"myths and outright lies!" Topic

Kevin,

And how would he have done that if the Grande Armee had been cut off and trapped at the Berezina?

He would have been lost with his army.

You are willing to presume a conclusion from the circumstances which I am not. As Alexandre beat me to pointing out, I find it easy to believe that Napoleon could have escaped with a small escort.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Kevin,

"[S]omething that would or could be used in a paraphrase" is not to be put in quotes, as the words of the original source. That is why historians use [ ]. See, I used them here to denote that your "something" was not the beginning of a sentence and did not have a capital "S" in the original.

You do teach history, right? Do you tell your young students that they can re-write a source's words, as long as they believe that the re-writing is not important, that the re-worded passage reflects, in the view of the student, what the author "would" or "could" or "might" say?
Really ?

Amicalement,
- Alexandre

Whirlwind,

Well, TW and Kevin are bent out of shape (from my perspective) because Alexandre and I, and I think you and some others take issue with calling the Berezina an unqualified victory. So far I don't think any of us in "the opposition" have a problem with saying some version of French won the battle, or the French accomplished their goal / mission, or that the French accomplished something amazing. Just that any call of a victory must be qualified due to the massive circumstances. That was where this all started. Kevin said it was a victory, Alexandre said he took issue with 'victory' being 'unqualified' and it went from there.

Then there is all the business about the quotations that Kevin uses and argues with and beats people with, just to find out that one is perhaps completely fabricated and the other is at best an unqualified paraphrasing… Kevin calls us all names and says we are ignorant and our source materials suck and our mothers were fat and whatever, then he is shown to be incorrect in the use of his quotes and he says, "Well, none of that matters I'm still right."

So yes actually, I think aside from pride there is very little factual disagreement. Though now we have moved to talk about whether Napoleon could have escaped had the French army collapsed at the Berezina, Alexandre and I think it possible, Kevin and TW think it impossible. That seems to be a continuation of their position that the Berezina is a huge big deal for the French and so the more dire the consequences the more exalted the victory… My view is that the Berezina is a very big deal, use of the term 'victory' for the French when applied to it really must be qualified and Napoleon very possible could have escaped with an escort of his Guard cavalry even if his army was destroyed in detail.

Alexandre,

Execpt by Napoléon ! …. who shot him in the eye while hunting together in 1808!

And he was unable to ride at Wagram because he what, fell from his horse or something.

Regardless, I think Kevin meant wounded in battle. I don't think his evidence supports his conclusion here, it is a very grand statement. Napoleon was in the line of fire a lot – something I just recently stated as being support for the fact that his death or capture at Berezina was not more likely than it was on several other occasions during pitched battles – but only got hurt twice, once was in the foot, I don't recall the other. Yet Oudinot gets wounded a ton of times during his career. Does that mean that Oudinot put himself in more dangerous circumstances than Napoleon did or just that he was less lucky? I don't think it is conclusive.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Whirlwind,

What did you and Bandit take my meaning to be? It would be quite nice if you could actually quote me directly to indicate what I have said, rather than people just guessing. I thought my position was quite clear through repetition;
-Beresina cannot be compared to Borodino or Eylau in the way that Bandit is attempting to do.
-The Russian campaign as a whole was a massive loss for Napoleon.
-Beresina itself a very important battle, and was a win for the French.
-Beresina was a huge missed opportunity for the Russians.
-Beresina was a loss for the Russians.

I would imagine that there is a great deal of consensus with the preceding conclusions, as they seem to be self evident to everyone except Bandit and Alexandre, who are desperately clutching at straws ("I find it easy to believe that Napoleon could have escaped with a small escort" being the latest piece of straw-clutching. Whilst technically it might possibly be true, it rather misses the point of the whole debate).

Bandit,
"Napoleon was in the line of fire a lot – something I just recently stated as being support for the fact that his death or capture at Berezina was not more likely than it was on several other occasions during pitched battles". This also misses the point entirely. The danger to Napoleon at the Beresina did not arise from being in the line of battle, it was to do with the very real chance that the entire army including all its commanders could and perhaps should have been captured, if only the Russian commanders had done their jobs properly and acted with more elan.

TW,

This also misses the point entirely.

The point was comparing relative risk to his person.

Cheers,

The Bandit

The point was comparing relative risk to his person.

But none of your examples relate to the rather unique and specific type of danger that the French and Napoleon were in at the Beresina. Unless you do that it is missing the point of the discussion.

