"British Expeditionary Corp - Quality?" Topic

….. I posted the above in the manner I did, because I try to be intellectually honest. I could have conveniently omitted the second sentence.

Your job is to read it with proper objectivity and not wildly jump to convenient conclusions. It relates to the serving of a turreted 15in gun, not the 11in gun as mounted in the Monitor at Hampton Roads. Monitor fired 44 rounds in that engagement, which did not by any stretch involve (as implied by your math) 5 to 7 hours of shooting.

B

"Ok, got me there. Of course, if Britain is at war with with Russia, then why would she go to war with the US? Or.. If she's at war with the US, then why would she go to war with Russia? Doesn't make sense, does it now? "

The proposition was that Russia would declare war on Britain and send troops to America to fight the British. I think you didn't bother to read it.

"Most navies worry about SEAGOING assets (including the RN). A floating battery does not a SEAGOING asset make. And you are the only one who can't see the difference. You're not seriously suggesting Terror would take up a position in a battleline with Warrior, Defence, et al? If yes, then you know even less about less naval warfare than you've already shown. "

Well, there's a quibble over nothing. So again, shall we enumerate all the US ironclads that aren't floating batteries:

Galena

That is all.

"A for the 'commissioning' issue. Well, you can push a ship out before its completed (its been done many times). Not generally a good idea, though. As for Defence being 'commissioned': So what? She got her assignment. Whoopee. Doesn't change the fact that she was still under dockyard hands getting fitted out. And I doubt the Admiralty would have been very happy sending her out that way. "

The point is lost I see.

All those ships you write off as not yet Commissioned – they can be within a month if the need arises.

Lets be kind and set the date as March '63, after the Passaics have Commissioned (bar one). The following are in Commission or in Reserve and activatable within a month:

(Aetna)
Black Prince
Caledonia
Defence
(Erebus)
(Glatton)
Hector
Prince Consort
Resistance
Royal Oak
(Terror)
(Thunder)
(Thunderbolt)
(Trusty)
Warrior

Merely 8 armoured frigates. I exclude all the batteries, as you don't like them, and the US have a full 10 ironclads in Commission, but all of them batteries.

"Parkes isn't my only source. Unlike you, I don't cherrypick sources. "

Apparently you do, since you've just acknowledged deliberately ignoring one source (Parkes) that contradicts your thesis.

"Never said a single hole. But multiple hits, even hits in the citadel waterline (which could open seams through shock) could. "

Indeed, so lets repeat probabilities. On average a US battery needs to fire 1,300 rounds for each waterline hit given the assumptions above. Since a monitor carried around 60 rounds, it would get a waterline hit once every 22 sorties, assuming it expended all its ammunition every time.

Or maybe we shouldn't be so cruel. At ranges of less than 200 yards USS Monitor hit the Virginia with 20 or her 41 rounds expended. Of course not one of these shots hit Virginia at the waterline so it's difficult to tell. Of course there are no hits at the waterline because the Monitor couldn't depress her guns below horizontal. The later Passaics couldn't depress or elevate the 15" at all because of the smokebox, hence couldn't hit a target beyond about 300 yards with it unless they skipped the ball.

So – Monitor firing at the waterline:

If closer than 300 yards waterline hits are impossible because the guns can't depress.

If greater than 300 yards the chances of a single hit on the waterline become minor, and the chances of multiple ones negligible.

In fact a wooden US warship could stand a much better chance of inflicting significant damage, especially a big frigate. However it would not be shell-proof and would suffer heavily from Warrior's 112 lb shells.

"Your job is to read it with proper objectivity and not wildly jump to convenient conclusions. It relates to the serving of a turreted 15in gun, not the 11in gun as mounted in the Monitor at Hampton Roads. Monitor fired 44 rounds in that engagement, which did not by any stretch involve (as implied by your math) 5 to 7 hours of shooting."

41 rounds, divided equally between serials 27 and 28 between 8.45 and 12.15, just over 5 minutes per load (respective reports of Lt Greene, acting commander US ironclad steamer Monitor (12th March '62) and Lt Jeffers, battery captain US cased battery Monitor (16th March '62)).

At Charleston, in ca. 2 hrs 15 mins firing the ironclads fired:

New Ironsides: 8 rounds
Montauk: 17 rounds
Passaic: 13 rounds (turret knocked out)
Weehawken: 26 rounds (leading the column)
Patapsco: 10 rounds (turret knocked out)
Catskill: 22 rounds
Nantucket: 15 rounds (turret knocked out)
Nahant: 15 rounds (turret knocked out)
Keokuk: 3 rounds (then sunk)

Of the nine ironclads one could't point herself at the enemy (NI), 4 had the turrets knocked out by concussion of enemy fire and Keokuk was riddled and sunk.

"All those ships you write off as not yet Commissioned – they can be within a month if the need arises."

THAT I sincerely doubt. 3 months, maybe to full combat ready. And I got your point; I just don't agreed with it (and I doubt any serious historian would).

No one is seriously debating that the RN could defeat the USN if Britain intervened. Of course they would prevail; given the size of the RN, they damn will better. But it would not be the pushover that you so vehemently contend. And they may even lose one (or more) of their precious ironclads in the process.

"THAT I sincerely doubt. 3 months, maybe to full combat ready. And I got your point; I just don't agreed with it (and I doubt any serious historian would). "

Fair enough, you don't agree with it. You have no actual evidence to contradict it.

Of course, any "serious historian" would ask when these ships were actually ready for sea. One might by lead to Lord Pagets statement during the 1863 Navy Estimates ( link ), and one might even note he states why ships weren't ready more quickly. Unlike the US the British tested their plates and rejected those not of the highest quality. Of course in event of war they intended to use readily available average quality iron and rapidly plate a lot of additional ships with armour only as good as that of France or America.

