"Shipping and transporting Pershing tanks" Topic

I read a long time ago that the Liberty ship was designed to carry Sherman tanks. That was supposedly part of the calculus over whether to manufacture, ship and use vast numbers of Shermans, and why production of the Pershing was delayed.
How correct is that?

And bearing on this, how many Pershings could fit on a Liberty ship, as opposed to Shermans.

Could a Pershing fit on a landing craft? This could be important in invading Japan. Or, did the plans count on seizing facilities with Shermans so they could unload Pershings?

The interesting question to me about Pershings and the invasion of mainland Japan (assuming no nukes) is this: why bother with them at all? It's not as if the Japanese had anything that would really require a Pershing to handle it, right? I would think that Shermans and Chaffees and Stuarts, combined with the various SPGs and TDs, would have been a perfectly adequate armored force for the operation, and you would save yourself a lot of problems by leaving the Pershings at home (or in Europe).

Doug

Can't answer the other questions off the top of my head, but there were a lot of reasons why the Pershing was delayed, size being one of them. There was a lot of resistance from the Tank Destroyer crowd, a perception that tanks heavier than the Pz IV were in fact rare (surprise!), as well as a lack of strong desire from the Tank crowd.

Opinions on the Sherman seemed to vary quite a bit during the war. After Normandy there was a very heavy demand from front-line tankers for not just a better cannon, but a better tank as well. This demand dropped off after the breakout from Normandy, upticked again during the invasions into Germany proper. So it might have been the Army's own mixed feelings on what was needed was also an impediment to the Pershing's deployment.

Damon.

The interesting question to me about Pershings and the invasion of mainland Japan (assuming no nukes) is this: why bother with them at all? It's not as if the Japanese had anything that would really require a Pershing to handle it, right? I would think that Shermans and Chaffees and Stuarts, combined with the various SPGs and TDs, would have been a perfectly adequate armored force for the operation, and you would save yourself a lot of problems by leaving the Pershings at home (or in Europe).

The Japanese were deliberately witholding their better tanks to resist the expected invasion. Check out: link for a listing of what could have been. At least a few of these designs (like the Type 5) might have required the heavier firepower the Pershing could bring (luckily it never went into production).

Damon.

The Pershing was delayed by disputes between the Armored Forces and Army Ground Forces about what was needed and the strange doctrine that said tanks should not fight tanks but leave them to the tank destroyers.

I realize that the Japanese were holding out their best tanks for mainland defense, but my impression is that even the best of what the Japanese had on hand (as opposed to on the drawing board or in the prototype stage) was hardly frightening, either in quality or quantity.

Doug

IIRC, Pershings that were used in very later Europe in WWII were off loaded a ports like Antwerp, as many landing craft could carry them, for some reason or another (?) … Regardless, I'd believe very few if any IJF's actual AFVs or on the drawing board would have very little to mininal affect on US Armor … Even if the Type 5 made it to the battlefield, their numbers would be small … Plus the IJF had very little actual tank on tank experience. However as noted here – link Some were sent to Okinawa because of high M4 losses. But never saw action … However, as in many island battles in the PTO, most allied AFVs were KO'd by other means than another tank … mines, suicide attacks, direct FA, etc. …

Given that the actual design of the Pershing wasn't finalized until January of 1944, getting them into action a year later was kind of a miracle of wartime production.

However, as noted in the link Patton and other Generals delayed the production/introduction of the M26 … believing it was not needed. But it appears many former surviving tankers in Europe would have believed otherwise …

Reading the USMC reports of their tank actions in 1945 they were of the mind that they wanted the 'new' T26/M26 to replace the M4, even though few Marine tankers had then had the opportunity to see one. I think a few M26s arrived on Okinawa after the main fighting had ended. The USMC applied a lot of field mods to their M4s and did not write-off IJA anti-tank capability in the slightest. The 47-mm was able to cripple an M4 with a shot in the right place, hence all the extra protection welded on. It wasn't the stand-up knockdown WoT style fights they were concerned about, it was the attrition suffered by trying to breach fixed defences including well sited and atk guns, machine guns concentrating on the accompanying inf/engrs and the attempt to channel tanks into prepared kill zones.

