"Why the bad rap for the French?" Topic

If the Germans had only attacked where they were SUPPOSED to attack , instead of being sneaky, we would not be having this discussion.

The key issue was not the placement of category B divisions in the Sedan sector (though the mismangagement of the units there certainly contributed to the breakthrough) but the fact that the French strategic reserve was committed to extend the front line even before the German offensive began. Had the French 7th Army been retained in it's original position the German advance after the breakthrough would have become much more difficult and the "sickle cut" may well have been delayed long enough for large parts of the allied formations in Belgium to escape the trap.

When looking at the defeat at Sedan one should not forget the Germans. Guderian's corps was the largest and best equipped armoured formation deployed by the Germans. Even regular units and dare I say the BEF would have been hard pressed to resist an assault by 3 Panzer Divisions and the GrossDeutschland regiment supported by a host of independent units including assault engineers, STUGs and 88mm sp guns. And then there was the corps artillery including a 210mm battalion as well as the massive support provided by the Luftwaffe.

Sedan was always a German target and only in one version of the Case Yellow plan was it not hit by at least one PzD. But the head on clash in Belgium that would have resulted from the earlier versions of the plan would have been bloody indeed.

France's best troops rushed into Belgium on just that presupposition – placing their head in the noose so to speak. I think we can agree there were failures at every level of command.

Churchill claimed to have asked "Where is the strategic reserve?" and all the French high command could do is weep!

One needs merely to compare the casualties inflicted on the Germans in the French campaign to the casualties inflicted by the Soviets in 1941 in the same amount of time, to realize that while both the French and Soviets had caused the same amount (to the Germans), the Soviets could just keep retreating for hundreds (thousands) of miles yet.

France was consumed by a number of faults, but willingness to fight was not one of them.

Bad command, poor communications, lousy armor doctrine, political instability, lack of terrain depth, etc., but the French army fought hard.

No other country would have done any better, few if any could have done as well.

Dan

Weren't the troops at Bir Hacheim Foreign Legion?
My Grandfather was an Old Cotemptible and served throughout 1914-18, Somme, Passchendaele, Cambrai, Amiens etc. He didn't rate the French Troops as highly as the Belgians…..

Weren't the troops at Bir Hacheim Foreign Legion?

My Grandfather was an Old Cotemptible and served throughout 1914-18, Somme, Passchendaele, Cambrai, Amiens etc. He didn't rate the French Troops as highly as the Belgians…..

The question came up in class yesterday as to why the French have such a bad reputation for surrendering?

Do they? If so then I think your guess of 1940 is probably the best choice.

My Grandfather was an Old Cotemptible and served throughout 1914-18, Somme, Passchendaele, Cambrai, Amiens etc. He didn't rate the French Troops as highly as the Belgians…..

No doubt he had contact with the general Belgian Army, some of whom took leave in London. His contact with the French Army would have mainly been with middle-aged reservists in the rear areas of the British Army. British observers noted that British Army personnel often had low opinion of French troops as they had little contact with frontline troops.

It has not helped that the best 'French' troops have rarely been French – Legion, Tirailleurs Algeriens (Turcos), early Zouaves and Spahis, WWII Moroccans and Goums….

The problem in 1940 was that they did not attack in 1939 when the Germans were engaged in Poland. That threw away a chance to invade Germany and cause the Germans to oust Hitler. Lots of Germans were highly doubtful of another war and only supported the Nazis after the initial run of easy successes. Because the French govt. held back in 39 the Germans returned from Poland, built up strength and then chose where to attack. Meanwhile the French army had spent nine months sitting. around getting bored and demotivated.

in the 1880s they tried to wipe the ignominy of 1870-1 via an Indochina war. it was won by the French navy because the Viets kicked the land forces brutally

The idea that France would have attacked Germany in 39/40 is an absurb example of wishful thinking/hindsight history…there was zero (no, make that ZERO) political or military will to do this…the French as a nation, let alone as an army, were so scarred by the losses from 14'/18' that they were incapable of even contemplating such an action, let alone successfully carrying it out.

In Britain at least, Joe Public still believes quite a lot of WW2 propaganda, because actual events did not force much of it to be reconsidered at the time.

Thus Italians are widely regarded as cowardly, although those defeated in the desert were actually defeated as much by Ultra as by Empire pugilistic skill. The same troops had Ultra against the Germans too, but it was less useful because Britain tended to assume Rommel would obey the orders he and they were receiving, whereas Rommel in practice tended not to.

Likewise the British belief then and now was that our chaps were plucky improvisors whereas ze Chermans were square headed unimaginative clods. That one is, of course, just about exactly 180 degrees wrong.

