"Can skirmishers stop an attacker from closing?" Topic

Art,

Well, actually when I say, "What is X?" I'm actually looking for a number, like how much did the French prowess – in this case where the French do successfully halt the Russian assault – exceed the Russian prowess?

I'm not looking to say the French were X times better in general, I'm trying to define how much better someone's skirmishers must be in a given situation to halt the assault of formed units.

Cheers,

The Bandit

G'Day

Make the French skirmishers a prowess of 7 or 8 (the prowess of 8 is due to factor number 2)

Make the Russian skirmishers a prowess of 5

1…Their methods of detaching skirmishers en detail…

2…Difference in their general principles of grande manoeuvre for skirmishers and formed reserves.

Its all about the French having a better command and control due to factors i and 2.

Hope that helps

Best Regards
Art

Art,

It does a little. I know I'm asking what has to sound like a silly or foolish question. I'm just struggling with how to quantify the amount of advantage that skirmishers had to demonstrate to halt assaulting formed troops.

Cheers,

The Bandit

The largest variable would have to be the terrain.

Turning the question the other way round "How many formed troops does it take to push past a skirmish screen", and given like to like troop quality…

On an open plain 1:1 or even 1:2 would work. In the open a single battalion formed as skirmishers is unlikely to stop a single formed battalion. The skirmishers are far too dispersed to compete in firepower or melee.

On the other hand in an extensive wood where the movement of formed troops is all but impossible that could easily jump to 3:1 AND require the formed troops to fight as skirmishers.

That is presuming one accepts 3:1 as the proper ration to guarantee overcoming any resistance.

What makes any such calculation difficult is that skirmishers rarely worked in a vacuum but as part of a multi tiered defense.

Although looking at the actions of the F&I war like Braddock's defeat, we can see a very clear case of rough terrain acting as a force multiplier for skirmish only troops. Of course Braddock's force was not deployed for combat when the fight started, but they certainly had a hard time forming and countering their enemy's movements.

Had that encounter happened in an open field there is little doubt the British force would have been sufficient for the task.

Don't feel like digging through my books but Wikipedia says 891 French and Indians vs. 1300 regulars and militia. Braddock also had guns. Memory says 2 but I don't like trusting my memory.

Bob

Bob,

The skirmishers are far too dispersed to compete in firepower or melee.

I think that actually this missing an important facet, the skirmishers cause loss of forward momentum through fire and loss of will to close through disorder. They don't need to win a firefight. In fact, I would guess it is nearly impossible for skirmishers to lose a firefight calculated on losses inflicted as formed volleys against a skirmish line are gonna hit what? Some tiny number of skirmishers while outputting large volumes of ammunition, blinding shooters and fouling muskets. This is essentially what Kevin quoted at the end of the last page when he posted:

‘When the enemy, after having forced the line of advanced posts, approached the position occupied by the army, a cloud of skirmishers thrown out in front of this position often succeeded, by the efficiency of their fire, in putting a considerable portion of their adversaries ‘hors de combat,' carrying disorder into their ranks, and often forcing them to abandon their undertaking.'

On the other point:

On the other hand in an extensive wood where the movement of formed troops is all but impossible that could easily jump to 3:1 AND require the formed troops to fight as skirmishers.

Yet I'm not sure this is what we see at Friedland. The Russians did move columns into the forest, in fact when they finally pushed Ruffin out they did so with battalion columns. Ruffin also kept formed troops available and used them in counter-attacks and defenses within the bounds of the Sortlack forest. Thus, the feat did not require terrain that made formed troop movements impossible. During the majority of the fighting it seems fair to conclude the Russians held an advantage that bounced between 2:1 and 3:1 and they appear to have *chosen* to deploy more and more skirmishers, not forced to by terrain.

Turning the question the other way round "How many formed troops does it take to push past a skirmish screen", and given like to like troop quality…

On an open plain 1:1 or even 1:2 would work.

