"ACW vs FPW tempo" Topic

I'm struggling between focusing on the ACW & FPW for gaming/campaigning. They both have pros and cons but that's for another post.

One of the questions though that I've always had about the two wars is why was there such a difference in combat intensity? The FPW had something like 2 dozen major battles in the 6 months of the war. In fact there's half a dozen (if you want to count Worth) in the 1st month of combat.

The ACW on the other hand is much more lethargic with (quoting some random website) 72 major combats in the 4 years of the war. After Bull Run you have a gap of 3 months to Balls Bluff & Belmont (both of which are smallish), another 5 months until Shiloh, and one more until you hit the 7 days. Things pick up a bit after that but it's still 1-2 months between major battles and damn near a year post-Gettysburg before the Virginia theater wakes up again.

Why such a difference in tempo? Was it the need to train armies almost from scratch, the larger area and poorer terrain to fight in, political considerations because it was a civil war, more severe weather in the US, or something else?

Curious if others have reflected on this.

Yeah, the armies of the ACW were being built on the fly and officers were scarce. Remember in FPW they had large military infrastructures in place. In the ACW the structure got split when Southerners left and it had to be recreated. Plus the rail net in Europe was denser IIRC by 1870 so troops could be moved faster. And the rails were denser in the right places.

I'd also like to point how goddam huge the US is compared to the border between Germand and France:

That's a great overlay and certainly explains some of the differences. I still don't quite get why the long hiatus in Virginia between Gettysburg and the Wilderness Campaign although, there could have been substantial events happening that I just have missed.

Geographical size, interior lines, armies that did not exist and, you gotta throw McClellan in there somewhere. The US Army was about 16,000 strong at the beginning of the war; what was the size of the French and Prussian armies at the beginning of their war?

What did the Union have to do after a major pitched battle? They had to replenish their losses in terms of manpower, munitions, equipment and horses. Manpower was tricky because it was a long war and those with limited enlistments had to be mustered out and perhaps brought back in; regiments without replacement depots that were depleted had to be merged or disbanded; lost regiments had to be replaced completely. Munitions could be found overseas or in American factories but either way it took time to bring them to the armies. The same for replacing lost muskets and burst cannons. Since the states had responsibility for state troops, they didn't have a very efficient logistics base.

The Prussians, on the other hand, had the luxury of a standing army with standardized weapons and uniforms made in Germany with old regiments establishes by geographic region. During the war their replacement depots were constantly preparing reservists and new soldiers for the front lines, so after a grueling battle it was merely the case of bringing in ready (if green) soldiers to fill in the gaps.

Plus, the Union had to divide its limited attention and resources between a very active navy, multiple theaters, and multiple campaigns. The Prussians, by having a barebones navy and one major enemy (as opposed to the Confederacy and multiple Indian nations that were fully aware of Washington's distracted gaze), they could focus on the main Germanic army, the occupation forces for their lines of communication, and whatever developing forces that were coming to relieve Paris.

One reason for the difference in time between Gettysburg and the Wilderness was Meade vs. Grant. After Gettysburg, Meade did not pressure Lee. After the Wilderness, Grant never let go of Lee.

Another geographic factor between Europe and the US, besides the size of the eastern US as noted above, is that the US was heavily forested. Even infantry movement, except in battle, was constrained by roads and dense forests. Then when it came to the battles themselves troops had to negotiate lots of woods.

What a fantastic discussion and Mike, aka Extra Crispy, love that overlay! I think our friends in Europe and the UK cannot appreciate how big an area the United States is unless they have visited here. All great points gents about the logistics and differences between the conflicts. Also explians why we have to travel more in the States to get to gaming conventions which also dictates differences in how our gaming conventions are set up.

As another talking point you could also look at the difference in how the French and Indian War was conducted or the War of 1812 in comparison to the respective European conflicts, i.e., the Seven Years War and the Napoleonic Wars. Even today the United States has vast areas of wilderness or extremely rural areas. Also many of the waterways that the Union and Confederate armies had to navigate were not small by a long shot. The Potomac alone was an impediment to Union supply.

Great discussion here.
One thing about the ACW was that there was a good number of small battles/fights or raids, between the big well known battles that don't get the publicity.
I enjoy gaming both wars, but the FPW is my favorite with it's combination of Napoleonic Wars meets Modern Warfare.
Joe

Lots of great responses. A few that struck a chord relate to the aggressiveness, or lack thereof, of generals as a strong contributor. If McClellan had commanded the Prussian army in 1870, would that war have dragged on for 3 years with a lengthy gap between battles? If Moltke had commanded the federals in 1862 would the war have ended that summer?