We also thought the Japanese were Asia's Italians, only shorter, with bad eyesight and buck teeth. This stereotype has not survived nearly so well, because the events of 12/1941 to 2/1942 showed it to be nonsense.

The French defeat was rationalised for propaganda purposes as getting shot of a not very effective ally. Our other major ally, the USA, was perceived as initially confident beyond his abilities, and a bit trigger happy. Oddly this is probably the least unfair caricature of any of them.

I'm struck by how effective the WW2 British propaganda remains. Very hard to swim against that kind of tide.

I think the French reputation for surrendering without a fight is much greater in the US and does have a link to the anti-French hysteria centred around Gulf War II.

Brits can't really get too vocal about it or they run afoul of the 'why did your lot run off to Dunkirk' counterargument.

It's all much more complex of course but Joe Public likes his history black and white and painted with a broad brush.

I think the perspective presented here is mostly the British view. In general I think those in the US with historical interests have adopted this view, as the Brits are the most prolific sources of WW2 histories in the English language.

What is missing, for the most part, is the French perspective. I mean, if you ask why the French did something, or what happened to the French, wouldn't you want to try to at least examine how it looked from the French point of view?

So, some basic observations …

1 ) The French Army was pretty highly respected until WW2. If you look at the US Army, most of the equipment and officer training was modeled on what was learned from the French, who were our closest ally. The Brits were generally viewed with suspicion by the US until the whole FDR + Churchill thing got going.

2 ) The campaign of May, 1940 was an unmitigated disaster. A nation which prided itself on having the world's biggest and best army suffered a string of defeats that they have tried for 60 years to understand.

3 ) It wasn't until the late 1970s and early 1980s that military science (and theory) caught up with what happened in 1940. But it has been described largely from the viewpoints of those practicing it (the Germans in 1939 – 1942, the Soviets in 1944 – 45, and the Israelis in 1967 and 73), and little described from the viewpoints of those who suffered from it (including the French in 1940). The simple fact is that the German "Blitzkrieg" was a method of operations which sustained a high tempo of operations … so high that it got "inside" of the French decision cycle. In the time it took the French command to gather information, understand what had happened, formulate a plan for responding, and put that plan into action, the Germans had already caused other things to happen that made that French response useless / counter-productive. Troops, from ANY nation, quickly become demoralized when they receive orders that demonstrate no understanding of the reality as they see it on the ground. The French command was ordering counter-attacks against positions that were no longer on the front line (the Germans had already moved on), were ordering troops to assemble for further action at locations BEHIND enemy lines, were ordering units to coordinate who were separated by enemy forces, etc. In this environment, where even the high command demonstrates almost no idea what is actually going on, troops become prone to accepting any rumor that floats by. When orders don't make sense, units make it up as they go along, and when other friendly forces are seen withdrawing, they usually make up plans to pull back. So many French units "inexplicably" melted away.

By the way this is no different than how Polish troops reacted, or how Belgian troops reacted, or how Soviet troops reacted in 1941, or how US troops reacted (in Tunisia) in 1942. The difference was that the Soviets and the US had enough space, and enough time, to figure out how to get their command cycles shortened enough to survive. The French ran out of time and space before they could.

4 ) The French didn't surrender in June of 1940. They negotiated a cease-fire. They did a pretty good job of it, too, given the position they were in (1/3 of their country over-run, their army in tatters, their only ally having withdrawn the majority of their forces and resisting sending some (not all, but some) of the requested critical support). What is now called the "Vichy" Government was nothing more than the same government of France, moved to another city after Paris fell. Over time it became something else, but in June of 1940 it was the same government.

The suggestion that 200,000 French soldiers who had been evacuated from Dunkirk should have abandoned their country, their government, and their people because of a military defeat was seen as highly offensive by most Frenchmen. At that time De Gaul was seen as an officer who abandoned his post and fled from his country, a deserter in time of war. Not actually a very stirring leader. Let us remember that at this time there was still a French nation, with a French government, in France. I am not surprised that relatively few rallied to his call. This is not the same as Poland, or Belgium, or the Netherlands. Those lands were conquered by the Germans. But 2/3rds of France was still in French hands, under the French Government, in June of 1940. And would remain so until November of 1942.

5 ) Mehrs el Kabir was the most shocking thing that could have happened to the French. An ally generally does not turn on you when you are down. The French had specifically protected their Fleet from the Germans, both in their negotiations and in practice, and had communicated this clearly to the British. They had moved their fleet's main units, including battleships that were still under construction, away from their well-protected home port at Toulon to North Africa specifically to keep it out of the reach of the Germans (in case the Germans double-crossed them), and then THEY WERE ATTACKED BY THEIR ALLY!

