"Napoleon's Marshals - Officers or Lackeys?" Topic

Can we all agree that the role of chief of staff was very important and necessary component for the Napoleonic war effort, that Berthier excelled in it, and that he deserved a marshalate for this?

KTravlos : Can we all agree that the role of chief of staff was very important and necessary component for the Napoleonic war effort, that Berthier excelled in it, and that he deserved a marshalate for this?

Yes, and leave it at that. Heck, it should even be easy to agree that due to Berthier's role in Napoleon's army it was required he be a marshal so that he could not be seen as "lower" than those he was sending Napoleon's direction to.

I do not see where the argument is, von Winterfeldt says, "Eh, Berthier was pretty good, I like some other guys better," and Kevin says, "No DUDE Berthier is totally the most rad!" OK, great, so we've established you guys have differing opinions but this is starting to become a, "BUT I SEE IT DIFFERENTLY SO YOU'RE WRONG"–fest.

Can we go back to the topic now?

Cheers,

The Bandit

No, that is an incorrect interpretation of the discussion on Berthier (and I never use the term 'dude').

VWs opinion is that Berthier was nothing but a secretary. My viewpoint is that Berthier was the first of the great chiefs of staff in military history, and that he was essential to Napoleon's method of waging war.

That's a bit of a difference, I think.

B

'Can we all agree that the role of chief of staff was very important and necessary component for the Napoleonic war effort, that Berthier excelled in it, and that he deserved a marshalate for this?'

Good summary-well done.

B

Kevin,

OK, how about:

VW: Berthier = Eh.
Kevin: Berthier = EXCELLENT.

Woohoo… point is you each differ on your valuation of him. Now that we know you guys have a difference of opinion… next step is to move the conversation along.

Cheers,

The Bandit

I don't know how to start a topic, (being an overage computer idiot), but I wonder if this could be the place to ask peoples' opinions and/or insights regarding some of the lower ranking, lesser known generals, (or lower), of the Napoleonic period. There certinally seems to have been a great collection of characters out there whose lives and adventures make facinating reading. If it is inappropriate to suggest this here please accept my apology.
John Miller

next step is to move the conversation along.

Alternatively, both can support their claims with the relevant sources. I wouldn't, but that's because my knowledge of Berthier's is based upon secondary material and therefore, despite my favourable opinion of the guy, I can't prove that I am right. I believe that his working relationship with Napoleon was more than that of a mere military secretary, although I wouldn't go so far as to think of him as a chief of staff in the modern sense of the word.

Bas,

Interestingly, if you look at Berthier's duties and responsibilities and that of a modern chief of staff, they are amazingly similar.

Chiefs of staff run the staff, which is responsible to him for their performance and the smooth running of the staff. They are not operational planners, and most good commanders are their own operations officers and while they undoubtedly use their operations officers for planning, that planning is coordinated by the chief of staff.

The Prussian system went somewhat overboard on the operational side, making the operations section dominant on the staff, that system definitely showed its limitations in the 20th century and ultimately failed. And the Prussian system was merely an embryonic organization in 1815 and wouldn't become 'dominant' in the Prussian army until the 1840s.

After War II and the reorginazation of the German army as the Bundewehr, the US staff system with all staff sections being equal so to speak was adopted.

That system of staff sections headed by an assistant chief of staff under the chief of staff was established by berthier ca 1795 and was the genesis of how staff organization is done today. The US publications are available online and the duties of the chief of staff are definitely outlined and Berthier would most certainly be familiar with them. The chief of staff is today the headquarters 'pivot' as it was in Berthier's general staff and many of the staff procedures implemented by Berthier are still used today.

Berthier's importance in staff organization and functioning, as well as staff planning, cannot be overemphasized and relegating him to nothing more than a secretary or a 'chief clerk' misses the point which can be found and understood with a little research. One volume that I've found invaluable is Thiebault's staff manual, which was based on Berthier's staff instructions to the Army of the Alps in 1795. Staff organization is outlined and the responsibilities of the staff sections is detailed in it.

B

'Not only shown by books of Titeux and Vaché but also in one of the best books ever published about Napoleonic warfare, by Stéphane Béraud.'

Are you referring to Titeux's work on Dupont and Beraud's La Révolution Militaire Napoléonienne or Bonaparte en Italie: Naissance d'un stratege?

I have found Vachee to be too pro-Napoleon by an admiring author to the denigration of his subordinates. Further he relies in dubious source material such as Jomini.

B

Kev

That's my take on Berthier's role too, although with the caveat that Napoleon wasn't shy of micromanagement, as his correspondence demostrates, and had an overwhelming personality. I can only imagine what would be working under his command. If we also remember that those of his inner circle -and I think of Berthier as one of them- were in awe of his military ability, I believe that Berthier acted like a chief of staff with limited responsabilities. In other words, I agree with you that he was much more than a military secretary, but I also believe that he hadn't the freedom to act as a sounding board for his boss' ideas, as a chief of staff is supossed to do.