"No one is seriously debating that the RN could defeat the USN if Britain intervened. Of course they would prevail; given the size of the RN, they damn will better. But it would not be the pushover that you so vehemently contend. And they may even lose one (or more) of their precious ironclads in the process."

Certainly might lose one, put probably not Warrior. Royal Oak, Caledonia etc. are much better candidates for sinking due to their lack of subdivision.

[ 1 ] 41 rounds is correct – finger slip. You missed the twenty-odd minutes spent by Monitor when she withdrew from action to replenish her turret ammunition supply.

[ 2 ] It is not useful to simple quote rounds expended per ship unless you can demonstrate the time in action per ship. Because the battle overall lasted 2 hours and 15 minutes says nothing about the participation of each ship individually. Try taking such an approach to the British ships at Trafalgar and see what kind of nonsensical results are produced.

[ 3 ] Re waterline hits – I'm sorry to say this, but your continued obtuseness about the number of waterline hits produced by Kearsarge upon Alabama at 400-800 yards is simply beyond rational belief. Your 1 in 1300 frequency claim is meaningless eye-rolling imagineering unless you can demonstrate some actual foundation for the claim – which I seriously doubt. A projectile fired from an XI-inch or XV-inch Dalghren @ zero degrees elevation with axis of bore at 10 feet above the plane would strike the plane at approx. 300 yards. Monitor's gun axes were, by best interpretation of available plans, about 6 feet above the plane, so make that 200 yards. It has not yet been firmly established whether gun carriages employed aboard US monitors permitted angles of depression below zero degrees, but I'm willing to bet a lunch that they allowed for the service standard 5 degrees. Ricochet fire is really what does the job.

It really gets tiresome having to fact-check everything you claim, only to discover that 75 pct of your assertions are either outright wrong or are illogical and unjustified extrapolations drawn from the 25 pct of data that you somehow actually manage to get right. You need to go off and find a new forum for your fantastically amazing analyses. I really don't think we are a good audience for you.

B

"Of course, any "serious historian" would ask when these ships were actually ready for sea. One might by lead to Lord Pagets statement during the 1863 Navy Estimates"

Thank you for the link, very informative. Now, you do realize that this is Paget's ESTIMATE of what the navy will look like going forward from Feb 1863 (hence, The Navy Estimate). While valuable in intent, it obviously can't tell what actually is in service 6, 12, or 18 months out (unless Paget has access to a crystal ball!). Delays happen, for any number of reasons. And there is no way such delays can be predicted. So while this document is useful for telling where Paget hoped the navy would go, it doesn't tell where it actually went. So I'm at a loss as to how this proves your point.

I have to agree with blutarski (who said it far better than me). Between your wild assertions and misinterpretations, it has become evident that you have absolutely no idea on how to conduct proper historical research. The sad part is when you drop your "facts" on forums such as this, those not grounded in the subject area (and who are just looking for information) run the risk of being taken in by your agenda driven nonsense. And that I find that particularly disgusting…

Maybe you should go find some alt history/fantasy forum for your views…

"[ 1 ] 41 rounds is correct – finger slip. You missed the twenty-odd minutes spent by Monitor when she withdrew from action to replenish her turret ammunition supply."

In context this means nothing. Like using automatic weapon cyclic rates as an indicator of real combat usage.

If Monitor has to pause firing to replenish the turret then it is bringing the average RoF down, and hence the rate of hitting. Against a ship 10 kts faster than her she has no opportunity to withdraw if in open water and can expect 400 rounds coming at her during the process.

"[ 2 ] It is not useful to simple quote rounds expended per ship unless you can demonstrate the time in action per ship. Because the battle overall lasted 2 hours and 15 minutes says nothing about the participation of each ship individually. Try taking such an approach to the British ships at Trafalgar and see what kind of nonsensical results are produced."

Indeed, but at Trafalgar ships were not continually firing. Relatively at Hampton Roads or Charleston they were.

"[ 3 ] Re waterline hits – I'm sorry to say this, but your continued obtuseness about the number of waterline hits produced by Kearsarge upon Alabama at 400-800 yards is simply beyond rational belief. Your 1 in 1300 frequency claim is meaningless eye-rolling imagineering unless you can demonstrate some actual foundation for the claim – which I seriously doubt. A projectile fired from an XI-inch or XV-inch Dalghren @ zero degrees elevation with axis of bore at 10 feet above the plane would strike the plane at approx. 300 yards. Monitor's gun axes were, by best interpretation of available plans, about 6 feet above the plane, so make that 200 yards. It has not yet been firmly established whether gun carriages employed aboard US monitors permitted angles of depression below zero degrees, but I'm willing to bet a lunch that they allowed for the service standard 5 degrees. Ricochet fire is really what does the job."

Since Kearsarge probably only struck Alabama twice at the waterline in 173 rounds expended then indeed to within round 1% of rounds expended hit the enemy waterline.

Now factor into account that a monitor is going to hit a lot less, and that the majority of waterline hits will be on the citadel. If we are very kind to monitors accuracy at 800 yds setting it at 10% (a high value from extending the power curve from her Hampton Roads performance) then we're upto around 1 rd in 400 *expended* striking Warrior on the waterline. In fact this certainly seriously overstates the accuracy of a monitor at longer ranges, since we've extended the "2D" point blank range to the "3D" problem of long range shooting.

Even this "better" number means half a dozen sorties are needed per hit.

Monitor's gunnery was of course a bizarre thing. At Hampton Roads they found that the gearing on the turret had rusted and in the end they set the turret slowly rotating with the gun captain sticking his head through the gunport (as they wedged the shutters open) and loosing off a round "on the fly" when the turret was point approximately the right way. Not great against a target 100 yards away, pointless against one 800 yards away.

"It really gets tiresome having to fact-check everything you claim, only to discover that 75 pct of your assertions are either outright wrong or are illogical and unjustified extrapolations drawn from the 25 pct of data that you somehow actually manage to get right. You need to go off and find a new forum for your fantastically amazing analyses. I really don't think we are a good audience for you."