Most of the ships at Mers el Khabir had been patrolling WITH the British fleet to protect British trade lines from the German "pocket battleships" Graf Spee and Deutchland (the French had the only ships in service that were both faster than the German panzerschiffes and heavily enough armed to face them in single combat). Then, just 4 days after the French agree to a cease-fire with the Germans that same British fleet sails up and fires on them while they are at anchor, killing thousands of French sailors.

It is not surprising that the British made few friends in the French military, and were seen as stab-in-the-back enemies from that point forward. It is in fact rather remarkable that ANY French soldiers, airmen or sailor rallied to the call of a renegade colonel / high profile deserter based in London.

The US understood this pretty well in 1941. French naval units in our hemisphere were not attacked by the USN. The French carrier Bern was allowed to spend the war docked in Martinique, and to return to allied service (after extensive re-fitting at US ports) after the French re-entered the fight on the allied side in 1942.

It is one of histories lost opportunities that the British didn't try wooing the French forces around the world in July of 1940, and instead chose to immediately launch un-provoked attacks.

This is not to suggest that the British actions were not reasonable, given the view from their perspective. They discounted any and every statement the French made about respecting and protecting British interests in their negotiations with the Germans. The fact that the French did indeed protect the British interests … well it's tough luck for the guy who does the right thing when his ally just can't afford to believe him.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Great post Mark. One point though, the British did give the French fleet the option of sailing to the French West Indies to join those units already there.

Although it's understandable that the French government refused to do so, it's a little unfair to suggest that the British made no attempt at all to neutralise their naval by non-violent means.

British Admiral James Somerville of Force H, based in Gibraltar, was ordered to deliver an ultimatum to the French, stating:

It is impossible for us, your comrades up to now, to allow your fine ships to fall into the power of the German enemy. We are determined to fight on until the end, and if we win, as we think we shall, we shall never forget that France was our Ally, that our interests are the same as hers, and that our common enemy is Germany. Should we conquer we solemnly declare that we shall restore the greatness and territory of France. For this purpose we must make sure that the best ships of the French Navy are not used against us by the common foe. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government have instructed me to demand that the French Fleet now at Mers el Kebir and Oran shall act in accordance with one of the following alternatives;

(a) Sail with us and continue the fight until victory against the Germans.

(b) Sail with reduced crews under our control to a British port. The reduced crews would be repatriated at the earliest moment.

If either of these courses is adopted by you we will restore your ships to France at the conclusion of the war or pay full compensation if they are damaged meanwhile.

(c) Alternatively if you feel bound to stipulate that your ships should not be used against the Germans lest they break the Armistice, then sail them with us with reduced crews to some French port in the West Indies — Martinique for instance – where they can be demilitarised to our satisfaction, or perhaps be entrusted to the United States and remain safe until the end of the war, the crews being repatriated.

If you refuse these fair offers, I must with profound regret, require you to sink your ships within 6 hours.

Finally, failing the above, I have the orders from His Majesty's Government to use whatever force may be necessary to prevent your ships from falling into German hands.[10]

Somerville did not present the ultimatum personally. Instead, this duty fell to the French-speaking Captain Cedric Holland, commanding officer of the carrier HMS Ark Royal. Admiral Gensoul, affronted that negotiations were not being conducted by a senior officer, sent his lieutenant, Bernard Dufay, which led to much delay and confusion.

As negotiations dragged on, it became clear that neither side was likely to give way. French Navy Minister Admiral Darlan never received the full text of the British ultimatum from Admiral Gensoul, most significantly with regard to the option of removing the fleet to American waters, an option that formed part of the orders Darlan gave to Gensoul, to be followed should a foreign power attempt to seize the ships under his command.[6]

(Wiki, but corresponds to written sources
link

There is also the teensy matter of the Jews: Vichy France (which, as Mark says, was still the official government of France and unoccupied by the Nazis) exported its Jews at such a rate that even the Germans had to tell them to slow down. Tens of thousands of Jews were saved by the fact that they were lucky enough to live within the Italian zone of occupation – they were safer under the protection of Italian fascists than their own countrymen.

For those who want to sift through the spotty history of French military glory please check out the list on the following page and its links on the bottom:
link
Rod Robertson

One point though, the British did give the French fleet the option of sailing to the French West Indies to join those units already there.

Although it's understandable that the French government refused to do so, it's a little unfair to suggest that the British made no attempt at all to neutralise their naval by non-violent means.

