"Are games with figure removal inaccurate?" Topic

What I am asking is if the inevitable frontage shrinking caused by figure removal is accurate?
Did the unit shrink, or did the lines become thinner?

I am thinking about a game of Troy I played a few years ago, put on by Scott of Pictors. I was Agamemnon. I had a 5 chariot unit, and took 2 casualties. I took them on my left and right chariots. Suddenly, I could fit through a gap in the lines, caused by similar "contraction" by my Trojan opponent. And, boy, did I take advantage of that! I singlehandedly captured Troy and Helen after I blasted through the gap!

But on a more regular gaming basis, we play Age of Reason a lot. Units shrink from 12-18 figures to 4 or fewer and can still stick around, but their footprint shrinks.

Is the footprint shrinkage in the time frame of a miniatures battle accurate in a linear game?
SYW?
AWI?
Napoleonics?
ACW?
Ancients?
etc.

Not that the results of this will get me to change in any way what rules I play!

I would think the frontage would shrink rather than the lines getting thinner

It was at the Battle of Little BigHorn. Footprint shrinkage was very noticeable at this engagement. Same with the 300 Spartans last stand at Thermopylae.

I don't know about other periods, but in the Civil War units tended to rally around the flag. When the flag fell others would pick it up and as units shrank they would drawn in about the flags and reform their ranks. So as the battle went on the regiment would cover less frontage but maintain ranks and hopefully cohesion. I would imagine that the same would be true in other periods where units were drawn up in formations. But I would think that the tactical situation and the commander's could alter that though.

If you have a unit of say 36 figures arranged in 6 bases each of 6 men, then the removal of 1 base represents a loss of 1/6 of the unit (~17%). How many units suffered that level of loss in historical battles?

True, MajorB, but I view losses as not just killed and wounded, but also the shirkers, stragglers, and those escorting the wounded, etc. The loss percentage we see in the history books show the real historical losses.

True, MajorB, but I view losses as not just killed and wounded, but also the shirkers, stragglers, and those escorting the wounded, etc. The loss percentage we see in the history books show the real historical losses.

OK, so let's double the losses (i.e. killed and wounded) from the history books. How many units suffered that level of loss in historical battles (i.e. about 17% in killed, wounded, shirkers, stragglers, and those escorting the wounded, etc.)?

There are many instances of those who observed 18th and 19th century battles writing about the frontage of units shrinking over the course of a battle.

As for figure removal being accurate, that would depend on how many figures you remove, and why.

There are many instances of those who observed 18th and 19th century battles writing about the frontage of units shrinking over the course of a battle.

Yes, indeed. But that did that open up gaps between the units, or did the units in turn shuffle closer together, or did other units move up to fill the gaps?

Pretty much every example I remember (and I don't think it's worth the time to go dig up examples) described individual battalions getting narrower with gaps between battalions becoming wider. They also mentioned in more than one instance that battalions tended to end up several ranks deep, which is only natural considering the circumstances in which the soldiers found themselves.

They also mentioned in more than one instance that battalions tended to end up several ranks deep, which is only natural considering the circumstances in which the soldiers found themselves.

So perhaps the observed shrinkage of the frontage was more to do with this "bunching" effect rather than actual losses? I always thought that that was part of the role of the unit's officers – to keep the men in line, that is the formation they were supposed to be in?

Figure removal? How quaint.

While we don't have a lot of comparable histories in the ancient & medieval world, and one hesitates to extrapolate from recreations where no one actually dies…but, in medieval battle-scale (well, small unit) recreations, what I recall was that our lines, if they held, stayed roughly the same width with little side-to-side shrinkage (obviously there was front-to-back as ranks "died") until the immediate melee reached a lull.

At which point folks rallied around a standard or leader, thus shrinking the frontage and getting at least a little deeper unless the leader deployed them differently…but the natural tendency was to clump and shrink. My guess is that this is an all-too-human reaction.

Wargames tend to over-exaggerate the number of losses for a unit, but part of that is a mechanical failure of the rules and part of it is a failure on the part of wargamers. Wargamers will keep throwing a unit into the fight long after it would historically have been withdrawn or run away on its own. Morale rules try to model this to some extent and force those units out of the fight, but sometimes they allow too many losses to model it realistically, and sometimes they allow a pretty much destroyed unit back in the fight, when that unit should really be licking its wounds on the way to the nearest refreshment of choice.

Having said that, in my readings on WWII, I have come across units that broke and ran with hardly any casualties to speak of (just a few percent, or even, in one case, simply on the threat of being attacked), and I have come across units that stayed and fought when they should have broke and run long before (2nd Bn, 22nd Marines at Sugar Loaf Hill).