Perhaps not. Or perhaps, given the assumption you don't have a deep seated sense of racial or cultural superiority over non-Americans, one could apply that to oneself.

In fact one of the good things about fora is that ones ideas can be challenged and adjusted if found wanting, assuming one is willing. Lets go back to this

"1863 test: 15in Rodman smoothbore; 400lb spherical shot, 40 lb charge; range 200 yards; target 4.5in plate + 5 x 1.1in plates + 20in oak backing. Result: disk broken out of the 4.5in plate; 1.1 plates bent but not broken; oak backing slightly crushed; nearly all mounting bolts sheared or dislodged.

1865 test: 15in Rodman smoothbore; 400lb spherical shot, 60 lb charge; range 50 yards; target 6in solid plate of French manufacture (Petin, Gaudet & Co) 30in oak backing. Result: plate cracked, smashed and completely penetrated.

These were the results with 40lb or 60lb charges of ordinary cannon powder. The 15in Rodman was shortly thereafter proofed for a 100lb charge."

Of course, I can read the original – link and you're referring to serials 179 and 181a.

Since you want to suggest power of the 15" you skip one vital piece of information from serial 181a, the range was 50 feet. You also miss the fact that these experiments were with standard NCP, and the 100 lb charge was Mammoth. The 60 lb NCP produced 1,480 fps MV, whereas the MV with 100 lbs Mammoth was 1,538 fps (see link Not actually that big a jump is it?

"I have to agree with blutarski (who said it far better than me). Between your wild assertions and misinterpretations, it has become evident that you have absolutely no idea on how to conduct proper historical research. The sad part is when you drop your "facts" on forums such as this, those not grounded in the subject area (and who are just looking for information) run the risk of being taken in by your agenda driven nonsense. And that I find that particularly disgusting…"

Indeed, the propagation of incorrect information and bad experiments of a bugbear of mine. Hence I challenge bad information such as:

* 125 lb charges for the Rodman (incorrect, no ordnance manual shows this and there are no records of any such experiments. It is most likely an incorrect reading of the experiments with the 20" Rodman in 1867 which did fire 4x 125 lb charges).

* The Rodman used 100 lbs of hexagonal cake (wrong, it was Mammoth)

* HMS Terror does not exist and does not appear in the Navy List (immediately shows HMS Terror in the Navy List and a reference to USS Dacotah encountering her of St. Thomas)

* The 11 inch Dahlgrens of Monitor were not fully proofed (wrong, they'd been in service over a year and were serial no.s 27 and 28 which had been mounted on USS Dacotah. The 15 lb charges were the maximum authorised in 1862. In 1864 the navy authorised 20 lbs as a far or battering charge. No 30 lb charge was ever authorised)

I'm also very annoyed by things like people citing Parkes as "definitive", yet ignoring it when this "definitive" work contradicts their own thesis. Anyway, aren't you done with this "discussion"? Wasn't it too challenging to your opinions?

That is very funny tiggr chiding others for ignoring data that doesnt fit thier idea. And yes it is a massive waste of time as he is never going to allow any pro american idea to enter hois head no matter what.

Not that there are not plenty of americans who act the same way.I jsut find it odd that he hangs out on an American civil war board just so he can tell us all how stupid americans are, and how worthless all american equipment was and what totaly crappy soldiers we where.

So, why are we not still a british colony?

"Indeed, the propagation of incorrect information and bad experiments of a bugbear of mine"

Given the gross misrepresentation, misinterpretation and flat out manipulation that you engage in support of your virulent anti-US agenda (in this and other threads), the above statement comes off as absolutely hilarious.

Your agenda driven rants have had one profound effect: They have utterly and completely stripped you of any credibility.

I suppose some Lost Cause or Britannia Forever types would find comfort in your 'profound' ramblings. But those with even a cursory knowledge of the period will find them sad and even pathetic…

Enjoy your fantasy, I'm sure it gives you comfort….

badger22- Yeah, we have loons, too. And reading their ultra America Forever! stuff is enough to make your teeth hurt.

'So, why are we not still a british colony?'

Well, if we're to believe SOME people (so he can tell us all how stupid americans are, and how worthless all american equipment was and what totaly crappy soldiers we were), I can only quote one of my Texas relatives (whose great whatever served in the 1st Texas) favorite lines:

'Heck son, even a blind squirrel can find a nut once in awhile!'

I guess we found the nut!

"That is very funny tiggr chiding others for ignoring data that doesnt fit thier idea. And yes it is a massive waste of time as he is never going to allow any pro american idea to enter hois head no matter what."

Thank you for admitting your bias. I am indeed rejecting some very biased pro-American notions, and least those contradicted by the available evidence.

It looks like we've pretty much exhausted this conversation, since you ceased engaging with the topic several days ago for continued bouts of righteous indignation. Perhaps you'd care to proffer some evidence to back up your "ad-hoc reckons"? Simple things like finding an ordnance manual with authorised 30 lb charge for 11" Dahlgren or 125 lbs charges (of Mammoth, NCP, pressed cake or even No. 7!) for the 15" Rodman would have backed up your claims. However, you didn't do that, and so you didn't win – not that any of us are winners in this.

Now the done thing to do is agree with your fellow American, condemn all evidence contrary to your ideas as "fantasy" and look forward to this whole argument being repeated again (since I know we've had it at least once before, with the same result) somewhere else.

From Ordnance, July-August 1962. Written by Donald B. Webster, Jr.