Gary

Actually Patton had become a true believer after the break out and even had army vehicle maintenance up armor the Shermans by wielding on extra plates and when they could not keep up with demand Patton paid liberated Belgian factories to perform the up grade. Patton had learned that the Allied tanks and US doctrine like it or not were going to have to go head to head with German tanks and the disparity was just too obvious.

I always wondered why McNair felt that the American tanks could avoid the German ones, particularly if the Germans came looking for them.

The US doctrine of Tanks support Infantry and Tank Destroyers kill enemy tanks … proved to be a not always the "right" solution …

The Liberty Ship issue was just one aspect. Another was that Pershing wouldn't fit through the bow-doors of early- and mid-model LCTs. Even if the doors could be modified, an LCT couldn't hold two of them abreast, so (depending on the mark of LCT), you might only be taking two Pershings ashore instead of six Shermans.

Like I said, I knew there was a reason, just could remember it exactly ! Thanks again R Mark !

It wasn't just an issue with the LCTs. Most cargo ships of the era (Liberty included) had a maximum lift capacity of 40 tons with their onboard cranes. If you had cargo that was heavier than that you needed a heavy lift vessel (relatively few in number) or could only load/unload in a port with cranes of sufficient capacity (also not as common as you might think). A standard Sherman maxes out at 32-33 tons, while a Pershing is 46 tons.

cheers

TMP link

The M26 was also too heavy for the standard treadway bridge in use at the time, so they had to be ferried across rivers, rather than driving across like the M4 series.

As Gary noted above, it is the effectiveness against anti-tank guns that would have been more important than the oppositions tanks.

When maneuvering against defensive positions, power to weight ratios, track ground pressure, effectiveness of the HE round, and how many could be stowed on board are also important. My guess is that this makes for a more mixed comparison.

Of course an AP round if it hits an AT gun will most likely destroy it as well …

HE round is more likely to kill the crew of an AT gun, then you can run over the darn thing and take it permanently out of action.

I imagine that big, beefy 90mm gun might make it a very compelling "assault gun" for chucking high explosive at the enemy.

Tachikoma,

I'm not sure I agree – the US Army was using the British Bailey system, which (depending on configuration) could cope with 46 tons and Churchill Mk VII, which weighed roughly the same as Pershing.

I dunno, Weasel.

The 90mm of the Pershing was an antiaircraft gun. I'm not sure how good a HE shell it had. I know the 76mm was nowhere near as good an HE-thrower as a 75mm, because of the thicker shell walls.

Just read a REALLY bad book ("Tank Tactics" by Jarymowych) which details quite a lot about this, one of the massive armoury of different axes he grinds is the Pershing transport issue and what he describes as "The Great Allied Tank Scandal".
Interestingly He gives figures indicating that even though shipping was optimised for Shermans, the amount shipped was still UNDER the numbers required. He still manages to use this as a stick to beat poor old McNair (which is the equivalent of beating up a granny).
But it was still all Monty's fault, somehow…..

I can bash monty as well as anybody, but really? Did he slip over and try to convince us to make a subpar tank? I thought he was rather fond of US armor in north Afrika.

Kicking Mcnair is fine though.

owen

"even though shipping was optimised for Shermans, the amount shipped was still UNDER the numbers required."

Ah yes, the great Sherman Shortage. Happened around the same time as the great shell shortage.

Consumption of Shermans was under-estimated and a certain degree of scouring of rear areas for more of them was undertaken in late 1944. Tanks, like artillery ammunition, bomber crews and infantrymen, being consumable munitions of war. What the Allies being all set to win the war by Christmas, demand for replacements was miscalculated.

I am sure it was all Montys fault somehow.

"Of course an AP round if it hits an AT gun will most likely destroy it as well …"

Yes, although as one Churchill commander observed 'it required hair splitting accuracy', so HE was preferable.

Yes, HE is very much preferable … but sometimes you may not have that option … and for example an 88 is big target … small ATs, not so much … but take the shot and if you can call in FA or CAS …

I'm sure it was all still Monty's fault when he handed over 100s of British/Canadian surplus reserve Shermans to replace US losses. The British/Canadian policy was for 100% reserve strength (i.e. just as many tanks in reserve as in the front line). The US ratio was FAR lower (I forget the exact figure – 30% rings a bell?), which meant that the US Army in NW Europe simply ran out of tanks.