I tend to agree with this though I don't have much basis for my agreement. So were there times on the Peninsular that the British Army deployed *so many* skirmishers that the French formed units *could not* move through them? That would potentially be a terrain exempt example. Another is Davout's corps at Auerstädt where – was it Morand's division – deployed a huge number of skirmishers to bridge the line and halted Prussian assaults. They were in a built-up area if I recall. I'll dig into that one and see what I can find.

In theory a defender should be able to gain such an advantage through either large enough numbers of skirmishers or a balance of terrain and talented skirmishers to halt formed troops but knowing how large that advantage much be is proving very difficult.

Cheers,

The Bandit

T. Bandit,

"I think that actually this missing an important facet, the skirmishers cause loss of forward momentum through fire and loss of will to close through disorder. They don't need to win a firefight. In fact, I would guess it is nearly impossible for skirmishers to lose a firefight calculated on losses inflicted as formed volleys against a skirmish line are gonna hit what? Some tiny number of skirmishers while outputting large volumes of ammunition, blinding shooters and fouling muskets. "

I agree with this, however if there is no obstacle to keep the formed troops from advancing, and no threat other than skirmishers, going at them with the bayonet should send them packing unless they are highly motivated skirmishers. That goes back to my earlier suggestion that a thick skirmish screen benefits an attacker more than a defender.

You will disorganize the defenders' formed troops and if they advance to disperse your skirmishers they will have left their place in line.

At Quatre Bras (IIRC) one of the Scot's regiments, on the defensive here, charged a series of hedge lines to disperse enemy skirmishers. Each time the skirmishers were forced to retreat. Eventually when the Scots returned to their start position, the skirmishers returned like so many midges.

Time, distance, and terrain have much to do with skirmisher efficiency.

Getting back to Spain, I cannot recall any such incidents but as I say relying on memory is not my strong suit : )

Bob

Bob:

It was the 93rd of Kemper's brigade. It is described at the end of the Light Infantry chapter in Muir's Experience and Tactics in the Napoleonic Wars. [I'm doing this from memory]

The 93rd charged a much larger body of skirmishers spread over more than a brigade front. This is after at least a half hour of skirmishing where Kemper had thrown out all his light companies and the eighth companies as well and was still losing artillerymen and officers an an unacceptable rate. Wellington is the one who came up and ordered the Highlanders to charge. The regiment took heavy casualties as a result and when the regiment returned to the brigade, so did the French skirmishers.

To try and answer Bandit's question, of the 'X' factor, if the raw numbers place the French at 2 [1900] and the Russians at 5 to 7, [5-7,000], you have to take into account
when each attack occurred, so that the numbers weren't absolute at any one moment. If you add one to the French for their superior ability and one or two for the terrain advantages, you end up with 4-5 to 5-7 which could mimic the results at Friedland.

Obviously, from the 93rd's example, weaker numbers of formed troops could drive skirmishers away. I don't think skirmishers could stop formed troops from advancing, if they were determined. What I think could happen is the skirmishers could discourage formed attackers by 1. causing significant losses and 2. remain out of reach of decisive combat, again like the 93rd's experience [they were ordered to lie down after their return to reduce casualties from the French light troops.]

Obviously, at Friedland, the Russians kept pushing, with BOTH sides committing reinforcements [in fact both side better than doubled the original forces--on the same frontage] even after being 'discouraged', until they saw French reinforcements coming that made such efforts moot.

Anyway, those are possible answers to the questions.

Bob:

It was the 93rd of Kemper's brigade. It is described at the end of the Light Infantry chapter in Muir's Experience and Tactics in the Napoleonic Wars. [I'm doing this from memory]

The 93rd charged a much larger body of skirmishers spread over more than a brigade front. This is after at least a half hour of skirmishing where Kemper had thrown out all his light companies and the eighth companies as well and was still losing artillerymen and officers an an unacceptable rate. Wellington is the one who came up and ordered the Highlanders to charge. The regiment took heavy casualties as a result and when the regiment returned to the brigade, so did the French skirmishers.