<quote>
Perhaps even more important than his casting procedure was Rodman's development of progressive-burning powder. When any gun fires, of course, the volume of the bore behind the projectile increases as the projectile travels toward the muzzle. The normal black powder grain, however, irregular in shape, burns from the outside, so that its burning surface area continually decreases. Thus, in a normal black-powder piece, initial breech pressure is the highest obtained; the forward traveling projectile increases bore volume as the powder burns at a decreasing rate. Both occurrences reduce interior bore pressure.
Rodman proposed powder pressed into hexagonal grains perforated with several longitudinal holes so that as individual grains burned both inside and out, albeit almost instantaneously, the burning surface of each grain actually would increase. Rodman's powder didn't increase pressures--it simply maintained a higher bore pressure than normal powder could, as the projectile traveled forward. The result, logically, was an increased muzzle velocity of the projectile.
With charges of his hexagonal powder, Rodman's 15-inch gun, with its abnormally low bore, length-diameter ratio, fired its 330-pound shell at a muzzle velocity of 1,735 feet a second, much faster than the velocity achieved with any other gun, including many with bore length-diameter ratios as high as 20 to 1. With a 50-pound charge of hexagonal powder (two-fifths of the later standard 125-pound charge) the 15-inch gun at 25 degrees elevation had a maximum range of 4,680 yards.
<unquote>

- – -

Happy now? Please go away.

B

What a fascinating illustration of standards of evidence.

Here you have provided a secondary source which is a hundred years removed from the events and provides no citations.

A primary source would be something like the Chief of Ordnance reporting in 1868 – "This charge, viz: 100 pounds of powder, and a shot weighing 450 pounds, was then fixed upon by this bureau as the maximum charge for 15-inch guns…" ( link ).

We can discuss the errors in your secondary source, but in fact we have already. What is more interesting is the standard of evidence you are applying. Apparently a secondary source of dubious accuracy without any citations to back up its claims is okay – but only as long as it says what you want it to say.

Whereas primary sources, such as the statements of the contemporary Chief of Ordnance as ignored.

I'll repeat – can you give a *primary source* on a 125 service charge of any powder? Not a random error riddled secondary source?

I must admit – you do have a special flair for unintended tragicomedy. That is at once the funniest and saddest thing I have read in a long time.

B

So that's "no, I don't have a primary source to back up my so-far groundless assertion, but I don't intend to let that stop me insult you". Well done you! When you've got nothing put up a brave front.

Whatever you choose to believe or imply about me is perfectly fine with me. Feel free to declare victory and raise a toast to yourself. I really don't care.

After that, however, please move find another forum to enrich.

B

I posted to this thread entirely because I'd been assembling brigade assignments, brigade commanders etc. of the British Army that could be sent to America in 1862, you may have missed it: link Hopefully at least it will help the OP get some brigade commanders names right.

You OTOH have contributed precisely nothing to the actual purpose this thread. Well done I suppose. Forgive me if when I have something useful for those interested I contribute, and please also forgive my low tolerance for poor research.

Whatever…….

Low tolerance for poor research? And yet you used the figure of 850 shot to hit for custer, which is not only vastly poor research, it is even poor basic math.

And when you post something that poorly done, it makes the rest of what you do suspect. Not that that seems to bother you in the least.

I would like to learn more about the real capabilities, but i dont see that happening from somebpody that started with the final answer, cherrypicked battles and data that suppoort that answer, and is convinced that he already has all the answers and no alternate theory could possibly have any validity.

owen

Well I'd managed to resist for 171 posts but I finally cracked and had to see if my prejudice was being justified.

Glad to see you guys didn't let me down, more tangents than a Geometry class and enough hot air for a balloon flight!

Ah well, not quite Harry Turledove I suppose.

I'm seeing this from two angles. I don't agree that British regulars were significantly better than the American troops (it didn't help in 1776 so much), but then I'm not seeing any willingness to concede that the British regulars may well have been better (American psyche?)

Anyway my campaign has started regardless. The 4 corps ANV has been stopped at winchester after Hill's Corp ran into the Union XI and XII corps, both sides taking a mauling before Hill retires South.

Anyway my campaign has started regardless. The 4 corps ANV has been stopped at winchester after Hill's Corp ran into the Union XI and XII corps, both sides taking a mauling before Hill retires South.

Well that has got to be first for the "Flying Dutchmen" of the XI Corps stopping anyone. Talk about imaginary battles!

Kim

"And yet you used the figure of 850 shot to hit for custer, which is not only vastly poor research, it is even poor basic math. "

The number of Indian men hit was 41*. Yes I erred because when I included 10 women and children hit by the 7th in the Hunkpapa village.

I also erred because I the figures in the literature ignore any rounds fired by Custer's 5 companies, because there is no return of them. The remaining 7 companies expended 38,030 carbine and 2,954 revolver rounds.

I will recalculate to (38,030 + 2,954) / 41 = 1,000 rounds expended per hit. This excludes the rounds fired by Custer's 5 companies, and since about a third of the Indian casualties were around Custer and Calhoun Hill's one would surmise fire effectiveness may have been closer to 1,500 rounds per hit.

Thanks for pointing out my error. I will double check published figures next time.

* 29 Killed:

Bad Yellow Hair
Bear With Horns
Black Bear
Breech Cloth
Chased by Owl
Cloud Man
Cut Belly
Deeds
Dog's Backbone
Dog With Horns
Elk Bear
Elk Stands Above
Hawk Man
Kills Himself
Lame White Man
Limber Bones
Long Road
Noisy Walking
One Dog
Plenty Lice
Red Man
Roman Nose
Swift Bear
Three Bears
Whirlwind
White Bull
White Eagle
Young Black Moon
Young Skunk

and 12 wounded:
Braided Locks
Dewey Beard
Elk Heart
Good Bear Boy
Iron Hawk
Knife Chief
Little Bear
Long Elk
Magpie Eagle
Pretty Bear
Red Horn Buffalo
Sun Bear

67thtigers

Way back on page one, you made this claim:

"In the Boer War the British worked really well except for one officer, Redvers Buller, and he was quickly sacked for being generally useless. Yet it is his "black week" that is remembered, not Lord Roberts superb movements afterwards."

