"Can skirmishers stop an attacker from closing?" Topic

I know the answer is both yes and no so let me give this some context.

An assaulting force is sitting at roughly 500 yards-to-contact with their defending opponent.

Is there a definable amount of skirmishing prowess that the defender can throw forward that will make advancing for the assaulter so difficult that they *can not do it*?

I'm not talking about, "your opponent has a skirmish advantage which will negatively impact you during combat so do you want to hold back and try and gain skirmish advantage over them?"

I'm talking about, "wow man, you can't close until you narrow the skirmish advantage they hold."

Is that a thing and can it be a predictable and definable standard?

Cheers,

The Bandit

I don't think skirmishers are ever meant to completely stop an attack. Their purpose is more to slow the attackers down and maybe throw them off their "A" game.

And alert the main line an attack is coming…

I seem to recall at Ligny Prussian skirmishers stopped a French attack. The Prussians were thick behind a hedge on the edge of a village. It wasn't until the French brought up guns and plastered them with grape that the attack succeeded.

The difficulty is trying to emulate this on a gaming table.

Predictable and definable I shouldn't think.

If the assaulting troops were very skittish and if the skirmishers disabled enough officers, maybe.

I do mean really skittish as in possibly running from the sound of friendly vollies skittish.

Although I do think skirmishers are more effective against defenders stood in place than against troops advancing against them.

In that respect I think defensive skirmishers are there more to protect their line from enemy skirmishers rather than from the attacking main body.

Bob

wrgmr1 has a good point although in rules terms I wouldn't think of skirmishers in a strong defensive position or works as "skirmishers" per se….if that makes any sense.

Bob

I'm hoping I don't derail my own thread but… Friedland. The Russians don't attack Lannes's right because they couldn't gain skirmish superiority. It seems to me that in a wargame this will *never* replicate. The Russian player will never choose to hold off for hours because the French have a strong skirmish line.

Friedland might well be an example of terrible command decisions on the part of the Russians, there is a ton of evidence pointing that way, I'm just bringing it up as a point of conversation should others be able to offer examples more on point.

Cheers,

The Bandit

G'Day

If you are referring to the situation when Lanne was by himself at Friedland…and Bagration made a determined effort to clear the forest of Sortlack…then you are correct.

Best Regards
Art

Well, one way to "black box" this might be to take the skirmishing firepower into account when determining the result of the attack; if the attack is repelled, you can see it as the skirmishers did their job.

Art,

If you are referring to the situation when Lanne was by himself at Friedland…

Yes, I was.

Pedrobear,

Well, one way to "black box" this might be to take the skirmishing firepower into account when determining the result of the attack; if the attack is repelled, you can see it as the skirmishers did their job.

That is really saying, "let's abstract skirmishing out of the representation and presume it is a part of unit combat".

That isn't an invalid choice but I'm dealing with a scope where that is not the case.

Cheers,

The Bandit

hey up,

is the question "do they stop an attack that is in progress" or is it "do they stop an attack from starting" or both cos the two cases seem different and might take into account different factors,

cheers

I think I`d agree that if they are in a positions, or terrain, skirmishers/smaller bodies of troops could deter formed troops from advancing.
Thanks for bringing this up Bandit – something to check up on!

Well despite a strong Anglo-Portuguese skirmish screen Loison's division did make progress at Bussaco but it appears that whole formed battalions had to support the tirailleurs.

So your troops are at 500 yds. There is a heavy enemy skirmish screen in front of you. The skirmisher's fire will not start to take effect until 100 yds, assuming that they are musket armed. Yet you cannot advance to within 200 yds., which will still leave you out of range. Verrrrrrry interrrrrrresting. Someone must have skirmisherphobia. Shouldn't formed troops have the same effect?

Skirmishers don't have to be necessarily a small group or detachment, especially as the French employed them.

A good example of that is the French infantry deployment at Jena facing Grawert's division when they attacked. The French infantry were deployed behind cover and kept up a destructive fire against Grawert in the open.

Grawert did and could not dislodge the French infantry in their positions under cover.

B

To further tighten the question, it is not if the assaulting command *chooses* to hold back because his enemy has a skirmish advantage. It is if the assaulting force *can't close* because of how overwhelming the enemy skirmish advantage is.

Major Bloodnok,

So your troops are at 500 yds. There is a heavy enemy skirmish screen in front of you. The skirmisher's fire will not start to take effect until 100 yds, assuming that they are musket armed. Yet you cannot advance to within 200 yds., which will still leave you out of range.

Actually I could already be under skirmish fire depending on how far forward of the main body the enemy skirmishers push forward which was highly variable and sometimes a lot.

Kevin,

Grawert did and could not dislodge the French infantry in their positions under cover.

Interesting example, I'll have to read up on that some to see if it fits the bill.