To try and answer Bandit's question, of the 'X' factor, if the raw numbers place the French at 2 [1900] and the Russians at 5 to 7, [5-7,000], you have to take into account
when each attack occurred, so that the numbers weren't absolute at any one moment. If you add one to the French for their superior ability and one or two for the terrain advantages, you end up with 4-5 to 5-7 which could mimic the results at Friedland.

Obviously, from the 93rd's example, weaker numbers of formed troops could drive skirmishers away. I don't think skirmishers could stop formed troops from advancing, if they were determined. What I think could happen is the skirmishers could discourage formed attackers by 1. causing significant losses and 2. remain out of reach of decisive combat, again like the 93rd's experience [they were ordered to lie down after their return to reduce casualties from the French light troops.]

Obviously, at Friedland, the Russians kept pushing, with BOTH sides committing reinforcements [in fact both side better than doubled the original forces--on the same frontage] even after being 'discouraged', until they saw French reinforcements coming that made such efforts moot.

Anyway, those are possible answers to the questions.

Bill, Bob,

The incident at Quatre Bras involved the 79th regiment from Kempt's brigade. In fact the whole brigade was involved, but the 79th pursued the French further than the rest of the brigade,

Bill,

We have discussed this before and the account in Muir's book is from a late 19th century regimental history written long after the battle, not an eyewitness account. When the actual sources and earlier regimental history are consulted, we see that the French skirmishers did not return, and the 79th retired and lay down to seek cover from enemy artillery fire, not skirmish fire.

Not only that, but the advance of Kempt's brigade routed Bachelu's division, or at least a brigade of that division, not just a skirmish line, and that is from the French account of Foy. Foy had to deploy a regiment in line to cover this rout.

Major:

Yes we have discussed this before. Thanks for the clarifications. I was doing it all away from my books etc. [I'm in Ottawa at the moment] My memory is not what it used to be…

From the accounts you mention, I still get the impression that the 79th's action as described was before Kempt's [not Kemper's] brigade advance and independent of it. I also can't believe that the regimental history would reduce Kempt's brigade's rout of a French brigade to the action of one regiment's against skirmishers… which is what the account clearly describes, right or wrong.

What I am running into when I consider the comparison of the two forces at Friedland is that if the Russian prowess is a '5' then the French prowess must have been *significantly* higher. The reason I say this is otherwise:

Turning back an assaulting enemy could be done predictably via skirmishers so long as the defender was capable of dedicating enough men to the skirmish line.

I need to review accounts of Auerstädt and see if they shed some light.

Cheers,

The Bandit

What I am running into when I consider the comparison of the two forces at Friedland is that if the Russian prowess is a '5' then the French prowess must have been *significantly* higher.

I'm not sure I see this. As long as the 'quantified' odds come out to 1:1, I don't see an issue… that is unless you believe the French success at holding the forest was a 'done deal.' My guess is, through better tactics of the French commanders, they won the 1:1 attack.

The reason I say this is otherwise:

Turning back an assaulting enemy could be done predictably via skirmishers so long as the defender was capable of dedicating enough men to the skirmish line.

Predictably? Did the French feel they were 'predictably' successful? The Russians? The main issue is frontage. If you have a front that can hold 2000 skirmishers, the other 3,000 can only hold the coats of the front line or replace them. They can't simply overwhelm the defenders in a forest without becoming 'formed' for all intents and purposes.

Bill,

I think I was unclear.

What I am trying to express is that in a particular instance, such as the Sortlack Forest, that the French managed to obtain an advantage over the Russians in skirmishing such that they could halt some formed Russian assaults.

If that advantage could be gained simply by throwing forward enough skirmishers then it would seem a wargamer could predictably halt the assault of his opponent by just sending all his units forward as skirmishers. This is obviously wrong since the historical French did not feel this would definitely bring them success, they were just hopeful it would work.

Cheers,

The Bandit

What I am trying to express is that in a particular instance, such as the Sortlack Forest, that the French managed to obtain an advantage over the Russians in skirmishing such that they could halt some formed Russian assaults.

That's not what Art describes. Skirmishers could repel the formed attacks on BUAs, why not forests? In both cases the attackers have to become dispersed to enter either one.