The British Army's 'Black Week' was hardly Buller's. He had nothing to do with the first two defeats of that week, and the one he presided over (Colenso) was called off as soon as things started going wrong. British causalities were therefore fairly light (about 1% of his force was KIA) and the abandonment of 10 RA guns was the main cause of embarrassment.

Far from being 'quickly sacked for being generally useless', Buller remained in command in Natal, broke the highly formidable Boer defences along the Tugela Line and relieved Ladysmith. This was no insignificant achievement. One Prussian observer remarked that it was ‘a wonder' that Buller had broken through the Colenso defences with just 30,000 men.

Buller went on to drive the Boer invaders out of Northern Natal, then push into the eastern Transvaal where he defeated Botha in the last set-piece battle of the conventional war at Bergendal. Even Pakenham – the biggest anti-British cheerleader of them all – confesses that, after his relief of Ladysmith, Buller enjoyed ‘eight months of unbroken success in independent command' and, when pitted against Botha in the eastern Transvaal, ‘manoeuvred the commandos out of a series of Spion Kops with less than a hundred casualties'.

One must understand how 67t processes reference source material. As a case in point, I refer you to the following exchange.
- – -
Blutarski cites from Holley's book:
"1863 test: 15in Rodman smoothbore; 400lb spherical shot, 40 lb charge; range 200 yards; target 4.5in plate + 5 x 1.1in plates + 20in oak backing. Result: disk broken out of the 4.5in plate; 1.1 plates bent but not broken; oak backing slightly crushed; nearly all mounting bolts sheared or dislodged.
1865 test: 15in Rodman smoothbore; 400lb spherical shot, 60 lb charge; range 50 yards; target 6in solid plate of French manufacture (Petin, Gaudet & Co) 30in oak backing. Result: plate cracked, smashed and completely penetrated."
- – -
> 67t responds: "In fact one of the good things about fora is that ones ideas can be challenged and adjusted if found wanting, assuming one is willing. Lets go back to this
Blutarski comments – "this" referring to Blutarski's above citations from Holley.
> 67t continues: "Of course, I can read the original – link and you're referring to serials 179 and 181a.
Blutarski comments – 67t is correct in saying that I was referencing those very serials in Holley's book.
> 67t continues: "Since you want to suggest power of the 15" you skip one vital piece of information from serial 181a, the range was 50 feet."
Blutarski comments – Go to the link provided by 67t. Find serial 181A and read it. Here is what it states (page 141) – "A target composed of 30-in oak backing and a solid 6-in French plate, made by Messrs Petn, Gaudet & Co, was cracked, smashed, and completely penetrated by a 15in cast-iron ball, fired at about 50 YARDS range, with 60 pounds of powder, at an initial velocity of 1480 feet per second."
- – -
Perhaps 67t simply misread the "yards" for "feet", … or perhaps not. In either case, comprehensive fact-checking and a large grain of salt must be considered necessary in any discussion with this gentleman.

B

As an Englishmen I would say the British would have been devastating….BUT the American adaptability would have offset this very very quickly indeed and would have been on Par in very short space of time.
Brits are better in defence than attack, ask the SS at Arnhem and in the Bulge.
With enemy being able hit at 700 yards with aimed volley fire would have been a shock to the US forces and as the US relied on more and more immigrants from Europe it may have been a big factor.
Colonel Fremantle wrote how amazed he was that the US troops were knocking the sights of the Enfield rifles.
Back then and today the British forces spend more time on the ranges than any other army/navy in the world. When I was attached to 42 cmdo RM, the USMC Gunney scored us all as marksmen and we were sailors!
So yes the impact would have been huge for the short term. BUT the artillery would have been even worse to deal with.

I can concur with the British spending more time at the range today. I deployed alongside some British aircrew and they needed a half day off once a month or so to go to the range. In contrast, I fired my pistol once two months before my deployment and never again. I think the unspoken assumption was that those of us not trained for ground combat would put up enough of a fight to slow down the enemy for a few minutes until properly trained and equipped personnel could arrive to finish the job.

I am not sure this British passion for musketry was in place at the time of the ACW though? From what I understand, it really came on in leaps and bounds after the Boer War of 1899-1902 and prior to the First World War.

"BUT the artillery would have been even worse to deal with"

How so?

B

Hi Blutarski, British Artillery was superior to the artillery in us by the US, yes you had a few Whitworth's but poorer and with no sighting equipment which made the artillery very accurate.

""BUT the artillery would have been even worse to deal with"

How so?"

Lets see, one side has an effective breechloading piece with extremely low lateral and range deviations and the observed ability to snipe off enemy artillery at ranges the enemy can't reply too, and the other side is the US.

Understand that if you were to switch out the Federals along Cemetery Ridge for British then the British infantry alone would smash the Confederate grand battery along Peach Orchard Ridge. We know this because it would be a repetition of their achievement at Inkerman:

"Notwithstanding the range, which was particularly great for light artillery, our guns caused considerable damage to the English artillery. But these injuries very imperfectly compensated the enormous losses which the enemy' s riflemen inflicted on the Russian artillery. A perfect cloud of riflemen, hid in thick brushwood, opened a very violent and very accurate fire against our artillery at the distance of 800 paces. Some of our guns, from time to time, rained grape upon them, but the discharge only checked the fire of the enemy' s riflemen for a moment, for, after their momentary fright, they only commenced to decimate our ranks more energetically. At the same time the English artillery hurled shrapnel on our artillery and infantry, but it was more the fire of rifled small arms than that of the artillery of the enemy which reached our artillerymen, of whom the greater part were killed or wounded."

- from "General Todleben's History of the defence of Sebastopol, 1854-5: a review"

"I am not sure this British passion for musketry was in place at the time of the ACW though? From what I understand, it really came on in leaps and bounds after the Boer War of 1899-1902 and prior to the First World War."