TW,

But none of your examples relate to the rather unique and specific type of danger that the French and Napoleon were in at the Beresina. Unless you do that it is missing the point of the discussion.

No, I'm not missing the point of the discussion, you are presuming your conclusion. You and I disagree on the key point, I think that the Berezina did not present such a unique risk to his person as you do. I think the risk there was akin to him being taken off his horse by a stray cannonball at Wagram or the Guard failing to turn back the Russian infantry that threatened Nappy's capture at Eylau in time. You think the risk is different and was higher… OK. That isn't missing the point, that is disagreeing about the conclusion.

Cheers,

The Bandit

'It is a true statement about your conduct on this issue.'

If that were so, then why would I go to the trouble of looking up material on Caulaincourt, his memoirs, and Sor and her 'stuff' in Cronin, and then post it?

I've shown myself that Sor's books were nonsense, supporting that stated viewpoint on this forum.

Your 'characterization' of what I have done and maintained here is wrong as well as insulting.

I made a mistake as to Lachouque, here, and it appears to me you're attempting to make it into something else. And that effort on your part is wrong.

B

Kevin,

Prior to you admitting the quote was wrong and false, you called me names for pressing you to address the suspicions about the quote. Had I not continued to press you as I did, I am not sure you would have ever admitted your error. Yet now you call me names while stating that you sought out the evidence and submitted the admission of error all on your own.

That you made a mistake with a quote doesn't bother me, your conduct surrounding it, the level of vehemency which with you defended the quote without supporting such and while denying the requests and findings of others and the name calling that you utilized in doing so – those things are what bother me.

I don't know what you think I'm making anything out to be. I'd like an apology for the mean spirited things you've said to me and insults you've directed at me.

If you want to know what I am after, I desire to meet the standard you expect of others and that you treat us similar to how you wish to be treated.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Gentlemen, maybe you should settle your differences on the field of battle, after all this is a wargames forum and you both seem to be living in the same part of the world. How about a refight of the Battle of the Bérézina? That way honour is satisfied in a Napoleonic way (or the romantic version of it)
Regards
M.
By the way, the Perry's make a nice range of Retreat from Moscow figures.

I am more than willing to apologize for anything that might be or could be construed to be wrong or out of line.

And that being the case, I do apologize to what I've said to you that was wrong. My fault entirely.

However, you've also been out of line and said things that were both wrong and insulting. I expect the same from you.

And that being the case, perhaps we can proceed from here.

And I will defend myself if I believe I am right, which I did in the Caulaincourt case. I make mistakes like anyone else, unfortunately.

However, it should also be noted that I did post the material from Cronin and that should also be recognized.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Marcel1809,

Problem is both of us would want to play as the French… for all the "anti-French bias" that's been attributed to me, they are still my side of choice :-p

Kevin,

I do not believe I said anything insulting to or about you, at least that was never my intent, therefore, I am sorry if you were offended by things I said to you or about you.

Regarding you defending your statements, my objection was never that you did, but how.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Then we're even and good to go-yes?

Sincerely,
Kevin

@TW,

Kevin:

And the crossing of the Berezina …allowed the French to leave Russia as victors in the last battle, defeating two Russian armies while conducting an assault river crossing in the face of the enemy.

Alexandre:

No Russian armies were defeated. Some French successfully escaped. Their "victory" was avoiding being wiped out to the last man and camp follower. As for "for the thousands of men and women that managed to make the river crossing", one might also recall the tens of thousands abandonded at the Berezina as "stragglers"

basileus:

To say that the Berezina was a French victory is to stretch the meaning of victory a little bit too much. It was a delaying action that went better than the French expected, but not much more. The army was a wreck. After the crossing the French continued losing men in droves. The Russians followed through with their pursuit and only their own exhaustion allowed the French to reorganize the shattered remnants in something similar to a functional army.

Kevin:

I completey disagree. You either win or you lose in combat. The Russians attempted to stop the French getting our of Russian and failed, and the French definitely outfought the two Russian armies they engaged.

That's a win, no matter how you wish to look at it.

Bandit:

Saying the Berezina crossing is a French victory also requires qualification.

Personally I feel it is foolish to say that many battles resulted in one side victorious and there other side defeated. It is ridiculously easy to find examples where both sides claimed they won, just to name a few between the French & Russians: Golymin, Pultusk, Eylau.