I really respect Arnold, and even more Ralph Reinertsen, for looking at all the original sources and drawing intelligent conclusions. Also, I fully admit that I did *not* go check all the relevant sources.

That said, the degree to which this was a serious attack to clear the Sortlak looks pretty unclear in Russian sources. The Russians arrived tired after a long march, and after a little rest, starting from 2 or 3 am, Bagration cleared the town of Sortlak and moved jäger into the woods, where French resistance stiffened.

In this, his mission was only to open the way and cover the deployment of the Russians crossing the river – which he did successfully.

Starting with daylight, the level of action increased. But nowhere do I read of any (repeat any) concrete intention to clear the wood so as to turn Lannes' flank or any other co-ordinated idea of offensive operations. Instead, Bennigsen's indecision, lack of orders, possible illness and so on seem to make up the bulk of the Russian narratives.

Now, again, I do not want to seem to gainsay Arnold and Reinertsen. But before we draw lots of general conclusions from this single example, I think we might carefully think about :
- exactly what were Bagration's orders ?
- when did the troops under him ( a total of 2 divisions) arrive, and in what condition ?
- how many troops were in the forest, vs. moving along its edge in open terrain ?
- how thick was the forest ?
- where were the rest of Lannes' troops ?
- exactly when and where did the next arriving French troops show up in this area?
- and so on.

- Sasha

P.S. – At Maloyaroslavets, the units dispersed into the buildings seem to have been able to hold against any attempt by formed units to clear them – true for both sides, by the way. The formed units tended to become dispersed and the whole thing degenerated into a rather disordered and bloody streetfight. Then the buildings were set on fire, by artillery. I think the same was seen by French when trying to enter Smolensk against the Russian rearguard.

Bill,

That's not what Art describes. Skirmishers could repel the formed attacks on BUAs, why not forests? In both cases the attackers have to become dispersed to enter either one.

I think we're missing each other, at least I'm not following your disagreement here.

I'd also wager to say that there is a difference between troops acting as skirmishers / tirailleurs and troops being dispersed to buildings and village squares in a built-up area though I can't articulate what that is exactly.

My objection isn't that skirmishers shouldn't be able to turn back assaults but obviously sometimes they were successful and other times they were not. Determining something about the 'chance' therein related directly to how to portray this within a wargame. If a system allows a skirmish force with a prowess of X to always halt an assault that could be bad, the defender just has to figure out how to get to X and he can't be attacked. That is obviously ahistorical and formulaic.

However, if it is adapted a little bit and a defender can prevent an attacker from closing if he obtains a skirmish advantage of X:Y, then there is play from both sides. To close my attack I don't necessarily have to win, I just have to make sure the gap is tighter than X:Y.

This begets the question of what should X:Y be?

It should be large enough that a defender can not predictably do it but small enough that it can occur.

Hence my seeking of historically examples of it happening and trying to quantify just what level of advantage the defender held when successful.

Cheers,

The Bandit

T. Bandit,

Please forgive me if this has beens stated previously but for your purposes what the player forces on the table likely to look like? Individual figures as part of a battalion, or battalions composed of stands with some stands detached as skirmishers, or something like battalions without skirmishers depicted, up to brigade stands etc,.

BTW my typing is appalling this morning Spell Check has found many errors but others must be creeping through : )

Reason I ask is the rare case of skirmishers alone repelling an assault might well be the difference between rolling a 5 and a 6 on a six sided die if the game is not played at an extremely low level.

Sasha's post was spot on suggesting that we may not be able to draw general conclusions from a single example. As they say here "things happen".

Depending on a game's level of abstraction, superior skirmishing capability might be rolled into superior training generally.

To look at a specific example, Paddy Griffith's rules for games where each unit is a battalion made up of division sized stands, units may only take towns and woods through skirmish combat. That is to say the minute a unit commits to an assault on a wood it is presumed to be doing so unformed. The fight thus becomes a drawn out firefight rather than a decisive "assault".

