"Napoleon's Marshals - Officers or Lackeys?" Topic

Greetings,

A friend's wargaming behaviour has made me think about Napoleon's marshals.
When playing as the French, he doggedly refuses, where possible, to lead an assault without Napoleon in the main force. I thought he was adhering to history but when I asked about it he said that the Marshals were good but powerless without Napoleon.
On the board, Napoleon naturally is the most powerful piece, but is this true in reality? I have heard that without Napoleon, Marshals such as Ney or Bernadotte did some very stupid things. I know that the Spanish campaign dragged on for longer than Napoleon wanted before he went there himself. But I also know that Desaix is credited for pulling Napoleon out of a sticky situation at Marengo, and later Davout saved Napoleon's bacon at Jena-Auerstadt.

Would you trust Napoleon's marshals with your army?

(apologies if this question has been asked and answered in the past; I am new to this forum)

They were a mix.

Some were pretty average, others were excellent, a couple were just very poor.

Couple corrections:

Ney did some stupid things whether Nappy was there or not, Bernadotte well, his main motivation seems to have been getting out of responsibility and avoiding battle.

Napoleon went into Spain in 1808 and never returned there, the "went on too long part) was post-1808.

Davout didn't really save Napoleon at Jena-Auerstädt but Davout performance at Auerstädt was pretty amazing.

That all said, there were a lot of competent marshals. Sometimes we think of them poorly because they lost to Allied generals who Napoleon beat but that becomes a bit too binary a comparison to be useful.

Cheers,

The Bandit

The situation regarding Napoleon and his marshals, and with the other general officers who did not make marshal, was that without them, Napoleon would not have accomplished what he did.

Napoleon's generals were the most talented collection of military talent ever to serve one man.

That does not mean, however, that all were excellent commanders. Some were, some were not.

The best of the marshals were Davout, Soult, Lannes, St. Cyr, Suchet and Massena.

The others were less talented commanders, some of whom, such as Oudinot, were promoted past their competence level, or like Ney, were given assignments (as he was twice in 1813) that he was not capable of accomplishing satisfactorily.

Odeleben and von Funck have given excellent charactizations and evaluations of many of the marshals in their two memoirs which are very helpful.

There was one indispensable marshals, who is usually either overlooked or underestimated, and that is Berthier, Napoleon's chief of staff.

B

Most of the core group of Marshalls, the ones given that rank in 1804, had made impressive names for themselves in the wars of the French Revolution and were thus a talented bunch. One of the biggest problems they had wasn't that they couldn't be trusted with independent command, it was that most of them didn't like one another. In the Peninsular in particular Soult, Massena, Ney, Marmont, Jourdan and Victor often stubbornly refused to support one another properly. It needed Napoleon to keep their egos in check but even he was wary of Davout's ambitions and was jealous of his ability as a general. Vanity and greed seem to be common problems of the Marshallate.

It needed Napoleon to keep their egos in check but even he was wary of Davout's ambitions and was jealous of his ability as a general.

Which has always struck me as sorta sad since Davout proved to be Napoleon's most loyal lieutenant.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Truly – of all the ones to be wary of…

Personality differences between the marshals and a lack of desire on Napoleon's part to relinquish command undermined some of their usefulness. The marshals were a mixed bunch at the best of times but outshone their counterparts in most other armies.

The Matshallate was as much a political body as it was a military one. Who got in was a largely a political decision. Politics would keep you out.

Kevin gives a list of the best with which I would agree with, but look at St. Cyr who was not rewarded until 1812 with a batton that he should have received in the first creation. He had been part of the office corp of the Army of the Rhine under Moreau and was suspect to Boney, when he failed to congratulate the 'Emperor' when he declared himself to that office he was further out of favour. His reward was short lived as he was hung out to dry in Dresden after in the latter stages of the Autumn campaign. Is it any wonder he sat on his hands during the Cent Jours?

So read some books on the twentysix and you'll get an idea of the depth of talent.

The one person I'd have made a Marshal was Bailly de Monthion to be chief of staff to the Armee du Nord in '15 instead of the Duke of Damnation who would have done far more use in the field than Ney.