Kevin – You've said that the Russians didn't accomplish what they wanted to: trapping the French against the river and concluded that therefore it was a Russian defeat. But you know the standard is more complex than that. I think you'd agree that Napoleon won at Bautzen, but if we apply this, "did they accomplish all of what they wanted standard" then Bautzen was a French defeat because they Russo-Prussian Army escaped. The same could be said of Eylau and all the smaller rearguard actions of the Russian army where Napoleon's aim was to pin them and draw battle.

Bandit:

Yes. I concur. I fail to agree with what I understand as Kevin's perspective of victory – that determination rests on a sole criteria. That baffles me. Any sole criteria. Napoleon destroys the breath of the Prussian field armies at Jena-Auerstädt in 1806, but the war went on for another year and two more major battles against the Russians, one of which crippled the French as much as it did the Russians – so Napoleon's aims for 1806 were not met – Jena/Auerstädt must be a French defeat! This makes no sense, the conditions of victory and defeat are more nuanced – as Alexandre previously alluded to.

As you point out – Borodino becomes a huge French defeat if this criteria is the only one applied. Napoleon wanted to, in reverse order of importance: 1) permanently stop the Russian retreat, 2) destroy the Russian field army, 3) end the war. None of these things are accomplished! Borodino must be a HUGE French defeat because the French goals were not met! But we all know the reality is more complicated.

TW:

I definitely agree with the first part of the sentence. As for it being a very bad defeat for the Russians, I am in two minds. If on the one hand, we accept the idea that the Russians were trying to trap Napoleon, then the Beresina represents a huge failure for the Russians . But if on the other hand we entertain the idea that Kutuzov did not want to totally destroy Napoleon, because he thought a weak France would be terrible for Europe, then it is not a failure from a Kutuzovian point of view.
But Kutuzov was not Russia, just one man in Russia, and I suppose the wish of most Russians at the time (i.e. after an invasion of their country) would have been to destroy Napoleon for ever. This did not happen, and the huge opportunity at the Beresina was lost. In that sense, I think you are correct in your statement that "the Berezina was a French victory and a very bad defeat for the Russians".

Regards

@TW:

Beresina cannot be compared to Borodino or Eylau in the way that Bandit is attempting to do.

They are being compared as battles in the Napoleonic Wars in which both sides had objectives and either met, partiallty met or failed to meet those objectives. Napoleon palpably did not meet his objectives in fighting those battles. So, if we are saying that the Russians were defeated at Berezina because they did not meet, or very partially met their objectives, one can easily make the comparison with any battle in history.

And I'll re-iterate: I think Kevin is right when he makes this argument. Military operations are carried out with specific objectives in mind and this view naturally accords with this way of evaluating the results of these operations.

The Russian campaign as a whole was a massive loss for Napoleon.

Agreed.

Beresina itself a very important battle, and was a win for the French.

Agreed wholeheartedly by me. However, the many posters take a very reasonable view that if an army escapes with something around 50% of its initial strength and tens of thousands of men (and women) are lost, then words like 'win' and 'victory' are hard to use with their normal connotations.

Beresina was a huge missed opportunity for the Russians.

…maybe. I'm always wary of the this should have/would have/could have hypotheticals. Given the circumstances on the day, perhaps the result wasn't so unpredictable, it is difficult to say.

Beresina was a loss for the Russians.

Well, I think so. But it is easy to make the case the other way too. A sporting analogy perhaps? If you expect to be hammered 6-0 (football or baseball, either will do) and you 'only' lose 3-2, you have done far better than you have expected, but you have still lost. You just did far better than the pundits predicted. I don't myself subscribe to this view, but something along these lines can be made into a very strong argument.

What I think is surprising is when someone switches from one view to the other, depending on the battle being fought.
One suspects it is sometimes done to make sure the 'right team' wins.

Regards

Dominic Lieven, in his excellent study of the wars between Russia and Napoleon, says that according Russian sources the intentions of Kutuzov weren't to accomplish a Bailen at the Beresina. For Kutuzov the goal was to expel the French from Russia, not wipe out the Grande Armee, which he didn't think it was possible in the state of exhaustion of his own troops. When all was said and done, the Russians didn't press their attacks on the French bridgehead with all the panache it would have been needed to pull out a massive encirclement. In good part, again according to Lieven, was due to they were too at the limit of their endurance. At the time, neither the French nor their unwilling allies nor their enemies thought of the Berezina as anything else but the closing act of a tragedy for France's arms.