Bob

Please forgive me if this has beens stated previously but for your purposes what the player forces on the table likely to look like?

Opposing forces who are dealing with this skirmish issue are likely to be brigades or divisions. Battalions are depicted but not independently manipulated. Skirmishers are drawn from any part of the brigade / division and allotted to the frontage of the brigade / division.

Players will decide what amount of skirmishing force to throw forward and decide what battalions to deplete to do so, they can allocate them to one battalion or spread them across many. This skirmishing force is done in the blind, i.e. your opponent doesn't know what you bid and you don't know what he bid. Then you both roll dice, add in what you bid and compare numbers. Higher number gets the skirmish advantage which provides some combat benefits.

What I am dealing with here is the question of if a degrees. Just because your skirmishers have the upper hand over your opponent's skirmishers doesn't mean yours stand a chance of preventing his formed units from closing against you. Yet it would seem there is a point at which yours demonstrate such a great advantage that they are able to do just that. Defining that is hard.

Sasha's post was spot on suggesting that we may not be able to draw general conclusions from a single example. As they say here "things happen".

I concur with his appraisal that it is too fine a sample. I am concerned that simply saying, "against built-up areas and woods an attacker must have skirmish advantage to close," as I believe as the math plays out too greatly in favor of the defender making every plank and straw building a fortress. Similarly, if the stats are adjusted so that plank and straw isn't treated like a stone castle, then all of a sudden skirmishing in the open is a toss up with neither side having any advantage going in, which, some nations were better or worse at given times.

To look at a specific example, Paddy Griffith's rules for games where each unit is a battalion made up of division sized stands, units may only take towns and woods through skirmish combat. That is to say the minute a unit commits to an assault on a wood it is presumed to be doing so unformed. The fight thus becomes a drawn out firefight rather than a decisive "assault".

I don't think that is a bad way to deal with it at that level, at the level I'm dealing with I don't think it works directly.

Cheers,

The Bandit

" making every plank and straw building a fortress"

Actually the plank and straw seems have worked quite well …. assuming enough building(s) to get all of a given formation behind the planks. The problem is that the building(s) catch(es) fire. And then either you burned in place or you get into the bloody streetfight, literally fighting on/over the bodies of the fallen in such confined spaces that superior number don't matter much. Really ugly stuff. But it seems that this was pretty much the usual result.

And the stone buildings really need to get blasted into by artillery …. the Russians swept passed and tried to assualt the French and Italians inside the Ste.-Elizabeth Otrada monastery at Maloyaroslvets several times, but the few grenadiers inside held out all day long.

- Sasha

Interesting concept T. Badit.

At that scale perhaps skirmish results might be judged by time rather than by loss. Given a finite amount of day light the skirmishers need only hold up and attack until the attacker runs out of time.

So the "standard" ratios of force between skirmishers can be used with 1:1 granting minimal delay while 3 to 1 or more grant s a major delay or something on that order.

My objection isn't that skirmishers shouldn't be able to turn back assaults but obviously sometimes they were successful and other times they were not. Determining something about the 'chance' therein related directly to how to portray this within a wargame. If a system allows a skirmish force with a prowess of X to always halt an assault that could be bad, the defender just has to figure out how to get to X and he can't be attacked. That is obviously ahistorical and formulaic.

Okay, I guess I'm with you. We need to find similar events, at least 20--but more the merrier, to start making conclusions about the 'chances'. The Jena fighting in Isserstad and the adjoining forest are another example. The forest on the left-middle of the Allied line at Bautzen is another. Once you have the examples, you can make some coherent generalizations and start grouping them by shared events. Until then you have nothing to form any conclusions about 'chances'. i.e. the statistical odds of something happening or not.

Bonjour Sasha..et al…

Mon Vieux Pote…I agree with you in regards to Arnold and Ralph…and like yourself I have not validated all their sources…but I do know that they have made a few mistakes when it comes to understanding each country's military system and their general principles of grande manoeuvre.

But we do have one very reliable source who gives nothing but praise to the Russian Army, and was actually there to provide 1st hand accounts of the Battle of Friedland, his name is Sir Robert Wilson and his staff.