It was. The British had a national obsession with the rifle at the time, hence the British having a National Rifle Association at the time, whereas the US namesake was formed in 1871 by veterans disgusted with the poor standard of shooting by troops in the ACW.

In the army those who achieved the highest proficiency (class 1) on the ranges were awarded marksman badges (the same crossed rifles I wore) and additional pay.

The British had three levels of qualification:

class 3- could only consistently hit targets from unsupported standing whilst estimating range upto 300 yards
class 2- same at 600 yards
class 1- same at 900 yards

In a typical regiment about a quarter of the men were class 1, more than a third in some. It's worth noting that the bottom class (3) was a higher required standard than Berdan's sharpshooters.

The British revised musketry training after the Boer war because of the low hit rates achieved at fast moving crossing targets at long (> 600 yds) range. This was more a problem of the riflemen not acting instinctively to engage rather than misses of shots actually fired. The new training used pop up targets on tracks that would only be up for a few seconds to condition troops to fire at fleeting targets of opportunity.

bgb – Both the CSA and US artillery of the ACW period had modern sights. Two-thirds of Union artillery was rifled by 1862, with the other third (apart from a few special purposes SB howitzers and mountain guns) consisting of modern M1857 12lbr smoothbores which provided superior anti-personnel canister effect and were consider superior in counter-battery fire effect at ranges < 1000 yards – desirable, given the nature of the terrain over which the ACW was fought.

Whitworth and Armstrong RBLs were useful as long-range sniping weapons, to be sure, but proved too expensive and too physically delicate in service. These British RBLs were IIRC withdrawn from service in the British army in 1869 for those reasons and replaced by RMLs. Nor do I see these RBLs as being dramatically more accurate than the standard US 3in ordnance rifle within the ranges at which artillery was commonly engaged.

To get a sense of the efficiency of Union artillery, permit me to refer you to the battle of Malvern Hill, or, more interestingly, Antietam – where Lee was forced to configure his defensive lines in areas shadowed from the fire of Union heavy artillery sited 2,000 yards away on the opposite side of Antietam Creek. Then there is Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg. It's also worth noting that CSA artillery, of similar but lesser hardware quality, served my men trained in exactly the same manner as their Union counterparts, acquitted itself very effectively as well – taking Fredericksburg as an example.

I confess that I am rather skeptical of claims that British field artillery of the period was somehow dramatically superior to American. Some substantive/empirical proof of superior performance in actual service under similar tactical conditions is required in order for me to be convinced.

B

"and as the US relied on more and more immigrants from Europe it may have been a big factor."

I'm at a loss as to what exactly this is supposed to mean…

67t – You need to check your Gettysburg maps. I suggest Livermore and Ropes as a good source. The distance between Alexander's Confederate gun line and the Union position on Cemetery ridge was approximately double the 800 paces you cite for Inkermann.

Once again – fact checking appears to be necessary.

B

Yet again, more fact-checking required. Re Berdan's Sharpshooters versus British students attending "Hythe School" –

Entry requirements for Berdan's Sharpshooters : "A potential recruit was required to fire his own open sight rifle, fire ten consecutive rounds, reloading as fast as possible, at two targets. The first target was 200 yards away and fired at using a rest, the other target was paced at 100 yards and fired at offhand. A contestant missing the targets or averaging more than five inches ( known as the string of 50) from the center was disqualified."

The targets at Hythe, according to the following article, were 3ft x 6ft. Go here –
PDF link

The establishment of a regular school for marksmanship was a very good idea worthy of emulation. Lord Methuen himself drew his inspiration from the Germans in this regard. And it made good sense for a professional long service army. But the school was opened in 1859, which leads one to ask how many men actually passed through the course per year.

Readers may decide for themselves how Berdan versus Hythe performance standards compared.

B

"Whitworth and Armstrong RBLs were useful as long-range sniping weapons, to be sure, but proved too expensive and too physically delicate in service. These British RBLs were IIRC withdrawn from service in the British army in 1869 for those reasons and replaced by RMLs. Nor do I see these RBLs as being dramatically more accurate than the standard US 3in ordnance rifle within the ranges at which artillery was commonly engaged. "

They were not withdrawn. They were replaced in first line service by muzzleloading weapons of greater range due to greater velocity (due to improvements in the ordnance proper, specifically steel vice wrought iron). The new weapon was authorised in 1871 after it became known just how many Prussian Krupps failed in 1870. The old RBL remain reserve service pieces in the 1877 ordnance manual.

There are several significant differences between the 3 inch ordnance rifle and the 12 pdr Armstrong beyond the lower deviations and greater range of the latter (ca. 2,300 yds vs ca. 1,800 yds at 5 degrees). The Armstrong for example had a traverse, allowing the gunner to precisely aim rather than moving the whole gun roughly on target with the handspike. The sights on a 3 inch ordnance rifle were simple blade sights (i.e. like an infantry rifle) rather than more sophisticated tangent sights. This gave the Armstrong much better ranging.

However, one can observe direct competition between Whitworths and Blakely's in CS service against US pieces. The British built guns proved ridiculously superior to the US ones, leading to the US having to keep 20 and 30 pdr Parrott's with field batteries to compete against 6 and 12 pdr Whitworths and Armstrongs.

Hythe School of Musketry formed a course for the army in general in June 1852 and the first courses were in 1853. It previously had rifle courses for the rifle corps and sharpshooters in line battalions. You're confusing the establishment of the course for volunteers which started in 1859 with the earlier 1853 course for regulars and militia.

PDF link

The targets for initial target practice were iron 2 ft by 6 ft with a bull painted on it. Points were 1 for the outer, 2 for the inner and 3 for the bull. To pass into 3rd class 13 points were required out of 20 rounds expended.

