that comes to mind is what would have happened to Sickles Corp if he hadn't moved forward. His position in the line was lower than the position he advanced to and I can understand his desire to hold the high ground. Would he have been in a much worse position if he had stayed where he was and received the attack?

Lee's plan was for Hood to attack north parallel to the Emmittsburg Road while McClaw was to attack east perpendicular to the road. Lee thought the Union line was along Emmittsburg Road because of heavy skirmishing the night before.

If Sickle had stayed put, the Rebels wouldn't have had anyone to attack.

Oh boy, Phil. You have really opened a can of worms.

I believe Sickles would have been a better position had he stayed put. First, he would have been where Meade expected him to be (always a nice thing for the army commander to know where his troops are). Second, his salient put his corps in a position of being enfiladed, which would not have happened if he was where he was supposed to be. And he would have been harder for Longstreet to see because of how the ground lies, which probably would have enhanced Longstreet's natural caution (OK, this last is speculation.)

I look forward to reading the rest of this thread.

I pretty much concur with John the Greater's statements. Sickles got his command mauled and the resulting engagement handed the initiative to the Confederates.

I know that some historians are re thinking Sickles action. Had Longstreet's assault gone a planned Sickles would have been hit in the flank and probably rolled up. As things went it is now believed by some historians that Sickles unexpected potion disrupted Longstreet's attack.

I suspect it would have created a different set of "what ifs" for history buffs to argue about.

Sickles chose a line that was much to long for his troops to hold. Also, the next time that you are in Gettysburg go and walk the line that Meade wanted Sickles to hold, it is eminently defensible. That high ground that supposedly dominates it is itself dominated by the artillery on Cemetery Hill, as Alexander would soon find out.

jowady is correct. If you walk the actual ground you will see why it was a mistake.

I have walked that ground, and looked at the communications between Meade & Sickles, and with my last breath I will defend Sickles' decision as the right course of action.

Remember that Sickles was having a devil of a time getting Meade to listen to him. Meade was convinced that Lee would be attacking south, down from Gettysburg proper, and onto Culp's hill, etc. It's why Meade had all those works built, and the entire 2nd Corps facing north as a reserve. Meade, in his Pollyanna mind, could not conceive of anything else happening, so he brushed off all of Sickles pleas.

On top of this, Sickles had developed solid intelligence that Longstreet was to his front, and in force, and maneuvering further south. He (Sickles) had sent a recon force of 100 men of the 1st USSS, backed up by the 3rd Maine Infantry, into Pitzer's Woods, and they hadn't gone more than a few rods before they ran into confederate infantry massed. The 3rd Maine recognized the colors of two of the regiments, having been engaged with them previously, and the lines being that close.

In fact, not only was this intel passed along to Sickles, but after he had pushed his Corps forward, the 3rd was posted directly at the apex, facing south with it's right flank anchored on the Emittsburg Pike, and it's back to the Peach Orchard. Colonel Moses Lakeman, of the 3rd maine, saw Hood's columns moving across the pike, and called up a battery of artillery which threw sufficient rounds into Hood's men as to force them to move further south out of range and delay his assault.

Had Sickles remained in place, there was no place for his artillery to deploy and have an adequate field of fire. His Corps would have been rolled up, and Hood's division would have been into the rear of 2nd Corps (still facing North) before they could react. Meade's 6th Corps (and 5th) were just arriving and in a depleted state of energy, many of their men having straggled due to the excessive humidity and lack of water on their forced march.

Sickles' deployment forward bought valuable time for Meade to turn 2nd Corps around and start feeding it's units into place, and also support 5th Corps' units as they arrived.

Dan Sickles is the true Hero of Gettysburg, with Oliver Otis Howard coming in a close 2nd.

Forgive my ignorance, but where did Sickle's proposed line on Cemetery Ridge end? Did it reach Little Round Top?

If Hood would have attacked up the Emmitsburg Road as planned, wouldn't he have struck empty air instead of Sickle's flank? Would he have then turned 180 south, marched south, and then moved east around the Union flank? Was there time for that?

I feel that this is a more likely outcome Cleburne1863.

My question is whether Warran spots them without the dust and smoke of the battles.