I hate to say 'it depends' but it probably depends, particularly with blackpowder-era warfare, on what your unit scale is. If your unit is a regiment then yes, some sort of contraction might be realistic. But if your unit is a brigade then it's probably feeding in reinforcements from regiments/battalions in reserve etc (all the stuff that's happening below the player level), and actively trying to maintain the same frontage, so contraction probably wouldn't happen on a noticeable level.

For medieval and ancients, my gut feeling is that formations were deeper, leading to more men to feed into the ranks, meaning that contraction probably *didn't* occur until the unit was either getting massacred or in the process of breaking.

-Will

"Are games… inaccurate?"

Yes. Next question?

I think in general, if the units are moving forward, they will tend to fill in the gaps and shrink the frontage. If they are engaged and static, they will tend to stay spread.

A good (well, fun) way to handle this is to have you and your opponent alternate removing units. It takes a bit longer, but both people are actively engaged, so it doesn't seem so.

From your original example, I'm not sure the chariots wouldn't go from rank to file and shoot the gap, anyway. Chariots really need to keep moving to be effective.

I think in general, if the units are moving forward, they will tend to fill in the gaps and shrink the frontage. If they are engaged and static, they will tend to stay spread.

Sounds logical, but do we have any evidence to support that view?

I suspect that figure removal is more accurate than the current offerings where units take "damage" and then all at once is removed from the field.

I am thinking about a game of Troy I played a few years ago, put on by Scott of Pictors. I was Agamemnon. I had a 5 chariot unit, and took 2 casualties. I took them on my left and right chariots. Suddenly, I could fit through a gap in the lines, caused by similar "contraction" by my Trojan opponent. And, boy, did I take advantage of that! I singlehandedly captured Troy and Helen after I blasted through the gap!

I think this victory is more a result of your opponent not filling in the gaps. You broke through the enemy line and exploited your success.

I agree with Sundance. Casualties are not a good value set to base how a unit remains functioning with. The historical record indicates that casualties (numbers) are not a good value set (or indicator) of a unit's ability to remain functioning as a unit. As for frontage, as long as it remains where it is, it remains a force to be reckoned with. Think in terms of the old boardgame principle of "Zone of Control". A man does not necessarily have to be standing on every foot of ground in order to remain "in control" of that turf!

I have been advocating a change of value sets from casualties and numbers to Cohesion- how well the unit's leadership is maintaining control over the men. When you think about it, not many rules sets make the attempt to see how well the officers are doing THEIR job of keeping the men focused upon whatever task at hand during the timeframe a turn represents. When you don't create value sets that correspond to what was happening within a unit, it should not be surprising that you get wierd results.

"Does it really matter if a unit maintains it's frontage at the expense of depth?" Yes. It shows that the unit's leadership retains sufficient control over the men to get them to A) Not allow them to melt away and B) the unit is doing something as directed. The unit remains a threat that the enemy must continue to find a way to deal with. Seems pretty basic to me….so why even worry about shrinking frontages? (unless you want to show it as a form of loss of control?)

In some casualty removal games, like WAB, the lost figures do not represent only casualties but also loss of unit cohesion and fighting ability do to fatigue and other such things.

Of course fatigue is not independently accounted for in the game but as the unit loses more guys it gets less and less effective in combat.

The guys that are "killed" are not necessarily connected to more death than any other abstraction on the tabletop, like turns are necessarily connected to time.

So call it what you will but if a unit in WAB goes from 4 ranks to 3 ranks it loses some of its ability to continue to fight on.

No more or less a priori inaccurate than any other wargame mechanic.

What does figure removal represent in the game? Does figure removal bring about or reflect an accurate and appropriate effect for what is being modeled?

Or does figure removal mean somebody is stealing my toy soldiers?

Or does figure removal mean somebody is stealing my toy soldiers?

God forbid!

I am also thinking of Waterloo, where the "British" et al regiments took a pounding all day long. If the frontages shrank, how did that affect French attacks? Did the gaps between units increase?

Miniature removal avoids the tabletop markers clutter and roster requirements to track losses. I must remember to "steal / miniature kidnap" from my opponent next time while he isn't looking. Then send the ransom note during the battle.

At Waterloo the allies tended to form deeper formations (4 rank stuff) due to the compressed nature of the frontline. With all those battalions the front line battalions would have been greatly extended across the battlefield using 2 rank formations.

Correctly staged, wargames can be very accurate and demonstrative simulations of course (though most deliberately are not … most try to be plausible games) …

Is the removal of casualties a key issue that governs the possibilities of accuracy? No, probably not.

But bear in mind that modern interpretations of Bosworth (Ingram, Foard etc.) interpret that the famous reference to Oxford ordering every man to keep within 10 feet of the standards is 'keeping tight' order in response to the line thinning as casualties were taken. This closing up is thought to have created the gap through which Richard could see and so attack Henry Tudor.