Good point, by the way, about the Prussian General Staff. I agree it can't be considered a model outside Prussia and Germany.

Three pages later and I have to say The Bandit answered the question quite well in the second post. I love this place!

Mind you the thread itself is full of interesting thoughts and information as are all of our threads.

Bob

Kevin wrote, "Thiebault's staff manual, which was based on Berthier's staff instructions to the Army of the Alps in 1795. Staff organization is outlined and the responsibilities of the staff sections is detailed in it."
I note that this is found on page 82 of my copy of the esteemed Colonel Elting's "Swords Around a Throne".

And here are these instructions themselves :
« Document sur le service de l'état-major général à l'armée des Alpes » (1796)
link

The full text is available at the link. A summary for those who don't have French:
1. This document was a letter to the War Minister, where Berthier reports the "provisional dispositions" which he has made for the general staff of the army of the Alps. He lists the 5 positions of adjudant general allotted for the Army of the Alps (2 of which are vacant), and then lists the areas of responsibility assigned to each officer. He then lists the distribution list for the order of the day, both as a full text and as a summary, depending on the recipient. This section takes less than 2 pages of the published text (a small format book, maybe 200 words to each page).
2. Next is 4 pages listing the various re-curring reports that the army staff should be making.
3. Next is 3 pages listing the reports required of adjudants-general assigned to the divisions of the army (not corps, by the way).
4. Berthier then proposes using the military cartographers to document, topographically, the movements of armies and to file this with the both the cabinet of Directory and the general depot of the War Ministry. He asks the War Minister to seek concurrence with this idea from the adjudatns-general (staff officers with the assimilated rank of colonel), the engineering coprs and the military cartographers' corps. He says he sent a copy of this proposal to the Directory. This section is 5 pages of text.

Some comments:
1. We have here, not counting the cartography project, about 9 pages or appox. 1800 words. It is very little and it is stretching to describe this as "the responsibilities of the staff sections is detailed". The majority of the text is just listing which reports should be filed when. In several places there are references to existing laws and regulations, especiallly as to the form and substance of the reports. The tone is more one of reporting compliance with regulations being reported to the War Minister than some report of innovation or practices undertaken on local initiative (exception made for the proposal abot cartographers recording movements of troops).
2. These approx. 1800 words were sent as a manuscript letter to the War Minister in 1796. It appears to have been Berthier's response to the requirements for streamlined and regulated organization of field forces as decreed by the Directory in January 1796. See the "Arrêté du directoire exécutif, concernant l'organisation générale de l'armée du 18 nivôse an 4", Journal Militaire 1796 (vol. 13), pages 949-67.
3. Although Berthier most likely retained a copy of his letter, there is absolutely no indication of any other distribution of this document other then to its intended recipient. Specifically, young Paul Thiébault was then an aide de camp to general Solignac in the army of Italy and there is no reason to think he ever saw this letter, although he later served under Berthier in Italy.
4. Berthier's letter was not published until near the end of the 19th century. So, there can be no question of Thiébault's work being "based on" it – clearly it could not have been. However, Thiébault was certainly informed by his experience in the army of Italy, where Berther was later appointed chief of staff.
5. It is very very unclear to me, looking at the original sources, if Berthier's activity as a chief of staff in the army of the Alps, or even later the army of Italy, was in any way structurally different than that of the chief of staff of any similarly sized French formation in those years. It is also quite unclear to what innovation, if any, Berthier made – as opposed to competently implementing the then-existent regulations governing army staffs. There is certainly nothing in the sudject letter to indicate anything more than compliance with regulations.
6. This is not to meant to imply that Berthier did not do his job very well, and with a rather unique and difficult commander in chief, and amid a national situation that blurred the lines between politics and the army, while fighting an enemy on the enemy's home territories, and with later 18th century communications technology! Overall, doing the job of chief of staff at all well in these conditions must have required an officer of great, almost heroic, talent for such work.
7. But, I fear we may be back-fostering some participation in the development of military science on Berthier in this instance : he ran the grand army staff in later years, so he must have been important in the French devleopment of the concept or doctine of the general staff. His little letter to the War Minister does not really support this concept, despite Kevin's (and the late Colonel Elting's, and various French historian's) wish that it did.

Amcialement,
- Alexandre

P.S. For comparison, this post is about 900 words, or half the total of the subject text from Berthier on staff activities in the army of the Alps.

Kevin,

Interesting that you regard the Prussian system with its pre-eminence of the Operational (or J3) element. My experience in UK, NATO, US and UN HQs, from Battalion to Coprs, both in training and on operations, is that the J3 branch are still regarded as pre-eminent. To the extent that J3 doing another branch's work is seen as pro-active but another branch giving direction on their own subject is often seen as steping beyond their remit!

