"British Expeditionary Corp - Quality?" Topic

So they had single shot muzzle-loaders during the 1861-1865 period? In that case, the folks who are rating the British army as being so vastly superior to the Americans (North and South) are talking through their hats. For 1861, sure. But by 1862 most of that superiority would have been gone and by 1863 they'd be near equal. By 1864 the Americans (North or South) would beat any equal sized force of any European army hands down.

Yes, the Enfield was the British Army's rifled musket from 1854 to 1866 [not 1856] We'll never know what the British could have done against an American army in 1862-3, but I would think it would have been a tough fight, hardly a walk-over.

Considering the disparity in the size of the armies fielded by the American army compared to any British expeditionary force, the length of time at war compare to the British at that time, both soldiers and commanders, I can't imagine it would have been a walk-over for the British.

There is more to shooting than the weapon. I'd take, in modern times, a group of American or British riflemen over an equal sized group of irregulars with identical weapons in a firefight.

The British in the Crimean were consistently hitting with more than 5% of their shots. On a typical ACW battlefield the troops hit with about 0.5% of their shots with essentially the same weapons. Ergo the British rifleman has at least ten times the killing power whilst toting the same weapon.

In fact we now know this was as much a psychological phenomena as greater skill. The British were the only army to train with realistic looking targets – they used sheet iron with enemy soldiers painted on it rather than the blank white sheet of most armies simulating target frontage. The effect was to operand condition the British soldier to correctly apply his fire habitually. Unlike an American volunteer the British rifleman had been conditioned to kill.

Then there is the skill difference. The British riflemen were outranging Russian smoothbore artillery in '54-6 and shooting down the gunners. Very little like it ever occurred in the ACW. The major difference is the Confederate Army of Tennessee in '64, and Cleburne's division the year earlier at Liberty Gap. Cleburne had been in the British Army and knew about the Hythe system (although he never went through it). He had the Hythe syllabus imported and copied, and trained his division accordingly. At Liberty Gap a Federal division was blown away without getting within half a mile of the brigade Cleburne left there (see Bilby: link ).

Then we could discuss the retention of the "touch of elbows" close order line in both American armies when the British had trained all their infantry as light infantry and riflemen and were fighting with the entire infantry in contact deployed into thick skirmish lines with supports. These were of course of formalisation of the old "loose files and the American scramble", but with the new rifles it became essentially the only way they fought.

I can't claim to know much about the British army of the period, but I do know a great deal about the American army and its tactics. And I know a thing or two about shooting. Frankly, I am highly skeptical of your 5% hit claims. I'm not aware of any army in history that got anything close to that. Not on a real battlefield.

So do the British need pontoon train or do they just walk across the water?

The British in the Crimean were consistently hitting with more than 5% of their shots. On a typical ACW battlefield the troops hit with about 0.5% of their shots with essentially the same weapons. Ergo the British rifleman has at least ten times the killing power whilst toting the same weapon.

As I said before:

Crimean War:

*British Rifles outranged Russian Smoothbore muskets
*British fought most of their battles on open terrain [apart from the siege.
*The Russians ablidgingly fought in columns
*The Russians were far worse shots than any American troops

In the ACW:
^Both sides all fought with identical weapons
^Both sides fought in close, wooded terrain
^Both sides fought in loose lines, making for much harder targets to hit, particularly in woods and close terrain.
^Both sides were equally skilled with rifled muskets and knew how to take advantage of terrain to counter that skill.

And keep in mind that when mass attacks over open ground did occur in the ACW, much higher hit rates were recorded.

I've always been curious about how those hit figures were arrived at. I'm reasonably certain that there wasn''t any team of statisticians roaming the battlefield immediately after a battle counting the dead and wounded and determining just what weapon did the damage and then going to each battalion and looking through cartridge boxes to determine ammunition expenditures. No, I'm quite sure that the figures come from total casualties listed on the rosters and compared with total amounts of ammunition issued to the troops. A system very suspect at best and it tells you nothing about the ranges or circumstances of the combat. Frankly, such statistics are meaningless.

5% hit rates, see for example Strachan p 54: link

The British sustained hit rates above 5% for the whole of the second half of the 19th century against enemies good enough to allow themselves to be targets. Remember that after the 2nd Boer War British units and the Boers had shooting competitions and the British won handily every time. The problem was one of target location. This is not a problem when the target is good enough to come on in a close order two rank line.

