"Napoleon's Marshals - Officers or Lackeys?" Topic

'The problem with Napoleon's Marshalls may have been Napoleon. Was ANY command in the French Army truly "Independent" from Napoleon.'

Yes, they were and Suchet is an excellent example of being in an independent command and performing excellently. And he wasn't the only one. Eugene in 1809 in Italy was another outstanding example.

'Being "independent," "daring," "resourceful," and "willing to take risks" necessitates the sanction to make mistakes when you take those risks, and the quality of forgiveness in those above the person making mistakes. I don't see forgiveness as any part of Napoleon's nature. Thus many of the martials, to avoid doing anything dangerous, did nothing.'

Which of the marshals did 'nothing'? And if you take a look at Napoleon's relationship with him commanders as well as his civilian subordinates, you'll find that Napoleon's usualy policy when someone erred, was to forgive them.

'Napoleon's standard reaction when the going got tough was the he got going. Egypt, Russia, and Spain. His disinclination to seriously spend time there is to me a "bug-out."'

This is a common 'complaint' used by Napoleon's detractors without looking into the subject.

When leaving for Egypt, Napoleon told the Directory that if needed he would return. He found out about the problems, military and political, in France and that was why he left Egypt. It wasn't a 'but out.' In fact, two recall orders had been dispatched to Egypt for Napoleon by the Directory. Napoleon missed the first one; he received the second when he landed in France.

In Russia, Napoleon refused any idea of leaving the army before they got across the Berezina, although urged by some of his subordinates to do so. After the Berezina he left Murat in command and left with Caulaincourt and a small escort for Paris. Again, it wasn't a 'bug out.'

Napoleon left Spain because the French discovered that Austria was preparing for war and an invasion of Bavaria. That isn't a 'bug out' but it was heading to the crisis in the Empire.

Napoleon did made a mistake in not returning to Spain, however, which compounded the error of invading in the first place, which opened a continuous second front against the French.

'If Napoleon's marshalls were less than sterling, then Napoleon has no one to blame but himself.'

And you should make the distinction of which of the marshals 'were less than sterling' and why and perhaps give a few examples. As it is, the statement is too sweeping to help.

B

I agree on Grouchy getting a bum rap.

He was stuck waiting around for what a day before he was finally released to pursue?

What are 30k going to do to 80k. You have the tiger by the tail. Lot of those Prussians were still in good order.

Yes, they were and Suchet is an excellent example of being in an independent command and performing excellently. And he wasn't the only one. Eugene in 1809 in Italy was another outstanding example.

I believe Eugene was quite competent but his performance in Italy in 1809 demonstrations some decent decision making and some very bad decision making. He was receiving coaching from Napoleon via correspondence and counsel from Victor who was sent there for that explicit purpose. There is a fair amount of evidence of Napoleon attempting to micro-manage "independent" commanders, his brother got a lot of "direction" via correspondence while in Spain. Maybe Davout in Hamburg acted completely independently…

And you should make the distinction of which of the marshals 'were less than sterling' and why and perhaps give a few examples. As it is, the statement is too sweeping to help.

I don't think any examples are necessary for his point, he's saying that *if* there were shortcomings the ultimate responsibility for those falls to their boss.

That said, I think it is easy to pick out obvious examples of marshals with subpar performances:

Ney – His reckless attack at Jena, his pursuit of the Prussians leading up to his arrival at Eylau, his inability to act as a wing commander and to command an enlarged corps.

Massena – His low energy performance during large parts of the Spring Campaign in 1809.

Bernadotte – His choice to place personal advance over battlefield performance… most of the time.

Macdonald – Kulm. Ya'll come back now, ya hear!

Saint Cyr – "The cossacks are coming, let's pull out."

Junot – Spain.

Jordan – Spain.

Marmont – "How come he got promoted again?" asks the army.

Berthier – A man born to do a desk job.

Murat – "Geeze, how come all my cavalry have blown horses…" at Eylau, his over anxious, "ATTACK, ATTACK, ATTACK" mentality during the invasion of Russia and abandoning the army so he could start scheming for himself after Russia…

Heck, all the marshals have shortcomings, they are easy to pick out. They were as a whole quite excellent as a group though.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Blucher had three of his four corps at Ligny and was beaten while outnumbering the French. The Prussian casualties were very heavy, and if Bulow's corps was not present after the battle, it is doubtful if the Prussians could have rallied as well as they did.

Grouchy's pursuit was not as vigorous as it could have been. He stopped in the mud and lousy weather when the Prussians kept going.