Cheers,

The Bandit

"Skirmish screen" is the problem here. The Devil is in the details. A skirmish screen could be just the light companies of a few units or so thick that the enemy mistakes the screen for the main line.

Some rules only allow for separate skirmish detachments. Others only allow X proportion of each unit to detach as skirmishers.

It would seem that in practice there was no limit to the amount of men that could be sent out skirmishing, even to the point that the main line could be seriously weakened if too many resources were committed to the screen. At that point if the screen didn't stop the enemy the main line wouldn't either.

I allow each unit to send out as many skirmishers as its owner would like. The catch is that these count as losses to the parent unit until and if they return.

This can lead to some very thick skirmish screens that can bog down an assault until the attacker, perhaps over reacting by sending out too many skirmishers of his own is finally left with too few formed troops to make a go of it.

M C LeSingeDew,

This can lead to some very thick skirmish screens that can bog down an assault until the attacker, perhaps over reacting by sending out too many skirmishers of his own is finally left with too few formed troops to make a go of it.

Sure. But what if the attacker doesn't deplete himself to play the skirmish contest.

Can the defender put forward so many skirmishers that the attacker can't close?

Cheers,

The Bandit

In rules terms, if the formed troops make contact with the skirmishers they are fairly sure to sweep them away. The question is how much disruption the skirmishers cause before the attacker can close.

Let's say the defending brigade has four battalions and sends out the maximum skirmish force. That would put two battalions worth of skirmishers on the skirmish line. Their fire will not be as effective as two actual formed battalions of course.

Now if the attacker approaches in column on a two battalion front he will take a lot more fire than he can return on his approach. If the skirmishers are say 500 yards from the main line, and manage to fall back without getting caught it will go badly for the attacker.

Training or "Rep" as we call it would most likely be the deciding factor here. If the attacker has even an average Rep the defender will be hard pressed to stop the assault.

Equally if the defender has a poor Rep his skirmish screen is more likely to met away than to do much damage to the enemy.

Given a high Rep defender and a poor Rep attacker a thick skirmish screen would have a good chance of blunting the assault.

My intent was to model the battalion/brigade commanders' dilemma: balancing the skirmish screen with keeping enough troops formed in hand…actually a lot like the cavalry discussion. How many squadrons up front and how many to keep in hand for emergencies?

Hope that didn't ramble too much!

Bob

Friedland. The Russians don't attack Lannes's right because they couldn't gain skirmish superiority. It seems to me that in a wargame this will *never* replicate. The Russian player will never choose to hold off for hours because the French have a strong skirmish line.

Friedland might well be an example of terrible command decisions on the part of the Russians, there is a ton of evidence pointing that way, I'm just bringing it up as a point of conversation should others be able to offer examples more on point.

Skirmish combat was rarely 'decisive' and very much attritional in nature. Both sides knew this. [The Prussians stood for better than three hours at Jena under supposedly intense skirmish fire and only broke when outflanked by Murat and Soult.] If the Russians at Friedland
1. Didn't know how many French tirailleurs they were facing, screened by the woods,

2. Knew that it would require a good deal of their infantry strength--and time--to take the woods and push back the skirmishers, and

3. Saw little tactical advantage to be gained from all that effort.

Just some thoughts. However, I think if skirmishers are modeled correctly, the same kinds of conudrums will be created. Skirmishers didn't stop advances. They did give the enemy pause when contemplating an advance and the attritional effects the attacking forces would suffer in morale and casualties.

As French staff officer Pelet observes after Bussaco and Ney's attack:

….Thus the day passed, skirmishing and losing men uselessly. I cannot express how much aversion I have always had for skirmishing. It is difficult to imagine how much it costs in casualties or, as one my day—drop by drop. Two new attacks against the position, just like the first, would not have been more deadly.

I could not resist saying a few words. The skirmishing ended on our side and the enemy started it again. As a matter of fact, it was extremely difficult to stop bickering except by withdrawing our troops, and this was not without inconvenience for either advantageous terrain or the morale of the army. However, I do not think skirmishing can be allowed for its own sake in any case, unless it is to prepare attacks, cover movements, or momentarily detain the enemy at one point while they are being attacked or outmaneuvered at another.

Italics mine.

The French Campaign in Portugal, 1810-1811
An Account by Jean Jacques Pelet. Translated by Donald D. Horward 1973

Skirmishing was an 'inconvenience' that had its benefits and down-sides. One was having it take over, being fought 'for its own sake'. Being drawn into such an extended attritional firefight could be a benefit to the defender, as at Bussaco, or for the attacker, as at Jena.

G'Day Bill,

I think Horward has badly mistranslated Pelet…

Just as quite a few have misunderstand his explanation of the Guard manoeuvring in square at Waterloo.