So if removing a base, or removing figures and closing up creates an avenue through which the rear lines can be attacked, as happens with, say, DBA, this is a very useful and plausible mechanic*

But it seems to be event and period specific … at Naseby a century and a half later, the organisation of armies is very different and it seems that when an entire unit is driven out of the New Model line, it just increases the pressure on the regiments either side.

So it is a case of picking horses for courses rather than seeking universal mechanisms.

Phil
Ancients on the Move
*indeed, why I chose DBA for reconstructing Bosworth

Sounds logical, but do we have any evidence to support that view?

Not that I know of. Nor do we have any evidence to refute that view. For the time periods in question, we don't have accounts of the battles (AFAIK) that provide those details.

In the absence of that, I tend to default to assuming people will (mostly) act (generally) how they were trained. Rally 'round the flag. Form a line at a certain spacing. Not move until you are ordered/signaled to. That sort of thing.

"OK, so let's double the losses (i.e. killed and wounded) from the history books. How many units suffered that level of loss in historical battles (i.e. about 17% in killed, wounded, shirkers, stragglers, and those escorting the wounded, etc.)?"

Well I can't speak about other wars but in the ACW things were not as you see it. It was fairly typical for regiments to start seeing the regiments shrink in alarming proportions during the fighting. Against the officer's orders, men helped their ‘Pards' to the rear or just had "unpatriotic feet". As an example… on the first day's fighting at Gettysburg the 6th Wis. (which was an elite regiment and member of the Iron Brigade) was mauled during the fighting. They withdrew to finally spend the night defending Culp's Hill. Their C.O. Rufus Dawes counted only 34 men that night with the Colors out of about 400+ before the battle was fought. In the next 12 hours about 100+ men from the 6th found their regiment on Culp's Hill. These men got 'lost' during the fighting on the first. This sort of thing happened all the time. It does not take much research to find hundreds of these types of accounts.

Regiments did and should shrink in an ACW game.

Yes, ACW regiments faced a loss of men due to various reasons.

But the question is does that reduction in manpower substantially affect their ability to control the same amount of frontage?

Or would the unit still be able to control roughly the same amount of frontage with say 30-40% casualties but maybe became more brittle?

If the first case is true then it makes sense to remove figures but if the second is true then it doesn't (at least if it means their frontage contracts).

In real life close order units seem to have been somewhat reticent to charge through the tiny gaps wargamers exploit. This issue is discussed at some length by Phil Sabin in his various books. So figure remove away, just don't let units pile through the gaps unless they are really big

"…does that reduction in manpower substantially affect their ability to control the same amount of frontage?"

--I'd say yes from what I have read.

"would the unit still be able to control roughly the same amount of frontage with say 30-40% casualties"

---I'd say no. Perhaps a much lower percent they could but not in the 30+%… no.

"but maybe became more brittle?"

---That is true as well. When deciding to charge a lot was due to a decision on a lack of firepower being returned. If they perceived a weakening of return fire they would go. Of course many charges went forward regardless but… that's another discussion. :)

Hi, Avid. If a unit could hold the same frontage or not does not seem to be a matter of "frontage" as it is how well is it remaining as a functional unit. One man holding his ground remains a deadly threat to any enemy that comes close and this fact must be dealt with, somehow. This should be the problem of the opposing player. Does he commit an entire unit to force the remnants off? Does he just shoot it out? Maybe just bypass it? In any case, I think you see where I went with that example.

I do agree with what you are getting at when you talk about "When is the right time to charge?". From what I have read, firepower missed most of the time, but when it becomes desultory and the rate has slackened, it can be assumed that the either the unit leadership is failing to direct and control the men's fire or everyone is quickly becoming fatigued. In either case, it should be the best time to force an issue with an advance. While many may believe the object was to kill, it really was to get the other guy to give up ground so you could benefit from the effects of maneuver. (Not just into a better and more threatening position, but it also increased the feeling amongst the men that they are perceived to be winning if they are moving!"

A very interesting conversation for me! It does my heart good to see more gamers trying to understand what is really happening at the time when battles and skirmishes are taking place and less of broad brush strokes rules based upon old beliefs.

Tom

Interesting topic, gents! Revisiting the idea that soe of the casualties are helping friends to the rear, or just fatigued and unable to fight for the moment, how many rule sets let you pull a unit back, let them sit for a few turns, and get some of those men back?

I know there is a mechanism for reorganization of a Maneuver element in Empire (though I've only had one game go long enough to see it used in the 2 years I've been playing). Do any other rules make use of something like this?

I may have to try adding something like this to out Impetus games. A unit that loses combat points could pull back behind friendlies and rally for a turn or two and roll to get some back.

Has anyone tried something like this?