He validates that after the French Hussars are driven back, the prisoners taken informed the Russians that it was Oudinot's corps (which was shattered at Heilsberg according to Beningzens beliefs) was now stationed alone at Posthenen.

Sir Robert Wilson states it was general Beningzen intentions to take the forest and destroy Oudinot.

As for the state of the troops, both the French and Russians were worn-out and I find it amazing that both sides were able to continue the fight.

Within the forest it was necessary to use the trails for formed troops, and it was possible to conceal formed troops in the end of the tree line.

As for the Forest of Sortlack, there were only two battalions of Ruffin deployed en tirailleur and the other two battalions were in support en colonne par peloton on the trails.

As for the disposition of Lannes body of troops; Albert's Brigade, were to the left of Posthenen, while two batteries and Oudinot's reserves were initially positioned behind Posthenen, which he used as his center of operations while the rest of his battalions were stretched out from Posternen to the Forest of Sortlack, with Ruffin in the forest.

When Dupas division arrived around 07:00, Lanne had it formed to the right of Posthenen, Dombrowski' division formed behind the massed battery at Posthenen and with Verdiers arrival around 07:45, they were divided into two mobile columns, one which was to manoeuvre on the edge, and just within to deceive the Russians of the actual strength of the French.

It is this mobile column of Verdiers that hugs the edge of the woods as concealment, prior to making their assault on the Russians that are formed in the clearing.

Around 09:00 the whole Russian Army moved forward, bringing its left into line with the front then held by the Jagers in the forest of Sortlack. There were 3000 Jagers in the forest of Sortlack, supported by two battalions, five squadrons, and four guns at the village of Sortlack.

According to Sir Robert Wilson, by 11:00 the French were giving way on all points, and General Beningzen hoped to take the forest with the Guard Jagers to lodge themselves in the woods under the command of Colonel St. Priest. But the Guard were forced to retire in "perfect order" from the forest about a half a musket-shot distance away to obtain shelter of some farm houses, they were then supported by Russian cavalry that manoeuvred on the right to gain the rear of the French.

Sir Robert Wilson had made only two critics…one in case of an incident that was necessary to retreat due to a mishap, no precautions to defend the entrances into the town and cover the retiring troop were taken, and the need for military police within the city of Friedland was never forth coming.

Unlike some who believe that in the end, the Russians were broken and routed in mass confusion caused by Serarmont's massed battery, it was actually the lack of any military police in the town that cause the panic within the streets as everyone attempted to cross the bridge. But towards nightfall all order was restored once more, and the entangled carriages and men were disengaged and passed through the city.

for those who have read Napoloens Bulletin and Bennigsens Dispatch dated 15 June, both should be taken as specious.

The second critic that Sir Robert Wilson had was that the Russians had a limited amount of skirmishers against the French, which utilized…hmmm…

-I am not certain the British at Friedland could possibly be correct, because according to most contemporary historians and wargame designers…only the British on the defensive used terrain to their advantage. To even have what is call a modifier "Troops under Wellington Reverse Slope" ;-)

OK…Seriously…

The French in their defensive disposition, from Heinricksdorf to the Forest of Sortlack, their formed columns were concealed by means of the woods and terrain, while the trailleurs and their formed support laid down in the long grass or behind favoring ground.

The Russians that were on the Battle line were not so fortunate. The infantry were drawn up in two lines; in the first the regiments stood with their first and third battalions deployed, and the second battalions were formed in column behind. The second line consisted of entire regiments formed en colonne par bataillons behind the third battalions of the front line.

Therefore this can explain why the Russians in 1807 have such a limited amount of skirmishers due to the Russian military system that was utilized from 1805 – 1807…when only relying upon line battalions to detach light troops.

(note: quite often the military system used at Friedland is confused with that of the greatly improved Russians military system and their general principles of grande mannoeuvre of 1811)

What this means is that the differences between the Russians and French in their methods of detaching skirmishers en detail…and the difference in their general principles of grand manoeuvre.

