"Zuber's Account of Mons and Le Cateau" Topic

Just finished Zuber's the Myth of Mons and although i had much initial reservation, i'm now fairly convinced.

His aim is to debunks the 'anglocentric' view that britsh rapid rifle fire mowed down row upon row of the invading Hun and that they advanced on firing from the hip.

In what seems to be more factual descriptions of events rather than the euphemisism seen in British accounts – ' they payed a heavy price' 'weight of number forced them back', German accounts give actual casualty returns and details of tactical manouever.

Far from being mown down, the Germans advanced in bounds, hitting the dirt to return fire, feeding more and more men into the firing line. So what the British saw as men falling was in fact men dropping to the ground, the fire was coming from the prone troops not the advancing ones. The germans were also gaining fire superiority with close artillery support to suppress the enemy prior to the final assault.

Zubers also states that at both battles the British had greater numbers engagged and also suffered higher casualty rates.

He does appear to have an obsession with Franc Tireurs though, conjuring up irrational amounts of fear and outrage.

He maintains that the British troops were courageous, well trained and good shots but leadership was poor. Units were already engaged at Le Cateau before Smith Dorien's decision to stand and fight, the postions were exposed to heavy fire when attempting to withdraw, the order to delay and retire was turned into to stand and die by subordinate commanders. Bascially the Germans had trained for years for this war, the British were trained for colonial conflict.

I am about one-third of the way through his Ardennes book and it is equally enlightening. He certainly gets right down into the nitty-gritty detail that is necessary to understand how armies fought. Certainly their appears to be a much greater subtlety to early War tactics than we have been led to believe.

The Mons book will be next.

Zuber has been much debated on this board and the consensus is that he offers a couple of new ideas, but is far too enamored by the early war German army.

While he is correct that Germans would drop to the ground to evade fire, there are certainly British eye-witnesses who could tell the difference between a German evading and one who was genuinely killed or wounded and wrote about it.

Zuber has been very selective in his use of translated content. His use of British sources is very limited. Many of Zuber's interpretations are therefore compromised and must be taken with a high degree of scepticism.

He was not the first to note the over-estimation of casualties. Jack Sheldon pointed this out several years before. Furthermore Zuber has downplayed info on those units that did suffer heavily.

Zuber's interpretation of British command is woeful. He betrays an almost complete misunderstanding of the command decisions that were made. Worse still, he has mis-represented what happened on the German side. I have read almost all of his German sources and he has been very selective in what he quoted, though the quality of the translation for what is quoted is very high. I am just about to publish an English translation of the German official history of the battle (Die Schlacht bei Mons). This will help correct the balance. Further detailed analysis of the British tactics will follow.

Robert

Check out "Challenge of Battle" by Adrian Gilbert. Gilbert's use of British sources seems to confirm Zuber's conclusions.

Mons & LeCateau were not British military victories.

The British Official History contains deliberate prevarications.

I have read Gilbert's book. It is not one that I would recommend. While he has made extensive use of anecdotal accounts, Gilbert often extends the conclusions of these accounts without additional supporting evidence.

Gilbert's view of the British command process is based on standard sources, which provide a limited and incomplete perspective. His analysis of the German perspective is also limited, relying significantly on Zuber's work for the Battle of Mons.

Robert

Here is an example of Gilbert's view of British command style:

"With or without suitable training opportunities, British commanders did not inspire great confidence. Apart from their personal strengths and weaknesses, the system tended to encourage a restrictive approach to command. According to Martin Samuels, British military doctrine considered the conduct of war as inherently structured and 'effectiveness was seen as being achieved through the maintenance of order'. Even if Samuels has overemphasised the distinctions between British and German operational theory, the British outlook stressed a strict obedience to orders within a tightly controlled operational framework. As a consequence, commanders lacked the flexibility to respond to the unforeseen circumstances that were inevitably thrown up in war."

As Gilbert notes, his view is very heavily influenced by Samuels work. Gilbert has tried to draw back slightly but the view permeates Gilbert's selection of anecdotes. The notion that all British commanders lacked flexibility does not bear close scrutiny. It is true that some commanders lacked flexibility but the same was true for some German commanders too. This comes through very clearly in Die Schlacht bei Mons. British tactical thinking encouraged the commander on the spot to be responsible for final decisions and there is a lot of evidence for this in the Battle of Mons and the retreat.

In drawing on Samuel's work, supplemented by some of the conclusions drawn by Zuber, Gilbert makes mention of Auftragstaktik. This is the concept of mission-directed command, where higher command issues directives for a battle or operation. Lower command levels are left to work out the details. The term was coined after WW1. In 1914 the somewhat equivalent term was Weisungsführung. This applied to army level commanders though, so the likes of von Kluck. Sometimes it was extended to corps commanders but Die Schlacht bei Mons illustrates how tight objectives were set at this level. The adherence to these objectives led to important opportunities for exploitation being lost.

Robert

If anyone is interested in a more balanced view of how the German army was set up for the Great War then I recommend 'The Great War Dawning' by Buchholz, Robinson, and Robinson.

Robert

Thank you Robert. I very much appreciate your work.

Hey, Monk2002UK, please let us know when you finish the translation/publication of "Die Schlacht bei Mons." I'd be interested in reading it (found out that Grandpa on Mom's side served as a transportation sgt, stayed stateside).

Lion in the Stars, I will do. Currently I am recreating the maps from the originals. Several new maps are being created besides. The aim is to have plenty of maps throughout the text, specifically to cover off every place name that is mentioned as well as to provide a complete understanding of how the battle unfolded.

The translation work is completed.

The final work will be published in several different formats.

Robert

monk2002uk

Please let us all know as I too would be interested.

Regards

Yes, will do.

Robert