And if he had pressed it and tried for the battlefield as he was urged to do by Gerard and other subordinates, his approach as the Prussians approached Waterloo, he could have kept the Prussians off Napoleon's flank.

It's an interesting group of 'what ifs' but it should also be noted that Grouchy won at Wavre and his retreat from Wavre was masterly.

He's an underrated general officer and commander, and his reputation has been placed merely on Belgium in 1815 and not the rest of his service. The bottom line is that Grouchy was an excellent cavalry commander who fully deserved his marshal's baton in 1815.

B

'I believe Eugene was quite competent but his performance in Italy in 1809 demonstrations some decent decision making and some very bad decision making. He was receiving coaching from Napoleon via correspondence and counsel from Victor who was sent there for that explicit purpose. There is a fair amount of evidence of Napoleon attempting to micro-manage "independent" commanders, his brother got a lot of "direction" via correspondence while in Spain. Maybe Davout in Hamburg acted completely independently…'

Eugene was inexperienced as an army commander in 1809, but Victor was not sent to be his advisor in 1809. Macdonald later claimed that idea for himself in his memoirs, but that is just Macdonald 'remembering with advantages.'

Eugene did receive instructions on how to command by Napoleon, which makes sense here and the correspondence sent could be construed as being a field manual on how to command an army.

However, Eugene was his own man, and while his initial performance was shaky and he was initially defeated, he grew in command during the campaign and was more than competent and firmly in command of the Army of Italy, and did not have a 'coach' or 'advisor' during the campaign, and Napoleon certainly didn't send or assign him one.

Eugene's later performances in Russia in 1812, Germany in early 1813, and in northern Italy in 1813-1814 clearly demonstrate that Eugene was an excellent corps and army commander, who knew his business and was usually successful. He is the most underrated French commander of the period.

B

'I don't think any examples are necessary for his point, he's saying that *if* there were shortcomings the ultimate responsibility for those falls to their boss. That said, I think it is easy to pick out obvious examples of marshals with subpar performances:
Ney – His reckless attack at Jena, his pursuit of the Prussians leading up to his arrival at Eylau, his inability to act as a wing commander and to command an enlarged corps.
Massena – His low energy performance during large parts of the Spring Campaign in 1809.
Bernadotte – His choice to place personal advance over battlefield performance… most of the time.
Macdonald – Kulm. Ya'll come back now, ya hear!
Saint Cyr – "The cossacks are coming, let's pull out."
Junot – Spain.
Jordan – Spain.
Marmont – "How come he got promoted again?" asks the army.
Berthier – A man born to do a desk job.
Murat – "Geeze, how come all my cavalry have blown horses…" at Eylau, his over anxious, "ATTACK, ATTACK, ATTACK" mentality during the invasion of Russia and abandoning the army so he could start scheming for himself after Russia…'

Heck, all the marshals have shortcomings, they are easy to pick out. They were as a whole quite excellent as a group though.

Just a few comments…

-Your characterization of Berthier is incorrect. And being an army chief of staff is just a little more than a ‘desk job.' He was the best chief of staff of the period and was in the field and not behind a desk on campaign, accompanying Napoleon with the forward command post and with the advance guard of the army.

-What is many times overlooked on Marmont is his independent command in Dalmatia and his abilities not only as a tactician, but as an administrator. He did have an ego problem, which would lead him, with Talleyrand's urging, to turn traitor in 1814.

-Jourdan (not Jordan) was way past his prime and was more a political appointment than military.

-Murat's great charge at Eylau was successful and made up for Augereau's failure at Eylau and giving time for Davout's main attack on the Russian left to gain momentum. Murat deserted after being named as commander of the Grande Armee. It was Berthier who convinced Eugene to take command and loyally supported him, immediately writing Napoleon urging him to confirm Eugene in command, which he did.

-Junot was not a marshal.

-I would think that you have underrated St. Cyr and his skill and expertise won him his baton in Russia.

-Macdonald wasn't at Kulm. Vandamme was in command at Kulm. Macdonald had been defeated by Blucher at the Katzbach.

-Bernadotte was a plotter and his appointment as a marshal was not one of Napoleon's best decisions, but it was probably done for two reasons: to better keep an eye on his intrigues and he was also family. Bernadotte's performance on 14 October where he managed not to become engaged at either Jena or Auerstadt was the result of a direct disobedience of orders and was treacherous to boot. His dismal performance and insubordination in 1809 got him relieved and sent home. In short, Bernadotte was a skunk of the first order.

-From all I have read, Massena's performance in 1809 was superb, beginning with the organization of the IV Corps at the beginning of the campaign.