Well I don't think soldiers of the caliber of Davout, Soult or Ney could be described as anyone's lackey! But yes, a mixed bunch.

Soult's performance in Northern Spain and Southern France in 1813 and 1814 is a remarkable one, earning him the respect of Wellington and the British Army. Davout's record in terms of combat, administration and civil-military relations will stand with any Great Commander.

Murat on the other hand should never have been promoted beyond Regimental Command level, and even then he'd need a pretty good and forceful XO to keep the admin and horses running… Bernadotte was never really much more than a havering egotist with delusions of grandeur – which eventually got realised!

I guess the quesiton becomes more finely balanced if you want to equate the rank of 'Marshal of France' with that of 'Corps Commander'. Under the 'battalion carre' Napoleonic strategic concept, Corps Commanders should be able to command their Corps independently and make strategic theatre decisions indepenedent of Napoleon, working to his overall strategic aim but not awaiting or checking every set of orders with him.

To my mind, only Davout, Massena and Soult were capable of this. Davout could fight and win against all comers, Massena could until he met Wellington, and Soult, the 'Duke of Damnation' was holding Wellington to account until numbers and logistics told against him.

Davout up against Wellington would have been interesting. Fortunately, perhaps, for the Great Duke, it never happened!

Lots of good comments here. In the OP there is also a reference to the validity of the Marshals leading in wargaming setting.

So, first comment regarding wargaming with the Marshals is that unless you are playing a large scale, high level Campaign where strategic moves are ordered by the Emperor then most of the time, on a wargaming tabletop, you'll be taking the part of the Marshal, commanding a Corp or Wing.

Napoleon led very few assaults after he became Emperor. Perhaps as General Bonaparte in Italy in 1796 he led from the front but once he made Emperor he issued Orders to Marshals to lead assaults and so your friend will have to attack with the Officer at hand, not the Emperor every time.

Quote your friend the examples (in chronological order) of Austerlitz, Jena, Auerstadt, Eylau, Friedland, Eggmuhl, Aspern-Essling, Wagram, Smolensk, Borodino, Lutzen, Bautzen, Liebertwollwitz, Leipzig, Hanau, La Rothiere, the 6 Days of Glory, etc, etc. Napoleon led no assaults and wasn't even present all day at some of those actions.

Trust was clearly frequently placed in the Marshal's to lead in a tactical, wargaming, "tabletop" sense. The biggest failings of the Marshals were "off table" if I can use the term – strategically manouvering for battle is where they let him down the most.

Davout up against Wellington would have been interesting. Fortunately, perhaps, for the Great Duke, it never happened!

I was just thinking this scenario. Wellington and the Armies at Talavera vs. Davout at Eckmuhl

Napoleon depended on his marshals who were the second best group in history. Alexander the Great's Companions were the greatest.

Murat did pretty good at Eylau

Cardinal Hawkwood,

First, cool image, thank you for sharing.

Second, I think there is a fair defense to be made for Murat.

Third, I'd caution against claiming Eylau be included in that defense.

At Eylau Murat led a fantastic cavalry charge, however, due to his oversight, no reserves were maintained, all of the available squadrons deployed and charged from the reserve in turn. This meant that spent squadrons had no reserve support to fall behind. The ultimate result was that the breath of the cavalry reserve was blown en massé after breaking through the Russian line. The Russian infantry reformed behind them and the Russian cavalry charged into them. It was a bad place to be. Napoleon had to send forward the Guard Cavalry in order to rescue Murat's Cavalry Reserve… who's original mission had been to save the VII Corps and plug the hole left by it breaking up.

Cheers,

The Bandit

I think Lannes was one of the best.

Lannes has a bit of Stonewall Jackson about him – cut down in his prime, never really replaced.

And lets not forget that Murat, through neglect and ignorance of admin and horseflesh, effectively wrote off about half the entire French Cavalry reserve in the first few weeks of the invasion of Russian in 1812. And its not like his staffers didn't try to advise him different – he just ignored them…

Agreed, he was courageous, conspicuous and knew how to lead a charge. That's about it – fantastic for a Colonel, with a good XO to do the donkey work, but to my mind you need a few more skills to be an effective 3 Star…Lasalle would have led just as prettily, but also made it count.