Just an observation, but I think you'll find the reality of J3 being a little more than just the primus inter pares is pretty universal.

Adam

That isn't my experience working on staffs from battalion to the joint level.

Now, commanders may give that to the operation section with their prerogatives, but cooperation between staff sections with all being relatively 'equal' being the norm.

B

It is my belief that actually reading Berthier's letter concerning the staff of the army of the Alps leaves a rather different impression than hearing about it secondary works, especially modern Egnlish-language secondary sources that Kevin seems to favor. The same might be said of Thiébault's contribution.

It might also be of interest to note that in Thiébault's "Manuel des adjudans-généraux et des adjoints employés dans les états-majors" published in 1800, Berthier is mentioned only once. On page 30, Thiébault relates that, exceptionally or not in accordance with standard procedures, Berthier would leave the army of Italy headquarters and follow in personal attendance on Bonaparte as that commander moved about for his "grand operations".

On the other hand, virtually every paragraph of the "Manual" is stated to be in accordance with one or another law, decree, ministerial instruction, regulation, etc.

See :
link

The proliferation of these various laws, decrees, instructions and regulations certainly generated the need for a bright young officer to summarize the net effect of all these on the activities of staff officers. And that is what Thiébault did with the "Manual". The "Manual" itself, however useful, cannot be said to be any sort of innovation in military science. Nor would we expect such from a young junior officer such as was Thiébault in 1800.

Amicalement,
- Alexandre

For comparison, from 1796 Reynier (of Maida fame, commander of the Saxon corps in 1812) was the chef of staff in Moreau's army of the Rhine. From a study done by the French general staff, we see Reynier's active participation in direction of the various divisions of the army, his doing key reconnaissance work, his proposals for future operations, etc., etc.
Worthy of note, I think,
- Reynier seems to have a much more active part in planning and decision-making under Moreau than did Berthier under Bonaparte
- Reynier seems to be on quite familiar terms with his commander, whom he address not with a formal military salutation, nor even with the "citizen-general" style of the Revolution, but instead as "mon cher Moreau".

See the section beginning here :
link

Beginninng here:
link
we see some of the archival holdings of the reports, correspondece, etc. from Reynier's headquarters. These seem essentially the same as those listed by Berthier in his letter to the War Minister discussed above.

Amicalement,
- Alexandre

@basieleus 66

" I believe that Berthier acted like a chief of staff with limited responsabilities. In other words, I agree with you that he was much more than a military secretary, but I also believe that he hadn't the freedom to act as a sounding board for his boss' ideas, as a chief of staff is supossed to do. "

That sounds to me – he was a military secretary who wasn't even consulted – what a difference to the Prussian staffs of e.g. Blücher / Gneisenau, what difference to Moreau / Reynier.
What difference is Berhtier to e.g. Fain??

No doubt that Berthier still had a very important work to do – which was essential as well for Napoléons military machine, but he was far away from being a dynamic chief of staff.

The unhappy dual system Napoleon – Berthier caused a lot of unnecessary friction and there were quite a few critical observations in the French officiers corps about Berthier.

Your assumptions on the Imperial staff and on Berthier are incorrect and it would be helpful if you could actually demonstrate your material.

Fain was a secretary and there is a great difference between Fain and Berthier. According to Ferdinand von Funck, the Saxon liaison officer at Imperial Headquarters, Berthier's responsibilities were:

'Berthier…in spite of a rough exterior…was not an unkindly man and, although hard and irascible, was amendable to reasonable representations. His often cross-grained manner was, as a rule, a consequence of the pressure of work, under which he all but succumbed…All the problems connected with the needs of the army and of their transport in war were thrown on him as Minister for War and Chief of the General Staff. The armies were scattered from Bayonne to the Bug, from Calabria to the Helder, and as far as Stralsund; they were shifting their positions incessantly, had to be supplied and directed, and the whole of it passed through [Berthier's] hands. However ably his office staff supported him, he always was and remained the clearing house through which all business was transacted…the infallible day book to which Napoleon was referring every minute of the day to make sure how his balance stood. For this reason he had to be in attendance on him on every battlefield, on reconnaissance, at every review…without fail on every study of terrain.'

Napoleon stated that 'General Berthier, chief of staff, has spent his days fighting at my side and his nights at his desk; it would be impossible to combine more activity, good will, courage, and knowledge…'

Those are not descriptions of a secretary, but of a valued staff officer, in this case a chief of staff, who knows his profession from muzzle to butt plate.

B

Is a "Military Secretary" the same thing as a "mere secretary"? I thought it was a rather more significant role.