Not only did Pelet command a Regiment of Old Guard at Waterloo…but he later wrote about the manoeuvre de detail of light infantry…as well as the de detail (sub-division functions) on squares.

As for the Russians not gaining superiority in the forest of Sortlack, it had nothing to do with terrible command decisions.

The Russian intent (good or bad) was to clear the forest of enemy tirailleurs, so that their formed troops could assault the right flank of Lannes Corps. The Russians tirailleurs sent in were unable to complete the mission.

The Russians attempted to take the forest four times, on one occasion they nearly took it…when the French finally pushed the Russians out, they in turn attempted to take the village of Sortlack and were thrown back into the forest.

Actually it could be considered that a very large portion of Lannes troops fought en tirailleur with local counter attacks to keep the Russians from not knowing exactly how weak he was.

Best Regards
Art

Always good to have some light cavalry available to attack a skirmish screen in open order. The infantry screen can be nearly annihilated by this tactic.

I think a lot of the issue is about information, or lack of it. And that's quite hard to represent on the tabletop.

You are advancing with troops in close order. You come up against a dense skirmish screen. You know that you can clear that screen if you mount an attack with the bayonet. But what's on the other side of that skirmish screen? Your attack is likely to disorder your men. If there are formed troops beyond those skirmishers then at best your attack will be blunted, at worst they will counterattack and drive you off. So you might instead choose to detach your own skirmishers to meet the challenge…

This scenario is more likely where terrain interferes with the line of sight. Less likely in the barren wastes near Los Arapiles than amid the folds, hedges and high-growing rye of Quatre Bras.

So it resolves on what modern managers call "risk appetite". How much risk are you prepared to run to make rapid progress? So wargames rules should be designed so that an impetuous advance runs a greater risk of a nasty surprise…

Art:

What exactly is poorly translated with that quote? Does it give a different meaning to Pelet's sentiments? I've read the French, though I am hardly conversant in the language. Pelet had experience commanding light infantry long before Bussaco too. Disliking skirmishing in general doesn't mean he avoided it or wasn't willing to commit to it as his ending comments indicate, as well as your examples.

I think a lot of the issue is about information, or lack of it. And that's quite hard to represent on the tabletop.

This.

I still haven't found a method short of double-blind gaming with an umpire (which requires at least 3 'players' and at least double if not triple the number of minis) that I like for restricting information about who and what is on the other side of the hill.

Light cavalry scouts ahead of the entire army (and rides down skirmishers too far from their supports), and skirmishers scout ahead of their battalion/brigade.

G'Day Bill,

In all of his Post Napoleonic writings, he has never once expressed his aversion to skirmishing…

Pelet observation of Ney's attack at Bussaco is more than likely taken out of context or mistranslated…

Best Regards
Art

Art,

The Russian intent (good or bad) was to clear the forest of enemy tirailleurs, so that their formed troops could assault the right flank of Lannes Corps. The Russians tirailleurs sent in were unable to complete the mission.

The Russians attempted to take the forest four times, on one occasion they nearly took it…when the French finally pushed the Russians out, they in turn attempted to take the village of Sortlack and were thrown back into the forest.

So my question is, did the Russians at Friedland *choose* not to move forward with formed until the woods was cleared or were they *unable* to move forward with formed troops until the woods was cleared?

Cheers,

The Bandit

G'Day

Both…

Since the Russian assault on the forest failed, the Russian formed body of troops were unable to safely pass through the woods with French tirailleurs present. Therefore the only choice was not to move forward.

After the 4th assault failed, observers from the church tower saw French reinforcements arriving, so the flanking movement was called off.

You original question was:

"Is there a definable amount of skirmishing prowess that the defender can throw forward that will make advancing for the assaulter so difficult that they *can not do it*? "

In this case, the Russians knew they could not advance through the forest with formed troops and defeat the French Trailleurs…I therefore agree that your posting of Freidland meets your criteria.

Best Regards
Art

The difficulty in gaming is to differentiate a skirmish line, say a few companies of skirmishers vs. two or more battalions of skirmishers.
I've read historical quotes where the author says "a cloud of skirmishers". How many in a cloud?

Would 3 battalions of skirmishers be able to stop an attack by 3 battalions in line or column? I would say it depends on the moral of both sides. Or if the skirmishers are in some kind of defending terrain.

In a village, most battalions are broken up into various buildings, walls and hedges, basically in skirmish order. However they can be very difficult to push out. An attack steams down the street rooting out the defenders.
Most rule sets don't go into this detail but give one side a defensive factor for the village. The attack and defense is abstracted.

As I mentioned before at Ligny, the Prussians were defending a hedge, does that give them a bonus?

Since the Russian assault on the forest failed, the Russian formed body of troops were unable to safely pass through the woods with French tirailleurs present. Therefore the only choice was not to move forward.

