"British Expeditionary Corp - Quality?" Topic

I must correct myself on Osborn, as he has events one day out in his report. In fact he reports at Malvern Hill he was too far right to engage and only fired 79 rounds that day.

Of all the battery commanders in line I checked none report firing on enemy batteries ca. 1300-1430. Whereas Armistead's report is of course definite Pegram's and Grimes' batteries were cut down in this period.

Of course the big siege guns on the hill report opening a counter battery fire at 1000 hours, lasting until 1830 when indeed Porter ordered them withdrawn.

Report at link

It seems to me that almost exclusively the siege pieces fired counterbattery, whilst the field batteries preserved their fire almost entirely for infantry.

"It seems to me that almost exclusively the siege pieces fired counterbattery, whilst the field batteries preserved their fire almost entirely for infantry."

Which is pretty much according to the doctrine of the time.

Re: The CSA's Whitworths…

According to E.P. Alexander (Longstreet's Arty chief) the Whitworths had their strengths and weaknesses.

On the plus side was their exceptional accuracy and range. On the minus side was the fragile nature of the breech mechanism (not unusual since the technology was new and not yet 'soldier proof'. The RA had some of the same problems, IIRC), the too small shell (the bolt design did not allow for much of a filler), and the heavy and awkward carriage (the entire gun weighed some 20%-25% more that a 3" Ordnance Rifle. Later in the war the Richmond Armory designed a lighter and more robust carriage). The final problem had to do with how to use the gun to its best advantage. Given the nature of most of most ACW battlefields, the long range could not be brought into play as often as liked. So the lesser ranged alternative with a better shell became more desirable. Given the pluses and minuses involved, Alexander concluded that for most missions, the 3" Ordnance Rifle was a better fit for the army's needs.

I see that others have clarified the picture very nicely re the fact that it was Hunt who was in tactical command of the artillery (including the guns of the siege train) at Malvern Hill that day. I'm sure that the Whitworths were did their full part at Malvern Hill, but there were probably 30-40 other guns participating in the counter-battery fire and I see no evidence or testimony that the fire of the Whitworths was uniquely superior.

Here is E P Alexander's opinion of the Whitworth in his own words, as cited by Hazlett – "As a general field-piece its efficiency was impaired by its weight and the very cumbrous English carriage on which it was mounted and while a few in the army may often be valuable the United States three-inch rifle is much more generally serviceable with good ammunition."

To be sure, the Whitworth was a gun with excellent ballistics for its time. The fact that those present in the Union artillery were assigned to the siege train suggests two thing to me: (1) that they were seen as useful weapons for long-range precision fire; (2) that they were insufficiently mobile to accompany the forces in the field. On the other hand, what was the actual quantified practical difference between the battlefield performance of the Whitworth and, for example, the US 3in ordnance rifle (another weapon with a reputation for excellent accuracy) at combat ranges within the practical limit of the sighting apparatus of the day? Reading between the lines of Alexander's comment above, the difference, if any at all, was not sufficient to sway his opinion in favor of the Whitworth as a battlefield implement.

The Whitworth, despite its long-range accuracy, was limited due to its lack of effective anti-infantry ordinance.

Primarily firing a solid "bolt" that could disable a gun carriage, or batter a fortification it made sense for the Union to employ them with the siege train. After the Peninsular Campaign the Union sent the Whitworth's to the defenses of Washington where they could also be employed for river defense.

The Confederates kept a couple with the field artillery, eventually putting two single guns into one section in Hardaway's battery. With their limitations it's clear that Alexander's assessment that 3" rifles would be better makes perfect sense.

Kim

During Gen. Gillmore's bombardment of Fort Sumter, besides numerous mortars and Parrott rifles of various calibers, he had 2 large Whitworths, taken from a captured blockade runner. They were manned by Naval personnel ashore. Here's what Gillmore's chief of artillery, Colonel John W. Turner, said about them in his report (OR Series I, Vol. 28, Part I, p.223):

"The two 80-pounder Whitworth guns in the naval battery, though not under my supervision, came under my observation. These guns opened fire with shell, but it was found necessary to abandon their use entirely, in consequence of their repeated and constant premature explosions, which greatly endangered our troops in the advance trenches, and of the probable injury it would do the guns. Solid shot was then used exclusively. There appeared to be much difficulty at times in loading these guns by the projectile wedging when part way down. It could then be rammed home only by heavy blows of a handspike or by attaching a powerful purchase. They were very unsatisfactory in point of accuracy, shooting very wild, seldom hitting Fort Sumter at a distance of 3,980 yards. In comparison with the 8-inch Parrotts in the same battery, they fell far short in accuracy, and subsequently one of them became disabled by the gun apparently sliding through the re-enforce to the rear. A displacement of nearly an inch took place, closing the vent completely. The other being considered unsafe after this, further use of it was discontinued."

These guns were obviously muzzle-loaders. I believe they had a bore of about 5 inches.