Tom,

You are right. It wasn't a frontage issue per se, more of a firepower issue as you stated. I think the frontage issue though is directly connected to the regiment starting to come apart at the seams. As the regiment shrinks in size it also means NCO's are dropping and officers are losing their grip on the tactical situation. Men start to look around and think perhaps or talk openly, 'What do we do now? Are we being flanked? Should we run? We can't take any more of this.'

Personally, I kinda like removing models/stands as they take losses. It implies the regiment is losing cohesion and men to maintain their firepower and morale levels. The old SPI Terrible Swift Sword game had a great rule when you played the whole 3 days of Gettysburg. Overnight each division or brigade could regain strength due to healthy men finding their regiments after the day's battle.

There is also (not normally 'gamed') a huge factor of the C.O. officer being unable to command any further. The remaining officers are usually very busy taking care of their own men and if the situation is at a breaking point and no one is in direct command. Even for a minute or two things can go south very quick! As an example… at Gettysburg, Lt. Col. Miller of the 147th NY, fought on the first day. Cutler's right-hand regiments were ordered to fall back to McPherson's Ridge because there was a real threat to be flanked. As Miller received the message he was hit and went down. It was bedlam at the time and no one else knew he was knocked out of action or that an order was received to pull back! The other two regiments pulled back leaving the 147th fighting alone. As the regiment became surrounded on 3 sides one Captain ran back to Miller and couldn't find him. At this point this Capt. ran to the next officer in command and asked him what he wanted to do, they were surrounded and were in jeopardy of being totally surrounded. They both agreed they would not get out unless they made a run for it NOW! The very un-military order was given, "About face, RUN!" How many games have special rules or a chance in which a C.O. becomes hors de combat and this creates the regiment to fall apart or malfunction?

Good discussion.

Dan,

Some rules use ammo depletion as a way to pull regiments off the line. You could view this as a strictly ammo problem or exhaustion or being 'played-out' rule mechanic. The problem, which I hate, is that it means there are more markers on the table (which I hate) or record keeping. Blah!

Dan: Yes, I have tried this with some great results (or at least my playtesters liked it!) I try to account for how successful the efforts of the unit's leadership have been during the time frame this turn represents (usually 15 minutes in my design). I call it a "Cohesion Check". It represents a snapshot in time and is done at the end of the Brigade's activation. It is taken like a morale check except if passed, the unit's cohesion goes up one notch (25%).If it fails, nothing more happens as the unit leadership either needs more time to make an effect or they just did not improve cohesion enough that it registered. We already know how bad the unit is when we check at the end of it's turn. We only account for the efforts of the leaders to improve things or cope with cohesion loss for that turn.

Avid: I remember TSS. A very good friend of mine in Dayton had made a set of ACW rules (Glory Road) from the mechanics. I used that set over the years to get at least 12 more gamers into historical miniature gaming with those rules!

Back on the OP post: John: In the games that you enjoy most (regardless of the period), do you view frontage as being more or less of an issue when compared to unit on unit combat? (think back to Tractics where the detail was so in the weeds that you had to roll for automatic damage based upon where the shell hit. Does it matter that Sgt. Rock's musette bag gets blown off the tank when the tank can still shoot at you?) Does it matter where the breach occurs in a unit that sends them reeling away or is it more important to know the unit just ran away?How granular do you need in a rules set to have a fun game for you? (I understand different strokes for different folks, BTW, so there is no "wrong" answer, just yous…I am interested to know.
Thanks!

Tom

Wargames tend to over-exaggerate the number of losses for a unit, but part of that is a mechanical failure of the rules and part of it is a failure on the part of wargamers. Wargamers will keep throwing a unit into the fight long after it would historically have been withdrawn or run away on its own. Morale rules try to model this to some extent and force those units out of the fight, but sometimes they allow too many losses to model it realistically, and sometimes they allow a pretty much destroyed unit back in the fight, when that unit should really be licking its wounds on the way to the nearest refreshment of choice.

One of the reason I like 'Napoleonic Command' & 'Rifle Wars' rules, you don't get huge numbers of causalties but fatiques wears out units in a reasonable time scale.

Like many gamers, my H&M units are deployed in a double line. Frontage does not shrink unless they take more than 50% casualties.

As Martin Rapier suggests, I think we are missing the bigger problem here: this unit – which had just sustained 40% losses, remember – carried on charging forwards through a gap just wider than itself. Sure, one could say this represents the chariots 'breaking through', I suppose, but it is the sort of thing that drives me mad in wargames: I cannot imagine a historical unit commander saying: 'say, now I've just lost 40% of my command, the gap between those two enemy units is now a foot wider than my frontage! lets just advance through it!'
Maybe zones of control are the best way to solve this – one cannot simply march past enemy units up to a certain distance away from them or something.