As to the Russians in the Crimea. They indeed did have a Minie rifle (M1854) which was in the process of being rolled out over the whole army. As a stopgap they were issuing the elongated "Nessler ball" for their M1845 percussion muskets which gave similar ballistic performance to the Minie ball out to about 400 yards. The 50 gram Nessler ball was replaced with an even heavier model in 1855 with longer range causing even worse wounds.

If playing Volley and Bayonet I would rate the Russians as having Rifled Muskets. The percussion ignition combined with an elongated ball giving good ballistic performance out to 400 yards (4") would argue for it.

However, of course their formations were quite Napoleonic. Their infantry had 3 major formations:

1. Skirmish line (essentially the same as British)
2. Company columns – each company formed in three double rank lines covered by a skirmish line.
3. Attack column – the battalion in attack column formed into 4 company lines, with the companies in three ranks covered by a skirmish line.

The attack column is not conceptually different from Upton's "innovative" column employed at the Mule Shoe, or Hancock's divisional attack columns there. So the formation is hardly to blame for the lack of Russian success.

It's difficult to know whether the American armies were better shots than the Russian. Both had exactly the same amount of training in marksmanship – none. We know that American musketry was at best 1% effective, and that attacking at Inkerman the Russians inflicted a greater number of casualties (as a percentage of enemy forces) than any battle of the ACW. That is the Russians were in fact *more* deadly to the British and French than Americans were to each other.

Remember, the "rifle myth" has a basis in fact, and that is the effectiveness in the hands of European regulars of the period. That it was assumed this was innate to the weapon, and independent of the level of skill and training possessed of the firer is now under serious challenge. Does stop it being everything it was theorised to be in the hands of those properly trained and indoctrinated in its' use.

The major difference is the Confederate Army of Tennessee in '64 …

And yet the Army of Tennessee only won 1 battle in its entire 4-year history. (And that 1 was in '63.)

It's difficult to know whether the American armies were better shots than the Russian. Both had exactly the same amount of training in marksmanship – none.

I am not sure were you got that information. What makes you thik that the Union and Confederate soldiers had zero training in marksmanship?

The Russian muskets were not as good as the Enfield. The Russians were getting new weapons, some still with smoothbore muskets and using formations and tactics that were not particularly compatible with any kind of effective fire.

Other issues such as the education level of the Russian soldier compared to the British or the Americans is also an issue in dealing with technology

And with the enemy isn't producing effective fire, it is so much easier to concentrate on yours.

Bottom like is the Russians were nothing like the Americans when it came to fire combat. There is every reason to believe the British success against the Russians wouldn't have been repeated with the Americans, if such a contest had actually occurred. The two conflicts and the opposing armies were apples and oranges in just about every category you wish to chose.

The attack column is not conceptually different from Upton's "innovative" column employed at the Mule Shoe, or Hancock's divisional attack columns there. So the formation is hardly to blame for the lack of Russian success.

Well, I guess we could debate Upton and Hancock's use of the open column versus the Russian's use of the open and closed columns, but I think the point wasn't blaming the column for the Russians lack of success, but suggesting that it isn't a formation favoring a fire fight, in which case the British wouldn't have faced much 'suppressive' fire from the Russian columns vs say an American firing line… Suppression being known to have a major impact on whether the other side fires back effectively or not. For instance, Upton's 'indian rushes' creating supporting fire wasn't exactly a Russian tactic during the Crimean War.

Because , with the noted exception, that how much they had. See Bilby, Civil War Firearms for example.

I'll point out that the major field battles of 1854 were fought with P1851 Minie rifles and P1842 smoothbores, and no P1853 Enfields were issued to the Eastern Army until 1855.

The Russians covered their fronts with dense clouds of specialised skirmishers, just like the Napoleonic French….

Quite a few Americans of both persuasions already knew how to shoot when they joined up.

I like the arguments of 67thtigers and he brings up sources as well, as for the ACW armies, indeed I was under the impression as well – that they did not have a lot of life firing training.

To all the interesting speculation – I like to see a Prussian expditionary force aiding the Union ;-))

I'll point out that the major field battles of 1854 were fought with P1851 Minie rifles and P1842 smoothbores, and no P1853 Enfields were issued to the Eastern Army until 1855.