So you'd say that at a certain point enemy skirmish prowess is so great that formed troops *can not* advance against them?

If I understand that correctly then my next question is, how do we quantify the degree of advantage that the defending skirmishers must have to cause this?

Cheers,

The Bandit

G'Day

To determine or express variables in this case…

For a military game, it would be by using rules, data, and procedures designed to depict an actual or assumed real-life situation.

In the game civilian wargame design you use…can you replicate the events at the forest of Sortlack?

Best Regards
Art

Art,

Well, in most wargaming rules I've played you can't replicate the events of the Sortlack forest. Thus, I am investigating this in the broader perspective of "just how big an advantage is necessary to replicate this?"

If we were able to arbitrarily assign the value of X to the Russian skirmishing effort, then what multiple of X was the French effort in order to accomplish this feat? The Russians adding more skirmishers doesn't impact this as we can assume either:

• The French bolstered their skirmishers enough to maintain the same advantage they previously held.

OR

• The French advantage was so much greater than the threshold that as the Russians bolstered their skirmishers it was unnecessary for the French to do so.

In either case the necessary question is where YX is is greater than X by enough to cause this result, what is Y?

Cheers,

The Bandit

In all of his Post Napoleonic writings, he has never once expressed his aversion to skirmishing…

Pelet observation of Ney's attack at Bussaco is more than likely taken out of context or mistranslated…

Art:

Well, without some specifics on the mistranslation, I'm not sure what you see or why the translation of that particular passage describing Ney's attack and Pelet's reactions misrepresents what Pelet is trying to say. I also don't necessarily think that because Pelet only expressed his aversion to skirmishing once, that he wasn't 'really' expressing how he felt or it has to be misinterpreted because it is a singular statement. How many times does he need to repeat it before it's considered a true sentiment?

It is understandable, given how the battle with Ney's brigades developed that it would provoke Pelet's thoughts on skirmishing, where writing on other battles and topics earlier and later might not. This could be particularly true if he felt that his views on the proper role of skirmish combat had become generally accepted by the the time of his later writings.

I don't know. I'd be interested to know where you see Howard's errors in interpretation.

Best Regards, Bill

So you'd say that at a certain point enemy skirmish prowess is so great that formed troops *can not* advance against them?

If I understand that correctly then my next question is, how do we quantify the degree of advantage that the defending skirmishers must have to cause this?

Bandit:
Do we know how many Russian skirmishers tried to push out how many French out of the woods? How much time the attempt[s] took up? I wonder if the Russians even knew the relative numbers because of the woods.

In either case the necessary question is where YX is greater than X by enough to cause this result, what is Y?

How does one 'quantify' the prowess of formed troops in column and line? I would think that it would be the same type of calculation. The 'decisiveness' of Skirmishing is deceptive. Look at the hour's long 'skirmish' that took place before Salamanca with about 4,000-6,000 skirmishers on each side. It was hardly 'decisive'. One side simply decided the goal wasn't worth further effort, though neither side was 'defeated.'

My personal opinion is that the general ability of skirmishers were pretty much what you see in most gradations of infantry capabilities. One thing I do see making a difference is numbers. At Jena, the Prussians pushed back the French on several occasions, such as re-taking Issenstadt and the adjoining woods from the French Tirailleurs in the middle of the battle. Yet, most everyone agrees that the Prussians weren't 'as good' as the French…certainly not anywhere as experienced.

In some ways, we may be trying to make this harder and more different than other infantry combat than it was.

From Wheeler, 51st Foot, in 7th Division. Journal entry dated 2 Sep 1813, referring to the French attack across the Bidassoa in late August to relieve San Sebastian.

[p.125] "They outnumbered us greatly, the nature of the ground prevented us from bringing many men into action, only a few companies could engage. I was in reserve the first two hours and witness to many noble achievements performed by private soldiers….. [p.126] The enemy kept reinforcing their skirmishers, so that the fire that was at first slack now began to be very brisk, and in a short time they began to advance on our line, but not with that firmness one should expect from their superiority of numbers. Our skirmishers stood firm, but the fire being too hot for their liking they rushed forward on the enemy, who gave way—and in a few minutes our line had possession of their ground. This charge drove the enemy into a forest on their reserve."

The skirmish goes on and back and forth, but I was intrigued at the clues to enemy capability that Wheeler shares, as well as the sense of feeding into the skirmish.

The skirmish continued in cycles:

"The fire was now tremendous and our line fell back to draw them out on open ground. The hill now swarmed again with the enemy, and a stationary fire was kept up a long time." A general wanders into harm's way, prompting a charge by two companies to rescue him. "In a moment they were mixed with the enemy and down the hill they went together, pel mel, into the wood. The General was rescued.
"Our company was now ordered to the front, we soon got into action but as the enemy had joined their reserves and the large trees completely covered them, we fell back on our reserves. This soon drew them out from cover and brought us all together by the ears. I never remember to be under so sharp a fire in an affair of this kind before." … "We were now obliged to give way to superior force. By dusk we had lost nearly a league of ground, without allowing the enemy to gain any other advantage. I think it was the dearest league they had ever purchased."

