"myths and outright lies!" Topic

Given the huge losses in the campaign, essentially the complete destruction of the largest French/Allied army raised in the period, the defection of the Prussians and the Austrians and then a host of other German states from the French, and including the losses in combat and from abandoned stragglers at the Berezina itself, some might see a contradiction between :
"I have no nationalistic feelings to massage"
and
"the crossing of the Berezina …. was important in a few areas, not the least being it allowed the French to leave Russia as victors"

Well, I suppose you are American, so if not "nationalistic feelings" for the French, how about "pro-French bias"?

Amicalement,
- Alexandre

Alexandre,
Slicing up other people's post to suit yourself is not very helpful.
Reading your post one could presume that Kevin had claimed the French had left Russia as "victors". What he actually said was "it allowed the French to leave Russia as victors in the last battle, defeating the Russian armies while conducting an assault river crossing in the face of the enemy".
So yeah, it was quite an important battle! Not least for the thousands of men and women that managed to make the river crossing.

What is often overlooked is the huge losses the Russians incurred during the campaign which also had to be replaced, along with the huge losses in the countryside as well as the loss in villages and cities, including the self-inflicted burning of Moscow by its governor.

No German states defected from the French after Russia until the next campaign.

The French stragglers who refused to cross the bridges at the Berezina were given every opportunity, Eble leaving the burning until he tried to get them across.

There is an interesting comment by a French Guardsman at the Berezina who stated that if the tables were turned and they had trapped a Russian army in the same way, 'not one would have escaped.'

B

Dear Telestic,
Point taken – for which my thanks.

However, if we add more, then Kevin's little bombast is even more biased: "to leave Russia as victors in the last battle, defeating t[w]o Russian armies"
No Russian armies were defeated. Some French successfully escaped. Their "victory" was avoiding being wiped out to the last man and camp follower.

As for "for the thousands of men and women that managed to make the river crossing", one might also recall the tens of thousands abandonded at the Berezina as "stragglers" or the hundreds of thousands lost in the campaign overall, or that this set the stage for the loss of the French Empire itself.

Speaking of "victory" in this context without extensive qualifications is, in my opinion, biased.

Amicalement,
- Alexandre

You are incorrect. Wittgenstein's command, was defeated by Victor who was the rear guard of the Grande Armee at the Berezina.

Tshitshagov's command failed to stop the Frnech bridging operations at Studenka and then was defeated in its attempt to stop the crossing.

Clausewitz makes some interesting comments on the Russian failure, including Kutusov's failure to support his two colleagues during the fighting.

The Berezina was a French victory and a very bad defeat for the Russians.

B

"The Berezina was a French victory and a very bad defeat for the Russians."

Proffering this *unqualified* statement reveals a strong pro-French bias, as far as I can tell. It is a little like saying that the performance at Ford's Theatre on 14 April 1865 featured wonderful acting.

But, adopting your "tunnel vision" of the events at the Berezina, why do you suppose that tens of thousands of stragglers were lost there, that Eblé could not get them moving? Maybe you will say that they were exhausted, famished or freezing. And again, one could ask, why were they in this condition? And if you will say something about long distances and bad weather. Then one could ask why the Russian forces were in such comparatively better condition that they could not only provide for their own troops, but also attempt to save the French stragglers (many of whom passed into captivity and eventual repatriation)? And do not respond that they were on friendly territory, as the area was Polish-Lithuanian – both unfriendly and far from Russian supply sources.

But, by then we would be out of your tunnel, where all you can see is that the Berezina was an unqualified "victory" for the French.

Amicalement,
- Alexandre

If you disagree, then demonstrate how the Russians won at the Berezina.

Again, you are clearly incorrect here, and this, along with all of your postings are clearly strongly biased for the Russians, regardless of any evidence to the contrary.

What is fact at the Berezina is that the Russians had trapped the Grande Armee at the Berezina, capturing Borisov, the obvious crossing point, and burning the bridge despite desperate French efforts to recapture the bridge intact.

That being the case, a ford was found north of Borisov by French cavalry en route to the main army. A deception operation was carried out by the French which diverted Tshitshagov's attention from the new crossing site and Eble, the pontoon chief of the Grande Armee, was put in charge of bridge construction at Studenka.