My error then. I assumed that they had them as they were issued that year. From my understanding the Russian infantry had only smoothbores.

The Russians covered their fronts with dense clouds of specialised skirmishers, just like the Napoleonic French….

That, I think, is a bit much. 'Clouds?' of Jagers? And what was their hit rate, if not equal to the British? As the British and French sent out skirmishers too, if the Russians didn't do well with small arms fire, that certainly would do less to hinder any British fire.

Bilby, among others looked for and don't find any US or CSA Army-wide program for firearm training…because it didn't exist, just as they wouldn't find any army-wide program [or manual] used for training…[There were 19 used to some extent in the AoP in the first year of the war.] And training in all its aspects was uneven. Training was left to regiments and brigade officers for the most part.

For example, Paddy Griffith writes:

"We find that it [the 24th Michigan] was sent to the front within a very few weeks of its formation in July 1862, and in its only recorded target practice during that time three men were wounded and one died of a heart attack"

(Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil p.88)

This would be the only target practice for the regiment until four months later, which remained the only other one until after Gettysburg where the unit suffered 80 percent casualties. After that serious target practice was given the men. [i.e. they had more than one practice within a four month period and actually had four months without action in camp.]

Yet the other regiments in the same brigade received several times that practice in the same period, none of regiments receiving equal numbers of practice. Source {Fuller, Claud, E. The Rifled Musket. New York: Bonanza Books, 1958.

Point being that while it can be debated who would be the better trained and thus better shots, British or Americans [Even though the British too, trained by regiment], the Americans did have aimed fire practice. Uneven, particularly in the first year of the war, but certainly not totally absent.

Like the rest of the training, it was catch-as-catch can during the first part of the war. However, every manual written had instructions for firearms and aiming, Evey one had the orders "Ready, Aim, Fire, Reload. Upton distilled all that had been learned during the ACW in his 1867/1875 tactical works.

At Alma, the Russians, seriously outnumbered still put up a substantial fight and conducted an orderly retreat, so it was hardly a walk-over. I don't have any reason to believe in different terrain, different arms and a year or more combat experience, that the Americans would have done better given the same odds…

That's just the way I see it.

Well, I read the whole Strachan piece that 67thtigers kindly provided the link to. Interesting stuff, but there was nothing there to change my opinion. The accuracy figure were either for controlled range conditions (which are meaningless) or the extravegent claims from two Crimean War battles without any data to back them up. I'm willing to concede that long-term British regulars would be somewhat more effective than American volunteers, but ten times more effective? No, I don't think so.

I'm with Scott.

"would beat any equal sized force of any European army hands down."

Except if you know as much about the European armies as you know about the US and CS army, it is always a sign of wisdom to avoid exaggerations.

Well, I was assuming the fight would take place in North America rather than Europe :)

This has been a very interesting topic. I have to side with Scott Washburn on this. While I believe British regulars would have a higher hit ratio I doubt the 5% figure. Just an opinion. Thanks, John Miller

If we're to believe 67thtigers, then not only could the British dispense with a pontoon train (as they can walk on water, as BW1959 noted), but rolling for hits could be eliminated (as they have perfect accuracy at all ranges). Of course, they take a hit on movement through woods (since they're 10' tall, they'd knock heads on low hanging limbs)….

I've read Strachan and I'm with Scott. The analysis is far too shallow to make that kind of broad statement.

As for 'bringing up sources': As my thesis advisor told me, you can probably find references to support just about ANY position (if you have an agenda to grind). The key is to balance your sources and be rigidly impartial (even if it explodes your thesis…).

The Federals have three offensive options against Canada:

1. Up the Hudson river valley towards Montreal.
2. Across the Niagara frontier towards Hamilton.
3. Across from Detroit towards London.

The British never really considered stopped the last two as viable unless they could be stopped at the borders. Hence in the winter '61/2 there were battalions concentrated on all three routes to seize the American side of the frontier and secure positions to delay them (Ft Montgomery, Ft Niagara and Detroit respectively). They intended to abandon the peninsula flanked by Detroit and Buffalo (with Cleveland over Lake Erie) if they could not gain supremacy on Lake Erie and let the Federals smash themselves against heavy entrenchments at Toronto.

In front of Montreal or in the Hudson river valley was where they intended to fight the main field battle.