Napoleon reached the Berezina with the remnants of his army. He had between 80-100,000 men, of which only 36,000 were actually in any state to present battle to the approximately 50,000 Russians that were closing on the French. Victor was able to fend off Russian probes all the day, with heavy casualties for both sides. At the end of the day, Napoleon had lost another 25,000 men -plus 30,000 non combatants and about 10,000 stragglers that were captured by the Russians in the immediate aftermath of the battle. Paraphrasing the Marechal Villars, another "victory" like this and wouldn't have been any French army to speak of.

And yet, the battle was nothing but another bloodbath. It didn't change anything. The French continued their retreat, losing more men and horses -see Zamoyski- in the process. They were lucky (if another two years of war can be considered fortunate, of course) that the Russians were on their tetters, almost as spent as the French were. Otherwise, they would have been wiped out before Napoleon would have been able to rebuild his army for another round. It wasn't that the French were so brilliant and the Russians so bovine, but that both armies were like two boxers that have reached that point of exhaustion in which punches can't gather enough strength to knock out their opponent for good.

From the esteemed Steven H. Smith, an 1844 English language review of Mlle Sor's "Souvenirs" of Maret.
link
She appears to also have been sharing "confidences" with the duc de Bassano. The poor reviewer almost runs out of early Victorian euphemisms for being a bath house girl
.
But, from other threads, it would now appear that Kevin has decided that just maybe the Mlle is not exactly a first rate source for Napoleonic military affairs after all, even if she seems to have quite adept at affairs of another sort.

Amicalement,
- Alexandre

@basileus,

I'll have to re-read the relevant bit.

Regards

Wow, I don't refresh the page for an hour or so and boom, lots more posts.

Cheers,

The Bandit

'…it would now appear that Kevin has decided that just maybe the Mlle is not exactly a first rate source for Napoleonic military affairs after all'

Again, you are wrong.

First, I never said that Sor was a credible source, or that she was a source at all. The first mention of her came from you.

Second, I have demonstrated the problems with Sor, quoting Cronin's evaluation of Sor and Caulaincourt from Cronin's biography of Napoleon.

So, you have mischaracterized what I have said and posted on the forum on that subject.

And I quoted the following on this thread as well:

'Perhaps this might help:'

'About 1826 Caulaincourt, suffering from cancer of the stomach, went to take the waters at Plombieres. there he met Charlotte de Sor, alias Madame Eillaux, a novelist. She questioned him about Napoleon and persuaded him to show her certain pages of his manuscript Memoirs. Caulaincourt died in 1827; ten years later Charlotte de Sor published a two-volume Souvenirs de Duc de Vicenze. So successful were they that she followed them up with two more volumes, again purporting to be based on Caulaincourt's papers.'

'Caulaincourt's authentic Memoirs were published only in 1933, admirably edited by Jean Hanoteau, who was then able to describe Sor's books as a tissue of absurdities, untruths and spiteful words, the historical value of which is nil.' Yet they had been freely used by previous biographers of napoleon! Caulaincourt's Memoirs, written between 1822 and 1825, are based on notes taken daily about many things, including the character of Tsar Alexander, but Napoleon, in St. Helena, called his former Grand Squire 'a man who is both sensitive and upright', and his Memoirs are among the most valuable sources we have.'

-Vincent Cronin, Napoleon Bonaparte: An Intimate Biography, 448.

B

Kevin,

'…it would now appear that Kevin has decided that just maybe the Mlle is not exactly a first rate source for Napoleonic military affairs after all'

Again, you are wrong.

First, I never said that Sor was a credible source, or that she was a source at all. The first mention of her came from you.

Second, I have demonstrated the problems with Sor, quoting Cronin's evaluation of Sor and Caulaincourt from Cronin's biography of Napoleon.

What Alexandre is doing, is criticizing your choice to rely on and vehemently defend a secondary source without close inspection which would have shown you that the secondary source was feeding you information from Sor and thus tainting your posting.

You have posted that the source is faulty but I think Alexandre may not feel the point has been made, again due to how long and how strongly, and at times how meanly you attacked each of those who addressed it with you.

Cheers,

The Bandit

"First, I never said that Sor was a credible source, or that she was a source at all. The first mention of her came from you.

Second, I have demonstrated the problems with Sor, quoting Cronin's evaluation of Sor and Caulaincourt from Cronin's biography of Napoleon."