TKindred: Your comments suprised me because I was not aware that the 2nd Corps ever faced North, Would it be correct to assume that this was from the time of their arrival and were they facing North when elements of the Corps were dispatched to assist the 3rd Corps? Thanks, John Miller

If Hood would have attacked up the Emmitsburg Road as planned, wouldn't he have struck empty air instead of Sickle's flank? Would he have then turned 180 south, marched south, and then moved east around the Union flank? Was there time for that?

It is hard to say because:
1. Longstreet had already argued with Hood about following Lee's plan nstead of going after the Round Tops and the deep flank. Longstreet rather stubbornly refused to change anything even with Sickles unexpectedly in place with a refused flank.
2. It is not easy to move a Division's direction by 180 degrees in any quick way within range of the enemy over broken ground. As it was, It took nearly an hour for Hood to get into his original jumpoff point and his two support brigades still were disjointed, coming up further west than planned.
3. And when would the Rebels have known that there wasn't any Union flank along Emmittsburg Road. It was 4 o'clock when the Rebel attack begun. Would they have had time to change the entire front of the attack?

We've played the 2nd Day scenario with Sickles staying put, and it was still a hard fight.

John Miller,

Harry Pfanz shows the dispositions in his book about the 2nd Day at Gettysburg. Basically, Meade had ordered 2nd Corps to form behind Cemetery Ridge, and Culps Hill, facing north. They would have formed the reserve behind the 11th/12th corps line(s), and acted, if possible, to exploit any failure of the CS forces to breakthrough the federal lines.

link

I can't agree with the idea that Sickles saved the day. I think things would have gone better if he'd stayed (more or less) where Meade put him. The Fifth Corps was close at hand and the two corps would have been sufficient to stop Longstreet's attack without dragging half the Second Corps out of position and opening up holes all along the Union line.

OTOH, the Union ended up winning the battle and that's what counts. If I magically found myself standing at Meade's HQ on the morning of July 2, 1863, I wouldn't had said a word to anyone :)

I think that Sickles did what he did… And the Union won the battle…

Anything else is speculation…

That said I am a fan of Dan Sickles… I mean the man really LIVED! His life would read as an improbable story except that its true…

My personal opinion is generally that he disrupted Confederate plans in a number of ways that probably did not help Lee. The disruption was hard on the Third Corps but there are lots of other cases of similar casualties without a victory at the end…

I am not sure that the men of the Third Corps blamed him and they were the ones there…

TKindred: Yeah, I read the book, (years ago, right after it came out), and I forgot that, (getting old I guess), but thanks for the memory jolt. Still have the book, by the way, and this conversation has inspired me to read it again. Thanks again, John Miller

Had Longstreet's assault gone a planned Sickles would have been hit in the flank and probably rolled up.

Is that a typo? Because it's exactly backwards. Lee's plan was for Longstreet to attack up the Emmitsburg Road to Cemetery Hill. He was unaware of the length of the Union line running down Cemetery Ridge; he thought it ran down the Emmitsburg Road. Longstreet tried to argue with him, but Lee reiterated the order. Had Sickles been where he was supposed to be, HE would have been on LONGSTREET'S flank, not vice versa!

Sickles was the only politically appointed/non-West Point General heading a Union Corps at Gettysburg. Not surprisingly, he is the only Corps Commander during the battle to purposely disobey a direct order.

Sickles' Corps was destroyed, but it forced Meade to throw in regiments and brigades piecemeal as they came up in an attempt to save the situation. As the Confederate artillery officer Alexander pointed out, 20,000 Rebels beat 40,000 Union in a five hour battle. The Union did however, retain possession of the ridge and Little Round Top.

Sickles, not withstanding his lost limb, went straight away to Washington and gave his version of events to any of the Washington politicos who would listen long before Meade or other Generals could give their versions. By Sickles' reckoning, he saved the Union from disaster and that has stuck as a controversy ever since.

The way Washington worked, few if any Union Generals were punished or court martialed for disobeying direct orders. Sickles disobeyed a direct order, had his corps destroyed, but he was celebrated.