Both Russian and French line battalions detached skirmishers en peloton-compagnie by 4, 8, or 12 Soldiers from each half battalion in column. Therefore with both half-battalions from the battalion column, that would be approximately 30 to 50 skirmishers being detached, with approximately 96 skirmishers being detached for special assaults.

1…for French line battalions, the tactical fractured unit was the demi-bataillon (or half battalion deployed in line), and the subdivisions of the demi-bataillon was the peloton (fractured).

1…for the Russian line battalion, the tactical fractured unit was the subdivisions of pelotons (fractured). They did not manoeuvre en deployed demi-bataillon, which is not to be confused with a colonne par peloton

2…for the French light battalion, the tactical fractured unit was the demi-bataillon (or half battalion deployed in line), and the subdivisions of the demi-bataillon when detaching skirmishers was the compagnie-division. Therefore the disposition for the light battalion was to detach only two companies as skirmishers while on the offensive, with a formed reserve.

2…for the Russian light battalion, the subdivisions when detaching skirmishers was the compagnie-division. Therefore the disposition for the light battalion was to detach the entire battalion as skirmishers with the second line of battaions as support , or with a formed reserve. Again the Russian battalion did not manoeuvre en deployed demi-bataillon, which is not to be confused with a colonne par peloton (up until 1803 this general principle of manoeuvre of detaching an entire battalion as skirmishers was also executed by the French).

When the battalion detaches skirmisher en peloton-compagnie, the tactical units are divided and has no central command.

When a battalion detaches skirmishers en compagnie-division it is one tactical unit with a central command.

When a light battalion detaches all pelotons en compagnie-division, there is no formed reserve and it is extremely hard to command and control this formation. It is the second battle line that must act as the formed reserve, but it cannot control the skirmishers effectively.

(this is not to be confused with a grande bande, because it has a formed reserve which controls the movement of the detached skirmishers)

When a light battalion detaches one or two pelotons as skirmishers en compagnie-division, it has control of the skirmishers, and manoeuvre for the formed battalion is possible.

Type of formed reserves used by the Russian and French:

For the French they could have a colonne d'attaque, colonne double or colonne de peloton…where the Russians during this time could only use a colonne de peloton or a colonne par division with skirmishers detached en peloton-compagnie.

Oudinots entire division was capable of detaching all grenadiers and voltigeurs en compagnie-division. As were all the Russian light battalions, but not their line regiments.

For the Russians, the infantry were drawn up in two lines; in the first the regiments stood with their first and third battalions deployed, and the second battalions were formed in column behind. Either the first battalion detached one peloton on compagnie-division, or the third battalion detached skirmishers en peloton-compagnie. In either case a regiment only had approximately 50 to 90 skirmishers.

This would explain Sir Robert Wilson statement when he said that they did not have sufficient skirmishers.

Since manoeuvre for formed units in the woods was limited to the trails, the Jagers would enter without a formed reserve to guide them. They would have to rely upon the regulating compagnie-division in the woods to guide off of.

The French were under the same circumstance that the Russians were in, as to embarrassing terrain, but the French were on the defensive, therefore without a local formed support nearby, it was not as disadvantageous, nor against the general principles.

The support was formed en colonne par section or colonne par peloton

1…Skirmishers detached en compagnie-divisions are twice as effective as skirmishers detached en peloton-compagnie.

2…Entire battalions deployed as skirmishers on offensive is less effective, has less command and control than a battalion with two tactical compagnies deployed as skirmishers.

3…Marechal Lanne only had three regiments that could not deploy trailleurs en compagnie-divisions.

Another example 1792:

This would be the French Army from 1792 to 1793, when it was an army of tirailleurs and marched en colonne par bataillons with the exception the Battle of Jenappe.

Dampierre disregarded the orders given to him to form colonne par bataillons to march up to the enemy then deploy en tirailleur. Instead he formed his battalions en colonne d'attaque formed on the center.