-Ney's problems with commanding large units has already been addressed, but I don't see problems at all with his performance in 1806 or 1807.

As a summary, I have not seen a better appraisal of the marshals as the following:

‘Massena, Davout, and Suchet were the masters, capable of independent missions. So, to a lesser degree, were St. Cyr, Soult, and-for a while-Macdonald. Lannes, had he lived, might have ranked with their best. The rest were human projectiles who required their Emperor's aim and impulse. Their service was hard . Their names are remembered.'-John Elting, Swords Around A Throne, 155.

I would also recommend von Funck's and Odeleben's memoirs for some very candid comments on the marshals. Both books are very enlightening.

B

Eugene was inexperienced as an army commander in 1809, but Victor was not sent to be his advisor in 1809. Macdonald later claimed that idea for himself in his memoirs, but that is just Macdonald 'remembering with advantages.'

My bad, you are correct it was Macdonald and Macdonald took it upon himself to see himself as Eugene's advisor as it was not directed by Napoleon.

He [Eugene] is the most underrated French commander of the period.

That I'd agree with.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Your characterization of Berthier is incorrect. And being an army chief of staff is just a little more than a ‘desk job.'

I wasn't meaning to belittle his role as chief of staff, is was preeminent man in that role for the period. I was meaning to belittle him as a commander at which he was lacking at the start of the 1809 campaign.

What is many times overlooked on Marmont is his independent command in Dalmatia…

That is a good example.

Junot was not a marshal.

This is what I get for not editing my posts well enough, I'd even written in Jerome but then removed him but missed Junot… my bad.

Murat's great charge at Eylau was successful and made up for Augereau's failure at Eylau and giving time for Davout's main attack on the Russian left to gain momentum.

Yes but had he managed the use of reserves he might have preserved more of his horsemen, as it was, a lot of them were lost unnecessarily because of their (mis)management and Napoleon had to send in the Guard Cavalry to 'rescue the rescuers'.

I would think that you have underrated St. Cyr and his skill and expertise won him his baton in Russia.

I think Saint Cyr was an excellent commander, I put him in just to show that everyone made mistakes.

Macdonald wasn't at Kulm. Vandamme was in command at Kulm. Macdonald had been defeated by Blucher at the Katzbach.

Yep, I'm a bit tired it seems this evening or otherwise just typing faster than I am thinking… you're be correct in correcting me.

I don't see problems at all with his [Ney's] performance in 1806 or 1807.

Really? What are your thoughts on his actions at Jena, I am critical of them. In 1806-1807 he did some excellent work but during the battle at Eylau he failed to keep the Prussians off the field.

On a related note… not sure if I've ever written such a factual erred post before… thanks to all for not jumping on me.

Cheers,

The Bandit

'I was meaning to belittle him as a commander at which he was lacking at the start of the 1809 campaign.'

Berthier was not the commander at the beginning of the 1809 campaign. Napoleon was the commander of the Army of Germany and attempted to do it from Paris through his chief of staff-Berthier.

And Napoleon botched it and Berthier got the blame and that stuck.

B

'On a related note… not sure if I've ever written such a factual erred post before… thanks to all for not jumping on me.'

All of us make errors and post them from time to time. Those are called 'mistakes' nothing more, nothing less, and all of us should remember that, I think.

And it is counterproductive to my mind to jumping all over people when they make mistakes, as well as unjust. It leads to bad feelings and false accusations as well as hard feelings, and I believe that you'll agree that's wrong.

B

All Hands: I want to thank you all for your opinions and insights in answering my question concerning Ney. I greatly appreciate it.
John Miller

And it is counterproductive to my mind to jumping all over people when they make mistakes, as well as unjust. It leads to bad feelings and false accusations as well as hard feelings, and I believe that you'll agree that's wrong.

Certainly, such is most easily avoided when such mistakes are addressed directly, avoiding a hardline defense when questions are raised as it would drive all involved towards confrontation.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Defending one's position, if a person believes they are correct, is a natural outcome of both research and experience. If proven wrong, then a mistake has been made, not obfuscation or intellectual dishonesty, the mistake is admitted and all should move on.

History is not an exercise in democratic practice: and while discussion can become vehement which isn't a problem in itself, blind accusations as to character and motivation should not enter into the 'discussion.' Unfortunately, on TMP it usually does and that is wrong on many levels.

So, you are fortunate in not being 'taken to task' for your errors, and you should not have been anyway, as, again, all of us make them whether we are historians and authors, new members, or talented amateurs.