I'm damned if I've ever seen the remnants of – or read about – heavy entrenchments in my home town, Toronto.

Can you elaborate?

Was this a system of trenches that were to be dug – a la Richmond?

Not trying to be snide. Am really quite interested.

"As for 'bringing up sources': As my thesis advisor told me, you can probably find references to support just about ANY position (if you have an agenda to grind). The key is to balance your sources and be rigidly impartial (even if it explodes your thesis…)."

I am not disagreeing, but in this thread only 67thtigers takes the effort to provide them.

Naturally such a speculative topic lead to opinion based arguments.

As my thesis advisor told me, you can probably find references to support just about ANY position (if you have an agenda to grind). The key is to balance your sources and be rigidly impartial (even if it explodes your thesis…)."

only 67thtigers takes the effort to provide them.

von Winterfeldt:
Well, that hurts--the only one?

Yes, the questions about what would happen that never did are the most controversial. However, I have yet to see references to prove:

Lincoln was not the President of the US during the ACW

Or Napoleon never was crowned Emperor or was present at Austerlitz

Or The Battle of Gettysburg was fought in Philidelphia

Or the ACW armies were never organized into divisions and corps.

Or… you get the idea. There are lots and lots of positions concerning history where all references support them to some degree. The ones that don't are in the decided minority where history is concerned. They just get all the attention because they are open questions.

I imagine the advisor was thinking of all those positions that don't have conclusive evidence either way, like Napoleon was poisoned on St. Helena or Lee was a mediocre general who was just lucky enough to fight worse opponents.

I suppose, and I must stress that I am not knowledgeable in any way, so this is meaningless opinion, that on a corps level , Gablenz's Austro-Hungarian Army in Danemark of 1864 could give a good account against a similar sized CSA and USA unit.

"The British in the Crimean were consistently hitting with more than 5% of their shots"

….. W o w . This implies that a 600 man British battalion with 40 rounds per man could putatively inflict 1200-1500 casualties with a single basic load of ammunition. Would that be in 15 minutes (3rpmpm) or 40 minutes (1rpmpm)? I marvel that the Russians were so foolish as to resist for two entire years.

No wonder the British army disdained the use of machine guns prior to WW1.

Fantastic – in the very truest meaning of the word.

B

Yes I got the idea, but

It is about the hypothetical performance of a British regular Army in 1861 – 1865 – what could it achieve – in theory ( I stress theory).

I agree it is speculative, but there must be information about training, battle field performances etc. about the British army of that time.

I also wonder how this expeditionary force, in case it would do action on the Eastern theater – would be supplied with food, ammunition, clothing etc.

….. Balck's "Infantry Tactics" would be a useful reference to provide some perspective on this subject. It addresses in some detail the practical battlefield effects of the introduction of the new rifles (Dreyse, Chassepot) on European battlefields.

B

Thanks for the hint, can you be more specific about what work of Balck you are speaking, he seemingly published quite a lot – at a short glance of his introduction of tactics, 4th edition, this seems far too modern – drawing any conclusion about the British of 1860 – 65??

European armies were trained to take into account the change in trajectory that a ball from a rifled musket took after 100 yards. This would make the British better at longer range volleys. It's one thing watching your fall of shot while skirmishing but not as part of a volley. There were a large number of muskets picked up after Gettysburg which were miss loaded and unusable and from an army that were mostly veterans. Some American families took gun ownership and marksmanship seriously so a small number of the members of a unit would cause a large number of casualties.
The British were unlikely to have been able to keep up with the depravations on campaign that the Confederates took for granted.
At the start of the war the British would be far superior but by 1963 the Americans would have closed the gap and by the end of the war they would have thrashed anything Europe could have sent at them.

Ahhh … Sorry about that. Re Balck, I was referring to Wilhelm Balck. I'm guessing that you were thinking of his son Hermann Balck. Wilhelm, the father, wrote (among other things) a book by the name of "Infantry Tactics", a very detailed and thorough analysis of tactical combat from the Napoleonic period through early WW1. IIRC, it is available on archive.org.

B

Since we are in full fantasy mode here. How many corps could the Unions staunches ally the Russian Empire, send to America?

Because as soon as the Britain declares war on the United States, Russia would declare war on Great Britain. And whoever is allied with Russia declares war on Britain and off we go, a world war.

