"Why the British lost at Isandlwana but won at Rorke's Drift." Topic

I have read many accounts, chats and had many discussions with others about this. Everyone centers on ammunition, stupidity, numbers, etc. My opinion is that the main cause of these outcomes was strategy and tactics. At Isandlwana, outnumbered 15 to one, the British formed up facing the main body of Zulus, the head of the Buffalo. When they did this they presented a wide open, undefended target with flanks and an undefended rear against a superior, mobile force. The Zulu commanders were able to take advantage of this and use their usual tactics. They pinned the British down, swept the flanks and attacked the rear. The British were unable to defend against this in their formation. Had they formed a square around the camp using their wagons as barricades, there may have been a different outcome.

At Rorke's drift, outnumbered 35 to 1, Chard built barricades out of mealie bags and boxes. He gave the Zulus a tight, compact defended target. He denied the Zulus the use of their superior numbers and mobility. There wasn't enough room for it. There weren't any flanks or rear to exploit. The Zulus were reduced to frontal assaults. Everywhere they went they were slowed down by barricades and met with bullets and cold steel. Had the Zulus continued the battle into the next day they may have eventually worn the British down and overrun the position, but at what cost. In the 10 hours of attack they had taken over 500 casualties. In addition Dabluamanzi must have received word that Chelmsford's main column was approaching. It may have been the reason the Zulus bugged out.

As I understand it, the British at Isandlwana were formed up to oppose a continental opponent, that is to minimize casualties from small arms fire by spreading out their formation. At Roark's Drift they were formed to oppose an army with minimal small arms, that is tightly formed.

Because Lt. Bromhead's men used Arbuckle's Galvanized Patented Ordnance Box Discloser!

Order them now!

And more seriously, Nick says likely things. Also, the Zulus seem to have failed to coordinate their assaults. It is unlikely that the 100 defenders could have repulsed several thousand attackers from multiple directions, but such an assault never materialized.

seeing the results as we know them today it's easy hindsite. Flanks were unsecured Nick, their flanks were unsecured. At Rorke's the had no flanks as they were basically largered as a formation.

The Zulu at the Drift had just run a couple miles to get there- that can't be easy carrying those shields, and after dumping adrenaline earlier that day.

Because at Isandlwana, the Brits only had Bob Hoskins and Peter Vaughan to keep things from getting out-of-hand, but at the Drift they had Nigel Green to keep things dressed right.

A HUGE contribution to the survival at the Drift, which is seldom mentioned, is that the reserve ammunition supply for the entire column was located exactly there. I have read that they fired an average of 900 shots per rifle, which sounds high, but would have been impossible anywhere else in the theater.

Surprise – that was the critical difference.

At Isandlwana the force had no time to laager the wagons and were not aware of the numbers they were facing when the initial dispositions were made. Criticism of those dispositions in hindsight is a bit pointless.

It would be fair to say that the camp could have been made safer against potential attack. Remember that they were not expecting to occupy the position for long AND they believed that the enemy was miles away.

The Zulu commanders were specifically told not to attach stongpoints such as the Drift but this was ignored by a rash commander out for glory. It shows some very astute military thinking compared to the stupidity and arrogance of Chelmsford.

They didnt bring their choir to Isandlwahna

The British strength was firepower. The Zulu strength was speed and massed numbers trying to close to make use of their stabbing spears. Since the Zulus almost always enjoyed a marked numerical advantage, British survival came down to finding a way to frustrate the Zulu's ability to close to contact. This could, with difficulty, be accomplished by achieving a situation where the firepower was so great that it was able to kill the Zulus faster than they could close. Most often this frustration was achieved by use of the fortified laager.