What you did was something I've seen you do countless times for the past 14 years, and it's always amusing to watch a new batch of people figure you out.

You tossed out a quote that you'd cribbed from an English-language secondary source, because you'd never read nor checked the original. But of course you didn't say that; you made it look as though you were directly quoting a primary source: "Culaincourt…" No indication that you'd gotten it from somebody else's research, or in translation.

Then when it raised eyebrows and somebody questioned you, you vehemently defended it, insulted them repeatedly, and told them it was up to them to prove you wrong.

And guess what: they did. They found the originals, and of course they weren't what you said they were, and in one case it turned out to be spurious.

But you kept defending it vehemently for a while, avoiding their direct questions and challenges by insulting them and then trying with increasing desperation to say that it was irrelevant and didn't matter, etc, etc….

Then – after your opponents had done all the work for you – you "found" a quote from another English language secondary source which proved what they had been saying all along. That your initial quote was rubbish.

But now you're claiming that you never thought the original source (which you didn't even know existed until somebody else did the work despite your obfuscations) was credible. And flogging the fact that you supposedly "helped" prove that it was not credible, because you very belatedly included a snippet from an English-language Napoleon biography.

And yet all you had to do was either of two things that I've never, ever seen you do, in a decade and a half:

1. Admit that you didn't know where the quote came from or that you weren't sure of its origin, OR

2. Once caught, admit that you were wrong.

If you'd just done either of those simple things, it would have saved everybody another 100+ postings, tons of insults, and two days' worth of your wriggling around on yet another hook of your own making.

Yep.

What Sam said.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Yeah.

What Dr. Mustafa said.

Amicalement,
- Alexandre

Can M. Brechtel read French?

It would seem odd that an 'authority' on Napoleon didn't. How would one consult primary sources otherwise? Yet it appears that nowhere on this thread has he quoted an original French document. This points to at least a lack of research on his part.

I am sorry if he finds this post offensive, but after all, he started it. I shan't be reading his reply, should he deign to make one.

I am sorry that he is unable to quote, or most likley doesn't want to do it.

It is dead simple

Author, book title, place of publishing, year of publishing, page – then quote.

By that it would be transparent and people who are interested could cross check easily.

Otherwise – I agree completly with the Travelling Turk.

What Sam said. I've deliberately not joined in this thread as it became quite clear what would happen. Rather than join in, I read the posts with interest, and, sure enough, as Sam has pointed out, Kevin did his usual. It is, quite simply, bad history, as I've pointed out before, and should be embarrassing to him. Yet it isn't….

"Another myth could be that the Austrian army was useless and always beaten by the French"
Myth or at least utter ignorance of the facts, yes.

"Its a shame that the very capable troops of the Austrian army often are poorly rated in games"
However, is not closely related to the performance of their army; nor is it possibly a myth, having not mere reputation but sound management methodology to back that up.

Had the Austrians attempted to officer their troops the same way as the British they would have lost their Empire long before. They required large numbers of troops and simply could not, in the social structure of the time, or wealth, provide enough officers to match a British structure.
Thus British infantry were superior at the unit level, inferior at the army in the field level.

The lack of officers was particularly prominent with their battalion level skirmishers. Big changes were made between 1805 and 1809 but still insufficient to reach French or British levels of command and control.
There is more detail but it is a fact if you apply simple management theory to the command structures of troops you will find it invariably predicts/confirms their relative combat performance.

So myth & not myth with the Austrians.

Whirlwind

I've re-read Lieven's take on the Berezina and it is not how I said in my previous message. I mixed the dates. When Kutuzov asked Alexander to allow him to stop the pursuit was after, not before, the Berezina. Kutuzov, according Lieven, argued that his army was in its lasts and that there was a risk of losing it altogether. Although, it was in bad shape before November 26, it was the three weeks after the battle when it reached its exhaustion point.

Later I will quote Lieven's relevant paragraphs. His take on the action is very interesting, as he has analyzed it from Russian perspective instead the usual French.

Best and apologies for the mistake.