Tshitshagov was on the west bank of the river and Wittgenstein was coming up in support in order to take the French crossing site.

The bridges were built, troops were put on the west bank to protect the crossing site and the bridges, and defeated Tshitshagov in his efforts to take the bridges and block the crossing.

Victor was given the mission as the army's rear guard and he defeated every attempt by Wittgenstein to crowd in on the crossing.

Losses on both sides were heavy, but all of the formed units of the Grande Armee got across the river to relative safety.

Kutusov conveniently stayed out of the fighting and failed to support his fellow army commanders.

'Chance certainly somewhat favored Bonaparte in his discovery near Borisov of a place so favorable for the passage as Studenka; but it was his reputation which chiefly saved him, and he traded in this instance on a capital amassed long before. Wittgenstein and Tshitshagov were both afraid of him here, as Kutusov had been afraid of him at Krasny, of him, his army, and his Guard. No one chose to be defeated by him. Kutusov believed he could obtain his end without that risk; Wittgenstein was reluctant to impair the glory he had acquired, Tshitshagov to undergo a second check.'

'Bonaparte was endowed with this moral strength when he thus extricated himself from one of the worst situations in which a general ever found himself. This moral power, however, was not all; the strength of his intellect, and the military virtues of his army, which not even its calamities could quite subdue, were destined here to show themselves once more in their full luster. After he had overcome all the difficulties of this perilous moment, Bonaparte said to those about him 'Vous voyez comme on passé sous la barbe de l'enemi.''

'Bonaparte had here entirely saved his old honor and acquired new, but the result was still a stride towards the utter destruction of his army. We know how much of it reached Kovno, and that the Berezina contributed the last blow towards this result.'

So, in conclusion, the Russians failed to trap the French at the Berezina and the French clearly outfought two Russian armies, while the third failed to engage, undoubtedly because Kutusov didn't want to get beaten once again.

Therefore, you comments on 'unqualified statements' and 'a strong pro-French bias' are not only uncalled for, but are not supported by the evidence provided, which is from a French enemy and is a primary source.

Again, if you want to continue the discussion, stop the ridiculous personal comments and derogatory nonsense. That has no part here.

I suspect that you cannot take Russia or the Russians being either criticized or defeated in the field. The Russian army was not the best of the period and had a lot of problems, beginning with the overall lack of officer education which is mentioned and discussed by both Langeron, a Frenchman who was a Russian general, and by Wilson, who witnessed the Russian army in two campaigns. Further, Christopher Duffy clearly chronicles the 'development' of Russian military education from Peter the Great to the Napoleonic period, and the Russians were clearly behind the rest of Europe in both general and technical education, which explains why Russian engineer and artillery officers were not as technically skilled as their European counterparts in France, Great Britain, and Austria.

B

To say that the Berezina was a French victory is to stretch the meaning of victory a little bit too much. It was a delaying action that went better than the French expected, but not much more. The army was a wreck. After the crossing the French continued losing men in droves. The Russians followed through with their pursuit and only their own exhaustion allowed the French to reorganize the shattered remnants in something similar to a functional army. As much as Napoleon berated Eugene for giving too much ground, the truth is that the Viceroy hadn't the means to stop the Russians. If you see at the great picture, the Berezina was inconsecuential. Its relevance came later, when re-writing the history of the wars, when the French were looking for some bright spots in what had been the worst disaster suffered by any French army since the Imperials captured Francis I at Pavia.

I completey disagree. You either win or you lose in combat. The Russians attempted to stop the French getting our of Russian and failed, and the French definitely outfought the two Russian armies they engaged.

That's a win, no matter how you wish to look at it.

And the Berezina was not inconsequential. If the Russians had blocked the crossing and defeated the French, the war was over. The Russians failed and the French got out with their remnants which included Napoleon and the principal French commanders.

The Russian pursuit after the crossing did not hinder the French getting out and both armies suffered immensely from the cold and privations, and casualties mounted on both sides.

After the retreat ended Eugene built up an effective army to face the Russians and later the Prussians of about 60,000 and that Army of the Elbe joined with the new Grande Armee in April 1813.

What is usually overlooked in this campaign was how much the Russians also suffered, casualty wise, and the actual total will probably never be known. However, the Russian casualties were very heavy, possible as heavy as those of the French.