Inyezane – Gatling, arty, flanked Zulu attack – British victory
Gingindlovu – good laager, British victory
Isandlwana – thin line, no laager, Zulu victory
Rorke's Drift- proper laager, British victory
Intombe – poor laager, Zulu victory
Hlobane – British caught out in the open, Zulu victory
Kambula – proper laager, British victory
Ulundi – gatlings, arty and rifles 4 deep – British victory

It bears remembering that in 1838, 500 Voortrekkers armed with muzzle loaders in a well constructed laager on the Buffalo River stood off some thousands of Zulus in a battle so one sided and costly to the Zulus that the river was renamed and gave the battle its' name; Blood River.

Funny that this thread showed up today … I just watched Zulu on Netflix. Great movie.

Mark

Command & control?
The commander at Isandlwana may have been Durnsford, may have been Pulleine?
At Rorke's Drift, Chard took command. This isn't to say he didn't listen to Bromhead or others.

The Zulu at the Drift had just run a couple miles to get there- that can't be easy carrying those shields, and after dumping adrenaline earlier that day.

Nonsense. A Zulu can run, RUN fifty miles…and fight a battle at the end of it!

But more seriously, iirc the Zulus at Rorke's Drift had also been at least a day longer with next to no food. That can't help.

Just finished "How can man die better" and "Like wolves on the fold" Pretty good explanation for defeat and victory.

There's daft for you, running to a battle (with Welsh accent)

Recently while doing some further research on a relative who was the last survivor of Isandlwana (Trooper Robert Kincaide, NMP), I came across a mention that the Zulu units at Rorke's Drift were older. Their average age was 50. I had never heard that before and it could certainly be a factor.

Another tidbit of information heard years ago was that the Zulu commander at Rorke's Drift was a relative of Cetswayo and this was why he wasn't killed for ignoring the order to not cross the Buffalo River.

Didn't the Boer scouts advise the British to laager at Isandhlwana as a matter of course? Or is that a 'movie memory'?

I've seen it many times myself KPinder, give British squaddies enough proper lager and they will fight and beat anyone!

I'll get me coat……….

I walked both battlefields in 2012 (on my way to get married in Scotland – my wife being South African – it was part of her lobola). Isandlwana was a huge battlefield, there were a lot of folds in the ground that let many warriors have a covered approach. Our guide, an elderly Zulu whose grandfather had been present, claimed that the Zulus were at one stage beaten until driven forward by the personality of a single chief. The frontage they tried to defend was huge for the numbers of British infantry available, and when one platoon went down, the line was rolled up. I just remember his account of Younghusband fixing bayonet and defending the steep path up to the cave against overwhelming numbers late in the day – he was honoured by Zulu warriors for his bravery.

I have also walked both battlefields. At Isandlwana, there are white-washed cairns strewn all over the place, depicting / honouring where groups of Imperial troops fell. What is remarkable is just how widely spaced they are.
It is my belief that this is one of the most important factors – as others have said, had they formed a tight square around the camp (or, better yet, built a laager) I am sure they would have won the day.
As it was, units were offered up piecemeal throughout the action and flanks could always be turned.

Imperium et Libertas: yes, it was my impression that the dispersed firepower was not sufficient to drive back large numbers of high morale close-fighters attacking from the short ranges of the various dongas, and once the line was breached, each platoon was attacked front and flank in turn till only small numbers fell back, and there were no defensive positions to fall back to.

So its the flanks then? Am I right?

Zargon – yes… although realistically it was just that the Brits were spread so thin, that their firepower was insufficient to keep every part of the attacking line away. And THEN they were able to hit flanks.

Khusrau

Yes – I agree. When the Zulu did 'play the game' and tried to charge the British line, they were driven back by weight of fire and it looked for all money that they had been defeated. As you mention, the stalled attack was rallied by one old induna (who I believe was shot as a result of his bravery).

So had the Brits adopted a tighter formation, without its flanks up the air and closer to the ammo wagons, I can't see how the Zulus could have over-run them.

Another factor, in addition to the dongas and folds in the ground you rightly mention, is that the battlefield was apparently covered in mealies (corn) which was 6' tall at the time, thus providing plenty of cover from view. Or so I was informed by our guide. The modern day battlefield is a lot more barren and arid looking.

Either way, it's certainly a haunting place.