Berdan's men fired offhand (i.e. standing) only at 100 yards (or 200 yards with a rest) and were allowed to use telescopic sights for both. The basic requirement roughly equals a 10 inch group. So the requirement for a sharpshooter was a 10 inch group at 100 yards from standing, this would place the "requirement" sharpshooter into the 3rd class, although of course many were better than the minimum requirement.

The knock on imported Whitworth's was that they were only useful for counter-battery work, having poor anti-personnel ammo, and that while they were accurate at very long ranges, there was seldom a line of sight to a target at such ranges.

The problem with Confederate artillery was partly inferior ammunition, but mostly the mixture of gun types within batteries, causing resupply problems, for one thing, and often having targets that were best suited for only some of the guns in a given battery.

Two-thirds of Union artillery was rifled by 1862, with the other third (apart from a few special purposes SB howitzers and mountain guns) consisting of modern M1857 12lbr smoothbores …

True of the Army of the Potomac, but not of other Union armies. Grant's army, for instance, was still using 6-pounders as late as Vicksburg.

The real problem was the Whitworth's they got were 6 pdrs, and of course this seriously limited their effect with shell or case. Hence the CS only used bolts and used them to snipe guns.

That said the US bought at least 4 12 pdr Whitworths, and these were with McClellan's siege train in the Seven Days. At Malvern Hill it was two of these and a few 4.5" ordnance pieces that counterbatteried the CS gunline at long range and smashed it utterly, take each gun one by one with concentrated fire. See Halzett et al.: link

Ergo since British guns in US hands proved lethally effective in the counterbattery, and the same is true in CS hands I think it's safe to say the British 12 pdrs in the Armstrong and Whitworth patterns were much more effective long-range pieces than the 10 pdr Ordnance or Parrott.

67t wrote – "Berdan's men fired offhand (i.e. standing) only at 100 yards (or 200 yards with a rest) and were allowed to use telescopic sights for both. The basic requirement roughly equals a 10 inch group. So the requirement for a sharpshooter was a 10 inch group at 100 yards from standing, this would place the "requirement" sharpshooter into the 3rd class, although of course many were better than the minimum requirement."

Interestingly enough, the Hythe Musketry School handbook (1860) can be found on Googlebooks. It tells a rather different story about targets and the qualification standards than does 67t. More fact-checking ……….

- – -
The beginning of marksmanship training involved firing four successive 5-shot strings at ranges of 150, 200, 250 and 300 yards. This was conducted as slow aimed fire from the offhand position, The target was a 2ft x 6ft vertical iron slab bearing a central 8in diameter bulls-eye surrounded by a 24in outer ring. There was no third ring to the target. A shot within the bulls-eye earned 3 points, within the outer ring 2 points, and anywhere else on the 2ft x 6ft target slab 1 point. A candidate was required to score at least 12 points to qualify as 3rd Class. A score of 15 points would enable him to advance to the 2nd Class. 12 hits out of 20 shots, randomly distributed on the slab, would on average earn 15 points and an advance to the 2nd Class.
- – -
The second stage of marksmanship training involved firing four successive 5-shot strings at ranges of 400, 500, 550 and 600 yards. This was conducted as slow aimed fire from the kneeling position. The target was a 2ft x 6ft vertical iron slab bearing a 24in diameter target disc (no bulls-eye). A shot within the target disc earned 2 points, and anywhere else on the 2ft x 6ft target slab 1 point. A candidate was required to score at least 12 points to advance to the 1st Class. 10 hits out of 20 shots, randomly distributed on the 2ft x 6ft slab, would on average earn 12 points for advancement to the 1st Class.
- – -
The ultimate stage of marksmanship training involved firing four successive 5-shot strings at ranges of 650, 700, 800 and 900 yards. This was conducted as slow aimed fire from the kneeling position. The target was a 3ft x 6ft vertical iron slab bearing a 36in diameter target disc (no bulls-eye). A shot within the target disc earned 2 points, and anywhere else on the 3ft x 6ft target slab 1 point. A candidate was required to score at least 7 points to achieve Marksman status. 5 hits out of 20 shots, randomly distributed on the 3ft x 6ft slab, would on average earn 7 points for advancement to Marksman status.
- – -

A successful candidate for Berdan's Sharpshooters had to demonstrate his ability to place 10 out of 10 successive shots in rapid fire into a 10-inch diameter target at 100 yards from an offhand firing position. Allowing for the extra range, it is not unreasonable IMO to suppose such a shooter to be able to randomly place all 10 shots within a 24-inch diameter target from the offhand position. This would earn a score of 22 points by Hythe reckoning firing half the allowed shots.

- – -

[ 1 ] If I am correctly interpreting the Appendix of the Hythe handbook, approximately 1,000 officers, non-coms and enlisted men passed through the program in its first two years of operations. While it is assumed that the officers who graduated the course with instructor certificates would passed along their knowledge to others, it is a question
(to which I do not have an answer at this point) as to exactly what percentage of the British army was actually effectively trained in the Hythe marksmanship system during the period under discussion.

[ 2 ] Here is a good reference source I found among my files outlining sharpshooting on both sides in the ACW – PDF link

B

"True of the Army of the Potomac, but not of other Union armies. Grant's army, for instance, was still using 6-pounders as late as Vicksburg."

Fair comment, donlowry.

B

Marksmanship training in the British Army prior to 1902 was left up to individual units which meant virtually no training was given.

It was only after the lessons taught to them by the Boers, did the British take marksmanship training seriously.

It paid off in 1914 at places like Mons. Sadly, most of the "Old Contemptibles" were gone by 1916.

The British took musketry very seriously indeed. The wholesale conversion of all infantry into trained light infantry trained in individual shooting commences with the 1833 drill manual.

By the 1860's the shooting prowess of ones regiment was a matter of pride and officers whose regiments couldn't shoot were looked down upon in society, said numbers being published in the newspapers. After 1857 the troops themselves received additional pay (1d per day) if they achieved the distinction "marksman", and were allowed to wear the same crossed rifles badge as modern combat marksmen do in the British Army.