"Minister for War and Chief of the General Staff"
This was 1800-1807. Actually it was a strange thing to do, as Berthier had, by necessity, to be absent from his ministry when the army was on campaign, which was indeed quite often.
Can you imagine a more modern army doing such a thing? Having "Beetle" Smith also doing Henry Stimson's job (USA World War II era)?
Or von Gneisenau trying to also undertake von Hardenberg's portfolio.
Either Berthier was gifted beyond all measure, or it was not such a great idea to double-task him, or both.
:-)

Amicalement,
- Alexandre

Mais c'est un onze!

Nice to see things back to '"' normal '"'.

'Either Berthier was gifted beyond all measure…'

Finally coming around…

B

'The unhappy dual system Napoleon – Berthier caused a lot of unnecessary friction and there were quite a few critical observations in the French officiers corps about Berthier.'

Which 'dual system' was that?

And what 'unnecessary friction' was caused by Berthier?

B

Oh dear, maybe another "problem" with one of Kevin's little so-called "quotes" …..

Kevin posted:
"According to Ferdinand von Funck, the Saxon liaison officer at Imperial Headquarters, Berthier's responsibilities were ….." and then a passage attributed to von Funck.

That is : Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand von Funck (Schoeppenstedt 1761 – Wurzen 1828).

Von Funck served as an aide or adjudant to the elector (later king) Friedrich August from late 1806 until his appointment to a command Saxon cavalry in 1812, then fighting as a French ally (for which von Funck also wrote memoirs). He never once served as "the Saxon liaison officer at Imperial Headquarters" and indeed had been serving as an officer of hussars, was wounded, captured and then sent to Dresden with a conciliatory message from Napoléon in late 1806. He had dinner at the French headquarters at this point, with Berthier's aides. That would be the extent of his opportunity to see Berthier in the dual rôles of minister of war and chief of staff.

See von Funck's entry in the Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie :
link
see also :
link

Kevin's so-called "quote" from von Funck is "derived" from this work:
In the Wake of Napoleon : being the memoirs (1807-1809) of Ferdinand von Funck, Lieutenant-General in the Saxon Army and Adjutant-General to the King of Saxony ; from the hitherto unpublished mss. in the Saxon archives
translated by Oakley Williams
Sl. : Sn., 1931.
xxii, 303 p. front., ports. 23 cm.

Well since Oakley's only other claims to fame was translating the libretto from Parcival and a couple of travel books, let's just move on to the original publication :

Im Banne Napoleons aus den Erinnerungen des sächsischen Generalleutnants und Generaladjutanten des Königs
ed. Artur Brabant
Dresden : Paul Aretz Verlag, 1928
416, [2] p., front. (port.) ports

Brabant was an archivist in Dresden:
link

The work can be downloaded here :
link

The work is a publication of scattered manuscript pages, mostly personality sketches by von Funck and found by the Arkivist Brabant.
At the time of wrting these sketches in 1814, after the occupation of Saxony by the Russians and Prussians and the capture of King Friedrich August, von Funck was dismissed from Saxon service for his pro-French attitude. I do not know of any other Saxon officer whose pro-French bias was so great as to require dismissal.

Von Funck spent the next few months in Wurzen writing. He returned to Saxon servicwas e in 1815, and entrusted with various diplomatic missions in Paris and London, aiming ot preserve Saxony from Prussian influence, only to be definitvely retired in 1816, where he set about writing a history of the Crusades.

Von Funck's consistent pro-French and pro-Napoléon bias should be recalled when reading Kevin's passage.

For anyone who can read German, stop here. Read the original work and draw your own conclusions, please. For the others ….

The original text for Kevin's passage starts on page 181 of the linked original German-language work.What got erased from the original as it made its way to TMP is interesting.

After "through which all business was transacted", there is an ellipses (….) in Kevin's passage. What von Funck went on to say was that Berthier memorized all the various data about the position and number and type of French and allied forces, in order to be able to immediately give an answer to Napoléon on any such question, and that Berthier rarely saw the headquarters but instead attended the person of Napoléon around the clock. Then von Funck said that the incessant preparation and delivery of this data created the rare merit of Berthier, but the the use and application of this information remained with Napoléon alone. then comes the conclusion of Kevin's passage, after the ellipses.
Then von Funck concludes that it is not surprise that Berthier was often Grumpy.

Well, the overall impression I get, reading the original text, is that von Funck saw Berthier as a person of progidious capacity for memorizing data, but also as what we would call a very neurotic sort of fellow, who slavishly followed Napoléon 24/7 to be able to provide that memorized statisitical information to him at any moment day or night, and that any use or application of this information lay with Napoléon alone. That's not the impression that Kevin's little snippet give.

But, hey, you can read the original for yourself, try some google translate if you need to, and decide for yourself if Kevin's little passage is given with enough fidelity to the original writer as to correctly capture his meaning, or whether someone along the line twisted things a bit to make Berthier look good.

Amicalement,
- Alexandre

Nice to see things back to '"' normal '"'.