Whirlwind,

So we agree *to an extent* on all of the points that I bullet-pointed. I also like your sporting analogy. Like you, it is not a view that I subscribe to either (although I can see why others might).
The only big thing that I would question is why you think it is surprising "when someone switches from one view to the other, depending on the battle being fought". If it is done to "make sure the right team wins", then I agree with you that it is a very dodgy methodology. But I'd like to point out that switching the criteria of victory is pretty much the approach eveybody takes, including every military historian I have ever read. All battles must be judged according to the specific objectives of the opposing commanders and the swing in strategic balance that has or hasn't occurred, as well as losses etc. No two battles were exactly alike, in some battles it was all about destroying the enemy and for others it was all about escaping, some battles were fought with the aim of relieving a besieged fortress and some with a view to pacifying an area of insurgent activity, and for some Commanders large losses were more politically or militarily acceptable than for others, and so on.
Trying to crow-bar the exact same criteria for victory on to two different battles that are not similar in any meaningful way is a useless exercise in rigid thinking, and inevitably leads to the sort of distractions and problems that have been exhibited on this thread.

Cheers,
TW

So for those of us who, as wargamers, don't check everything we read back to a primary source in the mother tongue, what is the fuss about these quotes and how do they alter the thrust of anything or change the price of sliced bread?

Good question Colonel. To my mind it doesn't matter, its just another convenient distraction people are using to avoid looking at the central issue that was being discussed. That, and allowing the usual suspects to have another dig at Kevin of course.

All battles must be judged according to the specific objectives of the opposing commanders and the swing in strategic balance that has or hasn't occurred…no two battles were exactly alike, in some battles it was all about destroying the enemy and for others it was all about escaping, some battles were fought with the aim of relieving a besieged fortress and some with a view to pacifying an area of insurgent activity, and for some Commanders large losses were more politically or militarily acceptable than for others, and so on.

This is basically my argument.

Where I have disagreed with the odd poster is to the extent that they argue that the objectives of the opposing commanders are a key consideration in one battle, but somehow less important when their favourite general didn't achieve what they were trying to do.

Regards

Colonel,

The topic was "myths and lies" – what part of the "history" that we think we know is actually not so accurate.

In the case of the two "quotes" (one spurious and the other "composed"), these have found their way into modern, English language sources that might easily (mis-)inform a wargamer or rules writer.

The two "quotes" also reveal, as examples, pathways by which any false or "myth-based" understanding of past events can seep into our idea of how to game this era.

And that, to me, seemed to be the topic of the thread.

And further, I promise you that I have and will do the same "digging" no matter who posts. Indeed, my first contribution on this thread was to support Kevin and to oppose the general ideas of the OP. I posted, to the best of my understanding, the exact, and rather modest, participation of non-French pontooneers at the bridging of the Bérésina.

I should also add that I really like reading Kevin's work. His style and approach very much remind me of his mentor, the late Colonel Elting. Both display a pro-French point of view, as do many other authors, and might be prone to not letting the facts, especially the details, spoil the "flow" of telling of a good story. But, such great fun to read and enjoy!

Amicalement,
- Alexandre

Alexandre, my personal view on the Berezina was that it was horrendous and hardly what I would describe as a victory, nonetheless Brechtel198 contends that it was such for the French. I am unclear as to how two eyewitness quotes, one spurious because it arose from a woman who supposedly got documents off a dying man, and the other composed because tracts of the original were missed out, negate Bretchel198's contention as regards the crossing being a victory. Do they do so?

My personal view on the crossing is based on a lifetime reading secondary English speaking sources and I don't believe I am wrapped up in any myth.

As regards TelesticWarrior's comment on the usual suspects, a post from the Travelling Turk and especially one aimed at Bretchel198 was bound to be jumped upon and bring them forth from the woodwork, as it did.

Colonel,

I am unclear as to how two eyewitness quotes, one spurious because it arose from a woman who supposedly got documents off a dying man, and the other composed because tracts of the original were missed out, negate Bretchel198's contention as regards the crossing being a victory. Do they do so?

False evidence can't be evidence of anything. Kevin could be right, the Berezina could be a French victory, but false evidence can't demonstrate his correctness, true and accurate evidence is required. Otherwise we are presuming our conclusions. Since the subject of the thread is myths and lies, it would seem that false evidence passed off to Kevin by historians and passed off by Kevin to us is dead on-topic as such is either a myth or a lie.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Bandit, the topic of the thread wandered, as is often the case, and at the relevant point when the quotes were introduced the issue in hand was whether the crossing was a French victory or not.

So whilst I can see that the correction of two quotations is important from the point of view of the perpetration of some myth, although given the content of the quotes I do not think much turns on it. I do not see how the correction of the quotes impacts dramatically upon Bretchel198's contention that it was a French victory.