The 90 round shooting package was an annual test. In the financial year 1861-2 the results of musketry practice were:

Number of men instructed: 131,214
Percentage achieving marksman: 8.17%*
"" 1st class: 25.55%*
"" 2nd class: 53.20%
"" 3rd class: 19.72%

* Since by regulation no more than 10% of a battalion were authorised as marksmen, in battalions where more than 10% of men achieved marksman the bottom marksmen did not get the distinction or the money, and were downgraded to 1st class.

In addition to the effective payrise, which was quite large (a private earned a shilling a day, but at least half of this was taken to pay for food, so an extra penny was at least a 17% increase in disposable income) lump sum cash prizes were awarded, and in 1861-2 84.05% of men who shot the course achieved at least some bonus.

This made the officers and men very interested in musketry, for their own financial advantage, as well as the fact that it increased their chances of surviving a firefight.

Now, after the Boer War deficiencies were noted, but they were the ones mentioned above. Troops would typically simply not engage a fleeting target at long range without thinking about it, allowing the target to go to ground. Modified practices were added, with a moving target popping up briefly, to inculcate the troops to shoot.

67t wrote -
" … the US bought at least 4 12 pdr Whitworths, and these were with McClellan's siege train in the Seven Days. At Malvern Hill it was two of these and a few 4.5" ordnance pieces that counterbatteried the CS gunline at long range and smashed it utterly, take each gun one by one with concentrated fire. See Halzett et al.: link

Ergo since British guns in US hands proved lethally effective in the counterbattery, and the same is true in CS hands I think it's safe to say the British 12 pdrs in the Armstrong and Whitworth patterns were much more effective long-range pieces than the 10 pdr Ordnance or Parrott.

….. Hunt had 350 guns available at Malvern Hill, with 250 deployed at any one time and 100 held in reserve. Depending upon the source, 40 to 60 Union guns were committed to counter-battery work against the Confederate batteries as they struggled up to the front in succession only to be individually overwhelmed at about 1200 yards distance. I'm sure that the two Whitworths did their part, but I highly doubt that their contribution was much more "lethally effective" that that of the other guns employed

E P Alexander comment on Whitworths from the very same Hazlett link given above – "As a general field-piece its (i.e. the Whitworth's) efficiency was impaired by its weight and the very cumbrous English carriage upon which it was mounted and while a few in the army may often be valuable the United States three-inch rifle is much more generally serviceable with good ammunition."

B

"….. Hunt had 350 guns available at Malvern Hill, with 250 deployed at any one time and 100 held in reserve. Depending upon the source, 40 to 60 Union guns were committed to counter-battery work against the Confederate batteries as they struggled up to the front in succession only to be individually overwhelmed at about 1200 yards distance. I'm sure that the two Whitworths did their part, but I highly doubt that their contribution was much more "lethally effective" that that of the other guns employed

E P Alexander comment on Whitworths from the very same Hazlett link given above – "As a general field-piece its (i.e. the Whitworth's) efficiency was impaired by its weight and the very cumbrous English carriage upon which it was mounted and while a few in the army may often be valuable the United States three-inch rifle is much more generally serviceable with good ammunition."

B"

Hunt? You're quite a way off. William F. Barry was Chief of Artillery. Hunt was commander of the artillery reserve.

If you read the reports of the battery commanders virtually none of them report firing at artillery. All report firing at infantry lines, the exceptions being:

- Osborn, who reports firing 50 shell at long range (1,300 yards or greater) at the insistence of Morell

-Kingsbury, who reports briefly firing on a battery at 1,300 yards before switching to infantry 500 yards in front

-Major Hemingway's detachment of the 1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery whose batteries (B, K and the two Whitworths) were employed as counterbattery pieces from the hilltop.

The counterbattery work was almost entirely Hemingway's batteries. No doubt other batteries did occasionally switch to the enemy batteries when there was no infantry pressing in on them, but the field batteries were all heavily occupied in anti-infantry work.

It is my understanding that the imported Whitworth's fired mostly solid shot ("bolts"); they had shells, but the shape of the projectiles did not allow for a sufficiently large powder charge. (See Boatner's Civil War Dictionary, p. 917.) I don't think they even had canister rounds. (Hard to imagine how they would work in a hexagonal bore.) According to Boatner (same page), the ANV had 4 3-inch (12-pdr.?) Whitworths in 1863, and the Tredegar Iron Works at Richmond was making ammo for them. It claims that Lee had 4 6" models at Gettysburg, but this seems unlikely to me; a gun that big was not a field piece. It says McClellan had a battery on the Peninsula but never used it, after which it spent the rest of the war in the defenses of Washington.

… the US bought at least 4 12 pdr Whitworths, and these were with McClellan's siege train in the Seven Days. At Malvern Hill it was two of these and a few 4.5" ordnance pieces that counterbatteried the CS gunline at long range and smashed it utterly, take each gun one by one with concentrated fire. See Halzett et al.: link,

Tyler deployed five 4.5" Rifles, five 30lb Parrots, two 8" howitzers and two Whiworths (Naiswald) near Malvern House. Late in the afternoon Porter order the seige guns to withdraw fearful the Rebels might break through the forward line.

The Union also had supporting fire from several gunboats on the James River against the confederates.

Hunt? You're quite a way off. William F. Barry was Chief of Artillery. Hunt was commander of the artillery reserve.

True, but it was Hunt and his artillery reserve he commanded that did the bulk of the fighting at Malvern Hill with Hunt employing every battery under his command throughout the day. Most of the credit for the performace of the artillery went to Hunt and the artillery reserve that day.

From 1 pm to 2:30 pm the Confederates attemted to bombard the Union artillery which responded and drove off most of the enemy guns. Around 2:30 the Confederates begain the infantry assualts which federal artillery broke up with case and cannister and supporting infantry.

Kim