Lannes, yes indeed, now there was a legend cut down in his prime…

The rank of Marshal of France was as much military as political. In the Ancien Regime, French kings used the rank as a mean to reward the scions of influential aristocratic families, as much as to push up the political ladder those nobles whose position depended of the King's patronage more than their family connections. Napoleon retook the idea when he was crowned Emperor, and in the same mood that his admired Louis XIV he choose for the rank both individuals whose political support (Bernadotte, who he knew could act as a figurehead for Jacobins, while he was still popular between the Army) he wanted to court and those who he believed deserved the rank for their military talents. In some cases (Murat) he rose them to rank because of their family connection to the Emperor himself.

To understand why and who Napoleon decided to rise to the rank of Marshal of France is necessary to understand the convoluted politics of the French First Empire. None of the Marshals were lackeys. Some were talented in military affairs, others could command the support of important power bases -civilian and military- for the Emperor. See what happened when they took "vote of non-confidence" of shorts in 1814! Napoleon knew that his legitimacy as ruler of France didn't depend on anything external to himself -i.e. dinastic rights-. He needed to get the support of those who could rally around the emperor the most politically relevant groups in France.

In Napoleon's France being a Marshal wasn't a simple recognition of your military acumen, but also of your political status.

They were Marshals of the Empire, not Marshals of France. A small point, mind, but a significant one nonetheless.

You are essentially correct in your posting as to the motivation for the creation of the marshalate and the reasons for the promotion of some of them.

The different political factions in France had to be addressed, and the promotions were a result of that. Similarly, the different factions in the army, as to who supported whom in the different armies, was also critical and had to be addressed. Some of those problems were solved by transfers; others by being 'elevated' to the marshalate.

And four of the new marshalate were Senatorial marshals (Kellermann, et all). Not all were successes, such as Bernadotte, and later promotions, such as Marmont and Oudinot, ended up by hurting Napoleon.

And some deserving generals of division were not promoted, such as Grenier and some others, and that was unfortunate.

Good posting-you've pointed out material that is usually overlooked and ignored. Well done.

B

'The one person I'd have made a Marshal was Bailly de Monthion to be chief of staff to the Armee du Nord in '15 instead of the Duke of Damnation who would have done far more use in the field than Ney.'

Agree completely. He was a skilled senior staff officer, had filled in for Berthier in the field when Berthier was periodically ill in 1813-1814, and would have assembled a staff, and used the established staff procedures, that Berthier had always done.

B

…. thus allowing Soult to function as a Wing Commander/semi-independant commander (and one with a wealth of experience against Wellington) and Ney therefore as a tactical commander to which he was more suited.

I always think of Lannes as an actual student of Napoleon, mayhaps a slower learner, but what he learned from the master he retained and built upon.

I agree he was cut down in his prime in 1809, because I honestly think him capable of independent, even major army command from 1810 onwards.

As for poor St. Cyr…the Emperor's back handed awarding of his baton speaks volumes…Here's your Baton, Marshal St. Cyr, the Fedex guy just dropped it off at the wrong hovel down the street!

The problem with Napoleon's Marshalls may have been Napoleon. Was ANY command in the French Army truly "Independent" from Napoleon.

Being "independent," "daring," "resourceful," and "willing to take risks" necessitates the sanction to make mistakes when you take those risks, and the quality of forgiveness in those above the person making mistakes. I don't see forgiveness as any part of Napoleon's nature. Thus many of the martials, to avoid doing anything dangerous, did nothing. Napoleon's standard reaction when the going got tough was the he got going. Egypt, Russia, and Spain. His disinclination to seriously spend time there is to me a "bug-out."

If Napoleon's marshalls were less than sterling, then Napoleon has no one to blame but himself.

Thank you all for a great discussion.

I've really enjoyed this one.

We've all behaved well, flung no insults at each other and I've ended up agreeing with Kevin.

Why can't we do this more often?

It would be nice, wouldn't it?