Colonel,

Bandit, the topic of the thread wandered, as is often the case, and at the relevant point when the quotes were introduced the issue in hand was whether the crossing was a French victory or not.

Indeed. But don't you think that inaccurate quotation within published works is a greater demonstration of 'myths and lies' in history than our various and differing opinions of whether a given battle was a victory for one side or the other?

Cheers,

The Bandit

@CTA,

Bandit wrote:

the French Army didn't leave Berezina feeling victorious. Not the senior command and not the rank and file. The marshals were frustrated and the men were demoralized to an extend the French during the period had not experienced.

Kevin responded with:

Really?

Perhaps the following might help.

'It has been said that the bridges presented a hideous spectacle due to the crowding and confusion…In reality, the crossing of the Berezina in the face of the enemy was a very large military imdertaking that reflects further glory on the army and its chief.'-General Baron Pierre Berthezene, French Imperial Guard.

'All honor to the French. Honor to the nation that breed such men! And shame on the cowards who would tarnish the glory they earned-a glory even more precious than the laurels coveted by their descendants, and that of the Europeans who were never able to beat them…'-General Caulaincourt.

Before making judgments on 'feelings' historically it might be helpful to take a look at the viewpoints of the participants, of which the two officers quoted above certainly were.

Kevin was using the two quotations to put forth the idea that certain senior French generals at the time thought that the Berezina was 'glorious'. So this case, in so far as it is based on these, is to some extent reduced.

Regards

Well I've read numerous books over the years on the 1812 campaign and I certainly don't take the view that there was anything glorious in the crossing of the Berezina, nor has anything I have ever read led me remotely to that view.

I can't disagree that quotations should be accurate in published works, how could I.

It has been very interesting to see the two quotations dismantled in this thread, and while Bretchel198 did suggest that the issue should be left, it may be a case of those that live by the sword.

CTA, as one of the "usual suspects", and, clearly one of your subjects for your intellectual and philosophical self-amusement, could I point out that I have no particular axe to grind as to whether the Beresina was or wasn't a victory for the French, glorious or otherwise. However, what I commented on was Sam's well worded and well explained exposition of Kevin's approach in this and the other thread. That Kevin attempts to floor his critics, or those he perceives to be his critics, with quotes from secondary sources, written by people whom he agrees with and who share his particular viewpoint. Kevin then becomes patronising and condescending, at best, to those who challenge his viewpoint, or the provenance of his quotes. In this case, Kevin argued on the one hand that his quote from Lachouque was correct and compelling, casting ridicule upon those who disagreed. It was then proven that Kevin's quote was based on a deliberate mis-quote by the secondary source. Once Kevin had failed in his attempt to defend his indefensible position, he instead argued, as you seem to, that the exact quote didn't matter. He was caught out, dead to rights. Rather than apologise, he attempted to bluster his way out. He also referenced his quotes as if they were from an original primary source, as was pointed out. For example, he wasn't quoting from Caulaincourt, he was quoting from Lachouque, however, he referenced it as if he was quoting from Caulaincourt. It is bad History. It is also dishonest. It is not what a Historian is trained to do, indeed it is what a Historian is trained not to do. Being caught out in a deception he should have apologised, not attempted to bluster his way out of the situation that he himself caused. It isn't the accuracy of his version of events, or the validity of his opinion that is in question, but his position and actions as a Historian.

Chouan, even I know the cut of Lachouque's cloth.

ColonelToffeeApple,

The thing that got me was – I'm just some guy, I don't have an advanced degree in history, I haven't published any works on the period, if I mis-posted a quote, by accident or otherwise, and someone corrected me, there is little consequence to how I respond. But, if I were someone who had works published on the period, and I am not just making this comparison to Kevin because he is not the only published author on this site by a long stretch, isn't it risky not to address such an oversight more directly and with less negative aggression? Anyone can make a mistake but the response to the mistake is very important.

I'll also say that following this I feel my criticism towards von Winterfeldt for posting in original languages has been overdone in the past, I still wish he'd post a synopsis so I could follow the general conversation without translating each of his quotes, but that he provides them in their original language becomes far more of an understood benefit from my standpoint.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Bandit. I'm not here to defend Bretchel198 he can do that himself and I didn't know he was a published author. This place is full of trained or at least serious historians, and how and why each of them posts the way they do is known only on to themselves, including the choice of language (in English) they use. Some impart knowledge differently to others.