B

We've talked a lot about the good Marshals. The OP asked about the bad. Since we know Napoleon was not a stupid, who are the weaker Marshals but what were their positive qualities that made them worthy of a baton?

Mortier for example is not an original thinker who would not be suited to independent command, yet is the type of officer who will follow orders and do his dam nest to carry out sensible orders. Her was also the pleasantest to deal with at a personal level.

So what about some of the others. No 'knocking copy' please. What were there positive qualities?

Napoleon had to leave Davout in Paris in the 100 days,

How much trust do you think he had in the other in 1815 to look after Paris for him.

Elliott,

Great question and one that should be paid attention to. Ney and Murat have already been mentioned. All of the marshals had good qualities, the point was to employ them to fit those qualities.

The basic problem in any period is having those generals who can command independently and be counted on the accomplish the mission. Frederick the Great commented that those are few at any time.

Here's a few thoughts on some of the other marshals:

-Kellermann may not have been a competent independent commander, but his service in the rear areas of the Grande Armee was outstanding, if not exceptional.

-Moncey was a man of character who reportedly would never attack anything he could outflank. He also refused to preside at Ney's trial and was unjustly punished for it.

-Victor was a good corps commander, and carried out a battle of annihilation against the Spanish at the battles of Ucles and Medellin and his rear guard action at the Berezina is especially noteworthy, conducted a reverse slope defense which the Russians could not defeat.

-Serurier was justly promoted because of his service in Italy with Napoleon as a division commander in 1796-1797. Napoleon thought highly of him, but he was probably not able to serve after 1805.

-Marmont was an excellent artilleryman and corps commander and was probably out of his depth as an army commander in Spain. His treason in 1814 ruined his reputation.

-Mortier was an excellent corps commander and though not of the strongest character, when in the face of the enemy he always rose to the occasion.

-Oudinot was a competent infantry officer and an excellent division commander. He never mastered the art of combined arms operations and while he could command a corps, he was out of his depth in 1813 as an army commander. It is strange that Napoleon gave him that independent command, along with Ney, and kept Davout in Hamburg. The possibilities of Davout in command on the Berlin front with a command of four corps has immense possibilities, as well as the chance to pay back Bernadotte, 'le miserable Ponte Corvo', for his treachery in 1806.

-Poniatowski proved himself as a commander in Poland in 1809 against the Austrians and less-than-benign interference from the Russians, who were supposedly allies. He did well in Russia and in 1813 and his death at Leipzig was unfortunate for Napoleon, Poland, and France.

-Augereau began well and ended up performing poorly in 1814. He was outstanding at Castiglione in Italy, and at Eylau he went forward with his corps even though he was sick.

-Lefebvre was interesting and was noted as a good tactician and combat leader. He had great moments such as at Montereau in 1814 where he led the Imperial staff in a charge in support of Pajol's wild gallop across the Montereau bridge and that action shattered an allied corps. He is also famous for his quote in Germany where he stated to the population he had 'liberated' that 'we have come to give you liberty, fraternity, and equality. Anyone who does anything without my leave will be shot.'

Again, some of best references on the marshals are Odeleben and von Funck, and Phipps' Armies of the First French Republic is another excellent reference.

Perhaps later we can discuss some of the generals who didn't make marshal, many of them better soldiers and commanders than many of the marshals, such as Desaix, Grenier, Compans, Reynier, Vandamme, and others.

B

'Napoleon had to leave Davout in Paris in the 100 days, How much trust do you think he had in the other in 1815 to look after Paris for him.'

Davout was a logical choice as Minister of War and it was he who rebuilt the French army for active service in the field in 1815.

His administrative ability was excellent and he was incorruptible.

Further, he was a hard man, had not taken an oath to serve the Bourbons, and didn't put up with nonsense. He opposed the employment of Bourmont as he didn't trust him. And he was right, as Bourmont later deserted to the Prussians.

Some of the marshals remained loyal to the Bourbons, such as Victor, Marmont, Macdonald, and probably Oudinot. Murat was unsuitable for employment because of his actions in 1814 and Berthier was unavailable as he was out of the country and then died on 1 June in Bamberg.

The independent commanders were carefully chosen in 1815, such as Rapp, Lecourbe, and Suchet. Likewise for the corps commanders assigned to Nord. Some of them were better soldiers than many of the marshals, such as Gerard, Vandamme, and Lobau (Mouton).

B

Again, some of best references on the marshals are Odeleben and von Funck, and Phipps' Armies of the First French Republic is another excellent reference.

