"French Light Infantry, were they good?" Topic

By Waterloo the French Light Infantry regiments were essentially just regular line infantry but I wanted to know if they were any good during the earlier Napoleonic conflicts in their role as light infantry.In other words were they good at skirmishing and other light infantry roles?

Also any information on the 9er regiment of light infantry would be greatly appreciated.

read

Crowdy : Imcomparable – which cover this regiment, it also will give you an idea of the ups and downs of a regiment in the Armies of the Republic and later under Napoléon.

Yes, read Incomparable.

One thing I've heard little of in wargames chat is the relevance of recruitment districts and how this translates (if at all) to the tabletop. Imagine the difference between a rural and an urban bunch of recruits: a rugged unit of light infantrymen used to outdoor hard labour, a unit of volunteers from the city made up of clerks and students. I think this influenced commanders when attributing tasks. We can imagine that as the wars progressed and regiments filled with men from all parts and multiple nationalities that regimental character became less pronounced.

Thank you for your comments, I will try and find that book. Wee wars you make a good point about recruitment. However I still need to know whether to model them skirmishing or not. We're they actually used in a light infantry role or was it just a name.

I believe all French Infantry were used as skirmishers when required. You can certainly model some of them skirmishing if you wish.

Carausius,

Yes. In short, they were good. The acted as shock troops (common for light infantry) and as skirmishers in addition to typical formed roles.

Cheers,

The Bandit

As I recall, the 9th Leger (and 96th de Ligne – both of 3 battalions), as part of the Ist Division of the Ist Corps in Spain, cleared the Somosierra Pass – most likely in open or skirmish order – while the squadron of famous Polish light horse attached to the Guard distracted the Spanish gunners by charging up the road in the center of the pass. The 24th de Ligne was the third regiment in this division.

The 9th, 24th and 96th were launched at night to attack the British on a hill at Talavera. The 9th went right up the hill and caused a lot of damage, while the other two regiments wandered off course, and were not engaged.

The day before, the 16th Leger (serving in the IInd Division of this Corps with the 8th de Ligne, the 45th and 54th de Ligne – all of three battalions) launched a successful open-order attack across a stream and through rough brush-strewn ground to surprise a Bitish brigade. The 45th Nottinghamshire Regiment of Foot is credited with saving the brigade from destruction.

The IIIrd division of this Corps comprised the 27th Leger, the 63rd, 94th and 95th de Ligne, all of 3 battalions.

These were all good veteran regiments.

GdeP

good veteran units – which were shambles in 1813, Crowdy is describing this quite well how this once superb units were destroyed by attrition.

The problem with reading "Incomparable" is that the 9th was one of the best of the legere regiments, hence the nickname and having a book written about them. Assuming they represent the abilities of more pedestrian legere regiments would be a mistake.

I can't recommend "Incomparable" enough. One of the best military history books I have ever read! (And I've been reading for over 50 years.) Too often we read histories which talk of 30,000 men moving here and there and we see them as blocks of automatons without thinking of them as individual human beings. This book brought the French infantryman to life for me. The hardships, late pay, inspections, hunger,rotten weather – it is all there and told thru their letters,diaries, and after action reports. Real people with real feelings.

Dammit, the 1st Léger even got into Hougoumont at Waterloo.

Hey thanks for the lead. I have been wanting to read something to tell the other side of the story since I've mainly read Sharpe and few other British books. (Some Historical as well as fiction).
Its on Amazon in Both books and Kindle versions

By Waterloo the French Light Infantry regiments were essentially just regular line infantry but I wanted to know if they were any good during the earlier Napoleonic conflicts in their role as light infantry.In other words were they good at skirmishing and other light infantry roles?

? I am not sure where you heard that. They weren't employed in the same manner as 'regular line infantry.' At Waterloo, leger battalions were almost always the first to be sent in as skirmishers, the practice throughout the wars It isn't any accident that the 1st Legere led the attack against the gates. If there were two regiments available, line and legere for skirmishing, the legere always went first.

The legere were seen as specialists in light infantry work. Whether they were well-trained, experienced or possessed skills and morale of a herd of Herefords, they were not seen as regular line troops, though obviously they could be and were used that way.

'…the 9th Leger (and 96th de Ligne – both of 3 battalions), as part of the Ist Division of the Ist Corps in Spain, cleared the Somosierra Pass – most likely in open or skirmish order – while the squadron of famous Polish light horse attached to the Guard distracted the Spanish gunners by charging up the road in the center of the pass.'

The reason that Napoleon ordered his escort squadron of the Polish Light Horse to take the Somosierra Pass was that the infantry was taking too long.