So it is only fair that hordes of Russians show up to help defend the Union.

I did look for William Balck, his infantry tactics – 4th edition, published 1907 is covering in detail the post 1871 developments but I cannot see a lot of information of the earlier times, in case – do you have a link??

vW – I'm sure you have found the correct book (there were several successively updated editions – the one I own went up through the first years of WW1). Balck does focus on the turn of the century period contemporaneous to him, but he draws upon historical cases dating as far back as the 18th century to illustrate his points. This thread brought Balck to mind for his commentaries on the nature of long range infantry fire, the vagaries of range estimation and sight-setting, and the effect of battle stress upon the behavior of men.

It's a long and somewhat dense book in places, but there is a lot of useful information and insight within.

link

B

Yes I agree a highly interesting book, still – it doesn't give me any idea how the Redcoats would have fought – nor how well they were trained at the time of the ACW.

At this time there were big discussion in Europe how to fight, with columns covered by dense or not so dense skirmishing linse, or with infantry still in line formation, or just waves of skirmishers, or just almost Napoleonic tactics and there was continous warfare in Europe as well, France against Austria in Italy, the Crimean War, Prussians against Denmark, and also the German war of 1866 – which should give a rough guess how a European expeditionary force would have fought or was trained to fight.

I also agree that the Union Army would be a very testing opponent from 1863 onward, for any European power.

If you are talking about the Army of the Potomac, the Army of the Cumberland or the Army of the Tennessee I would agree. Other units with less experience in combat or working together in large units might not have been as much of a challenge. This is why I see a "second front" being a more attractive option for the British than fighting sholder to sholder with Confederate armies and having to rely on Confederate supply lines. Of course we can't know because it didn't happen, nor did anything comparable happen.

Lets take Russia out of the picture. They eventually declined to intervene in favour of the Confederacy in late 1862 that's only because Britain and France would not meet the asking price. They stayed scrupulously neutral in 1861-2.

However, when the Poles rebelled in 1863 they faced a situation where the Crimean War may start up again, but with the Poles substituting for the Turks. Due to this they decided to position 3 frigates, 6 corvettes and 3 clippers at ice free ports in the United States. They had no intention of helping the Federals, and a century of searching for any evidence of "sealed orders" in the Russian archives has come up empty.

So the answer to how many corps they would send is: they had no intention of sending any, and had no capability to send any. So, none.

Yes, the British hit at Alma and Inkermann with 1 in 16 shots according to Strachan (in fact using existing data).

The doomed infantry at Isandlwana did better, loosing off ca. 56,000 rounds and hitting with one in 14 (ammunition figure from Snook) and the defenders of Rorke's Drift hit with 1 in 13 (figure from Holmes, Act of War, although Snook will point out most of the fighting was a static firefight with the Zulus sheltered behind a stone wall, at night).

Things could be higher. At Maida in 1806 Kempt's brigade got ca. 1 in 4 rounds hitting (Holmes, Redcoat).

The real question should be why was American musketry so ineffective compared to British.

Lets keep the Russians in the picture. They may have been the deciding factor that kept the British from recognizing the Confederacy. Huzzah for Tsar Alexander II, who saved the Union!

Russia's Participation in the U.S. Civil War

"Historian Webster Griffin Tarpley talked about the contribution of Russian Tsar Alexander II to a northern victory in the U.S. Civil War. 

He said that the Imperial Russian government had issued an ultimatum to Britain and France specifying that if those powers should intervene on the side of the Confederate States of America they would immediately find themselves at war with the Russian Empire. 

Mr. Tarpley marked the 150th anniversary of the arrival of the Russian Baltic Fleet in New York City on September 24, 1863, and of the Russian Pacific Squadron in San Francisco on October 12, 1863. He argued that it was the presence of those fleets that provided the final deterrence. Russia was the only country to extend direct military support to the Lincoln government."

"Commemorating the Russian Fleets of Autumn 1863" was an event of the McClendon Group, held in the Zenger Room of the National Press Club.

link

"Walk on water". That's a little silly isn't it.

Each army corps would contain a Bridging Train, RE under the proposed field establishment. In peacetime only one such train was kept on establishment (with the Corps at Aldershot), and the others formed from field companies.