But as JG said:

I think that Sickles did what he did… And the Union won the battle…

Anything else is speculation…

I think that Sickles made a mistake. He made two wrong decisions: first, advance his corps beyond direct support from other Union's corps; and second, not informing his commander in chief of his dispositions until it was too late to correct them. As far as I know changing a battle plan right before your enemy is about to attack and not informing of your intentions to your CiC are both capital sins. That the Union won the battle is not because Sickles' actions, but because the mistakes of Lee and Longstreet. If either of them would have provided the reserves to exploit the success of Barksdale and Wofford's brigades, the Union line would have collapsed. They didn't, and that was their fault, not Sickles' merit.

Having recently spent some time visiting Gettysburg, I returned to Scotland with my confirmed opinion the Gen R.E. Lee had wasted an opportunity by his poor control over his subordinates. Sickles advance with the III Corps held up Longstreet`s assault. The Confederate attack faltered when A.P. Hill`s troops did not continue the echelon attack while Longstreet`s troops were succeeding in dragging in huge numbers of Union reserves. R.E. Lee did nothing to ensure the assault continued, one of numerous decisive and ultimately disastrous mistakes he made in this battle.
If Sickles had deployed where Meade had instructed it might have been better or worse for the Confederates, if the Round Tops had been taken then Meade would just have withdrawn his army. But would the Round Tops have been overrun?

I've just been reading Sear's "Controversies & Commanders" which has a section on the Meade/Sickles ructions.

If you can read that and think of Sickles in terms of being a 'Lovable Rouge' I would be amazed.

A man who achieved is position purely through political maneuvering, at every level of his advancement and had no prior experience at the required command position. Had his Corps mashed through violation of a direct order and then reduced his commanding officer to defending himself in public for the remainder of his life, deserves no admiration in my book.

if the Round Tops had been taken then Meade would just have withdrawn his army. But would the Round Tops have been overrun?

The Round Tops played no part in Lee's plans. He was fixated on Cemetery Hill (which, in his view, probably included the higher parts of Cemetery Ridge).

I suppose the real question is what the effect on the overall battle was. Did it disrupt Longstreet (since he expected to find the line along the Emmitsburg Road) or was it pretty much to plan?

You can talk about upsetting Lee's plans andholding up Longstreet, however there were three things that have been pointed out so far.

1. He disobeyed an order of his commander in chief and was NOT where the Commander in chief thought he was.

2. He was in the open with absolutely NO defensive power, with both flanks way up in the air. Regardless of what he could or could not see (he wasn't there for a sightseeing tour) he had better cover where Meade wanted him.

3. His corps was wrecked in short order and Longstreet was not wrecked at all, but had plenty to still go up and make several attacks against Little round top. So the sacrifice of the corps was in vain.

OSchmidt…

1. Agreed
2. Agreed (generally)
3. Not so sure… I don.t think ypu can say Longstreet was in good shape… Also as to the 3rd Corps being wrecked… Hood and Mclaws combined outnumbered the 3rd corps on the field by almost 50% (in fact these two divisions were probably bigger than even the 6th corps if memory serves) and included some excellent troops… Serious casualties stopping them were probably inevitable…

And the Gettysburg buffs would not be able to have this cool debate without Dan's actions either… :-)

FWIW – I have a coffee mug with a picture of Dan Sickles and on the other side it says, "What would Sickles do?"

"What would Sickles do?"

Go for the High Profile and Publicity, Baby!
He lived it before, during and after the ACW.

If you are a Sickle's "fan" the mug I mentioned is available on Zazzle.com. I gave some of them to Gettysburg Park rangers I know and they seemed to like them too…

"What would Sickles do?" – It doesn't constrain you much :-)

For anyone who hasn't heard about Sickles life before and after Gettysburg, I strongly recommend you read more about his life – It's a fascinating read!

And let's not forget that he was instrumental in creating the National Park at Gettysburg…

Take care!

Hey! Does that mean if I buy one I can shoot some guy in the street, claim I was insane at the time and walk away from the rap to resume a perfectly normal life?

And let's not forget that he was instrumental in creating the National Park at Gettysburg

Now I wonder he did that?

"Some guy"? Give him more credit than that – It was the DC District Attorney…

And as I recall, by the standards of the time Sickles was faulted more by people for reconciling with his wife, than for shooting Key…

As I said – he makes for interesting reading regardless of your views of him…

And as I recall, by the standards of the time Sickles was faulted more by people for reconciling with his wife, than for shooting Key…

Absolutely true!