The Poles took the pass with one squadron of light horse, that was later supported by other Guard cavalry. The Poles had about 50% casualties and only one officer, a lieutenant, made it to the top of the pass with the surviving troopers, and he was wounded.

The Poles quickly overran four artillery batteries emplaced in the pass (a total of 16 guns), clearing the pass. The infantry arrived after.

B

I'm interested to hear more about the country vs city conflict. I don't know if it was Napoleonic, ACW, or what black powder era, but I distinctly recall reading somewhere, on good authority, that it is a misconception about country conscripts being inherently better material than urban conscripts, and this was due to isolated rural recruits being much more susceptible to diseases once they were mixed together in training camps. Whereas city recruits had better immune systems due to having already survived many common contagious ailments. If this is true, then while country men may have had more natural outdoors skills and experience, these would be nullified over a campaign season by country units suffering losses from disease at an unnaturally high rate.

This may not be relevant to a one-off tabletop action, but could have some bearing on a strategic campaign.

apparently not a big issue in the Napoleonic time, when you made it as a child to get older than 10 years, you could stand the rigors of a campaign more or less, unless you were conscripted too young.

For light infantry, it was the military philosophical impression that recruits from the mountains, including areas like the Vosgues – would be well suited for light infantry duties.

I don't agree that the 9e légère were such an outstanding light infantry unit, they got good press by Bonaparte but other light infantry regiments did equally do hard and successful fighting – remeber in the Revolutionary times the 9e dbl were even involved in the desertion of Dumourriez.

isolated rural recruits being much more susceptible to diseases once they were mixed together in training camps. Whereas city recruits had better immune systems due to having already survived many common contagious ailments

That seems hard to believe about France or any Western European country since the Middle Ages. Even in very remote place there were markets, people met traders, craftsmen doing their "Tour de France" to learn their skills, pilgrims, etc, and were nowhere safe from diseases.
As an example, the Black Plague in the 14th century:
link

Oman's account of the action at Somosierra: link

Regards

Did Oman use Niegeluski's account?

He does use de Segur's account, which is inaccurate. The squadron should have been at or near full strength, so that would be about 150.

De Segur states there were 83, and that is clearly wrong.

De Segur had a habit of 'remembering with advantages.' That fault would later get him called out by Gourgaud and being short for his trouble.

B

Did Oman use Niegeluski's account?

No idea.

He does use de Segur's account, which is inaccurate…De Segur had a habit of 'remembering with advantages.' That fault would later get him called out by Gourgaud and being shot for his trouble.

In what way is de Segur's account inaccurate and how is the inaccuracy known?

Regards

Until fairly recently in time most recruits were rural. After all 90% plus of the populations lived in rural areas. Mostly urban units were the exception, like London's trained bands in the ECW. Urban units also tended to be made up of middle class who could afford the equipment. Thus they tended to be better feed and healthier. Of course they were reluctant to leave the city too, since they were usually created to act as a home guard freeing up regular troops from garrison duty.

For light infantry, it was the military philosophical impression that recruits from the mountains, including areas like the Vosgues – would be well suited for light infantry duties.

VW: Would you happen to know where a reference[s] to that view might be found?

For one thing, de Segur stated that the strength of the squadron making the attack was 83, when that was the casualty count. The squadron strength of the new regiment was undoubtedly closer to the authorized strength of 150.

Have you read de Segur?

Have you read Niegeluski?

I highly recommend the latter.

Sincerely,
M

Patrice:

It was a factor. In France, there was a lot of isolation of different sorts outside the major cities. Half the country couldn't even read Napoleon's bulletins because of the regional languages spoken. And the Black Plague was spread by fleas on animals, particularly rats, not specically humans.

The same disease problems where troops recruited from different areas, urban and rural were mixed, occurred in the Mexican and American Civil War.

How much of an issue, I don't know, but a real one in Europe, none-the-less. Disease among armies entering new regions were a common occurance.

Have you read de Segur?

Have you read Niegeluski?

I highly recommend the latter.

I haven't read either. What are the differences (apart from the starting strength/casualty count)? I don't recognize the name Niegulski, who is he?

Regards

It is okay, forget it. I have tracked it down myself.

McLaddie

I cannot track it – it might be Duheseme or any other works of miliatry theories

Once more, oh dear ….