The bottom line is that the Russians missed an opportunity at the Berezina and were badly defeated in the crossing operations and the heavy fighting on both sides of the river.

And Clausewitz's comments on the action confirm this.

B

And yet nobody has answered to the question why is relevant to the history of the wars (or the crossing of the Berezina for that matter) the birthplace of the pontoneers that bridged the river.

It's always of interest to find out who did what and to whom at a point in history.

You may not be interested in the subject, but that does not stop others from being interested.

B

Alexandre's point appears to be that use of 'victory' regarding the battle at the Berezina must be qualified due to the greater and to his mind overwhelming circumstances. I don't see how anyone can consider this unreasonable.

For any example quotation that can be pulled from a Frenchmen saying they considered it a victory, there are thousands, perhaps tens of thousands who may not have written anything down but can easily be presumed to see it as a defeat.

The movie Pearl Harbor depicts the Doolittle Raid against Japan as some sort of "tit for tat" response to Pearl so that the Americans end the exchange with a victory – that is a bizarre and wrongful interpretation. The Doolittle Raid was important, it proved the viability of long range bombing runs against the Japanese homeland and changed the perspective of both sides. But claiming it as a victory in the wake of Pearl requires great qualification since Pearl resulted in the start of war between the US & Japan, the first large scale military attack by a foreign power on US soil since what… 1812 (?), the crippling of the US navy and the transformation of naval warfare from battleships to carriers.

Saying the Berezina crossing is a French victory also requires qualification.

Personally I feel it is foolish to say that many battles resulted in one side victorious and there other side defeated. It is ridiculously easy to find examples where both sides claimed they won, just to name a few between the French & Russians: Golymin, Pultusk, Eylau.

Kevin – You've said that the Russians didn't accomplish what they wanted to: trapping the French against the river and concluded that therefore it was a Russian defeat. But you know the standard is more complex than that. I think you'd agree that Napoleon won at Bautzen, but if we apply this, "did they accomplish all of what they wanted standard" then Bautzen was a French defeat because they Russo-Prussian Army escaped. The same could be said of Eylau and all the smaller rearguard actions of the Russian army where Napoleon's aim was to pin them and draw battle.

The Berezina was a French victory and a very bad defeat for the Russians.

it allowed the French to leave Russia as victors in the last battle, defeating to Russian armies while conducting an assault river crossing in the face of the enemy

You've undoubtedly read more than I have about the Berezina crossing and you've likely therefore read more first hand accounts but the French Army didn't leave Berezina feeling victorious. Not the senior command and not the rank and file. The marshals were frustrated and the men were demoralized to an extend the French during the period had not experienced.

If I apply your criteria to other battles than Leipzig could become a French victory because a lot of Frenchmen escaped and the Allies had wanted to catch them all… I'll admit readily that I have heavily pro-French but denying French setbacks doesn't support my favored side – it makes me look irrational.

The French actions at the Berezina were a victory in that they prevented [further] disaster by allowing the remains of the French Army to break contact with their pursuers. There is my own, French biased, qualified statement.

Cheers,

The Bandit

@Bandit,

The same could be said of Eylau and all the smaller rearguard actions of the Russian army where Napoleon's aim was to pin them and draw battle.

Surely an even closer parallel is Borodino, which by this logic must go down as a fairly severe French defeat.

I actually think there is something to this – after all, the question of what both sides were trying to do on the day is a key part of any judgement about the success or otherwise of a battle.

Regards

I agree with Bandit. And, by the way, I am also very French biased, and even have some "nationalistic feelings". However, I have greater feelings for accuracy and reasonable completeness when looking at history. To me, pro-French blustering and similar actually *detracts* from the real accomplishments of the 1er Empire. A more nuanced view lets us have more confidence in our appreciation of the achievements of the French. It may be a less "ooorah gung-ho" approach, but accurately detailing the actions of the French, in proper context, seems to me more complimentary than merely "cheering" for one side.

While on the topic of the "stragglers", some prisoner statistics for the campaign …..