The 'end' surprised me, and the quality of the skirmishers isn't remarked on, just the numbers. The skirmish action then repeats like déjà vu, all over again!

G'Day Bill

Pelet covers the battle of Bussaco in his book from page 56 to 66…

Pelet explains that they were wrong to attack such a position that was defended on such terrain…that it should never have been attacked at all…that the terrain was a disadvantage for the French…

Pelet observation of Ney's attack at Bussaco were taken out of context and mistranslated by Horward.

No where in the portion of the battle is it mentioned, to include his personal observations:

"Thus the day passed, skirmishing and losing men uselessly. I cannot express how much aversion I have always had for skirmishing. It is difficult to imagine how much it costs in casualties or, as one my day—drop by drop. Two new attacks against the position, just like the first, would not have been more deadly."

"I could not resist saying a few words. The skirmishing ended on our side and the enemy started it again. As a matter of fact, it was extremely difficult to stop bickering except by withdrawing our troops, and this was not without inconvenience for either advantageous terrain or the morale of the army. However, I do not think skirmishing can be allowed for its own sake in any case, unless it is to prepare attacks, cover movements, or momentarily detain the enemy at one point while they are being attacked or outmaneuvered at another."

Yes Howard must not have understood what he was reading.

Best Regards
Art

Only if they get lucky and shoot the colonel who is leading the attack.

But no they would not be able to stop them.

You are talking about several groups of 20-25 guys that are spread out in front and they are going to stop a 500 manned battalion from attacking.

Bill,

Do we know how many Russian skirmishers tried to push out how many French out of the woods? How much time the attempt[s] took up? I wonder if the Russians even knew the relative numbers because of the woods.

According to Arnold (handiest reference I have):

Do we know how many Russian skirmishers tried to push out how many French out of the woods?

Arnold states there were 3,000 Russian Jägers supported by cavalry (no number given) were advanced against Sortlack Forest. (Petre also stated 3,000 Russian Jägers were involved and Arnold does not cite Petre as a source).

Ruffin initially defended the forest with 900 Frenchmen in two battalions.

How much time the attempt[s] took up?

First skirmish assault was 2 hours. During this time two Russian militia battalions were added to the skirmish line. This assault failed.

Second assault was organized and begun about 7am. The Russians added the 20th Jägers to the skirmish line and the Lifeguard Jägers & Rostov Musketeers formed behind them in columns.

This second assault did close, Ruffin's two battalions withdrew farther into the forest.

A French counter-attack was then mounted. This consisted of Ruffin's other two battalions (now totaling four) and 650 cavalry.

The Russians then added the Moscow Grenadiers and the Pskov Musketeers. Their role is unclear.

At this point in the narrative Arnold re-sums the involved forces.
• Russians: 19 understrength battalions + cavalry
• French: 4 strong battalions + 650 cavalry

The Russians report having made four assaults up to this point. Four hours have passed, so roughly one assault executed per hour.

The Russians now committed the 4th, 25th & 26th Jägers, these battalions made a new assault, at least the Saint Petersburg Militia was also involved – these troops appear to have been formed, not part of a skirmish attack.

They won throwing Ruffin's four battalions out of Sortlack Forest.

Arnold notes that "most of Oudinot's infantry [were committed] as skirmishers". But while these included Ruffin's four battalions in Sortlack forest they also covered a lot of terrain outside the forest. Oudinot's division was 16 battalions total, approximately 7,000 (not all were present when the fight started, they were all up by 6am).

I wonder if the Russians even knew the relative numbers because of the woods.

The Russians had no idea the French force present.

My personal opinion is that the general ability of skirmishers were pretty much what you see in most gradations of infantry capabilities. One thing I do see making a difference is numbers.

According to Arnold's account of Friedland, this would not be the case. Two battalions of French numbering about 900 men held back 2-3x their number. Later four battalions numbering something like 2,000 men did similar.

This is a hard thing to replicate.

I am largely pondering, "Did Ruffin's men just roll lucky dice over and over or was it largely predictably that they'd be able to tie up so many Russians for so long?"

Mithmee,

Only if they get lucky and shoot the colonel who is leading the attack.

But no they would not be able to stop them.

You are talking about several groups of 20-25 guys that are spread out in front and they are going to stop a 500 manned battalion from attacking.

Well, if Friedland is an example of this happening then that conclusion is false. The average French battalion in Oudinot's division would be around 450 men and four of them, largely in skirmish order, held back at least a couple thousand Russians for ~4 hours.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Do we know how many Russian skirmishers tried to push out how many French out of the woods?