As regards foreign languages, I tend towards the view that if the posters can read and understand it they can translate it. I don't see the point in doing otherwise, unless someone can enlighten me.

You were on the receiving end of things in this thread, but I know from these boards that you are well capable of defending yourself.

If I made a mistake, I'd just say so and apologise as I don't see that much hangs on it.

Like CTA I don't see what all the fuss is about concerning the providence of one quote, one that was not even that important to the issue we were talking about at the time. Eyewitness accounts are important for understanding any battle but we can tell most of what we need to understand about the Beresina from the result alone. The French escaped when really they should not have. If the situation was reversed, i.e. 3 French armies of the era and one of them led by Napoleon converging on an enemy army in a pitiful state on the wrong side of a major river, it is likely that not a single Russian would have escaped.

The result itself, given the circumstances, tells you all you need to know (if you have a decent level of understanding of the campaign and the battle). In that case one possibly fake eyewitness report is a bit of a distraction, i.e a distraction from the obvious point that the crossing of the Beresina was a very important victory. Not a glorious one (there was nothing glorious about it), but a very important victory nonetheless.

Even for a mini-me, that's pretty rich!

Why was Berezina important?? If the French got clean away with the other half of the force, how would anything be different? Or have you decided the Russians would have caught Napoléon if only they had the will to power? The cossacks could have caught him after Maloyaroslavets or his sleigh could have overturned on the way to Warszawa.

Kevin's latest obfuscation is no more important than who invented the bricole per se. But it does take time for people like the Bandit to get off their high horse and realize it's not a battle between the Boney-bashers and the Napophiles, but between academic inquiry and intellectual dishonesty.

What irks me about the Berezina is the assumption, in popular circles, as an ending point for the campaign. It so Napoleon-centric that its almost offensive for the men that died or were captured after the crossing. In the three weeks after the Berezina, the French were practically destroyed. Only 20,000 men were still under arms when the Russians finally stopped the pursuit. Remember that Napoleon still had almost 80,000 men when he reached the river. Of course, as Napoleon wasn't present -he had gone to France, to rise another army- it looks like that the fate of the soldiers he left behind is inconsecuential.

That is why I said that the Berezina meant nothing. I was wrong, though. As Zamoyski and Lieven point, the successful crossing of the Berezina saved for Napoleon 2,500 officers and almost all the high command, whom he would use later to cadre the troops raised in France.

Still, it wasn't the decissive action that some late XIXth Century pro-Bonapartist authors -who had pass their vision to some modern popular historians- wanted to make believe. It wasn't a turning point, nor the French were saved after the crossing. The Russians almost wiped out the Grande Armee in the weeks after the battle. The pitiful remnants of the French army were saved not by the Berezina, but because the Russians couldn't continue the campaign due they were spent (my mistake was to believe that Lieven mentioned the relevant letter from Kutuzov to Alexander in the context of the advance to the Berezina, and not three weeks after the action).

This has been very interesting and enlightening for someone like me, who knows only a little about the Russian side of things. Are they perhaps the least understood of the major players? By that I mean the most poorly fleshed out for us Anglophones?

Hew Johns,

But it does take time for people like the Bandit to get off their high horse and realize it's not a battle between the Boney-bashers and the Napophiles, but between academic inquiry and intellectual dishonesty.

It is funny (not haha funny) that Kevin calls me names when I disagree with him and you belittle me when I'm not on your side of the argument. Kevin says it is because he's learned and I'm ignorant, you say it is because you see things clearly while I have an impaired view from my "high horse"… remind me the difference between what he did when he insulted me and what you do when you insult me? I mean, you're both doing it because 'you're better' right?

Cheers,

The Bandit

basileus66,

I'd largely agree with that. Maybe not all the particulars but the broad strokes. The French treated it as an end of their campaign, Napoleon certainly did, he went off to go organize for the next one. The Russians did not… though I think it might be more accurate to say the Russians saw the war continuing. Napoleon… my characterization of Napoleon is that most of the time a war and a campaign are equivalent, both in his aims, plans, hopes, etc… When things go well this proves out true, when things go poorly… the "what the heck do the French do now" question rears its ugly head.

By Lützen we are in a new campaign for both armies I'd think but certainly the same war. Yet until the Russians slow their pursuit post-Berezina… it is still the same campaign for them… I suppose the French who were still in the field may likely not have been thinking in terms of "campaigns" any more, just the next hurdle they had to cross to hold things together.

Cheers,

The Bandit