"Soviet 1980s planning algorithms" Topic

Hi all,
I've started reading Baxter's "Soviet Air Land Battle Tactics", and he describes the soviet battle planning method of Concept – Algorithm – Decision.
Did any examples of these algorithms emerge as the SU collapsed after the book was written?
Cheers,
Aksu

Do you have any links for this process?

Hi Murphy,

Not really, I bumped into it in the aforementioned book link

An command and controls discussion from rand.org has the following reference to couple of 1970s translations of soviet originals: V. V. Druzhinin and D. S. Kontorov, Concept, Algorithm, Decision (A Soviet View): Decision Making and Automation, translated and published under the auspices of the United States Air Force, 1972; D. A. Ivanov, V. P. Savelyev, and P. V. Shemanskiy, Fundamentals of Tactical Command and Control: A Soviet View, translated and published under the auspices of the United States Air Force, 1977.

Basically the process is a "flowchart" or "playbook", based on what the commander wants, using the situation as input, a certain plan is reached. Thats my understanding at the moment, anyway. Howver, the 1982 book by Baxter says that the actual "algorithms" i.e. the content of this decision making tree, is missing. Would be interesting to try them out for e.g. scenario building.

Cheers,
Aksu

I would like to see translated algorithm… I suspect it goes

repeat
if enemy still alive = True
then apply more force.
until enemy dead = true

move to next objective.

Maddaz111, you forgot the line that says "Verify that this is in the best interests of the party" with the political officer before moving forward.

Add to that…What is my competitor doing?

The attack on Berlin 1945 had Stalin playing one front commander off against the other.

I read that in Beevor's Berlin.

Ah I thought the political officer had the playbook…

My bad.

Is the political officer the zampolit?

Hi all,
I think Baxter's point is that the Soviets would be more flexible in their tactics than the iconic breakthrough attack. In a nutshell the assumption would be that the battlefield would be quite fluid, for example as both sides avoid force concentrations due to WMD risks. Hence a lot of meeting engagements. Also, the Soviets would try to envelop and/or attack the rear of the defenders. That's the theory anyway, hard to say how things would have panned out in reality. I suppose some of the officers on both sides would have been good and able to perform, some inept.
Cheers,
Aksu

Which page number? I'll take another look at it.

Hi Gennorm,
If you're asking about the description of concept-algorithm-decision, then it is introduced in the "Offence" chapter on page 92. (1986 hardcover edition).
Fluid battlefield thinking is introduced on p. 108.
If you're asking about commander flexibility on the battlefield, then check out the conclusions of the same chapter, pp 118-119.
The defence chapter is quite interesting as well, describing the flexibility the staff could have in planning how to defend, and then the (stereotypical) russian grim determination and stubbornness and immovability when executing the plan.
Cheers,
Aksu

I've put up a tiny little review of the book on our club site, if you are interested in seeing what it looks like.

link

Cheers,
Aksu of GeMiGaBoK club in Finland

I'm away for a week but I'll dig out my copy when I get home.

Very interesting item