Arnold states there were 3,000 Russian Jägers supported by cavalry (no number given) were advanced against Sortlack Forest. (Petre also stated 3,000 Russian Jägers were involved and Arnold does not cite Petre as a source).

Ruffin initially defended the forest with 900 Frenchmen in two battalions.

How much time the attempt[s] took up?

First skirmish assault was 2 hours. During this time two Russian militia battalions were added to the skirmish line. This assault failed.

So, it sounds like the woods were sufficient advantage to treble (or more, given the reinforcements that still failed to close) the effectiveness of the French.

I kinda expect even numbers to beat against each other with little success either way. But that is a pretty dramatic example, being outnumbered ~3.5 to 1 and holding!

Some more details on the Sortlack Forest numbers per Nafzinger:

Bagration had the following:

• Bagavout's Division, 12 battalions of Jägers numbering 1,600 men (133 man average)
• Raevsky's Division, 15 battalions of Jägers numbering 2,000 men (133 man average)
• Reinforcements, 1 battalion of militia and 2 battalions of Lifeguard Jägers numbering 900 men (300 man average)
• Markov's Support Group, 12 battalions of Musketeers and 3 battalions of Grenadiers numbering 5,200 men (350 man average)

Thus, I believe that between this and Arnold we can conclude the following:
• The initial 3,000 Jägers noted by Arnold were the combination of Bagavout & Raevsky.
• This initial 3,000 Jägers did not all take part in the pre-7am attacks as the 4th, 25th & 26th Jäger Battalions are part of those two divisions but are detailed as having first joined the fight during the 5th assault which took place sometime after 7am, perhaps around 9am.

So the rundown of Russian strength appears to have been:
• Between 5-7am: ~3,000 Jägers supported by cavalry.
• Between 7-9am: added ~2,000 Musketeers, ~1,000 Grenadiers, 300 Militia, 600 Lifeguard Jägers, total force ~7,000 men.

It is hard to get a picture of just how much of this force was fighting in open order. It is clear from Arnold's description that the final assault was made by formed battalions so not all of this force was dispersed. Similarly, it would seem not all of Ruffin's four battalions were dispersed. When his second two battalions joined the fight they made what appears to have been a formed assault and when his four battalions were finally pushed out it seems that at least portions of them were formed.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Art, Bill,

Regarding Pelet's supposed comments, are you sure that you are both referring to the same book / document? Horward's translation is of a 1,178 page handwritten manuscript on the Portuguese campaign that he found in the archives at Vincennes.

Bill, yes that description by Wheeler is a good example of the ebb and flow of skirmishers. One thing he mentions is the reserves. This is often overlooked in the discussion of skirmishers. It is not simply a case of a "cloud" of skirmishers acting randomly. There is a chain of skirmishers usually made of pair of men to allow protection whilst reloading. This is supported by the reserve, the size and composition reflecting the units ordered to skirmish. I think the British practise was to coordinate the light companies of a division into ad-hoc flank "battalions".
So getting back to the OP perhaps the question needs to consider whether the reserves using terrain to best effect can halt a formed body of troops (with their own skirmishers). My view is that a formed body of troops that is strong enough to overcome the supports will manage to make progress but at a cost of losses, disorder and fatigue. The only thing that will halt the advance is a similar formed body of troops having the determination to stand and fire a delayed volley and charge.

Major:

I'm not sure we are. Here is the translation:

The French Campaign in Portugal, 1810-1811
An Account by Jean Jacques Pelet. Translated by Donald D. Horward 1973

Page 181

As Loison's division was thrown back, a brigade of Marchand's division was pushed forward, but too late. It occupied the abutment beyond the passage of the upper Moura after a dispute with the enemy; each occupied it successively. The English maneuvered and fell back as soon as they received some cannon fire. Our brigade, attacked on its flank by artillery, was thrown to the left of the road. After fighting for some time, it found itself almost entirely dispersed into groups of skirmishers, and in the end it was necessary to support this unit with the second brigade. Thus we covered the entire slope below the convent of Bussaco while the enemy successively reinforced their line of skirmishers, hidden behind the rocks and the trees, but these Allied troops were not allowed to stay there very long, they were recalled by horns and replaced by fresh troops—an excellent method neglected by us for too long. Our system permitted the French regiments to be dispersed during a battle and in the end only the officers and bravest soldiers were left, and they were completely disgusted, even with having to fight for an entire day. The Portuguese were interspersed among the British; they acted perfectly, serving in the covered positions. Nevertheless, our skirmishers gained ground on the enemy and from time to t time pushed them beyond the reserves, which they were obliged to reinforce.