And this was why I was discouraging from taking the conversation this direction… now we need another 100 posts to discuss how altered a quote can be and still be called a quote…

Cheers,

The Bandit

Bandit

There is no need for that – just being honest and stating from where you quote – see as I did with my Jomini quote which was from the work of Béraud – if Brechtel would do it – then it would be more transparent from where he gets his quote – original German text or a translation – or whomever?

As to Funck – how would he know all the details of the work of the Etat – Major – as being a foreing officer? He could observe only from the outside.

As I wrote already, Berthier was brave, loyal, hard working – but still ancien regime in staff work – and he was only part of the Etat – Major, others like Eble had important tasks as well.

And again ….

Kevin posted:
"Napoleon stated that 'General Berthier, chief of staff, has spent his days fighting at my side and his nights at his desk; it would be impossible to combine more activity, good will, courage, and knowledge…"

Well, not exactly a real quote, but closely paraphrased from this source:

Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, 1750-1850
Tallahassee, Florida : Institute on Napoleon and the French Revolution, University of Florida. Press, 1985
link
link
page 65

Which seems to be really from here :

Letters and documents of Napoleon
John Eldred Howard
New York : Oxford University Press, 1961
link
link
page 107

Actually, this was not some summary judgement on Berthier's capabilities or career. It was actually written when Berthier first served under Bonaparte. The little snippet is actually taken from a letter to the Directory written from Italy on 6 May 1796. The Directory had just sent a letter of appreciation ot the army of Italy. Bonparte responds that such approbation is the "sweetest recompnse" that the army could receive (as opposed to pay, food or supplies?) and for himself, "nothing could add to the esteem and devotion which he shall show on all occasions to the Constitution and the Government "- a government for which his "motto will always be to give his life to support".
Ahem. I suppose he meant "always" as in for the next three and a half years.
Then he mentions Berthier. We can hope his praise for Berthier was more sincere than the rest of the letter.

So, far from being a considered judgement on Berthier, the original source of passage more or less "quoted" by Kevin was really just that Berthier had been "mentioned in despatches" in early 1796.

Bonaparte's letter is in the Correpsondence, and can be read here:
link

Maybe more interesting than Kevin's loosey-goosey use of so-called "quotes" is that quite a few letters from Bonaprte right at this time are giving explicit instructions to adjudants-general in the army's and divisions' (not corps) staffs. Although these officers would be nominally under Berthier's direction, it is Bonaparte who is sending them their orders, in rather painful detail. For the contemprary comparison of Reynier/Moreau, the French general staff study linked above shows such communications coming from Reynier.

Amicalement,
- Alexandre

Hew,

Is that "normal" enough ?

- Sasha

Hans-Karl,

"As to Funck – how would he know all the details of the work of the Etat – Major – as being a foreing officer? He could observe only from the outside."

Well, he was only at the headquarters briefly – maybe just one night – before being sent to Dresden with Napoléon's message. And he was not sitting with Napoléon and Berthier, but with Berthier's aides.

So, I think what he is really reporting is what Berthier's aides were saying about their boss to this foreign officer.

How Colonel Elting, Kevin or anyone else could take the passage from von Funck as really very informative about the working of the Grand Armée staff is beyond me. I suppose that the desire to say something positive leads to picking this source, and then cherry-picking the source's words to give the absolutely most positive slant on Berthier.

To me that looks more like propaganda, or biased special pleading, than history. But, since we can now all easily look at many of the original sources, as in this case, and quickly look up the biographical context for the sources' authors, everyone can draw their own conclusions for themselves.

- Sasha

Bandit,

"how altered a quote can be and still be called a quote"

I was taught, and do believe :
- it is not a quote unless you give a full citation of exactly where (i) you got the quote and, if appropriate, (ii) where the source you are reading got the quote
- if you change so much as a comma or capitalization in a quote, this *must* be shown with brackets [ ]
- it is preferred (by far) to quote fully, without skipping anything, but if you do, you *must* show this with ellipses …
- it is preferred (by far) to quote the entire thought, paragraph or even page of the original author, when in doubt include more not less
- if you offer a quote with gaps, shown with ellipses, you *must not* cherry-pick the quote to alter or slant its meaning, when in doubt include more not less
- if you offer a translation, it is not really a quote and should not be styled as Mr. Smith said, "Blah, blah, blah."
- if you offer a translation, you must say who did the translation
- if you offer a translation, you must also provide the original quote in original language
- when you give a quote, you *must* note not only who said/wrote it, but also when and to whom
- it is greatly preferred to trace all quotations to their original publication or manuscript source and to note/cite the full publication history
- it is greatly preferred to provide biographical notes for the author or original source, and this is virtually required (i) for the period around the time of the origination of the source and (ii) to the extent that any potential for bias or for an agenda can be discerned from the events of the author's life
- if you are aware of any deficiency in a source, or any reason why the source might be given less than typical credence, then you *must* explicitly mention this
- if you are aware of other sources of equal or greater credility than your quoted source who can be said to offer contrary information, you *must* explcitly mention these
- all of the above apply also when you paraphrase information from a source, just as if you are directly quoting, which is usually far preferred anyway
- paraphrasing is best used to summarize data : example quote – Mr. Smith wrote, "We built 10 cars in one factory each day, 5 per day in the second factory, and 12 cars per day at a third location." vs. ok paraphrase – Mr. Smith reported that 27 cars/day were built.
- paraphrasing is generally *not* suitable for opinions or judgements : example quote – Mr. Smith wote, "Ms. Jones was a mean, hostile and often absent supervisor." vs. *not ok* paraphrase – Mr. Smith reported that he did not like Ms. Jones' supervision.
- one's own thoughts, opinions, conclusions, etc. must be clearly marked, but are, of course, unrestricted : from the prior example, it would be ok to write – From my reading of Mr. Smith, I conclude that he did not like Ms. Jones' supervision …. however, such a passage would require a citation to what you read from Mr. Smith
- to the extent you cannot do any of the required or preferred items listed above, you *must* make explicit mention of this to flag the lack of context and/or provenance for the reader
- only by following *all* of these rules is a putative "quote" a real, useful and adequately profferred quote, otherwise it is just filling up space.