As you can see, 1 bridging train per corps: link

In September 1863? Really? Not, for example, in December 1861 when the British almost declared war on the US or any of the following period of tension that ended mid-July 1863 when news of Lee's defeat at Gettysburg reached the UK and John Roebuck's private members bill recognising the CSA was withdrawn undebated? My.

Just as silly as the British sending troops to fight for a slave holding South. So if we are going to indulge ourselves in a flight of fancy then why couldn't the Russians send troops or for that matter why couldn't the Martians send troops. I am sure someone makes the figures.

At least the Russians sent their fleets which is more than the British did for the Confederacy. The ice in the Baltic was a cover story. The real reason was to demonstrate to the British that Russia was not weak after the Polish revolts and was a world power that had to be reckon with.

The British and French were facing a situation that the Crimean War could start up again. So Britain was much too distracted to commit major forces to North America. To a war that was not in their national interest. I would imagine a combined Union-Russian fleet could get troops from Russia to North America.

Lets see. Why couldn't Russia, a nation with no significant transport capacity, fail in an endeavour to send slow moving troop convoys through the Straits of Denmark, down past Dover, Portsmouth, Plymouth and Queenstown, then past Bermuda and Halifax? A journey of ten weeks under sail.

Can you see a reason? Lots of big things that float, steam around and blow stuff up?

See Napier and Hughes for other views on British musketry.

B

"Lets see. Why couldn't Russia, a nation with no significant transport capacity, fail in an endeavour to send slow moving troop convoys through the Straits of Denmark, down past Dover, Portsmouth, Plymouth and Queenstown, then past Bermuda and Halifax? A journey of ten weeks under sail."

And why would the RN attack a neutral nation's shipping? Or are you assuming a war with Russia as well? In that case, NO WAY would Britain send troops to a North American war which they have no compelling interest with a more urgent war in their own backyard.

Face it, you've drunk heavily of the pro-Brit Kool Aid. And that's fine, knock yourself out. But don't expect others (who may have just as much access to material of the period) to do likewise…

"And why would the RN attack a neutral nation's shipping? Or are you assuming a war with Russia as well? In that case, NO WAY would Britain send troops to a North American war which they have no compelling interest with a more urgent war in their own backyard. "

Oh yes. I forgot that whilst sailing to attack the British (and French) intervention forces in the USA/CSA, as postulated, they are in fact neutral. My, what a strange definition of neutral.

Since they were at this time stretched to their limit trying to conquer the recalcitrant Poles and where filling their pants at the prospect of an Anglo-French fleet appearing in the Gulf of Finland, I must ask why the hell would they be interested in sending a single soldier to fight the Anglo(-French) in the Americas.

"Face it, you've drunk heavily of the pro-Brit Kool Aid. And that's fine, knock yourself out. But don't expect others (who may have just as much access to material of the period) to do likewise…"

No, I face the fact that I've been researching this for 12 years now, and often come across this kind of parochialism. The US and CS armies were certainly the best armies in the United States. However, that does not translate to fighting a professional army.

Most of this argument has been about the relative shooting abilities of the British regular vs the American volunteer militiaman. This of course goes back to the (now largely settled) debate about the lethality and usage of the rifle-musket in the ACW generally. There is now a grudging acceptance that the ranges in the ACW were not extended beyond Napoleonic ranges, and the fire was no more deadly. However, the very reason such a theory arose in the first place is that in the hands of British regulars (and to a lesser extent French) there truly was a massive increase in the capability of the infantry. Americans assumed this was an innate quality of the weapon, and were confused when in their hands it didn't perform as well as it did in British hands.

Hence were have the question – why did Custer's 7th cavalry only hit with 1 round in 850 at Little Bighorn, but Bromhead's detachment of the 24th Foot hit with 1 round in 13 (at least) at Rorke's Drift?

That in fact is partially explained by the fact that after 1865 the US Army put exactly the same emphasis on accurate and long-range fire after 1865 as it did in the period 1861-5 – i.e. none whatsoever. Of course the generals didn't have their heads that far in the sand and noticed the problem in late 1879 and moved to correct it, adopting a variant of the British system (mostly because the Little Bighorn shook them out of their complacency). However, the period we are dealing with is way before the 1879 and 1885 reforms in musketry.

