"Did convoys time the Soviet offensives?" Topic

We all know about the Soviet winter offensives. The traditional explanations for why the Soviets were better in winter are that the weather kept the Luftwaffe out of the fight, the snow reduced the mobility of German armor (and motor transport), and the Soviets had better winter clothing and such (particularly in the first winter).

I wonder, though, if the ability of convoys to get through to Murmansk and Archangel helped set the tempo, giving the Soviets a big logistical boost that allowed them to launch offensives. Convoys were essentially impossible in summer, with near-constant daylight, because it was too easy for recon aircraft to find the convoys, and for bombers to attack them. In winter, the weather could be horrible, but it was far harder for the Germans to even locate the convoys, many of which got through with relatively light losses. Spring and fall were in-between, of course. The Royal Navy halted all convoys in the summer of 1942 (?) and didn't resume until late in the year.

So, did the convoys determine the "pulsing" of the offensives on the eastern front?

In the Mediterranean, the arrival of particular big convoys at Malta, Alexandria and Tripoli delivered critical supplies and reinforcements that allowed offensives to kick off. But forces in North Africa were a fraction of the millions of men on the Eastern Front. One convoy could have a much greater influence in the Med than in the East.

In 1942 the US delivered 2,759,000 tons of lend-lease to the USSR: 1 million tons to Archangel and Murmansk, 750,000 tons via Iran and the remaining million tons to Vladivostok. In 1943 deliveries to Archangel and Murmansk were only 700,000 tons, with greater amounts coming in via Iran and Vladivostok. American aircraft lend-leased to Russia were mostly picked up in North America by Russian aircrew and flown to the front via Alaska and Siberia.

My point is that, while the Arctic convoys represented a dramatic and heroic effort, most lend-lease reached the USSR via other routes, which the Germans could not obstruct. The flow was relatively steady, building up throughout the war, and the provision of food, clothing and industrial supplies was more important than weapons. Particular convoys didn't enable offensives to kick off, although the overall flow was important in rebuilding the offensive capabilities of the Red Army.

Maybe on a local level. Most of the (finished) stuff that came through Murmansk and Archangelsk were used in northern Russia (at least after the resolution of the 1941 crisis), which only makes sense logistically.

Vladivostok? Was there some kind of arrangement with the Japanese to let these through and not sink anything flying the American flag?

Yes John, convoys regularly sailed through northern Pacific waters to Vladivostok, but the ships were flagged Soviet and not American. After Pearl, the last thing the Japanese wanted to do was antagonize the Soviets.

In answer to the OP, no I don't think there's any evidence this was the case: I think zfn makes an excellent point about convoys being only portion of LL.

Ziggy, I'm not talking about one convoy. I'm talking about the complete abscence of convoys in summer, and regular, successful deliveries in winter.

I'd argue that 700,000 tons over a 4 to 4.5 month span would make an immense difference.

It is an interesting theory and possibly had some influence on some local operations, but I suspect the timing of offensives was more based on overall logistical, operational and strategic considerations.

The Soviets didn't only attack in Winter (although they did attack then too), but also in Spring, Autumn and in 1943, and 1944, Summer. The exceptional year was 1942 with no major summer offensive, but many of the available reserves had been used up in the Kharkov offensive in late spring.

In 1943 the summer offecsive was late jumping off because they were waiting to counterpunch the German attack, but then proceeded to roll up much of the Ukraine.

There is a tendency for armies to be pressurised into going on the offensive once their political masters feel they have the materials to do it, so if nothing else I would expect some minor offensives to be timed as a result of an influx of lend-lease equipment/sup[plies.

700,000 tons sounds like a lot. But spread over millions of men over 4 months it is not really that significant.

EC, you're essentially arguing that Lend-Lease didn't make a difference.

Lend-Lease did make a difference but not in the manner you're proposing. The volume of supplies were substantial but, as already pointed, it didn't all funnel through the north. In fact, the Persian route became much more significant as the Allies built up their ability to move the cargo overland to the Russians on the Caspian Sea, thereby reducing the value of the Northern convoys. Given the alternative sources, the stream of supplies was much more consistent.