Before the modern digitization of sources with usually free internet access, the above requirements might occassionally be very challenging. Now, it is almost always very very easy.

Today failing to meet these requirements is really a big, bright, waving red flag of warning that someone is either biased, agenda-driven, special pleading or doing sloppy research.

That's why it is so easy to find the "problems" with Kevin's little snippets, his so-called "quotes".

- Sasha

P.S. At both my secondary school and university, in addition to outright plagiarism, there was a lesser offense of sloppy documentation, which included substantive or repeated violation of any of the above-listed rules. This was considered to be a sort of misdemeanor instance of the greater "felony", and subject to similar disciplinary measures, only with lesser penalties in the end.
Even an inadvertent or passing violation of these rules would get your work handed back as "incomplete", and with no extension of time given for completion.
And that was before the internet, of course.

Missed one ….

Kevin posted,
Thiebault, the author of the premier staff manual of the period (1800 and 1813) stated that:
'Quite apart from his specialist training as a topographical engineer, he had knowledge and experience of staff work and furthermore a remarkable grasp of everything to do with war. He had also, above all else, the gift or writing a complete order and transmitting it with the utmost speed and clarity…No one could have better suited General Bonaparte, who wanted a man capable of relieving him of all detailed work, to understand him instantly and to foresee what he would need.'

That passage, proffered innumerable times by modern English-language secodary sources, was not in Thiébault's manual published in 1800. In the Manual, Berthier is mentioned only once (noted above), and that for his habit of being (unusually) absent from his post at headquarters, but instead following around in personal attendance upon Bonaparte.

The passage is actually from the "Mémoires du général Bon Thiébault …." published at the close of the 1800's under the "auspices" of his then quite aged daughter, Claire, and allegedly from manuscripts found among the family papers. The editor was Fernand Calmettes (1846-1914), an aspiring artist, journalist, fiction writer, editor and general intellectual of late 19th century Paris.

The context of the quote is the appointment of Berthier to Napoléon's staff in 1796.
Here it is for those who can read French and decide for themselves what it says:
link

For everybody else:
- "He had also, above all else, the gift or writing a complete order " is not what it says. It says Berthier had the gift of recalling/remembering all the orders ("se rappeler la totalité des ordres")
- the ellipses in the passage is from removing from the quote Thiébaults mention of Berthier's great activity or capacity for work, his untiring temperament
- then the part about Bonaparte wanting someone to handle all the details (to "disembarrass" him of these in the original)
- "to understand him instantly and to foresee what he would need" is a little overwrought in my opinion, compared to the French text, which I would render as "to understand him instantly and when needed to decypher him" – the French is "et au besoin de le deviner" – the idea is that Berthier was not able forsee Napoléon's needs so much as he was able to transmit with clarity Napoléon's orders when their obscurity made them hard to understand
- the original then goes on to conclude that, no assignment could have better suited Berthier, whose experience and zeal had made him a distinquished officer, but whose nature had not made him a warrior (Homme de guerre).

So, Kevin's little paraphrase or quote or whatever slanted Thiébault's text, making Berthier a writer of complete orders rather than someone who could remember them all, making Berthier forsee Bonaparte's needs rather than decypher his orders, and failing to note that it was Thiébault's opinion that Berthier was no "homme de guerre".

Amicalement,
- Alexandre

von Winterfeldt & Alexandre,

von Winterfeldt: There is no need for that – just being honest and stating from where you quote – see as I did with my Jomini quote which was from the work of Béraud – if Brechtel would do it – then it would be more transparent from where he gets his quote – original German text or a translation – or whomever?