BTW: Just reread my previous post. The last sentence should read:

"Now I wonder WHY he did that?"

I'll certainly agree that without Sickles' Insubordination we'd have a lot different things to talk about here! As he once said himself, 'The whole damn field is my monument', and while that's being a bit expansive that certainly holds for the southern half, for better or worse….

He did disrupt what all my research shows was a perfectly solid defensive position as imagined by that engineer Meade, and disrupting the Boss's plans is never a 'good thing', no matter how 'right' you may feel yourself. One can only imagine the fireworks had he been under the command of one Thomas Jefferson Jackson…….. ;-)

I'm the cartographer for a boardgame called 'Hammerin' Sickles', which uses 150 yd hexes, regiments and batteries, and rules that would work quite well with minis (and several folks have already done just that.) A great way to try out anyone's pet theories about what Sickles' forward movement did and didn't do in that battle.

However, anyone who believes that Sickles 'saved the day' at Gettysburg and is a hero because of it really needs to take their blinders off and read more than one book. As several mentioned, walking the actual ground at Gettysburg let's you see where he was actually ordered to be (and not the low ground where his men camped the night before – the lie he so often repeated to justify his actions), and can see both the strength of that position and the trouble it would have faced Longstreet with as he lined up to try and execute Lee's own very faulty plan (based as it was on a completely erroneous appreciation of Meade's position and how much of the AoP was actually on the field.)

My own guess is that had 'Ol Dan stayed where ordered, and Longstreet actually lined up as ordered, the realization that an entire unexpected Union Corps was now squarely on the flank of his intended attack would have had Longstreet aborting that attack due to the lateness of the hour (and if he didn't, the necessarily re-aligning of his own two divisions would have put things off another hour or two, which would have had even more of the Sixth Corps arriving right in position to reinforce the Union left.)

All a conjecture, of course, but this battle has been a longtime pet subject of mine (I used to live there, and have mapped it a good ten times now for various game.) A good game, which includes proper historical restraints on what you can and can't do, can really let you explore the possibilities.

I might add for folks who haven't visited Gettysburg for a few years, that the Gettysburg we all grew up with is NOT the Gettysburg the battle was fought on. In recent years the Park Service has been cutting down the trees that were not there at the time of the battle. A LOT of them! Some parts, especially down on the Union left, where the Second Day actions took place, you'd hardly recognize. The position by the Round Tops is a lot more formidable (as if it wasn't formidable enough) because there is a whole lot less cover for Longstreet's attack. When Sickles moved forward it put him that much closer to the Confederate assembly area and gave him that much less time to react once the attack stepped off.

I'll echo what Scott just said – the Park's restoration project over the last 15 years has it as close to 1863 as it's been in well over a century, with most of the important treelines and such cut back to ATOB (at time of battle.) From Little Round Top the historic lack of trees goes the whole way to the Emmitsburg road, and Munshower's Hill (at the northern end of LRT) is now the bare rocky knoll is was then as well – a perfect arty platform for the VI Corps Arty (as it would have been for Sickles had he obeyed orders….)

Much more fun now than in decades past, when you'd take friends around and constantly had to say, "Well, at the time of the battle you'd have been able to see……." ;-)

So why not just game it out and see what happens?

As to a remark made by Mr. TKindred a couple of days back, I have and am quite familiar with Pfanz's Second Day book, and I'd be interested in having the map pointed out that shows where Meade supposedly had the Second Corps positioned, 'facing north and behind and in support of the XI and I Corps.' The only map that shows the entire Union position is the early one on P. 120, showing Longstreet's hours long route to his jumping off position. In that one (as well as any other one in any other book covering the action that I own) Hancock is right where Meade actually placed him, anchored on Howard's left and then running south along Cemetery Hill/Ridge to around where the PA monument now is, and facing due WEST.

Sorry, but if you're going to drop a name like Harry Pfanz to somehow 'back up' your assertions, you really need to get the details right…….