It's kind of hard to imagine an admiral, in command of a substantial fleet under the flag of his nation in his own port, accepting an ultimatum and agreeing to sail out of port and into midst of an obviously hostile fleet that has just issued the ultimatum, under supervision with minimal crews (insufficient to fight).

Of course it is also hard to imagine such an admiral agreeing to surrender his fleet. And it is this second perspective that makes the first one impossible.

… the option of removing the fleet to American waters, an option that formed part of the orders Darlan gave to Gensoul, to be followed should a foreign power attempt to seize the ships under his command.

Darlan's orders were in keeping with the promise that the French had given to the British during their negotiations with the Germans. But it was the same promise they also gave to the Germans. There was no situation under which the French would accept a foreign nation taking their fleet. The fleet had orders to sail to neutral nations, or scuttle, rather than be taken by the Germans. Or the British.

Of course it would be impossible to sail THROUGH the British to get to a neutral port without risking being taken by the British.

And so the French had no real options left but to hope the British would not be so foolish as to actually fire on their former allies.

Let us turn the table to get a bit of perspective. What if … Japan had NOT attacked Pearl Harbor in December of 1941, but instead started their moves against the Dutch East Indies and British Hong Kong and Singapore without attacking the US first. Now imagine that the US did not immediately declare war against the Japanese (quite plausible given US isolationist sentiments of the day), but instead sailed several capital ships of the Pacific Fleet to Manila to express it's displeasure.

So now a British fleet including Prince of Wales and Repulse sails up to Manila Bay and demands that the US Admiral surrender his fleet or sail them to internment in Australia. After all the US was asserting a neutral position, and had a substantial fleet in being, which would be very dangerous to British interests if captured by the Japanese. In a "for us or against us" world, that fleet would need to be taken out of the equation if it could not be brought into the war on Britain's side. So hey, give up your ships or I'll open fire … you have 6 hours to decide.

Can you imagine any US Admiral deciding to give in to those demands? Can you imagine any US SecNav or President who would order the Admiral present to give in to such demands?

No, it is entirely unthinkable. Yet we find it necessary to criticize the French for the same decisions.

As it was, the Fleet and the North African colonies were France's principal bargaining chips in their armistice negotiations with Germany. They made it clear that if Germany did not stop their attacks, allowing the (runt) French Nation to withdraw from the war and remain un-occupied, that the fleet would in fact sail for Britain and the North African colonies would be turned over the British. This was a potentiality that the Germans found quite unpalatable, and so while they did dictate some rather harsh terms for the armistice, setting in place a set of structures that allowed them to subsume much of France's sovereignty over the following two and a half years, they still found it far better to have France and it's resources out of the war than to have French resources given over the Britain.

They (the Germans) could little have imagined, much less hoped, that the British would then do everything they could to drive the French onto the German side, up to and including attacking them, attacking them again, and again (Mers el Khebir, Syria and Madagascar), starting in less than one week. The net effect of the British attacks were:
1) To drive the fleet back to Toulon, where it was in fact within range of the German panzers; and
2) To give the British another hostile nation to deal with … from that point forward Britain devoted substantial forces (which they could little afford) to fighting Vichy, and suffered from convoy routing to avoid Vichy-patrolled airspace.

And in fact just as the French had assumed in 1940 when they received the British ultimatum, as soon as it was clear that the allies would take French North Africa in November of 1942, the Germans rolled over the borders and occupied the remainder of France, and the panzers made for the fleet in Toulon. And good to their word, the French scuttled the fleet right under the Germans' noses.

As I said, the fact that the French did indeed protect the British interests, both before and AFTER the British attacked them (and attacked them again) … well it's tough luck for the guy who does the right thing when his (former) ally just can't afford to believe him.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Very interesting insights from Mark 1 in his first post. I particularly appreciate the 'operational tempo' point.

The second post is not so coherent. The parallelism in the second post is flawed. To be a genuine parallel with Vichy France, the USA would have had to be already vanquished by Japan. The US would have to be partially occupied by a Japanese army. It would have to also have a rightist government, both sympathetic to Britain's enemies and willing to facilitate the murder of America's Jews.

Also,I must point out that France was NOT Britain's ally at the time under discussion. The 3rd Republic – Britain's ally – had fallen. Technically, Vichy was 'neutral'. In practice, 2 million French soldiers were kept in Germany as slave workers to enforce Nazi control. Why was it so easy to believe their Navy was safe? Anyway, what does Mers El Kebir have to do with the core question? 'France gets a bad rap – because the naughty British bombed its Navy…'

In the ACTUAL context, I am amazed at the reasonable and non-confrontational tone of the Royal Navy's ultimatum. In fact, it makes me now regard Gensoul's pride as entirely responsible for the unnecessary death of his own sailors.