Alexandre: Today failing to meet these requirements is really a big, bright, waving red flag of warning that someone is either biased, agenda-driven, special pleading or doing sloppy research.

I agree with both of what you are saying regarding quotations. My statement that we will now debate what is considered a quote isn't because it should be up for debate but because if historical trends continue, it will be debated and argued rather than accepted and embraced.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Quotes are tricky business, even if you quote them in full. For instance, say you report (to follow Alexander): "Asked why he didn't like Mr Anderson, Mr Jones answered: 'Because he is a bigot and a racist'" What can this quote tell us? It doesn't give us any insight on Mr Anderson's actual believes or behavior, just whan Mr Jones thinks about him. Perhaps, Mr Anderson told a joke and Mr Jones thought it had a racist overtone, but we don't know for sure if that was the case or just that Mr Jones is particularly sensitive to supposedly racist jokes. In that case, the relevant question would be not if Mr Anderson is a racist, but why Mr Jones constructed an image of Mr Anderson as such.

What I mean is that quotes by themselves have not value at all. Everything is about context and interpretation. The almost reverential regard for "witness reports", "primary sources" ecc that some people -trained historians included- have for them makes a disservice to history as discipline. We run the risk of becoming nothing else but antiquarians, collecting quotes and reports with accuracy, but without meaning.

Dear basileus,

I do agree completely. but I also prefer to do the drawing of conclusions from the context, etc. myself (and to let others do it for themselves) and prefer not to read someone else's "pre-chewed" conclusions.
But all your points are really very valid.

To see the dangers of letting someone else do the "pre-chewing", the last example of a false, or poorly proffered, or just mangled, so-called "quote" of Kevin's, from Thiébault, we can note :

- Kevin introduces the "quote" with an allusion to the Manual for staff officers published in 1800, when the "quote" is not from this work
- The "quote" was actually not published in the putative author's lifetime, nor with strong academic provenance …. but rather long after the putative author's death and from alleged privately-held manuscripts edited by a rather socially, but not academically, prominent intellectual … and Kevin did not note this
- The era of publication, the close of the 1800's, is often characterized as one of rampant, even excessive, nationalism …. and in France an era when the First Empire's military "virtues" were often thought of as antidotes to the more recent empire's military catastrophe …. and Kevin did not note this
- Kevin gives us the "quote" without saying where he got it, nor who translated it …. no citation at all …. a red flag warning
- The period of time with which the original text is concerned (spring 1796) was one where the putative author was (i) extremely young and inexperienced, and (ii) not a witness to what is described
- The translation is clearly defective with "the gift or [sic] writing a complete order" and very arguably defective with "to foresee what he would need" …. and both defects tend to make the sense of the passage more positive about Berthier
- The so-called "quote" has an ellipses which removes mention of Berthier as a person of untiring work effort …. between the ellipses and the mistranslation, we are given to understand that "No one could have better suited General Bonaparte" based on false precedents …. the immediate precedent to this conclusion was just Berthier's untiring work
- The so-called "quote" stops short, and does not add the overall conclusion on Berthier from the original passage, that he no "homme de guerre".

The total is eight different defects in source usage in the one little passage!!

I do not know if Kevin was intentionally trying to adduce a false and misleading so-called "quote", or just can't tell the difference for himself, or just does not care as long as he can offer something in line with his pro-French and pro-Napoléon bias.

But this little passage is a great example of why the "rules" I posted above are really a requirement when proffering historical materials, and why I would rather each person draw their own conclusions after being given the full context for a quote.

- Sasha

"What I mean is that quotes by themselves have not value at all. Everything is about context and interpretation. The almost reverential regard for "witness reports", "primary sources" ecc that some people -trained historians included- have for them makes a disservice to history as discipline. We run the risk of becoming nothing else but antiquarians, collecting quotes and reports with accuracy, but without meaning."

I disagree absolutly, quote make us transparent, people who are interested can check – if I quoted correctly and from what soure I did quote.

This alone would help to eliminate a lot of manipulation – like De Scheels said …. – when looking De Scheels – I could not find the quote – but after a lot of investigation it was not De Scheels but Toussard – making a totaly different story.

The next step is the interpretation of the quote, one can offer ones own interpretation but also a quote enables others to read the source of the quote and come up with different interpretations.

Of course I agree that history is the art of "treatment" of sources, you are right that it needs interpretation and context. A transpartent work however is providing both.

Or – without the use of primary sources – no interpretation is possible, without quotes – no context.

Some cheerised books provide nothing else than the context or opinion of the author, relying that he is a renowned historian, personally I don't like that works at all, I like to know from where the author drew his opinion.

Alexandre

I wasn't actually defending Kevin's use of sources. I am aware of his errors and do not condone them. Neither I was defending the idea of historical works -as VW seems to imply in his answer- devoid of primary sources. That would be like shooting myself in the leg! After four years working on Spanish archives for my PhD research I am aware of the value of primary sources. What I meant to say is that going all crazy about primary sources and forgetting that they are not as transparent as they look is not history either.