Elcarto: I was under the impression that at least one Division of the 2nd Corps faced north initially, on a line from Cemetery Hill to Ziegler's Grove. I certinally may be mistaken in this, but I thought that was what was being refered to. Thanks, John Miller

I may be completely off base here but it seems there are similiarties between the move of the III Corps on July 2nd and General Barlow's advancing his Division to Blocher's Knoll on July 1st. If my memory serves me, (and sometimes it dosn't), Barlow was instructed as to his Division's position and chose to disregard his instructions also. I am not a Sickles fan and I believe he should have obeyed his orders, but he and Barlow are such different characters I wonder if that has effected the perception of their actions. (Phil Hall: If this is too far off you topic please accept my apology in advance.) Thanks, John Miller

Much of the debate on the pros and cons of Sickles advance seems to be related to geography. Defensible terrain is certainly a worthy consideration but I think this is another dimension to consider that has not yet been discussed.

I am not crediting Sickles in any way for tactical brilliance but I believe that his actions did substantially contribute to the set of causals which produced a Union victory.

Namely, I believe that the destruction of Sickles' corps adversely impacted the human state of the advancing confederates. Any engagement, whether resulting in victory or defeat saps inertia. We know that it was very hot that day, we know that the confederates expended ammunition on Sickles and we know that they suffered casualties. I don't know the battle well enough to comment on exactly how far McLaws troops had march first to get to Gettysburg and then to get in position on their right flank to attack but it was pretty far (technical term).

I have been both an active duty paratrooper and an ACW reenactor and while I do credit these soldiers with being very hardy troopers, the march, heat, engagement and losses had to sap McLaws' troops blunting their attack prior to reaching the intended union line at the expense of many union lives.

The other point I find interesting is that almost by accident, Sickles' blunder was a catalyst for Meade immediately moving support troops to precisely the spot of the main confederate advance.

The last point, I would make, and I am not sure I know precisely where Sickles was supposed to be, but people seem to believe that this location was impregnable. I would only offer that Little round top is about as defensible a piece of terrain as you could wish for and despite that the confederates very nearly broke that line. So could this have been true of Sickle's intended position as well?

The counter to that is certainly the smaller interior lines union troops could have used to reinforce him.

Anyhow – just though the human dimension of the struggle should be considered as well on the final verdict.

I thought an interesting comment made was that Longstreet may not have attacked at all if he had known the union line was not on the Emmitsburg rd. being so late in the day. That would certainly make for an interesting what if scenario on day 3. What would Lee have done with Longstreet in tact?

I am not crediting Sickles in any way for tactical brilliance but I believe that his actions did substantially contribute to the set of causals which produced a Union victory.

Namely, I believe that the destruction of Sickles' corps adversely impacted the human state of the advancing confederates. Any engagement, whether resulting in victory or defeat saps inertia.

I am not sure how you could call it a Union victory. It required 40,000 Union troops to stop [inflict enertia on, if you will] 20,000 Rebels. Because of Sickles movement, the Union rushed troops in piece meal, a regiment here, an brigade there, whatever had come up. What if those 30,000 had been supporting an intact III Corps waiting along the ridge line and round tops--close to help? The ridge line wasn't impregnable, but it sure as heck was more defensible and better supported than where Sickles moved to. Anyone can see that, high ground or not.

If the Gettysburg had ended on July 2nd, it would have been seen as a victory comparable to Chancellorsville and 2nd Manassas, and more damage had been inflicted on the Union in those two day than either earlier battle: Three Union Corps had been destroyed and the Union driven out of just about every position they'd held--and that is accomplished with a faulty plan on Lee's part.

I used to live in southern Maine and was always surprised to look at old (1890-1910 era) photographs of areas that I knew quite well. Now most areas are grown up into woods. Then they were clear fields. The reason is that before the automobile, transportation and portable power came from horses and oxen. These feed on hay. Open fields are cultivated for hay, which was a valuable annual cash crop compared to no or little return from forest. Maine in the summer has long days, cool temperatures and good rainfall, so hay for local use and shipment to eastern cities (as well as beef) was the dominate use. You will see much the same in other places, before the day of gasoline driven power. In addition, where the land is too broken and rocky for machine aided haymaking, it often was used for woodlots. Cattle would be pastured through these as well, which kept down brush and made many battlefields "park-like" rather than through a wilderness. Things to keep in mind when doing our wargaming.