Maybe, one day…

Sincerely,
Kevin

I'm having a hard time understanding why someone would put such a requirement as in the OP. When I go to play a game I take what's given to me and do the best I can with it. If Napoleon's not there, then you make do with who is?

BTW, I think Ney was a good marshal, but he burned out in 1812 and became a little irrational.

OSchmidt,

Napoleon's standard reaction when the going got tough was the he got going. Egypt, Russia, and Spain. His disinclination to seriously spend time there is to me a "bug-out."

I'm not familiar enough with 1810-1811 in Spain to say, but the rest of the time that he wasn't in Spain… there were some other larger things going on. Should he have invaded Russia? Probably not, should he have gone back into Spain himself instead? In retrospect it makes sense but at the time I have no idea how he determined the one course over the other. Certainly 1809, 1813, 1814… the guy had other things to deal with that were much bigger than what was threatening him from Spain.

Cheers,

The Bandit

As Basileus 66 has rightly said in an earlier comment, Marshals were not just appointed for military reasons but also for politics etc. In that sense it might be of interest that Marshal was strictly speaking not considered a "rank" (like général de division etc.) but rather a "title", a subtle difference but still.
That being said, purely on his military merits, I think Davout rises far above the rest (and Lannes might have been of the same level) Oh if only Davout had been at Waterloo the world could have been a very different place ;)

Did the Marshals not deliberately describe themselves as 'Marshals of France' when persuading N to abdicate? Not necessarily with an eye to the future but to make the point that they had inherent authority over French Soldiers other than ties to him, by virtue of their rank and service…

Marcel1809,

When the subject of Waterloo gets debated I often find myself thinking, shoot, if the French had the ability to pick from the various commanders who'd been lost or were otherwise unavailable – would Waterloo have even happened? I lean towards thinking the whole campaign would have been entirely different.

Sparker,

I am not sure. I know they were technically Marshals of the Empire and technically Napoleon was Emperor of the French (i.e. not 'of France'). The title Marshal of France existed both before and after the Empire for whatever that is worth. While sorta different I expect the two have been conflated a lot more in history than just amongst all of us.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Thank you all for the plethora of responses.

I was intrigued by what nsolomon99 wrote:

Napoleon led very few assaults after he became Emperor. Perhaps as General Bonaparte in Italy in 1796 he led from the front but once he made Emperor he issued Orders to Marshals to lead assaults and so your friend will have to attack with the Officer at hand, not the Emperor every time.

Again, I've a mixed understanding of this (my interests lie more in late/modern Russian and German history, but French history is growing on me). On our game map, the 'Napoleon' counter, standing, is the size of a chunk of a country, so its representation of his exact presence is vague. How far would Napoleon be from the battles, as in, the deployed men? I'm not naďve enough to believe that all those heroic portraits of Napoleon riding on the battlefield are fully accurate. Not only are they glorifying him, no doubt, but for example a brain illness kept him from the battlefield for bits of Jena and Leipzig, and a colic and stomach ulcer hampered his command at Dresden. But there are accounts of the Emperor staying close to men in combat, much closer to the fray than other generals, both Marshals and opponents of the Empire, would have dared to stand.

The Conservatoire,

When translating it to a wargame it gets to be very… situation specific. Napoleon was at Austerlitz, Jena, Heilsberg, Eylau, Friedland, Aspern-Essling, Wagram, Smolesk, Borodino, The Berezina, Lützen, Bautzen, Dresden, Leipzig and a whole slew of others…

Was he leading in assaults? No, he was ordering in assaults. Would he be present on your battlefield [tabletop]? Difficult to say. If you are playing Austerlitz in 1805, he was there, but if you are playing the north or south flank, each where *lots* of the action took place, he was not present. He sat in the center mostly observing how his orders were being carried out.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Spain is an example of where command and control at a macro level broke down.

Only Suchet comes out with much credit and even he wasn't a team player all the time. Soult last longest but some of his decisions leave a lot to be desired and his co-operation with lacking.

Marmont actually was doing well until Salamanca.

Napoleon could have made it so much simpler if he had not allowed the Marshals to have autonomy. Any military school should study Spain as an example of how not to run a war.