- Kutuzov in a letter to his daughter in late November wrote, "the enemy has left us no less than 150,000 prisoners and 850 guns".
- Recent archival reviews find records for 38 generals, 2646 officers and 173,725 other ranks.
- Buturlin, with access to the archives as they existed 170 years ago, put the prisoners at 48 generals, 3800 officers and more than 190,000 other ranks.

Of these, about 35% died before repatriation, 10-15% survived but declined repatriation and remained, most choosing to become Russian citizens, and 50-55% were repatriated.

See, for a general overview :
Б. П. Миловидов [& В.А. Бессонова]
Военнопленные армии Наполеона в России. 1806-1814
С-Пб : Крига, 2012
604, [3] – с. ил., портр., табл., 25 см

There are also numerous local studies giving good details about prisoners sent to specific Russian cities and towns, as well as memoires of Russian nobles who "hosted" more or less prominent French/Allied officer prisoners.

Amicalement,
- Alexandre

'…but the French Army didn't leave Berezina feeling victorious. Not the senior command and not the rank and file. The marshals were frustrated and the men were demoralized to an extend the French during the period had not experienced.'

Really?

Perhaps the following might help.

'It has been said that the bridges presented a hideous spectacle due to the crowding and confusion…In reality, the crossing of the Berezina in the face of the enemy was a very large military imdertaking that reflects further glory on the army and its chief.'-General Baron Pierre Berthezene, French Imperial Guard.

'All honor to the French. Honor to the nation that breed such men! And shame on the cowards who would tarnish the glory they earned-a glory even more precious than the laurels coveted by their descendants, and that of the Europeans who were never able to beat them…'-General Caulaincourt.

Before making judgments on 'feelings' historically it might be helpful to take a look at the viewpoints of the participants, of which the two officers quoted above certainly were.

Paul Britten-Austin's The Great Retreat is very helpful in this regard.

B

Myth: the attack on Hougoumont at Waterloo was meant as a diversion.

Myth: Bijlandt's brigade was shot to pieces on the FORWARD slope (and ran back).

Myth: Napoleon and his staff could observe through their telescopes the Prussian troops at Chapelle St. Lambert ("nous crayons d'apercevoir")

Just throwing in another few Sparks, as this seems an appropriate thread for it ;-)

Oh, if anyone can't get enough of the Berezina, you can read pretty much the whole thread again here: link

in the Armchair General from a couple of years back. Brechtel198 is 'Massena' on that one, if you really coudn't tell…

"tarnish the glory" ???
"a glory even more precious" ???
"Europeans who were never able to beat them" ???
Really?
So, a more detailed and nuanced understanding, putting events in context, is some kind of glory tarnishing, of which we should be ashamed?

How about this for your "glory"? – a mother sitting on the remains of the burned bridges, her legs broken, driven to inconsolable madness, holding the frozen corpse of her enfant and begging the Russians to help the child. The general comte de Rochechouart, then serving as an adjudant to Aleksandr, bade one of his Cossacks blow the poor woman's brains out, to end her misery.
link

I hope that story does not tarnish anyone's glory.

Amicalement,
- Alexandre

@Alexandre,

Berthezene and Caulaincourt were there, presumably saw many such things and they chose to call something there glory.

Many people think that there can be both glory and horror in war.

Regards

This is not not not "cricket" :
"'It has been said that the bridges presented a hideous spectacle due to the crowding and confusion…In reality, the crossing of the Berezina in the face of the enemy was a very large military imdertaking that reflects further glory on the army and its chief.'-General Baron Pierre Berthezene, French Imperial Guard."

First, in the original text, there is several paragraphs separating the "It has been said that the bridges presented a hideous spectacle due to the crowding and confusion" and the rest. Second, the remainder does not start with "In reality", as if put in opposition to first part.

What the general baron Berthezène says is that it was indeed really bad before the bridges, but maybe not so bad as *romance" (i.e. fiction) writers have made it. Actually, the most pointed message of the passage is that he does not really accept general Partouneaux's excuses for the surrender of his division.
See :
link
pages 169 and following

Either Kevin is quoting out of context, or Britten-Austin "composed" the passage to fit his narrative form. This technique was clearly explained by Britten-Austin, and his warnings should be carefully heeded by anyone using the book now. Again, an example of the pitfalls of relying on modern English-language secondary sources.