No wonder the French fleet scuttled at Toulon. They now knew that Britain was not bluffing,(belief in a bluff being the only rational motive behind Gensoul's, and to some extent, Darlan's behaviour.) They also now knew the Germans were intent on taking all of France, which in their defense, they may not have believed in 1940. To me, Toulon is not proof that Darlan was right – Darlan's position! it is proof (to me) how self-deceived senior French leaders were in 1940.

Having now myself wandered from the original question, I can't resist wandering back – by adding what a pathetic performance the French fleet managed with 6 hours warning. Further 'evidence' for the 'bad rap'. The US Navy had no warning at Pearl Harbor, yet Japan's strategic intent failed. The French Navy had 6 hours warning,but….

US readers of Mark I's second post need to also consider the attack by French forces on their fleet at Casablanca. US 'conciliatory' policy towards Vichy France made no difference in practice. Vichy ships were supported by German U-boats. For all practical purposes, Vicky was a loyal ally of Germany, not a betrayed ally of the Allies.

I read one account by a French infantryman on the front lines that they received no orders for three days(!) during the actual attack. All they heard was from troops passing them that claimed they had orders to withdraw, so finally the unit decided on their own to follow everyone else. They never saw the Germans.

I read one account by a French infantryman on the front lines that they received no orders for three days(!) during the actual attack. All they heard was from troops passing them that claimed they had orders to withdraw, so finally the unit decided on their own to follow everyone else.

Exactly!

And I have seen accounts by French soldiers and officers (and one journalist) of units being ordered to assemble in towns or depots that were already in German hands, or being told that they would receive support from units that had already retreated or been overrun. And often what they "heard from troops passing them" was that the panzers were coming, right around the corner, already bypassing them on the flank, etc.

Is it any wonder that the front line troops loose heart in such circumstances?

These are all the same things that I have seen in American accounts from Kasserine Pass in 1943 and the Ardennes in 1944, and in German accounts from Minsk in 1944.

They are all symptomatic of the same phenom … once you can get inside your enemy's decision cycle, his orders stop making sense, and rumors are every bit as credible as information from higher command. And armies that do not provide a great deal of autonomy (and training!) to the lowest levels of command, that is to say armies that rely on centralized decision-making, will tend to melt away.

This was the critical analysis done by several colonels in the US Army after the Vietnam war, that led to the Airland doctrine and the re-organization of US divisions and revamping of doctrine and training of the 1980s, that produced the extremely effective US Army that has so decisively trounced very powerful Iraqi forces in two land wars since 1989.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

The parallelism in the second post is flawed. To be a genuine parallel with Vichy France, the USA would have had to be already vanquished by Japan.

Yes, well are never perfect, are they?

However, the parallelism should be strong enough to make the point.

US was neutral in 1940. We did FAR LESS to help Britain than France did, and our navy was a FAR GREATER threat to British interests, should it fall into the wrong hands.

In my analogy the neutral US had moved its ships CLOSER to the risk of capture by the enemy, while in actual case the neutral French had moved their fleet FARTHER away from the risk of capture by the enemy. Moved their fleet farther away explicitly, deliberately, with fore-thought, in a measure intended to honor their commitment to their British allies … a measure that was communicated TO their British allies, and that their British allies then used as critical intelligence to attack said French fleet.

It would have to also have a rightist government, both sympathetic to Britain's enemies and willing to facilitate the murder of America's Jews.

Hmmm. Well, Britain had also just installed a rightist government (Churchill formed his government to replace Chamberlain in May of 1940).

At the beginning of July, 1940, Vichy was absolutely NOT sympathetic to Britain's enemies. Vichy was entirely and wholly focused on France's needs, while remaining sympathetic to Britain and Britain's interests. That is, until Britain launched an unprovoked attack. And then launched another unprovoked attack. And then another. Then … well … inexplicably they became somewhat more hostile towards the British.

And yet, French military intelligence continued to cooperate with their British counterparts, right up until the German occupation of Vichy in 1942. Yes, even as Britain was attacking French forces, the French were providing Britain with intercepts of German communications and appreciations of German and Italian forces, both on the continent and in North Africa.

Now as to Vichy's treatment of French Jews … there is little to defend. But I would opine that it sure is amazing to suggest that the British ever did ANYTHING to give comfort to European Jews. Or that they could make decisions in July of 1940 taking into account things that happened in 1941 and 1942! Gosh, too bad they didn't have all that perfect future vision in 1938!