Tom V.

That's a great overlay and certainly explains some of the differences. I still don't quite get why the long hiatus in Virginia between Gettysburg and the Wilderness Campaign although, there could have been substantial events happening that I just have missed.

Yep, alot happened between those two battles.

The Prussians and French had

1. Fully established armies and goverments totally
organized and committed to war. [US army total at the
start of the ACW: 14,000 with half the officers leaving
for the South]
2. Specific plans [the Prussians at least]. Both sides
needed a fast victory. Even the year and a half faced by
the Prussians was almost too long.
3. A very small area with very large forces.
4. The destruction of the opposing armies and convincing
the heads of state to sue for peace as the goal. In
the Civil war the Union had conquer an area the size of
Europe, as shown and convince an entire population to
give up.
5. Europe had a military tradition and expectations that
basically had to be invented for the Americans during
the War. [i.e. long established Professional
institutions]

I could go on… but that's enough.

By 1863 the ACW armies were fully formed and experienced and yet there are still these lengthy periods without a significant battle. The area of operations in Virginia is roughly similar to that of eastern France so at least locally that's not the predominant driver. I'm beginning to lean towards logistics In a long campaign (human and material) and the inclination of specific commanders.

By 1863 the ACW armies were fully formed and experienced and yet there are still these lengthy periods without a significant battle.

Probably. The same thing happened with the FPW. There was a real slow-down in major battles after 1871.

It also indicates that neither side could not figure out a winning strategy in the east. Both had failed several times with invasions and offensives. Bash them and bash them again, and damn the casualties ended up being decisive… For the Prussians, it was winning the siege of Paris.

Good points. Guess it wasn't until Grant figured out the "bleed them to death" strategy it wasn't clear what to do next.

I think Extra Crispy and Rebelyell2006 got the jugulars here. I'll attempt a couple of capillaries, admittedly very secondary factors but still there IMO.

1) European nations -had- the benefit of close observation of the ACW, and its transition from the last vapors of the Napoleonic era to the primitive prototype of WWI, with rapid fire, long range weapons driving the combatants into trenches and attrition war; attrition of men, material and capital. They were the beneficiaries of example, and were surely alerted to some of the changes inherent in modern warfare's voracious appetites.

2) A part of the American lethargy was rooted in repugnance for the task at hand. Total war against a very similar population base and the slaughter of almost mirror image soldiers, and the deep and terrifying prospect of the end of the old republic. Procrastination can be seen not only in leaders, but in the people at times.

That's a great overlay and certainly explains some of the differences. I still don't quite get why the long hiatus in Virginia between Gettysburg and the Wilderness Campaign …

Well, there was the Bristoe Station and Mine Run campaigns, and the Kilpatrick/Dahlgren raid. But Meade was under orders, for quite a while, to stay on the north side of the Rappahannock and recuperate his army. He also had to send off quite a few troops to NYC to prevent further draft riots, and a division to SC to help take Charleston (which didn't come off). Lee was forced to stay quiet for quite a while due to the tremendous losses he took at Gettysburg. He also complained that he wasn't receiving enough grain to feed his horses, so they weren't in shape to move. (By complaining directly to Davis he finally got some help on that problem.) Then, of course, he had to send off 1 of his 3 corps to Tennessee, which then led to Meade having to send off 2 of his 7.

However, you are missing important things going on in other places throughout the war -- places like the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, West Virginia, the Trans-Mississippi, etc. While they didn't always result in major battles, they did involve substantial resources of men and materiel.

As for the size of the US compared to Europe, I remember an uncle who was in the Army telling about some Europeans officers, I think French, who visited the US before WW2. He said they were amazed at the distances. They told him they drove each day as far as from Paris to Brussels and did that for 3 days, and they were still in Kansas! LOL

To give an idea of the comparative scale of things, consider John Hunt Morgan's famous raid north of the Ohio River. On the overlaid maps, above, using the European city names, as they overlap the US map, his raid started below Strasbourg (in TN), then north to Luxembourg (across KY), to Hamburg, where he was captured in northeast Ohio.

Very good points one and all. Thanks much for pitching in to the discussion. The ACW is almost like WW1 (except for starting out with trained armies) where there would be titanic upheavals every so often with interludes of replenishment in between. The needs of a)long campaigns and b) large geographical areas drive a reduction in tempo when compared to the FPW, or Austro-Prussian War, or back in the day of Napoleon where a typical campaign was over in 6-12 months (the 1812-1814 period excepted).