Amicalement,
- Alexandre

As for the "quote" from de Caulaincourt, I can't find it anywhere in his memoirs.
link
The coverage of the actions on the Berezina begins form page 160. It is quite detailed and includes discussion of the 10-12,000 "stragglers" that were abandoned.
The "rah-rah" tone of the passage does nto even sound like de Caulaincourt, who writes a rather high-brow, polished, but not affected, French.

Actually, I can't find anything like it French, by anyone.

Perhaps it is something in that Kevin or Britten-Austin just created ????
Maybe Kevin can provide a real, original, French-language source for the passage?

Amicalement,
- Alexandre

Whirlwind,

Indeed, Berthezène and de Caulaincourt were there. But they (i) were really strong Bonapartists, publishing memoirs well after the event and amid a specific social context, and (ii) apparently didn't even say what Kevin (or Britten-Austin?) claims that they said.

As to glory and war – well, certainly it was believed then, at least by some officers, that one could speak of the glory in war and not violate any social norms. How broadly this idea was accepted is largely lost to the illiteracy of the vast majority of the population. Indeed, I am not 100% convinced of that the officers who wrote in this vein were not more reflecting social conventions than their own real feelings.

My own experience colors this judgement. I lost all thought of "glory" in war the first time I got muddy and cold in boot camp. Subsequent experience did nothing at all to rekindle such ideas. However, my experience of modern (and often asymmetric) combat with automatic weapons, lots of communications and electronics, and high explosives delivered by remote platforms (or left in a trash can as an IED), in service of an industrial or even post-industrial power …. well, it is in some ways remote from the experience of 200 years ago.

Amicalement,
- Alexandre

Whirlwind,

Surely an even closer parallel is Borodino, which by this logic must go down as a fairly severe French defeat.

I actually think there is something to this – after all, the question of what both sides were trying to do on the day is a key part of any judgement about the success or otherwise of a battle.

Yes. I concur. I fail to agree with what I understand as Kevin's perspective of victory – that determination rests on a sole criteria. That baffles me. Any sole criteria. Napoleon destroys the breath of the Prussian field armies at Jena-Auerstädt in 1806, but the war went on for another year and two more major battles against the Russians, one of which crippled the French as much as it did the Russians – so Napoleon's aims for 1806 were not met – Jena/Auerstädt must be a French defeat! This makes no sense, the conditions of victory and defeat are more nuanced – as Alexandre previously alluded to.

As you point out – Borodino becomes a huge French defeat if this criteria is the only one applied. Napoleon wanted to, in reverse order of importance: 1) permanently stop the Russian retreat, 2) destroy the Russian field army, 3) end the war. None of these things are accomplished! Borodino must be a HUGE French defeat because the French goals were not met! But we all know the reality is more complicated.

Kevin,

Paul Britten-Austin's The Great Retreat is very helpful in this regard.

I sometimes ponder if you realize the people you are talking down to might have the books you denote.

Paul Britten-Austin's chapter on the Berezina crossing is entitled: Chapter 18: Holocaust at the Berezina I wonder if he titled it that because of how poorly the Russians came out of it or do you think he could be referring to the French situation? Let's dig deeper and see what Austin has to share:

The following is not all a quotation but I wanted it clearly offset so that readers could see what part of my post is primarily referenced material, within this section quotation marks and page numbers abound, all of them are from Paul Britten Austin's 1812: The Great Retreat, 1996 publication since that was the work Kevin so desired I reference.

Also, I've italicized everything that isn't my own commentary.

"Throughout this horrible day we saw the human heart laid bare,"Rossetti, 288 – do you think he called it a horrible day because of how victorious he felt?

"More tha 60,000 men, [Rossetti realizes] properly clad , well-nourished and fully armed, are about to attack 18,000 half-naked, ill-armed ones, dying of hunger and cold, divided by a swampy river and embarrassed by more than 50,000 stragglers, sick or wounded and an enormous mass of baggage," Rossetti, 288 – it appears the French had cause for concern as to their dispositions.