But whether it was a perfect parallel or not was not the point of the analogy. The point of the analogy was to ask US readers to contemplate the perspective of having a British fleet deliver an ultimatum to "our" fleet, under threat of attack, specifically BECAUSE we were neutral.

That is the ultimatum that the RN delivered to Gensoul at Mers el Kabir: "Because you are neutral we shall destroy you if you don't surrender." We claim it was unreasonable French pride that guided the French reaction. But if it were an American admiral we would have expected the exact same reaction … or perhaps an even more forceful rejection. Oh those prideful French … who do they think they are, almost acting like they are Americans!

Also,I must point out that France was NOT Britain's ally at the time under discussion. The 3rd Republic – Britain's ally – had fallen. Technically, Vichy was 'neutral'. In practice, 2 million French soldiers were kept in Germany as slave workers to enforce Nazi control. Why was it so easy to believe their Navy was safe?

France had been Britain's ally. Britain had abandoned France to it's fate at Dunkirk (yes, I know not really. But pretty close to …). With German armies running rampant across France, and the French army unable to stem the tide, and more than 5 million displaced refugees already on the roads of France, and 80 million French citizens at risk, the French government struck the best deal they could.

To say the 3rd Republic had fallen is rather dis-ingenious. French governments "fell" 27 times between WW1 and WW2. A new government was formed, headed by Marshal Petain, according to French constitutional processes, BEFORE the armistice. Britain was still allied to that government. After the armistice was signed, Britain waited all of FOUR DAYS before attacking.

In fact, it makes me now regard Gensoul's pride as entirely responsible for the unnecessary death of his own sailors.

OK, so put yourself in his position and consider … how would you have responded?

Let's see. My ships are in port, at anchor. If I surrender them, we may lose our homeland with 50 million French citizens. If I don't surrender, my sailors may be in for a rough day. Hmmmmm, what is my duty as a French Naval officer?

No wonder the French fleet scuttled at Toulon. They now knew that Britain was not bluffing …

The scuttling of the fleet at Toulon had exactly NOTHING to do with whether the British were or were not bluffing. It had to do with the French commitment that the Germans would never take the French fleet. The tanks at the gates of the harbor were German, not British.

There was nothing the Brits could do to affect events on the continent in 1942. Any reference to the British, in the context of the scuttling of the fleet at Toulon, is or was 100% bluff.

They also now knew the Germans were intent on taking all of France, which in their defense, they may not have believed in 1940. To me, Toulon is not proof that Darlan was right – Darlan's position! it is proof (to me) how self-deceived senior French leaders were in 1940.

Hmm. Let's see.

France tells Germany that they will keep their fleet and colonies neutral if Germany will allow them to withdraw from the war. Germany agrees.

France defends its fleet from the British. Germany does not invade. Germany makes no demands on the fleet.

France defends Syria from the British. Germany does not invade. Germany makes no demands on the fleet.

France defends Madagascar from the British. Germany does not invade. Germany makes no demands on the fleet.

French forces in Algeria and Morocco capitulate to US and British forces. Germany immediately invades Vichy France and French Tunisia. Germany demands that the fleet in Toulon surrender. The fleet scuttles.

Yep, I can't see how Darlan so deceived himself to think that defending the French colonial territories and fleet were worth it, as that was only 100% effective at keeping the Germans out of the remainder of occidental France.

Now after all of that, I say again, I am not a fan of Vichy. Neither are any of the French folks I've ever spoken to about these things. But the question here, as I understand it, is focused on the behavior of the French military. Why do they get a bad rap?

To suggest that a sailor or soldier, officer or enlisted, in the service of his country, was acting somehow dishonorably by protecting the interests of his nation and his people, as his legally formed and continuously serving government saw fit to issue to him in his orders, well it defies history and gives a very distorted understanding of a complicated and nuanced situation.

Don't turn reality upside-down by appealing to "blame the French" sentiments. It was Britain that was the hostile agent at Mers el Kabir, launching an un-provoked attack on a neutral fleet… not the French. It was the US that launched an unprovoked attack and invasion against a neutral nation's military forces and territory at Casablanca … not the French.

Don't bash the French for doing their duty. They were placed into an almost impossible position. Even though many put their sympathies with the Allies, they knew it would cost them their homeland if they didn't fight. History proves they were correct. Don't heap dishonor on the already sad fate of the French in 1940-42.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Mark, that was a superb summary.