Let's all read the account by Niegolewski (the wounded Polish lieutenant who made it through the 3rd Spanish battery) for ourselves.
"Les polonais a Somosierra en 1808 en Espagne: réfutations et rectifications …."
le colonel André Niegolewski
Paris: Martinet, 1854
link

Comments :
1. This work is about correcting errors in the account by Thiers, not errors by de Ségur (whose Memoires had been published in 1824 and which the colonel Niegolewski would certainly have read by 1854) or by Oman (who was not yet even born in 1854!) – Adolphe Thiers wrote a general multi-volume history of the era that was widely read in France, as he was also a leading political figure including serving as prime miniser in 1848. – Thiers' volumes covering the Consulate and the Empire appeared from 1845 to 1862.
2. De Ségur is mentioned once by the colonel Niegolewski, as charging with the Poles and being several times wounded, as is recounted in de Ségur's own memoirs.
3. There is every reason to think that Oman would have seen the work by the colonel Niegolewski, as Oman himself often writes in direct correction or refutation of Thiers. – Indeed, correcting Theirs was one of the main goals of Oman's work (along with correcting and/or amplifying the earlier English-language account of the Iberian campaigns by Napier)
4. The work of the colonel Niegolewski, while providign various interestign details, does not purport to be an overall view of the action at Somosierra, but a specific correction or refutation of Thiers.
5. The rôle of the French infantry is mentioned from pages 54 and 94 – in terms not inconsistent with the account of de Ségur nor the relation by Oman

Let's all read the account by de Ségur for ourselves.
The relevant slection from volume 3 of de Ségur's "Histoire et Mémoires" can be read here :
link
Comments:
1. He doesn't anywhere say that the strength of the 3e escadron of the Poles was 83 troopers.
2. If Kevin thinks that some trivial error of mis-counted Poles undermines all of de Ségur's account, he should at least point out correctly where this error occurs in de Ségur's text.

Although I can't see anything substantively "wrong" with Oman's relation, he does go on an on about the brutality of Napoléon, his lack of care for the lives of his men, his eagerness to make theatrical gestures that could become fodder for his régime's propaganda, etc., etc., etc. Not that these conclusions are totally unreasonable in light of the events at Somosierra, but one might prefer a less vituperative account of the engagement. So, probably the most detailed and careful "staff-study-style" secondary source for Somosierra is "Campaign de l'empereur Napoléon en Espagne (1808-1809): Tudela. Somosierra …" by Dominique-Eugène-Paul Balagny (Paris: Berger-Levraut, 1903), which can be read here :
link
Again, Balagny's account is not substantively different from those of de Ségur, Niegolewski or Oman with regard to the rôle of the the French infantry.

Here is a pretty good schematic map of the action:
link

- Sasha

Yes – oh dear, Brechtel is also ignoring completly the work by

Pouzerewsky : La Charge de Cavallerie de Somo – Sierra (Espange), Paris chez Lavauzelle 1900 – who does a nice examen critique at the beginning of his booklet – and indeed his critic of Niegolewski as well.

This work is available on line – for download

Yes, the Puzyrevskiy is another nice one. Here is a link for it:
link
- Sasha

Sorry it took me so long to respond but thanks for all your knowledgeable responses :)

Now…
I've not seen comments in any related thread about the 'organisation' of the 9eme and the adoption of voltigeurs.

Given the background of Terrys' (UK) reenactment and membership within the 9eme Legere as they stepped aside from the NA and became 'hardcore' serious, I'd have expected that there would have been extra clarity and comment on these matters.

Seems we're still floundering 4 decades later…
[No I don't think I can afford the book s/h at current usurious prices].

thanks for any info d

Read "Incomparable".

link

I will! Just ordered it from Amazon. 👍

>>Read "Incomparable".

Which is why I was seeking helpful discourse. I could buy it, do that, and be very p*** if it didn't contain relevant information.

Surely someone can tell us whether or not theres any detail on this tiny section of errata that boggles so many minds.
OTOH I note that prices have plummeted from the US$80-100 i originally saw it for a few months ago. However, some Amazun freeks want $60 USD freight, so no, I aint buying like that.

Yesterday I paid $7.98 USD for a used "very good" condition copy on Amazon with free shipping. You should check again. There are used copies still on Amazon for as little as $5.15 USD.

The French light infantry regiments were armed and equipped as the line infantry, but 'Though line and light infantry had the same organization, weapons, equipment, and drill regulations, there was a difference between them, as definite as it was intangible. Infanterie legere had acquired a tradition of dash and aggressiveness, of advance guard and flank guard service, of rapid deployment and expert skirmishing. It asserted the right to lead all attacks…' -John Elting, Swords Around A Throne, 207-208.

The senior light infantry regiments were formed from the elite chasseur battalions of the old Royal army.

The elite voltiguers were formed in 1804-1805, one company per battalion of light or line infantry and were picked soldiers, and the enlisted men could be no taller than 4 feet, 11 inches (French) with officers being allowed an inch more. They were trained to shoot rapidly and accurately and the companies were always to be kept at war strength.