Kevin, I believe you have nailed the problem. The men who became Marshals did so because of their service in the wars of the 1st and 2nd Coalitions.

The problem is many of the posters here and I have been guilty of it as well over past 40 years as well get distracted by the Imperial period and overlook the Revolutionary Wars.

I suspect this is because, ultimately, most rely on sources in English and the British performance in these wars was pretty poor so it gets ignored. Yes, there is quite a lot on Napoleon in Italy, but only because it's Napoleon.

Fortescue's 'History of the British Army' only does the British involvement and whilst he's not quite as dismissive of the war as he is of the War of the League of Augsburg, you definitely get the impression he wants to get on to the Peninsular War.

I'm am making a point of reading Phipps this year – it's be devilishly difficult to get hold of at a reasonable price – and here you the Marshals getting their start. Ken Trotman must be congratulated on trying to bring this to a wider audience.

As a purely practical point of view, all the games I host are scenario driven exercises in storytelling. I'm constantly looking for potential scenarios and the Revolutionary Wars provide ideal examples.

Who to make a Marshal?

One book I do consider essential to any Napoleonic library is 'Once were Titans' because it shows clearly the depth of talent that was available to the French. If you haven't got copy yet, do so, it well worth the effort and a great book. The Revolution produced so many fine generals. It is such a contrast to say the British were Wellington keeps a poor general because he is afraid if the man was sent hope he would be replace by someone worse.

Here are a couple of thoughts:

Bailly de Monthion for practical reasons as a great chief of staff who had worked with Berthier and knew his methods and understood what Napoleon wanted.

Vandamme – probably not. Reading Galligher's "Napoleon's Enfant Terrible" Vandamme was hard enough to control as a General. Being a Marshal would have gone to his head and he would have been even less a team player.

Desaix and Kléber would certainly have been Marshals had they lived.

I would not have made Eugene a Marshal, because we was more important doing what he was doing governing the Kingdom of Italy.

Elliott,

I think Eugene wasn't made a marshal because he was a Viceroy, which, I think, makes him senior to a marshal.

I have seen that Murat was removed from the list of marshals because he became a king.

I have no idea how accurate the above comments are, but they might be interesting to explore.

Eugene was very successful as a Viceroy and ruled fairly, honestly, and well. Apparently he was ruthless when dealing with corruption. He is too often overlooked and that is something that is a shame, as he is an interesting study. I started my study of him long ago with Carola Oman's book on him.

Murat tried to make him turn against Napoleon in 1814 and Eugene refused. Apparently, in 1815 he couldn't get back to France as he was held in semi-arrest in Bavaria by his father-in-law.

And Eugene remained loyal to Napoleon, as did Hortense his sister, after Napoleon divorced their mother. That is admirable for both of them.

I have four of the five volumes of Phipps and I'm still looking for the volume I don't have. The study is excellent and indispensable.

B

My understanding is that once you have the title Marshal, you keep it and any higher office, so Murat remains a Marshal but his rank is now King. Philippe Pétain would be an example from a later period.

I'd agree on Eugene on all points. I'd recommend Epstein's "Prince Eugene at War" to all. It shows clearly Napoleon's mentoring of Eugene and his grasp of the theater of operation.

Another couple book I enjoyed is "Napoleon's Italian Campaigns 1805-15". It covers 1805, 1809, 1813-14 and 1815. True Gill and Epstein cover '09 in more detail, but the others are very overlooked campaigns.

Another showing Eugene as an excellent commander is "The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Norther Italy, 1813-14" by Nafziger and Gioannini.

Kléber wouldn't – after he had smashed Bonapartes face after returning from Egypt – his military carreer would have ended.

Bandit's characterisation of Berthier is correct, at least in the years after 1797 he became Napoléons military scretary.
Not only shown by books of Titeux and Vaché but also in one of the best books ever published about Napoleonic warfare, by Stéphane Béraud

You don't know what Kleber would or wouldn't have done if he had returned from Egypt in one piece.

Desaix and Davout certainly didn't, and they didn't come back with Napoleon.

And as for Berthier, you are wrong and have shown nothing to support your view.

Berthier was not Napoleon's 'military secretary' that is an absolutely ridiculous statement and one which reflects little knowledge or understanding of Berthier, the duties of a chief of staff, and/or staff organization and functioning.

B

Kevin,

And as for Berthier, you are wrong and have shown nothing to support your view.

Regarding Berthier, each of us have only offered an opinion and vague reference, you included.