Thanks,

Pat

The 1940 Churchill coalition wasn't exactly 'rightist' though, which in a British context would mean Conservative (that was Chamberlain). Here's the 1940 Cabinet, with political affiliations. More of a cross-party wartime 'unity' government IMHO. link link

Remember also that Churchill was very much a francophile.

Just a small point, not trying to hijack the thread, but:

the French had the only ships in service that were both faster than the German panzerschiffes and heavily enough armed to face them in single combat

is not quite correct. Hood, Renown and Repulse could each defeat a Panzerschiff quite as easily as Dunkerque or Strasbourg. So could the King George V class BBs, for that matter, but they weren't quite ready for the early cruises of Graf Spee and Lutzow.

"Britain had abandoned France to it's fate at Dunkirk"

While simultaneously evacuating a quarter of a million French troops, holding out with one more division and shipping a further two divisions, plus evacuated French troops, back into Cherbourg and Brest to carry on the fight…

EH?

"Or that they could make decisions in July of 1940 taking into account things that happened in 1941 and 1942!"

We did: We predicted that France's fleet would end up in German hands and be an insurmountable threat to our survival and acted upon it.

"France defends Madagascar from the British. "

Yes, the same France that completely failed to defend Indochina from being used as a Japanese base…

On a technical point entering into unilateral discussions on capitulation would end any alliance. Can anyone think of an alliance that survived one of the parties surrendering to the common enemy?

Mark – I don't think we are going to agree. I'm too prejudiced, but not against the ordinary French serviceman.

This fascinating thread is exploring how France has got a bad rap. I'm not saying it is entirely deserved. I am just saying it is very understandable.

I'm sure the world is secretly very grateful for France's brave stand against Britain in Madagascar and Syria, it's noble defence against the US at Casablanca….. How was Vichy 'neutral', whilst permitting the activities of the Milice, the raising of a French Waffen SS Division, anti-Ally combat action, etc?

It's entirely incorrect to call Britain's cross-party coalition government Rightist. A summary that is fluent but erroneous cannot be superb.Fall of French governments were indeed common. However, this was the Fall of France, understood as such at the time, and the fall of the 3rd Republic,(which is why the 1946 government initiated the 4th Republic, which continues today.)

Vichy was proto-Fascist at the least – hence the executions post-war insisted upon by De Gaulle. Let's not forget that the senior figures of the State you call neutral, Mark, were regarded as traitors by the Free French and subsequently the 4th Republic. But Britain had to see them as allies????

Up date your infos Beaumap, now it is the 5th Republic since may of 1958 …

I do not know if the Frenchies rep is that low but if they would not be around one third of the Osprey's titles would not exist and we would not have that many stories to tell …

World is probably not so gratefull for Vichy's achievements,as it is certain than the "Dos de mayo" and the victory of an ignorant mob led by obscurantist monks allied to Britain in 1814 led Spain to the best: two more centuries of dictatorship, including a 2 millions casualties civil war.
It is sometimes good to be defeated, ask the Germans and the Japs!

Don't think Russian historians/media have a French bashing stance.
They were respected in times of Napoleon. AT that time Napoleon armies deserved respect,and also being able to defeat a strong enemy was giving a nation more pride than kicking a lousy opponent.
During Crimean war French and British were considered to be tier 1 opponent. In the media French were portrayed as more impressive, glory-searching command in contrast with scheming Brits who were trying to win the war with other hands.
In WWI due to large involvement in the west under French command (Russian expeditional forces) there was a lot of first-hand accounts on what was happening in the trenches.
So both Tommy Atkins and Jacque (not sure how the French called their grunts) were respected.
Pre-WWII Soviet Union had better relations with France than with UK. The collapse of 1940 was shock, as both Stalin and HQ were expecting more resistance in the West.
Still, no real French bashing then. Vichy government got a large dose of hatred later on. De Gaulle was quite popular, and Normandia-Neman fighter unit history and operation received a very positive press. Even at cold war times there were several times when WWII veterans were meeting each other and I was lucky to see Mirage squad in the air in 1975 – just in the air above our summer house….

one thing explain what was France in 1940…
the norwegian campaign
Bad plans ( Chasseurs Alpins in Namos with no supply, no ammunitions, no AA support, ), heroic fighting, and victory in Narvik because of a group of HQ talented officers and well equiped, well supplied, motivated troops ( and not only FFL ) … and the support of the navy and some british landing crafts … then, the british and french HQ/Gvt sounded an ignominious retreat, closing the second front …

In France, the "vieilles badernes" of the french HQ were too old, most of them thinking that mister Hitler was a good guy … And i'm not sure that the British HQ was different …

The "bad rap" comes from the minds of most gamers because we remember four things.