No doubt these 'runts' were aggressive, nicknamed the 'kleine manner' because of their skill and dash.

At the Berezina, the first troops across were Polish lancers, each carrying a voltigeur piggy-back on the horse. They swept the western bank clean of Russians, mostly Cossacks, and when other troops crossed, each dead Cossack had been shot in the head.

Well apparently few either have or can't "Read "Incomparable"
so it's not answered at all.

…the 9th Leger (and 96th de Ligne – both of 3 battalions), as part of the Ist Division of the Ist Corps in Spain, cleared the Somosierra Pass – most likely in open or skirmish order – while the squadron of famous Polish light horse attached to the Guard distracted the Spanish gunners by charging up the road in the center of the pass.

The reason Napoleon ordered the escort squadron of the Polish Light Horse to charge up the pass was that the infantry were taking too long to take the pass. The Poles did not 'distract' the Spanish gunners, they overran and took the four batteries that were emplaced in the pass. And the Poles lost about half of the squadron accomplishing their assigned mission. One wounded officer made it to the top of the pass, Lt Niegelewski, and he won the Legion of Honor doing it.

Brechtel

What is the source for "At the Berezina, the first troops across were Polish lancers, each carrying a voltigeur piggy-back on the horse. They swept the western bank clean of Russians, mostly Cossacks, and when other troops crossed, each dead Cossack had been shot in the head."? Given the inaccuracy of smoothbore muskets it seems implausible and smacks of an old soldier's tale (at least to me)

Thanks

Paul

It can be found in The Great Retreat by Paul Britten-Austin-Chapter 16: 'Two Fragile Bridges.' See pages 255 to 261.

Yes, but where did he get it from?

The three volumes produced by Paul Britten-Austin are realistically primary source anthologies.

Have you not seen the books?

link

link

I am aware of them – the question is really – is this an example of a good anecdote a la Marbot, or is the specific incident (Cossacks all shot through the head) well-documented?

I've looked in Marbot, Volume II, and didn't find it there. IT could have been from Castex. Regarding the lancers and voltiguers, that might be from Rapp.

Regarding voltigeurs' marksmanship, they were specifically trained to shoot rapidly and accurately.

Thanks for looking – I must admit that I remain sceptical as however well-trained the men were, their weapons weren't that accurate

My son is interested in bow-shooting and he is pretty good. There is an indoor range down the street and both he and I were shooting one evening and the two people shooting to our right had the 'modern' equipment including sights.

I was taught to shoot decades ago by my eldest brother with a longbow and no sights. I was shooting well (only at about 50-100 feet) and the person to my right remarked on how could I hit the target without a sight. I just replied that was the way I was taught and practice (and I had not shot for years).

The reason for the above? Even inherently inaccurate weapons can be used well depending on the circumstances. Plus flushing out Cossacks and killing them at short range could quite possible be quite an exercise in accuracy.

So much rhetoric and little substance.

According to Ch-Major J Dupas who wrote of the pursuit of Kutuzov 14 Nov 1805, Murats strong cavalry corps had been stopped by skirmishers in a forest, so the Grenadier Division was brought up:

Les 4 batallions de la brigade Dupas battent la charge et se jettent tous les 4 en tirailleurs. L'attaque fut vive et impétueuse cette manoeuvre, quoique n'étant peut-être pas avouée par tes savants tacticiens, réussit, à merveitte.

L'ennemi intimidé par cette nuée de tirailleurs soupçon nant un corps d'armée considérable derrière eux, n'osa rien entreprendre d'offensif;

et il est de fait que dans ce combat dont l'avantage nous est resté, 3.ooo hommes d'infanterie ont battu et chassé de toutes ses positions un corps russe de plus de 25.ooo hommes; le terrain étoit jonché de morts; on s'est battu jusques a 8 heures du soir. Cela ne doit point étonner;…

Ok so the last bit is bluster, yet correct, as the Russians were masters of delay and disappear- hardly a 'gamers' scenario but much of the campaign and others went this way, all the way (and years) to Tilsit.

Oh and BTW, of course much of the 'elite' Grenadier Division was comprised with chasseurs (see elsewhere…). Perhaps they were good, for a while at least?
~d

>>According to Ch-Major J Dupas who wrote…

Oops- Dupas was another General, this typo is for Surgeon-Major Dumas (as in the writer, but not, err….).

Apologies for the silly error, all that writing elsewhere ;-\
d

Reading "Incompartable" now and I'm very impressed. I've read many regimental histories from later periods, but somehow I always thought that there really wasn't much available from earlier periods (lower literacy rates, less record keeping, longer ago, etc.) so I'm amazed at the detailed story the author has been able to put together. Highly recommended.