We can sum up the American volunteer – he received essentially no training in the correct application of fire and no battle innoculation. Often he went into battle for the first time not even knowing the basics of loading the musket. When fighting an enemy with essentially the same (terrible) level of shooting ability he did okay. Against an enemy who could shoot, that is another matter….

Hence were have the question – why did Custer's 7th cavalry only hit with 1 round in 850 at Little Bighorn, but Bromhead's detachment of the 24th Foot hit with 1 round in 13 (at least) at Rorke's Drift?

Really? You don't know the answer to that?

1. The Souix didn't attack in mass and were on horseback a good portion of the time.
2. The US Cavalry were first on horseback, then on the run, then surrounded in the open, scattered in at least three groups.
3. The US cavalry was outgunned. It has been established that a good number of the Souix were armed with Henry and Winchester repeaters while the 7th had single shot Springfield weapons.
4. The Rorke's Drift action lasted hours. The Little Bighorn was over in less than an hour.

The British didn't face any return fire, remained in one place, fought against massed targets on foot without any prior disorganization or surprise attacks. The British had hours to prepare.

However, the very reason such a theory arose in the first place is that in the hands of British regulars (and to a lesser extent French) there truly was a massive increase in the capability of the infantry. Americans assumed this was an innate quality of the weapon, and were confused when in their hands it didn't perform as well as it did in British hands.

Where did reason that come from? Who first expressed it?
There are at least two studies of Alma and the Crimean war that I know of before Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics Hardee 1855 and during the ACW [Summary of the Art of War, 1862 Emil Schalk] and neither comment on the increased British firepower or any expected or disappointing performance for the American Armies.

Will Sherman wrote this after the Civil War: William T. Sherman on Tactics and Entrenching 1891 pp. 394-397

Very few of the battles in which I have participated were fought as described in European text-books, viz, in great masses, in perfect order, manoeuvring by corps, division and brigades. We were generally in a wooded country, and though our lines were deployed according to tactics, the men generally fought in strong skirmish-lines, taking advantage of the shape of the ground, and every cover…

Europeans frequently criticized out war, because we did not always take full advantage of victory; the true reason was, that habitually the woods served as a screen, and we often did not realize the fact that our enemy had retreated till he was already miles away and was again entrenched, having left a mere skirmish-line to cover the movement, in turn fall back to the new position.

This is very different terrain and enemies than the fighting at Alma or Roarke's Drift. I would think, comparing the two types of warfare, one would naturally expect a much higher 'hit rate' at Alma and Roarke's Dirft.

When you have masses charging across open ground such as Pickett's Charge or Cold Harbor, you see far greater hit rates and of course, casualties [40-60%]

This isn't to take a thing away from British fire expertise, but comparing any results to ACW armies should take into account circumstances.

That in fact is partially explained by the fact that after 1865 the US Army put exactly the same emphasis on accurate and long-range fire after 1865 as it did in the period 1861-5 – i.e. none whatsoever.

Uh, have you read Upton's works, which were the basis for fire practice after the ACW? [from 1867 on]

I'm still totally skeptical of the accuracy figures being thrown around here. British 1 in 18, 1 in 14, 1 in 4? Americans 1 in 200, 1 in 250? Where are these figures coming from? Were there teams of investigators who descended on these battlefields mere hours after the shooting stopped to examine every corpse, rummage through every cartridge box? Accurately determine rounds fired vs casualties caused? I rather doubt it!

And what were the circumstances of firing? Long range? Short range? Were the figures for just one small section of a battle or the whole thing? I strongly suspect that the American figures are for whole battles or even whole campaigns, while the British are for some tiny part of a larger battle where close range fire probably did do terrible execution. But I'm quite certain that if you were to take just Picketts Charge or just the Union assault on Marye's Heights at Fredericksburg they were hitting a lot more frequently than one shot in 200. Without context, all these statistics are meaningless.

"Without context, all these statistics are meaningless."

I agree on this one.

Thank you, McLaddie and ScottWashburn. You very kindly and efficiently saved me the need of composing a long and contentious post on this subject.

B

"Really? You don't know the answer to that?

1. The Souix didn't attack in mass and were on horseback a good portion of the time.
2. The US Cavalry were first on horseback, then on the run, then surrounded in the open, scattered in at least three groups.
3. The US cavalry was outgunned. It has been established that a good number of the Souix were armed with Henry and Winchester repeaters while the 7th had single shot Springfield weapons.
4. The Rorke's Drift action lasted hours. The Little Bighorn was over in less than an hour.