Me: Berthier – A man born to do a desk job. … I wasn't meaning to belittle his role as chief of staff, is was preeminent man in that role for the period. I was meaning to belittle him as a commander at which he was lacking at the start of the 1809 campaign.

You: -Your characterization of Berthier is incorrect. And being an army chief of staff is just a little more than a ‘desk job.' He was the best chief of staff of the period and was in the field and not behind a desk on campaign, accompanying Napoleon with the forward command post and with the advance guard of the army.

von Winterfeldt: Bandit's characterisation of Berthier is correct, at least in the years after 1797 he became Napoléons military scretary.
Not only shown by books of Titeux and Vaché but also in one of the best books ever published about Napoleonic warfare, by Stéphane Béraud

Cheers,

The Bandit

Where would you like to begin?

I've supplied information on Berthier before, on this forum and others, so perhaps we can either just leave it here or go into material.

Up to you.

Sincerely,
B

Jomini : L'Empereur était lui même le vrai chef de son état – major.

p. 185

Béraud, Stéphane : La révolution militaire napoléonienne – tome 1er Les Manoeuvres, 2007

A great book to read, in my view, the best book ever published on Napoléon's art of war.

Berthier was very brave and loyal and had to suffer a lot under the tantrums of his chief.

In case – read Odeleben about this.

Kevin,

I'm not asking for support of opinion, I'm pointing out that while you challenged von Wintervelt on not providing support:

And as for Berthier, you are wrong and have shown nothing to support your view.

None of us have in this discussion, so the question is not if I want the conversation to switch course towards that but do you. If not, then we can just progress but the challenge is not necessary.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Kléber wouldn't – after he had smashed Bonapartes face after returning from Egypt – his military carreer would have ended.

Kléber had every right to be furious with Bonaparte immediately after he departed back for France, but if Kléber had any brains at all (and he did) then he would have eventually calmed down and realised that he owed Napoleon everything; study the battle of Mount Tabor and you will see that without Napoleon's great foresight that led to the rescue, Kléber would have been slaughtered along with his entire Division.
So no, Kléber would probably not have smashed Bonapartes face. Von Winterfeldt is projecting again, as that is probably what he would like to do to Boney, given the vitriol he usually displays in his Napoleon posts.

If Kléber had lived he most probably would have been made Marshal along with other figures from the Egyptian campaign like Desaix. Not Menou though.

I just showed at least one support, Jomini, I could go on – citing a lot of other sources – but what for??
The attitude of Brech is well known

TW,

Von Winterfeldt is projecting again, as that is probably what he would like to do to Boney, given the vitriol he usually displays in his Napoleon posts.

Please scroll up and see the various observations about how well this thread is going in the absence of statements like this one.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Well Jomini is hardly an independent source. To quote him is rather like relying on Marbot.

Look, we were doing well. Let's stop the mud flinging and move on.

Berthier was more than a secretary and he didn't get the job just because he was a staff officer. It was certainly a role to which he was suited.

I cannot help to disagree on that – Jomini's statement mirrores others as well, Béraud for example :

Napoléon est son propre bureau de planification et de conception des opérations. Il exerce seul cette fonction et, contrairement à certains de ses illustres prédécesseur, réunit très rarement un conseil de guerre pour recueillier l'avis de ses maréchaux. Sa maison militaire et l'état-major général ne sont que des organes de préperation technique qui alimentent Napoléon en données.

Berthier might have played a different role in the very early carreer of Bonaparte but later he was a military secretary who had no influence on planning.

Quite a different role to more advanced chiefs of staffs like Gneisenau or Radetzky.

P. 185, source as above.

Jomini is a horrible source. What he didn't know he made up or copied and he claimed credit for things he didn't do.

He failed as a corps chief of staff, and helped Ney ruin one of Napoleon's best planned battles at Bautzen in 1813.

He failed as a military governor twice in Russia.

He deserted in a pique and was a renegade.

He was not a combat officer and was never a colonel as he claimed. He was an adjutant commandant, which is the staff equivalent of colonel in the line, but using the title 'colonel' denotes troop duty and the command of troops, which Jomini never did.

At least Marbot commanded a regiment in Russia and again in 1815 and saw much combat, exactly the opposite of Jomini.

And Jomini held a special prejudice and hatred against Berthier because Berthier put him in his place when Jomini tried to bull his way through into Napoleon's presence when he was still a volunteer civilian ADC to Ney.

In short, Jomini is not reputable and cannot be used as a reference, and he is especially unreliable when talking about Berthier. As a soldier, a man, and a chief of staff, Jomini would not have made a pimple on a good corporal's butt.