1. France would have lost WWI and what went down in most peoples minds was Foch's "We are waiting for the Americans."

2. The whole fiasco of WWII. (from 1933 to De Gaul's basically allying himself sentimentally with the Nazi's against the Americans. He was nothing but a creature of the Americans-- I mean a create-ure and he owed us everything.

3. The whole history of Nato where if war came, we realized we would have to fight a two front war against the Russians AND the French, and that made us sympathize with the Kaiser and the Nazi's. Thankfully, if it ever came, we would have gone from the Rhine to Paris in shorter time than the Nazi's did.

4. The insults and insolence of everyone who went to Paris and France on vacation in the 20th century and came away, after having met the French, and the insults and arrogance of the Parisians, deciding that the they deserved the Nazi's.

We all grew up with this mind-set because there were part of our day-to day lives.

It took a later age to learn to discount what their eyes and ears showed them and listen to what the radical-chic elites told them.

I think the biggest reason for their failures was their geographic location – next to a country that was better prepared, motivated, trained and led. Ask yourself how good your NFL football team would be if they were in the same conference as the Patriots? They could have a winning record every year and never go to the Super Bowl.

In Indochina the French underestimated the enemy. They set up in a poor tactical position in a valley at Dien Bien Phu on purpose to draw in Ho Chi Minh's troops to defeat them in a large battle. The Vietnamese hand carried medium and heavy artillery into the surrounding mountains, something the French were not expecting and pounded the French defensive positions taking them one by one. The French did not have the logistical support to reinforce or air power to interdict but they fought bravely. The US could have done more to help but did not because of political reasons.

In WWII the Americans surrendered in the Philippines and the British in Singapore for basically the same reasons the French did in Indochina and in WWII. Surprised by an enemy that had the initiative, better logistical support and attacked from an unexpected area. That is no reflection on the fighting man or their small unit leadership.

I trained with the French Foreign Legion 2nd Paras on Corsica. They are well led and motivated as the US Marines and Royal Marines I worked with too. The French Battalion attached to the US Army in Korea was led by combat proven leaders and volunteers who hated Communism and were willing to go half way around the world to risk their lives and fight it. They had the effective logistical support and higher up leadership of the US and General Ridgeway. Something they didn't have in 1940. They gave as good an account of themselves as the US Army.

Here is an excerpt from one of their actions from official US Army history: These two machine guns fired steadily for several hours, although no close action developed until about 0200 on 14 February when a group of Chinese made an attack against the French Battalion just to the right of the machine-gun outpost. The enemy soldiers formed one hundred or two hundred yards in front of the small hill which the French occupied, then launched their attack, blowing whistles and bugles, and running with bayonets fixed. When this noise started, the French soldiers began cranking a hand siren they had, and one squad started running toward the Chinese, yelling and throwing grenades far to the front and to the side. When the two forces were within twenty yards of each other the Chinese suddenly turned and ran in the opposite direction. It was all over within a minute. After this incident it was relatively quiet in the rice paddies near the road cut.

History in Korea: link

Leadership + Training + Motivation + Combined Arms + Logistical Support = Fighting Effectiveness. A well led, trained and motivated combined arms unit that has all of the logistical support it needs to win is an effective fighting force, irregardless of their nationality. A unit that lacks in leadership, training, motivation or logistical support will normally lose to the one who has more. How effective would the US Army had been in WWII if they had the same level of logistical support and combined arms as the Germans?

I'd be careful about giving generalized national characteristics and morale ratings in small unit actions in a war game.

Wolfhag

Mark 1 seems not so much a gallophile as an anglophobe….Britain took in more German-Jewish refugees than ANY other country pre-WW2. Certainly more than the USA, despite tha large its well-organized Jewish lobby…..

One of the problems the French suffer is that anyone reading the history of WW1 on the Western Front in the English language, as written by British historians, would be shocked to learn that France actually had any troops fighting there. Written (half) in jest, of course.

As to France's experience with war in the mid-20th Century, I recommend reading Bernard Fall's book "Street Without Joy". What he presented in that book will come as a sobering surprise to many. My personal opinion is that whatever blots may stain France's military, the responsibility rests more with her politicians than with her fighting men.

B

"I think the biggest reason for their failures was their geographic location"

Frances geographic location, wealth and natural defences allowed it dominate Europe for three centuries.

Then those pesky Prussians came along, kicked over the apple cart and screwed up world history for the next hundred years.

….. Interesting demographic factoid I read recently: late 18th C France was the third most populous nation on earth after Russia and China.

B