I expect the USA still made us pay for them…

30% sounds about right boyo!

I hope the US made you pay for them ! But IIRC, much of the debt was dropped after the war. That being said, IIRC, Monty's ops like Goodwood, Charwood, etc. were designed to draw much of the German armor away from the bocage. To make the US penetration of that area's difficult terrain more quickly. So I'd imagine that may account for some of that 30% … I can't criticize Brit tactics. I think they did as well as the could, as did the US based on terrain, etc. … Of course it didn't help running into Panzers crewed by Whittman and the like …

IIRC, Tony Blair made the final payment. :)

That 100% reserve policy certainly paid dividends after things like Goodwood – all three Armoured Divisions back up to strength within three days and then conducting Operation Bluecoat 10 days later! I guess it came from the lessons of North Africa, where entire regiments had to amalgamated, disbanded, reformed, amalgamated, reformed, amalgamated, disbanded and reformed with depressing regularity.

The US Army perhaps hadn't had quite as much experience of losing whole brigades of tanks, so were perhaps more confident re their loss-rates. Sadly, their confidence was misplaced.

Just to drag it back to the topic – the reserves necessary to conduct operations also have to be factored in to the required number of tanks, so it wouldn't just be a case of replacing whole battalions with Pershings. You'd also need enough Pershings in reserve to supply that unit with combat replacements and sustain it in action.

For example, the British 11th Armoured Division wasn't committed to combat in March 1945 until sufficient Comets were in place to provide 100% replacements. The need was illustrated by the record of 3 RTR, which from March to May 1945 got through roughly one-third of it's original issue of Comets.

Cheers to Mr. Blair ! Maybe the US dropped what was owed for naval assets ? Yes, North Africa taught many lessons … The US had less experience than the UK, even after Kasserine … Fortunately both the US and UK managed to produce lots of AFVs. But regardless, it appears sometimes it was not enough … in the short run anyway … But enough to even Lend Lease many to the Russians … who pretty much out produced everybody. And yes, replacing entire units with Pershings would may only have been possible if production start earier as some wanted. And possibly at reducing production of other AFVs …

I think it's worth mentioning again that if you want to make some new tank you have to stop making some old tank.
By definition that new tank is unproven.
If the old one seems to be doing a pretty good job and the people in the field like it then you'd have to be insane or remarkably prescient to stop producing that old tank and start on the new.
Remember also that some of those experimental tanks weren't all that good.
As you're signing that order – how do you know you're not ordering a bad tank which is worse than the Sherman?

Dialling forward you then find there are less shermans made.
The plants, would have to stop making them.
Change production lines ( which is far from trivial ).
Produce nothing at all for a while.
Then make pershings.
You get issues when you start making something else so production would be down for some time on them as well.
In the long term you're also going to make fewer heavy tanks than medium tanks anyhow.
You then ship less to Europe.
Docks have more problems with heavier tanks, ships can carry less etc etc.
The net effect is less tanks in Europe, but some pershings arrive a few months earlier.
Any tank at all is better than no tank and the Sherman was actually pretty good at the main job armour is used for – supporting and fighting infantry.

My conclusion is that the most likely effect would be less allied tanks and more allied infantry dead.
In Europe anyhow.
I don't know about any possible invasion of mainland Japan in an alternative universe where the A bomb was a dud.

We used Pershings in Korea, but the consensus seems to have been that the M4A3E8 Sherman gave a better bang for the buck (shipping space) -- this vs. North Korean and Chinese T-34/85s.

Quality vs. quantity … However the M4 Easy 8 was possibly the "best" of the M4 "breed" …

Definitely.

The M-26 and M-46 were used quite a bit as artillery in Korea so I suppose they had a decent to good HE round.

Thanks,

Pat

Quality vs. quantity … However the M4 Easy 8 was possibly the "best" of the M4 "breed" …

errrr, no.

That would have been the Firefly, which the US refused to produce.

If you're going to include foreign-modified versions, then the Israeli M51 Super Sherman, with a 105mm gun probably tops the list.
link