Napoleon remarked that Jomini wasn't much of a soldier when he deserted in 1813.

B

I've already stipulated that my original statement did not reflect in any way an opinion about his quality as chief-of-staff it was remarking that he was not a field commander.

I don't believe that is being disputed anywhere, the man had a singular purpose though within it excelled beyond most of his "peers" in their respective roles. Few of Napoleon's field commanders were as talented at their jobs as Berthier is widely believed to have been at his.

Is there actually any argument here?

Cheers,

The Bandit

Berthier was the best chief of staff of the period, being responsible for creating the general staff for the French in 1795 and having it spread over the entire army. His rules and staff procedures were codified by Thiebault in his staff manual of 1800 which was translated into English, German, and, I believe, also Russian.

Berthier did extensive operational planning for the sweeping campaigns the Grande Armee executed across Europe, such as:

Berthier planned and executed the movement across the Alps by the Army of the Reserve in 1800.

Berthier and his staff planned and executed the movement of the Grande Armee from the Channel coast and into Germany in 1805.

Berthier and his staff planned and executed the marches and movements for the immense concentration of the Grande Armee for the invasion of Russia in 1812. See von Brandt's comments in his memoir In the Legions of Napoleon for his comments on how efficiently the Vistula Legion was moved out of Spain and across Europe. That efficiency was the result of staff planning and execution.

In addition to his duties as Major General and chief of staff of the Grande Armee, Berthier was also the French Minister of War from 1800-1807.

Gneisenau and Radetzky were good chiefs of staff, but were not as influential nor as skilled as Berthier. Berthier was the premier chief of staff of the period and compared to the Imperial staff, the Prussian general staff was an embryonic organization in 1815 that had copied some of the staff procedures introduced by Berthier.

The Austrian staff had skilled staff officers, but their staffs were not as well organized or led by their chiefs, including Radetzky. As late as 1809 the Austrians had no staffs at the division level, which threw all the staff work onto the corps staffs, slowing the flow of work and consequently operations.

Describing Berthier as merely a 'secretary' or a 'chief clerk' is relying on information from Jomini and careless later authors who believed, unfortunately, what Jomini mistakenly described.

Ferdinand von Funck's memoir is very enlightening on the marshals, and his comments on Berthier are very helpful. He saw Berthier work and undoubtedly understood staff work.

B

<sigh>

Cheers,

The Bandit

I still think Lannes is the best because I read a book about him as a young teenager 40 years ago. The book was fiction written in the 1890s, but I was too youg to know it was fiction.

Can there be a better source than that?

Have you read the biography of Lannes written by Margaret Chrisawn? It's excellent and highly recommended.

B

Brechtel198

No I hadn't. Will have to check into it.
The one I read was called "The Grenadier"

My older brother got it in the early 1960s from a library. BY the time I saw it, it was missing the last page or two.
link

For this sort of discussion I add my opinion to those above that Phipps 5 Volume work – The Armies of the First French Republic and the Rise of the Marshals of Napoleon 1st is a wonderful resource.

Yes, I know its hard to find, it took me years of persistence back in the 90s and cost me US$1,000 for a full set of the 1980 Greenwood Press reprint in excellent condition. The original release was by Oxford University Press in 1826 for anyone interested.

What makes it so useful is that Phipps (Colonel Ramsay Weston Phipps of the Royal Artillery) writes not just a detailed history of the early Campaigns but calls out references to the future Marshals along the way. For example, in his account of the Army of Italy in 1796 he recounts the history and points out where Jean Lannes was actually involved even though he was only a Colonel at the time and wouldn't normally rate a lot of mention.

For the benefit of anyone trying to track these Volumes down let me list which Volume covers the history of which Army:

Volume I: The Armee du Nord
Volume II: The Armees de la Moselle, Du Rhin, De Sambre et Meuse, De Rhin et Moselle
Volume III: The Armies in the West 1793-97 and the Armies in the South 1792 – March 1796
Volume IV: The Army of Italy 1796-97, Paris and the Army of the Interior 1792-97, the Coup D'Etat of Fructidor September 1797
Volume V: The Armies on the Rhine in Switzerland, Holland, Italy, Egypt, the Coup D'Etat of Brumaire, 1797-99

For what its worth let me add that a portion of Volume IV covering the Army of Italy has just been reprinted by Military History Press in their "Napoleons First Italian Campaign".

Nick

Eugene's later performances in Russia in 1812, Germany in early 1813, and in northern Italy in 1813-1814 clearly demonstrate that Eugene was an excellent corps and army commander, who knew his business and was usually successful. He is the most underrated French commander of the period.

