"China’s Most Dangerous Missile (So Far)" Topic

"Buried on page 40 of the Pentagon's latest annual report on China's military power is a brief mention of the YJ-12, a recent addition to China's portfolio of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). The report notes that, "The new missile provides an increased threat to naval assets, due to its long range and supersonic speeds." True, but in an understated way. In fact, the YJ-12 is the most dangerous anti-ship missile China has produced thus far, posing an even greater risk to the U.S. Navy's surface forces in the Western Pacific than the much-discussed DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile. The arrival of the YJ-12 is one more indication of how the U.S. Navy is falling further behind in the missile competition against China, exposing flaws in operating concepts that U.S. and allied commanders and policymakers have relied on for years.

According to a 2011 study that appeared in Naval War College Review, the YJ-12 ASCM has a range of 400 kilometers, making it one of the longest-ranged ASCMs ever fielded (and much longer than the 124 kilometer limit of the U.S. Navy Harpoon). Crucially, at 400 kilometers, Chinese attack aircraft will be able to launch the YJ-12 beyond the engagement range of the Navy's Aegis Combat System and the SM-2 surface-to-air missiles that protect U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups. In the past, when adversary ASCMs were limited to 100 kilometers or less, a carrier strike group had more time to react with its own aircraft and defensive missiles. It also had the option of engaging enemy aircraft before they launched their ASCMs, and more redundancy to cope with such attacks. With its 400 kilometer range, the YJ-12 will greatly erode these previous advantages.

A realistic future scenario is an attack on two or more axes by two Chinese Flanker regiments (totaling 48 Su-30 MKK or J-11B Flanker fighter-bomber variants). These Flankers (roughly corresponding to U.S. Air Force F-15E fighter-bombers, capable of supersonic speeds, and possessing a combat radius of 1,500 kilometers) could each be armed with two to four YJ-12 ASCMs. Although the carrier strike group's combat air patrol could shoot down a few of the Flankers before they launched their missiles, the strike group would still face the prospect of defending against over a hundred supersonic ASCMs approaching from several directions at a wave-top height. The group's close-in air defenses would have less than 45 seconds to engage the missiles after they appeared on the horizon. The YJ-12s would employ a variety of sensor types to find their targets and execute dramatic cork-screw turns to evade final defenses. A study from the Naval Postgraduate School concluded that in past engagements of anti-ship missiles against alerted surface warships, 32 percent of the attacking missiles scored hits. If only five percent of such a saturation YJ-12 attack impacted targets, it would still be a bad day for the carrier strike group…"
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Amicalement
Armand

I guess it's "dangerous" from an American viewpoint. But then, I also suppose that American carrier groups operating off the Chinese coast are possibly seen as "dangerous" or at least threatening to the Chinese. Maybe these military posturing games are just dangerous in themselves.

Yet another 'The Sky is Falling!' article… Wonder which defense contractor funded this tome…

The US has deployed ASM cruise missiles with that range and greater for over 20 years .its silly to assume no one else would or could field a simmilar weapon after all that time.
There have been BVR stand off weapons for around 30 years. The US navy can engage all air threats you dont need to kill the platform that launced the missile (Unless you do it before hand)as much as the missile itself.Missiles have had self guidance for decades so this article is kind of silly. But keep them comming armand I enjoy your posts.

For the knee-jerkers out there.

This article is based around ideas from Robert Haddick's book. Think of it as "An Inconvenient Truth" about what's going on in the Western Pacific in regards to China.

In Fire on the Water, Robert Haddick contends that much of the general public and many U.S. policy experts are unaware of the threat that China's military modernization poses to America's national interests in the Asia-Pacific region. He maintains that within a decade China will have the military power to place U.S. influence throughout East Asia at risk. To avoid a future crisis, the United States needs to fashion a new and more competitive strategy, one that better matches the strengths of the United States and its allies against China's vulnerabilities.

The U.S. forward military presence in East Asia is essential to protecting America's standard of living, its strategic interests, and the region's stability. This will be an increasingly difficult burden for the United States to sustain. However, U.S. forward presence will be less costly and less risky than encouraging China's neighbors to counter China's rising power by themselves, which would likely result in an unstable arms race and a conflict that would damage America's interests.

China's military strategy, centered on its rapidly expanding aerospace, naval, and land-based missile forces, is exploiting emerging vulnerabilities in America's forces in the region. Plagued by institutional barriers, the United States has been slow to adapt to China's rapid military modernization. Current U.S. responses are impractical, because they expend defense resources against China's strengths rather than its weaknesses.

Fire on the Water proposes far-reaching changes to U.S. diplomacy, military programs, and strategies to counter China's well-designed military modernization plan. The proposed competitive strategy will strengthen deterrence and bolster the credibility of U.S. alliances in the region. Throughout history the rapid arrival of a new great power has usually resulted in conflict. The United States, China, and Asia can avoid that fate if the United States adopts a more competitive strategy to influence China's choices and thus maintain the region's stability and prosperity.

Robert Haddick is a military analyst with three decades of experience researching security trends in Asia. He is currently based in Washington, D.C., as a research contractor for U.S. Special Operations Command. A former U.S. Marine Corps officer with service in East Asia and Africa, he has also been a columnist for Foreign Policy Magazine, the managing editor of Small Wars Journal, and a consultant to U.S. Central Command, the U.S. State Department, and the National Intelligence Council.

That's nice, Tgunner. Question: Where, in his copious resume, does it say he knows squat about current (or past) naval warfare? My comment stands…

"I guess it's "dangerous" from an American viewpoint. But then, I also suppose that American carrier groups operating off the Chinese coast are possibly seen as "dangerous" or at least threatening to the Chinese"

Excellent point.

Wait til you hear how loud we squawk when Chinese carrier groups are operating off San Diego!

Last paragraph Coastal. Or are you saying that by definition that Marines don't know squat?

I personally don't have a problem with Chinese CBGs. I just have a problem with China's current tactics. Go talk with some Filipinos or Vietnamese for details. I get to hear that a lot at school since I work a lot with them. They're scared… and it's not of US.

Yes all this is nice. But the PLAN has much more to worry about from the USN. I read articles like this back in the 70's about the Soviets. The other side always seems 10 feet tall but they always have a weakness. You will never know until the shooting starts who is right. Until then it is all guess work.