>I may be completely off base here but it seems there are similarities between the move of the III Corps on July 2nd and General Barlow's advancing his Division to Blocher's Knoll on July 1st. If my memory serves me, (and sometimes it doesn't), Barlow was instructed as to his Division's position and chose to disregard his instructions also. I am not a Sickles fan and I believe he should have obeyed his orders, but he and Barlow are such different characters I wonder if that has affected the perception of their actions.

Possibly, although I'd say that Sickles KNEW that he was disobeying orders, while Barlow was making an honest mistake while perhaps misunderstanding what Howard/Shultz wanted him to do. A slight, but crucial difference, as otherwise both their decisions resulted in a their own commands being destroyed and triggering a battlefield disaster. Had Barlow stayed on the line at the Almshouse and not advanced the XI Corps position would have been a lot harder to break, and taken longer.

> If the Gettysburg had ended on July 2nd, it would have been seen as a victory comparable to Chancellorsville and 2nd Manassas, and more damage had been inflicted on the Union in those two day than either earlier battle: Three Union Corps had been destroyed and the Union driven out of just about every position they'd held--and that is accomplished with a faulty plan on Lee's part.

The point is, the battle DIDN'T end on July 2nd, and the Union Army was still occupying every bit of the line that Meade had designed for it that morning (Ignoring for the moment the lodgement on Spangler's Knob made by Johnson's troops over on Culp's Hill.) Cville and 2nd Manassas had resulted in the Union Army actually leaving the field and ending the battle, which is hardly the case here.

Longstreet may have called it 'The best three hours of fighting ever done by any troops on any battlefield' (a bit of self-serving hyperbole there), but the actual results are these – He did indeed drive the Union forces out of the advanced ground that Sickles had stupidly occupied, but nothing more – the Union line was still intact. The main result was to thoroughly mix up the Union OOB and command structure to the extent that Meade had no option but to stay on the total defensive the next day, but certainly NOT retreat. This came at the cost of thoroughly bloodying two of the best Divisions in the ANV, and leaving them in a tactical position that was worse than the day before, in terms of making any further attack – a fact that Longstreet had to remind Lee of the next morning, when the Old Man wanted to simply restart the same action along the same lines.

Longstreet's troops did indeed achieve an incredible feat of arms against ultimately larger Union numbers, but the end result was that the Reb troops involved were in no condition to continue any attack against the now far stronger position occupied by the AOP on the southern half of the field, now reinforced by the VI Corps. Any game that allows you to simply keep re-using the same troops, regardless of casualties, until they disappear from 'the board' is ignoring a lot of historical reality. Check out the numbers of casualties, and especially the officers, in Hood's and McLaws' Divisions on July 2nd, and you'll understand why Longstreet knew they couldn't give the same effort again. The same goes for most of the Union units involved, but it's easier to defend than attack, and they had fresh reinforcements to count on – the only ones on the Reb side was Pickett.

Folks often look at Meade's nighttime council of war on the night of July 2nd as some sort of 'weakness' on his part; but if ever there were a time for an army commander to get his Corps leaders in the same tent and on the same page, it would have been Lee and his three on that same night – something that never happened in the entire three days. Lee might later bemoan the lack of a 'concerted effort' on the part of his Corps commanders as being the cause of his defeat, but he made no 'concerted effort' of his own to make sure that such happened.

Lee is often viewed through the lens of his 'lifetime average' rather than the specifics, but at gettysburg he (and his Corps Commanders) had perhaps their worst week of the war. While Meade may have been a bit too cautious overall, he had the protection of Washington and Baltimore on his head, and exhibited the same sort of 'unflappability' that we rightly attribute to Grant and then Joffre in 1914. He simply wasn't going to fold under pressure like McClellan and Hooker, and used the excellent Command Staff structure (built by both of those gents) to simply 'out-general Lee.

As Napoleon said, 'Never interrupt your enemy when he's making a mistake,' and Meade didn't.

Possibly, although I'd say that Sickles KNEW that he was disobeying orders, while Barlow was making an honest mistake

Easy test here. How many times was Sickles told where he should be and how many times was Barlow?

I think we all now the answer to that one!