This topic is a good example. Both "sides" are basing their idea about how Berthier worked with or for Napoleon based upon opinions of two -may be three- witnesses, one of them a foreigner that almost securedly wasn't privy to Napoleon's conversations with Berthier. It is irrelevant that Kevin quoted right or wrong: his report is worthless to reach any conclusion, either to support the idea of Berthier as a real chief of staff or as a military secretary. Instead trying to interpret and analyse the known facts, we are wasting our time running in circles around the actual words of a single witness.

I must insist: I don't deny the value of primary sources. My only goal is to explain that they are full of meanings that escape us; that they are not transparent at all, but opaque. They must be interrogated again and again, looking for layers of subtext that are not apparent at first glance.

Let me explain a case taken from my own research. When you read memoires of French soldiers that reported about the behaviour of the Spanish peasantry and guerrillas you will see two (actually more, but let's keep it simple for the moment, shall we?) different kind of information. First, one that cames from hearsay and rumor. In those cases, the reports of brutalities are very elaborated; the Spanish showed an incredible imagination in committing acts of violence against their French victims: frying them alive in boiling oil, playing bowls with their heads, skinning them, crucifixions, ecc. However, when they report murders that they actually witnessed those are brutal, but without any imagination: a wounded soldier shot by his captors, a throat cut by a knife, a head smashed with a rock. Now, if you read French literature from the XVIIIth Century you will see that when the author wanted to scare his readers, he constructed a narrative of brutality in which the imagination of the killer takes the central stage of the story; it is not the act of killing what makes a particular murder horrible, but how it is carried by the killer. This, by the way, is a resource used by modern authors of thrillers, both in novels and movies/TV shows. One of the French memorialists -I think it was Blaze, but I writing from memory, so I can be mistaken- recognised that he was writing using a Gothic novel titled The Monk as model for those acts of Spanish savagery he didn't personally witnessed. So, were they lying? Not at all. They were trying to convey their readers the horror that was to fight a war against a people in arms, using literary tropes that would transmit terror more easily than a mere description of reality. They were also explaining themselves why they showed no mercy to the Spaniards, not worrying about if they were killing innocents or culprits.

As you can see, if I would limit myself to quote the impressions of the French memorialists, I would be doing nothing but copy-paste; my readers wouldn't learn anything of value, except if they were familiar with XVIIIth Century literature, the literary tastes of the French society in the early XIXth Century and how the psyche of a veteran worked when he was trying to get some coin by selling his rememberances. I wouldn't be transparent. It's my job to understand those things and use them to explain my readers why a writer wrote what he did and how.

Best

One small point, I'm surprised Kevin has quoted from Thiébault; because that is one author he does not regard as a reliable, primary source.

If I understand the Kevin's argument correctly Thiébault was largely 'ghost written' years later. IIRC that was what Kevin used against my quoting Thiébault years ago.

That said I found Thiébault an interesting read.

For myself I love primary sources, that's why I seem to spend too much of my vacations back in the UK sat in the National Achieves in Kew.

OK, I realize that I will likely get clubbed by folks for posting this but, focusing back on the initial post, I would submit that as a general statement, warfare in the Napoleonic era was largely conducted using centralized command and centralized control at the tactical and operational levels. There are exceptions to this statement; for example in naval warfare Nelson effectively used centralized command and decentralized control at the battle of Aboiker Bay, and is even said to have delivered the "commander's intent" to his brother captains. This was risky but ultimately resulted in an English victory.

It was my initial impression when beginning my studies of Napoleonic era warfare that Napoleon's intent behind appointing Marshals of the Empire was to potentially delegate authority to conduct a campaign as a surrogate of himself. Upon further study, this impression fell apart – Napoleon was very much a centralized control strategist. There were certainly exceptions to this, but as a general comment, centralized control was certainly the flavor of the day at the tactical and operational levels, but must have been terribly taxing to both Napoleon and his marshals when considered in the context of running an empire.

I am currently donning by helmet and flak jacket awaiting the forum's spirited replies…

Jarhead

Jarhead,

The Corp structure was the big change in Napoleonic warfare brought about by the increase in field armies. These were self contained forces of all arms that were no ad hoc forces. They had improved staff work but was no wise centralized.

About Thiebault, you see again the highly one sided use of B for sources, there is an excellent discussion about Thiebault – and B knows about it – in English

THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
GENERAL PAUL THIÉBAULT
HIS LIFE AND HIS LEGACY
By
JACKSON L. SIGLER
A Dissertation submitted to the
Department of History
In partial fulfillment of the
Requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree Awarded
Spring Semester, 2006

I downloaded this dissertation from the net – which looks into this author and discusses the alledged "gost writing" – in short the memoires of Thiebault remain a valid source.