As to the question of the

Would you trust Napoleon's marshals with your army?

Yes, but not all of them.

Berthier was the best chief of staff you could wish for but look what happened in the opening stages of the 1809 campaign.

Mortier, probably the pleasantest of the Marshals would not have wanted to command an army.

My mistake, Kevin. I was thinking more in terms of the Ancien Regime than Napoleonic period. You are right. They were Marshals of the Empire, not of France. That was their title in the Ancien Regime and after the Restoration.

Though I'm sure these comments have been made before but here's my opinion. Napoleon was not an exceptional commander, however he was a brilliant coordinator, his campaigns were executed with brilliant speed and efficiency and his battles were won because he knew how to coordinate the men under him. Napoleon generally knew how to use the strengths and weaknesses of most of his marshals but he made some crucial mistakes with some of them. Most of Napoleons marshals struggled without the support of Napoleons command and his administrative talents, this is evidenced in Spain when the excellent André Masséna was left to his own devices and his protencity for looting and the lack of Napoleons presence and authority was crucial. Another mistake was to keep Davout in the War Ministry in the Waterloo campaign, though this decision was based on Davout's talents for ministry work he would have been better than Soult in the Waterloo campaign as he was Napoleon's best at the time, Massena having been essentially dismissed. Soult was a poor marshal as he was ambitious and detested Napoleon and also was very unsuccessful in Portugal. Napoleons three best Marshals were Lannes (whose death was a great loss to Napoleon), Masséna whose talents were wasted and Davout. The others all had their strokes of occasional genius but to be honest were just average.

As for the military quality of the Marshals, the usual suspects come to mind as the most able of them: Davout, Soult, Massena, Lannes and St Cyr. Suchet was a good soldier, but remember that he fought against Spanish armies lead by donkeys (the deployment and plan of Blake at Sagunto is for putting him in front of a firing squad!). When confronted by a strong position (Alcańiz and Castalla) Suchet didn't better than other French commanders. What Suchet did better than anyone of his fellow Marshals was to administrate the territories he occupied. From Napoleon's point of view that was almost as important as his ability to fight the Spanish. Due the expenses for the Imperial treasury that the war in Spain caused, to be able to almost self-finance the campaigns he started was a big boost for his reputation in the eyes of the emperor.

Bernadotte is much maligned. He was a better politician than commander. Still he wasn't an incompetent either. I would rank him above Oudinot, for one. Berthier was out of his depth as field commander, but as chief of staff he was quite brilliant. However, the only Marshal that was both competent as military leader, as administrator, and probably would have been as chief of staff was Davout. I strongly suspect that's -and his loyalty- why Napoleon left him back in Paris when he started his ill-fated operations in Belgium, in 1815.

Without denying the important political and other aspects of a "marshal" in the Grande Armée, the rank itself was not unique. The other continental armies had a general's rank above Lieutenant General – usually something like General of Infantry (etc.).

This seems like the correct discussion to bring this up. I know he had a few bad days but I have always been a great admirer of Marechal Ney and felt there was more to him than the heroic buffoon he is often portrayed. I wonder if any of the very knowledgable contributers to the TMP site would care to comment on their opinions of him. I ask this not to start an arguement but just out of curiosity because I seem to be in a great minority in my favorable feelings toward him.

John Miller

John,

Never one to claim any historical learning, but he's my favourite too. And often much maligned – in command on real operations I needed different commanders in different places doing different jobs. One of them was very like Ney (courageous, impetuous, occasionally a buffoon, militarily competent but most important inspirational). I could not have trusted his job to any of my other officers.

Adam

I've never followed it very closely, but Ney is one of the few marshals to have actually written down tactical doctrine, so he was hardly a dummy. My impression is that he suffers from being Nappy's right hand man in 1813 when Nappy lost (and Jomini's backseat driving doesn't help). And he is blamed for the cavalry charges at Waterloo – which in Barbero's estimation pinned the Allies, allowing the capture of La Haye Sainte and the establishment of a battery pulverizing Wellington's center.

Theres a theory that Ney was suffering from Post Traumatic Stress after 1812 (t would hardly be surprising) which affected his operational judgement thereafter. He certainly seemed to suffer from depression and lassitude at Quatre Bras and tunnel vision at Waterloo.