The British didn't face any return fire, remained in one place, fought against massed targets on foot without any prior disorganization or surprise attacks. The British had hours to prepare. "

I wasn't disputing the result, only contrasting fire effectiveness. Was the problem that the US cavalrymen didn't have enough time to limber up their trigger fingers?

However, at Little Bighorn most US casualties were to melee weapons, much like the British at Isandlwana. The Indians tell their tales of counting coup, and the majority of bodies showed lethal wounds from arrows or war clubs. The question of repeaters is an interesting one, since the evidence of casings on the battlefield suggest they weren't used until the Sioux reached within 400 feet of the government troops, a range at which the firepower of the M1873 Springfield should never have allowed the Sioux to get.

One should note the Zulus were very lavishly equipped with firearms, mostly Enfields although their standard of musketry was terrible. For example they noted that when they raised the rearsight the round went further, and concluded the rearsight controlled the power of the bullet. Hence they always engaged with the rearsight set at the weapons maximum range and overshot a lot.

We in fact know why the 7th Cavalry had such a poor showing. When the Sioux started pouring out of the village a fire control order setting the sights at 500 yards was issued, and then no further range settings were ordered. The Sioux moved inside the arc of the 7th's muskets and ensconced themselves closer than the deadly space of the 7th. Since the 7th never reset their sights the Sioux moved up with no effective fire on them at all.

"This is very different terrain and enemies than the fighting at Alma or Roarke's Drift. I would think, comparing the two types of warfare, one would naturally expect a much higher 'hit rate' at Alma and Roarke's Dirft.

When you have masses charging across open ground such as Pickett's Charge or Cold Harbor, you see far greater hit rates and of course, casualties [40-60%]

This isn't to take a thing away from British fire expertise, but comparing any results to ACW armies should take into account circumstances."

Do we see high hit rates at Pickett's charge or Cold Harbor? It's not clear.

We know that there was no long range infantry fire against Pickett's force. All bar 2 regiments held their fire until the range had narrowed to 100 yards or less. Against Picket's division there were 3,785 men and combined with the artillery they hit 1,974 men, of which probably the majority were casualties from artillery fire. We know that Stannard's men fired 10 volleys, and if we take that as a low average then 37,850 rounds hit 1,974 men (inc. arty casualties), approx 1 round in 19.

This of course is an overestimate because at least half the casualties are from artillery.

With Kemper we can break down the 538 men hit a bit. Of these about 200 were hitting whilst lying up and waiting for the charge (maybe 250), leaving 338 hit during the charge. Stannard fired about 10,000 musket rounds into Kemper's flank and about 500 (+/- 50) artillery rounds were directed at Kemper from McGilvery's brigade. Assuming Stannard inflicted all the casualties then 1 round in 30 took effect – fired at an exposed flank at less than 100 yards. If we set the artillery effectiveness at 1 round in 2 producing 1 casualty (very low considering some of the shells knocking out whole companies) then musketry would lengthen to 114 rounds fired per hit.

Most of the old Light Division (i.e. Pettigrew and Trimble) never got within musket shot (the low number of captured show this), but the force still had 3,168 hit, perhaps almost entirely by artillery.

Same at Cold Harbor and Fredericksburg. As heavy as any musketry was it was artillery that stopped the attacks dead and did the bulk of the killing.

"Uh, have you read Upton's works, which were the basis for fire practice after the ACW? [from 1867 on]"

Yes, and I know that they do not vary from previous practice. Rifle ranges (i.e. practice ranges) were 100 yards.

to quote:

"As the strength of troops armed with breech-
loaders lies in the volume and effect of their fire when
well delivered, so their weakness will lie in the very
superiority of their weapons when allowed to deliver
their fire injudiciously at long range; the officers,
therefore, should keep the men always under their
control, see that they husband their ammunition, and
by teaching them confidence in their arms, and delib-
eration in aiming, enable them always to hold their
fire till the enemy shall be within deadly range."

Upton in fact rejected the notion of long-range fire completely, keeping the Napoleonic notion of reserving fore for the last 100 yards. This is why the US Army did not deliver any training in marksmanship until the 1880's, and the American soldier remained a terrible shot.