> Elcarto: I was under the impression that at least one Division of the 2nd Corps faced north initially, on a line from Cemetery Hill to Ziegler's Grove. I certainly may be mistaken in this, but I thought that was what was being referred to. Thanks, John Miller

John, I've yet to see any map, and I think I have most all of them as that's my area of study, that shows what you're talking about. Certainly several of Hancock's Brigades were kept behind the line in 'field column' formation for use as a reserve, but that's what a good Corps or any other level Commander does. That's how he was able to send so many of his troops south to save Sickles' butt in such a timely manner. But any assertion that the II Corps was, at any time, facing 'north' to simply back up the I and XI Corps is just fantasy.

The II Corps spent part of the July 1/2 night camped in the area to the SE of Big Round Top, but moved up pretty early to fill in the part of the line they held for the rest of the battle.

> The other point I find interesting is that almost by accident, Sickles' blunder was a catalyst for Meade immediately moving support troops to precisely the spot of the main confederate advance.

As would have been the case had Sickles stayed where he was supposed to be…. The Union V Corps was in precisely the right place to be the 'central reserve' for the AoP until the VI Corps could arrive, as shown by how many of its troops were thrown into the fray.

> The last point, I would make, and I am not sure I know precisely where Sickles was supposed to be, but people seem to believe that this location was impregnable. I would only offer that Little round top is about as defensible a piece of terrain as you could wish for and despite that the confederates very nearly broke that line. So could this have been true of Sickle's intended position as well?

The Confederate troops 'very nearly broke it' precisely because there were no Union troops there until Warren grabbed Vincent, as would NOT have been the case had Sickles obeyed orders. The line of Sickles ordered position (roughly the Park Road) runs from LRT and Munshower's Hill on good defensible ground the whole way north to link with Hancock's left, and gives good Ary positions covering either end. The position in the middle gives no good arty positions, but likewise no Reb attack coming from the west is going to have any arty support either.

> I thought an interesting comment made was that Longstreet may not have attacked at all if he had known the Union line was not on the Emmitsburg Rd. being so late in the day. That would certainly make for an interesting what if scenario on day 3. What would Lee have done with Longstreet in tact?

Well, Longstreet was a career soldier, and given that it's pretty certain that he would have found out that Sickles was on his flank had he lined up for Lee's planned attack, I can't see him proceeding as planned. Whether there would have been time to re-align things and come up with a new plan is problematic, but he was a good enough a soldier to know a really BAD situation when faced with it. (Then again, he really didn't like the situation the next afternoon and still gave the nod.)

Either way, it's an interesting thing to try to game. In most of the various games that I've been involved with, we try to provide players with three different possible scenarios-

A/ The historical situation we all already know.

B/ The Lee's (wet) Dream – in which the Union line really does end around the Codori House, and the V and VI Corps aren't yet on the field – that seems to represent about the situation that he envisioned on the morning of the 2nd, when he made his Plan;

C/ The Lee's Nightmare – in which Sickles stays exactly where he's supposed to be, Longstreet lines up exactly as Lee planned, and starts to move up NE with his troops aligned on the Emmitsburg Road, only to find out, too late, that the III and now arriving VI Corps are squarely on his right flank.

You can play them out in any game system you want, in minis or board game.

I would argue that the fact that the debate continues to this day… Among intelligent people….

Indicates the lack of the completely clear answer some would claim exists as to the advisability/what if results of the move forward versus the positions (whatever they were) instructed by Meade…

Though there is less debate on the debate on the issue of disobeying orders even that gets some discussion..

James

I would only offer that Little round top is about as defensible a piece of terrain as you could wish for and despite that the confederates very nearly broke that line. So could this have been true of Sickle's intended position as well?

Lee had no intention of attacking the position Sickles was supposed to be in -- AGAIN: his orders to Longstreet, reiterated over Longstreet's protest, was to attack up the Emmitsburg Road!

Elcarto: I was refering to a statement in the Pfanz book on bottom of page 63 and top of page 64 where he stated the 2nd Corps line started at the Cemetery. I remember it confused me at the time, (twenty + years ago), and after rereading it again last night I remain confused. It seemed to imply, to me any way, that at some point the Right of the 2nd Corps line faced North across the above mentioned terrain. This could all me my misintetrpertation of what Pfanz intended. I do not believe there is a map showing this. Thanks, John Miller