For me the biggest mystery is his conduct at Bautzen – now thats a great 'what if' when his wing of the army was within an hours march of encircling the Coalition Army…

Bernadotte – my favourite, brilliant on the battle – field – and in politics – and clearly no lacky of Napoléon – and way more successfull ;-)).
Highly estemmed by the troops he commanded as well.

Good point Adam.
I have to admit my opinion of Ney is heavily influenced by enjoying Dan O'Herlihy's portrayal in Waterloo. As much flak as Ney gets for Waterloo, I still think he was a valuable commander, though independent command was not one of his strengths.

Even though several Marshals lost to Wellington, I think overall they where a talented group of commanders. Certainly they had faults but who doesn't. All the major powers had a mixed bag in that regard.

As much as I would love to think Davout could right every wrong from the 1815 campaign I don't think the eventual out come would have been much different.

I agree with your assessment of Ney. If he was in command of a corps he did well. Anything larger and he had problems, such as at Bautzen and in Northern Germany in 1813.

At Dresden, however, in command of a Young Guard corps, he was back to his old self and performed superbly.

It should be remembered that Wellington was a Great Captain and if not the best allied commander of the period (he himself believed that the Archduke Charles was), then he was definitely in the top two.

B

True I tend to favour the Coalition weltanschauung but even I do not consider Ney to be a buffoon. In the French army one does not become 'bravest of the brave' without reason.

He did well in the Revolution and deserved his baton in '04.

The Spring Campaign of 1813 does not show him at his best and he made a dog's breakfast of the 100 Days, but set against the rest of his record he was good at his job.

Would I trust him with a completely separate command like say Davout or Soult, even Messena on a good day? No. As a reliable subordinate, yes please.

'Berthier was the best chief of staff you could wish for but look what happened in the opening stages of the 1809 campaign.'

I think that Berthier gets a bum wrap at the beginning of the 1809 campaign. He was not assigned or appointed as the commander of the Army of Germany, but once again as Major General and chief of staff.

The problem was Napoleon's. He tried to command from Paris and made the mistake of sending correspondence to Berthier by both courier and telegraph, and the correspondence did not arrive in sequence which, to put it mildly, caused much confusion.

Berthier finally bluntly told Napoleon that he had to get in theater and straighten the mess out.

I think it should also be remembered that it was Berthier, in 1800 as the assigned commander of the Army of the Reserve, that got the army organized, put into corps d'armee, and got it across the Alps. Generally, Napoleon let him be until he himself got in theater.

B

Murat's main problem was that he had little regimental service and so never really learned to take care of either men or horses.

He always, at least from 1805-1807, had an excellent chief of staff in General Belliard.

Bessieres commanded the Cavalry Reserve in 1809 and did a superb job in that position. He was a better cavalryman than Murat, but Murat had an innate talent in motivating and moving forward masses of cavalry to get the job done, as at Jena and Eylau.

He was not present at Friedland and in his absence Grouchy was acting chief of cavalry. And in that position he held the French left flank outnumbered and outfought and outthought the Russian cavalry, including the Cossacks.

B

'My mistake, Kevin. I was thinking more in terms of the Ancien Regime than Napoleonic period. You are right. They were Marshals of the Empire, not of France. That was their title in the Ancien Regime and after the Restoration.'

Bas,

Not a problem at all and thanks very much for acknowledging my posting.

B

Grouchy is another Marshal that gets a bum wrap too.

Everything I've seen show he was a good cavalry office both as a leader and as administrator.

I think Grouchy gets bad press entirely because the Hundred Days went badly and completely ignoring of his prior performances. Ney gets polarized reviews for his glorified performance running the rearguard in Russia and his failings at Bautzen & Waterloo. In my opinion Ney has some real shortcomings and some real strengths which the "typical story" of those three polarizing events completely miss. The stories of the Russian rearguard are often vague and blown up so big they are larger than reality while the weight dropped on him for Bautzen and Waterloo exceed his responsibilities in those two actions… in my opinion.

Cheers,

The Bandit