Italy was something of an un-tapped mine for Napoleon, there were a great number of senior generals of division that qualified for corps command and even the Marshalate, Grenier probably topping the list, but followed closely by others.

And of course, it's always nice to see what started out as a very nice conversation with lots of honest and thoughtful contribution sliding once more into bickering…< Sigh >

NSolomon…I have four of the five volumes in my library, I will be getting the missing v3 later this year.

Andrew, good news, Volume III is the shortest of the 5 but only by a few pages shorter than Volume IV and contains some great material you'll struggle to find anywhere else in English.

Remember that the "Phipps" is written by different authors,the later volumes by descendants of the Phipps family using the library of Ramsay Phipps.

but later he was a military secretary who had no influence on planning.

A little bit over the top, perhaps. Nobody would deny that it was Napoleon who did the planning, but it was Berthier who was able to translate the emperor's ideas into workable plans. That is the function of a chief of staff, not that of a mere military secretary. We don't know how many of Berthier's own ideas went into the final draft of Napoleon's orders, as sources are vague in that regard. Napoleon could be a micromanager -see his Correspondence for hundreds of examples- but he also could be vague, particularly when he trusted his interlocutor. In the case of Berthier, I believe that he and Napoleon developed such a good working relationship, that the emperor could simply state his intentions and Berthier would be able to translate them into actual orders.

In this case, I agree with Kevin's take on Berthier.

Andrew,

Where did you find the missing volume? I'm looking for Volume III too.

B

'Remember that the "Phipps" is written by different authors,the later volumes by descendants of the Phipps family using the library of Ramsay Phipps.'

If that is actually true, so what?

The study is excellent, with superb scholarship and it is a valuable resource for the period.

B

As an adjunct to the above post, Phipps finished the first two volumes of the study and apparently knew he was dying. He made provisions to have the study finished and put into production by his son and granddaughter, who worked from his voluminous notes and manuscript of the work.

This reminds me of Madame Clausewitz finishing On War after the death of her husband based on his notes and the unfinished manuscript.

So, VW is correct in the fact that two of Phipps' family saw the last three volumes into print (his son responsible for assembling Volume III with assistance by Charles Oman, and his granddaughter Volumes IV and V).

They didn't write the three volumes, but assembled them from the raw material and the manuscript.

Again, this is a 'so what?' however. The intent and content were Phipps', as was the research and writing. I don't see why this should be a point of either contention or criticism of the work.

B

'…Macdonald took it upon himself to see himself as Eugene's advisor as it was not directed by Napoleon.'

By his own words he was, but in fact he was not, as Eugene grew into a more-than-competent army commander on his own.

Was advice given by Macdonald? Not any more than any other subordinate corps commander or other staff or general under Eugene's command. Macdonald is remembering big and attempting to take credit for something that was not his to claim.

And based on his record and character, I wouldn't have listened to him either.

B

None of his final ideas went into drafts of Napoléon, Berthier admits it himself,he had to obey completly any initiative was supressed, prime examples are all the warnings for the 1812 campaing and in the campaign Berthier was a constant source of critic, but he was reduced to tears by Napoléon.
Napoléon did not have the personality of a team player and needed a secretary (who without any doubt had to do very hard work – and big responsibility as well).
Could Berthier act like Geneisenau? I my view – no, as his helpless performance in 1809 proofed.
In case Napoléon did state his intentions and Berthier transfered those into written documents, then this is just the task of a secretary.

I'm sorry, but that is a complete misread of Berthier's duties as chief of staff of the Grande Armee. You have erred repeatedly in your 'assessment' of Berthier and his duties and accomplishments.

Do you actually understand what a staff is for and what the duties of the chief of staff are? Chiefs of staff run the staff at whatever level and Napoleon and Berthier formed one of the best and most successful teams of commander and chief of staff in military history. And Napoleon stated after Waterloo that if Berthier had been there, he wouldn't have lost.

Thiebault, the author of the premier staff manual of the period (1800 and 1813) stated that:

'Quite apart from his specialist training as a topographical engineer, he had knowledge and experience of staff work and furthermore a remarkable grasp of everything to do with war. He had also, above all else, the gift or writing a complete order and transmitting it with the utmost speed and clarity…No one could have better suited General Bonaparte, who wanted a man capable of relieving him of all detailed work, to understand him instantly and to foresee what he would need.'

And if any other attestations as to Berthier's expertise as Major General and Chief of Staff of the Grande Armee I would be more than happy to supply them.

B