He even acknowledges two important issues…

First…had his execution of turned out badly and the consequences involved…

Secondly…even though his execution worked out…it did not change anything for at least a couple of years…the French would still continue to march en colonne par battalions, deploy and manoeuvre en tirailleurs.

During this period the Allies were not certain how to combat the French that were using an entire force en tirailleur. Of course once they understood the problem, by 1794 they were more than able to handle tirailleurs en debandade.

Best Regards
Art

G'Day Gents,

It is also probable that the two French battalions were both deployed en grande bande…

In which case:

When one or more battalions of light infantry are to be formed as tirailleurs, the general shall warn the colonels, who would in turn inform their officers of his etat major the various needed points to be known on the line, and points d'appui for the line of tirailleurs.

(this would be interesting in the woods)

The officers would proceed to form the battalion en tirailleurs par compagnies (compagnie-divisions) for the dispersion of a battalion.

The lines of tirailluers are to be formed on one battalion, the colonel will let the chef de bataillon know where the various points and point d'appui are. The chef de bataillon will warn the compagnies of carabiners or voltigeurs that they will have to form two lines of tirailleurs, with the second line is 50 paces in front of the reserve.

Captains will command the first and second line, and the third line is formed as the reserve of the battalion.

To assure that everyone is in their proper position, the chef de bataillon will give the command to open ranks.
The commanders of each battalion shall give the various orders from the adopted signals by means of diverse batteries from l'ordonnance, or calls adopted for the school of tirailleurs. Which are repeated by the clarions/drummers of the chef de bataillon commanding the reserves and by the captains commanding the lignes de tirailleurs.

The tirailleurs are expected to know, as well as promptly obey the various signals no matter what sort of terrain the tirailleurs are in.

The Commander will use both a regulating body and guides on both end of the ligne of tirailleurs to execute any change of front and direction. Of course the use of calls are to replace the command of voice, due to the length of the line, and the turmoil of an action.

-and in this case embarrassing terrain.

Best Regards
Art

Sir Robert Wilson had made only two critics…one in case of an incident that was necessary to retreat due to a mishap, no precautions to defend the entrances into the town and cover the retiring troop were taken, and the need for military police within the city of Friedland was never forth coming.

How many 'military police' units did the Russian Army organize and deploy with the field armies? If so, what was the organization of any Russian 'military police' units and how were they employed and to whom were they attached in the field?

Unlike some who believe that in the end, the Russians were broken and routed in mass confusion caused by Serarmont's massed battery, it was actually the lack of any military police in the town that cause the panic within the streets as everyone attempted to cross the bridge. But towards nightfall all order was restored once more, and the entangled carriages and men were disengaged and passed through the city.

Friedland had been set of fire by Senarmont's artillery and the location of the town was not conducive for large units or amount of troops to move through to get to the bridges, of which all three Russian pontoon bridges were badly sited and could only be reached by going through the town. The town bridge, according to Yermelov in his memoirs, had been set on fire and was unusable, and the last of the serviceable pontoon bridges had been damaged by French artillery fire.

The movement through the town by the Russians was not organized and the day after Friedland the state of the Russian army according to Yermelov was 'in complete disarray' which says volumes on how the Russians tried to escape the trap on the other side of the Alle.

Without finding the ford across the Alle, and without the rear guard attempting to hold off the French advance, the Russian army would have lost its artillery.

Wilson in his narrative states that 'the bridges were ordered to be fired' which left Russian troops on the wrong bank of the Alle and that a 'great portion of the [Russian] infantry were obliged to plunge into the stream and escape by an almost impracticable ford.'

Lastly, your apparent disregard of the damage that Senarmont's massed artillery did to the Russian center, counterattacking Guard cavalry and to the town of Friedland undercuts and greatly underestimates the actual contribution Senarmont and his artillery gave to the French winning effort. Yermelov in his narrative gives it due credit as does the after action report of the French I Corps.

B

Anyone who wants to argue over Senarmont's French artillery, the conditions inside Friedland during the Russian withdrawal or anything else not related to the topic of skirmishing is free to do so – In another thread. Thank you.

Cheers,

The Bandit