[Two paragraphs on how Mermet's division reinforces Marchand's two brigades, and the how the rest of the day passed after the French attacks were repulsed, both sides firing cannon and skirmishing. ]

p. 182-183

….Thus the day passed, skirmishing and losing men uselessly. I cannot express how much aversion I have always had for skirmishing. It is difficult to imagine how much it costs in casualties or, as one my day—drop by drop. Two new attacks against the position, just like the first, would not have been more deadly. I could not resist saying a few words. The skirmishing ended on our side and the enemy started it again. As a matter of fact, it was extremely difficult to stop bickering except by withdrawing our troops, and this was not without inconvenience for either advantageous terrain or the morale of the army. However, I do not think skirmishing can be allowed for its own sake in any case, unless it is to prepare attacks, cover movements, or momentarily detain the enemy at one point while they are being attacked or outmaneuvered at another. General Reynier had wisely withdrawn his troops and taken up positions. There was hardly any more fighting in this direction.

…Towards evening the enemy, holding half the slope with a strong line of skirmishers who were seated and even lying down, was reinforced by large reserves, but several times we pushed them back as far as the summit. The enemy extended their line on both flanks as if to take a night position and form a chain of advance posted. Later they pushed their line forward and again started the fight. I did not know their goal, unless it was to recover the ground we had seized and not to abandon any part of the battlefield to us. This useless attack was repulsed by out infantry with the artillery hardly engaged. The enemy line was forced to retire even higher. Ours was formed and we remained there without any indication that the fighting might start again. Mermet's Division replaced the exhausted division of Marchand which had lost many men during the firing. It occupied both the upper and lower Moura with its posts extended to the height of upper Moura.

Bandit:

From your description, the Russian attacked in waves of @2000 at a time, so the initial 900 Frenchmen were up against 2:1 I would think, *maybe* having the same dynamics as Wheeler's description.

IF the French were in the woods and the Russians attacking across open ground, that would be another advantage.

From your description, the Russian attacked in waves of @2000 at a time, so the initial 900 Frenchmen were up against 2:1 I would think…

Well, at least 2:1 as we don't know how balanced the Russian efforts were. The first assault was less than 2,000, the second assault added 2,000 but we don't know how many from the first assault remained in the fight (could be some, could be none…). During this period there were also added another 2,100 reinforcements so at this point it again could have climbed past 2:1 but we still really don't know.

The last assault added another 1,500 men but again we have no idea how many of the previously committed forces were still engaged.

All I can conclude with certainty is:
1) The Russians always had a manpower advantage that was significant (at least 2:1 for most of it).
2) Ruffin went from ~900 to ~1,800 men (but minus unknown losses among the first 900).
3) The Russians continually fed in fresh troops while Ruffin could not.
4) The forest was an impediment to the Russians (mentioned several times in Arnold & Petre that it was an advantage to the French).

IF the French were in the woods and the Russians attacking across open ground, that would be another advantage.

This leads me toward the conclusion that Ruffin's men were the equals of the Russians even when worn and Ruffin rolled great dice for the better part of 4 hours. So that brings me back to, "Just how much more effective was the French force than the Russian force to prevent the Russians from closing during 3/5 assaults?"

Cheer,

The Bandit

Mark et Bill,

Your both right…I have the original that was published in 1815.

I now recall how the English version was used on NapSeries to start a fight… ;-)

I shall drop the issue until I see the English version ;-)

Best Regards
Art

IF the French were in the woods and the Russians attacking across open ground, that would be another advantage.

This leads me toward the conclusion that Ruffin's men were the equals of the Russians even when worn and Ruffin rolled great dice for the better part of 4 hours. So that brings me back to, "Just how much more effective was the French force than the Russian force to prevent the Russians from closing during 3/5 assaults?"

After that further analysis (thanks for posting rough numbers of reinforcements and timelines!), that sounds about right for defenders in good positions. You just aren't going to win without obscene casualties unless you outnumber the enemy 3:1!

G'Day

Originally Lanne gave Ruffin the mission of taking the bridge in Freidland, but when Oudinot arrived on the plains of Friedland, all previous orders changed.

Two batteries and Oudinot's reserves were initially positioned behind Posthenen, which he used as his center of operations while the rest of his battalions were stretched out from Posternen to the Forest of Sortlack, and Grouchy veered to the left.

Bagration decided to assault the forest because French prisoners brought to him by Galitzen, stated that there was only a reinforced division up against him.

Lanne in his report which he wrote on 23 June explains why most of his battalions were deployed en tirailleur. It was to make his force appear larger than it was, and it protected them against the artillery.

Then at approximately 06:00, Lanne detached Alberts's brigade from Oudinot's division to support the left flank near Heinrichsdorf, therefore there were no longer 16 battalions but 12 battalions to be stretched out from Posthenen to the Forest of Sortlack. Leaving Ruffin to hold the hold the forest on his own.

Upon Verdiers arrival from a different route, Lanne immediately had Verdier divide has command into two mobile columns, manoeuvring (left to right, and right to left) under concealment to assault the Russians at different locations, in attempt to make the Russians believe there were more French troops than there actually was.

Upon the Saxons arrival, Carrie was ordered to assist in manoeuvring to the left.

When the French were pushed back into the forest after attempting to take the village of Sortlack, the Russians once more attempted to assault the forest, but Verdiers mobile column left the woods and put the Russians in disorder.

Oudinot continues to use Posternen as his center, but the buildings of Posthernen were filled with the wounded, therefore Lanne established his ambulances at Georgeneau which guarded his lines of communication.

This is not about an engagement where skirmishers go back and forth on both sides, with an endless cycle without any tactical advantage to be seen. This event shows how Lanne with an inferior force kept a numerically superior at bay, using tirailleurs and mobile columns.

Best Regards
Art

It appears we have consensus that Ruffin's skirmishers prevented many, though not all of the five Russian assaults from closing to contact with Ruffin's formed elements.

My question then remains, how can we quantify the advantage that Ruffin's skirmishers held over their Russian adversaries to provide this result?

If the Russian skirmishing prowess was a 5 then the French skirmishing prowess was X5 and the question is X = ?

Cheers,

The Bandit

To answer the OP, perhaps the following excerpts from the publication noted might be of some help.

B

From Lallemand's Principles of the Minor Operations of War, Chapter 5, ‘On Skirmishing', 39:

‘…A new system of fighting was introduced. This system consisted of calling into play a considerable number of skirmishers-and to that France owes, in part, her early successes.'

‘During the first campaigns, when an army was to be attacked, or a position defended, a part of the battalions detached as skirmishers performed in front of these battalions the duties of an advanced guard at the commencement of an attack, sweeping the enemy from the whole front; and, in the same manner, these detachments formed in skirmishing order and dispersal along the front of their battalions, commenced the onset by a well-directed fire, which annoyed the enemy, shook his ranks, and thus weakened the resistance which he might otherwise have offered to the masses or the advancing lines. So much for the attack; now for the defense.'

‘When the enemy, after having forced the line of advanced posts, approached the position occupied by the army, a cloud of skirmishers thrown out in front of this position often succeeded, by the efficiency of their fire, in putting a considerable portion of their adversaries ‘hors de combat,' carrying disorder into their ranks, and often forcing them to abandon their undertaking.'

‘Thus the objects proposed by the enemy's generals miscarried; the attacks of posts were repulsed, or important posts were abandoned. The enemy's lines thus exposed to a fire of skirmishers, were quickly thrown into disorder form the losses they suffered; they broke their ranks, and the loss of the battle followed; or if it happened to be gained, it was no longer in consequence of the first dispositions, for these not having been carried out, it became impossible for the enemy's generals to reestablish the original order, or to direct, in the heat of action, the movements of a disorganized army…'

From Chapter 6: ‘Attack & Defense of Forests, 55-56:

‘…It is dangerous to establish a body of troops in a forest; but when from particular considerations it becomes necessary, every advantage presented by the ground and the local objects should be made available; such, for instance, as country houses and enclosures, which should be loop-holed; above all, the troops should be posted in the most favorable positions, where they may rally and protect the chain of skirmishers and their reserves; in short, all possible means must be practiced to make the enemy pay dearly for every step.'

‘the method of defending forests is based on the principle, that the borders should be occupied, whence the enemy advancing in the open ground, may be fired upon from behind the trees and hedges.'

‘In occupying the borders of forests, reserves should be kept behind the most important points, whether with a view to maintain the position, or to ensure a safe retreat in case of failure.'

‘In open forests with low underwood, troops should be disposed according to the usual rules; when they are dense and the undergrowth is high, and more particularly when the troops are few in number, the borders should be lined with skirmishers, who, posted behind trees, hedges, and ravines, render the approach more difficult to the enemy.'

‘Behind these skirmishers should be placed the rallying posts, and in rear of these one or two principal reserves.'

‘The strength of the rallying posts must be proportioned to that of the line of skirmishers occupying the border of the forest. These posts, which should generally remain in compact bodies, are intended to relieve and rally the skirmishers and to support isolated posts…'

G'Day

If:

The Russian skirmishing prowess was a 5

and

The French skirmishing prowess was a 5

What is X?

I take it you would not want my dry and boring explanation…just the answer…

The differences between the Russians and French are:

1…Their methods of detaching skirmishers en detail…

2…Difference in their general principles of grande manoeuvre for skirmishers and formed reserves.

3. Embarrassing terrain (in this case the forest)

I would give a bonus for all three reasons.

But the first two bonuses for the French only applies from 1806 to 1812…Then Russia and Prussia followed the same general principles of grande manoeuvres….

Best Regards
Art