Austin writes that von Suckow, previously of the now dissolved III Corps d'armée's Württemberg division, "is one of thousands who suddenly decide that if he isn't to suffer all the horrors of imprisonment in Siberia the time has come to try and get across," 297

"as only the first ranks could actually see the two bridges, the mass behind them, who couldn't, was pushing and shoving for all it was worth and thrusting the first ranks into the river," Sergeant-Major Thirion, 298

"At first they suppose the vast name is due to some temporary hold up; and wait for it to clear" Austin's comments, 299 which are then followed up by: "But fresh masses of isolated men are arriving on every hand, and only swell it further. No more movement. No one can budge. At each instant the obstacle's growing. After waiting for three-quarters of an hour we decide to go ahead; and do so, albeit slowly, thanks to our horses which strike and overthrow the wretched footfolk," Griois 299 – emphasis is mine, do victorious soldiers recant how lucky they were to escape by riding over their fellows?

"Doubtless it was some ill-conceived order, too strictly enforced, that caused much of the day's disasters," Griois 299 – Disasters¿ but this is a victory!

Austin notes that while the bridges were supposed to have their uses segregated, there the "proper military order" required for such did not exist. Austin, 299

Austin recounts Griois's experience further: "Soon her's regretting even plunging into this ocean of desperate human beings," 299 and goes on to speak of the acts of desperation resulting in more pushing, shoving and attempts by the most desperate to swim the river.

This is of course all about the crossing and not the fight going on forward of it but it seems the places are not that far apart as Austin notes that as Victor's, "hardly 11,000, mostly Poles, Bavarians and Dutchmen, plus… Fournier's 800 cavalry…[and] Daendels' 26th Division…after crossing the river, has been ordered back again," 302 are facing off against the Russians (Wittgenstein, Miloradovitch, Platov & Yermolov with an estimated combined 41,000) between 10-11am.

With that in mind Austin follows up with, "At 11:30 a.m. Tascher sees the first cannonball come rolling along the ground. And it instantly unleashes panic," Austin, 302.

"the multitude rushes in all directions – running from bridge to bridge in hope of getting across…Then we see the shells bursting among them…new torrents being caused by their terror," Dumonceau, 302

Then one of the bridges breaks and is swept away.

"Together with all this we heard, like the roaring of a distant storm at sea, cries, yells, the crashing of vehicles, an undefinable uproar. It filled us with horror. And with all this we heard, like the distant roarings of a tempest at sea, cries, yells, wagons exploding, an undefinable uproar which filled us with terror," Dumonceau, 302

Sounds like the Berezina crossing is going GREAT for our side so far… though we do have a minor setback at 1pm when Napoleon is informed that Partonneaux's divisions's long awaited arrival has been indefinitely delayed by his surrender.

According to Austin's commentary, "But it comes as a great shock. An 'infuriated' Emperor inveighs against Partonneaux's cowardice…he orders the news to be kept secret – or rather, only communicated officially to the hard-pressed Victor…that the army, at the critical movement, has lost its rearguard," Austin 302-303

"At the bridgehead, meanwhile, the crush is becoming more and more nightmarish," Austin 303 – When is the happy fun part where we win gonna happen?

The following pages are more accounts of the hardship of the crossing and chaos.

Now after 7pm, perhaps has late as 8pm, "the Berezina – at least, but too late – has begun to freeze over," Austin 311

Victor's command, which would now be considered the rearguard, is apparently crossing about now but they are unable to protect many from death:

"But the ice not bearing, it broke, swallowing up men, women, horses, carriages. A beautiful woman, caught between two ice-floes as in a vice, was seen clutching her child in her arms…But soon she's swallowed up…General Lefèbvre [the Marshal's son]…Kept repeating: 'Oh, what a dreadful disaster! And those poor people who've been left there under the enemy's fire,'" 311

Yeah, this sounds just great. You'd recommend that I look at The Great Retreat – I'd recommend that you consider the Berezina crossing in a context beyond that of just whether Victor was able to hold off the Russians until nightfall.

Austin's Chapter 15: How shall we ever get through? has whole pages accounting the terrible state of the men who can no longer be called rank-and-file because they have divorced their units and are sometimes pillaging their own! Page 241 has Caulaincourt raving about how great it is that the Austrian Auxiliary Corps has defeated the Russians – when no such thing occurred! Austin points this out as an example of how bad the state of the French Army has become.

Here's some more from Caulaincourt on the state of the army while riding at Napoleon's side: "Out men, though vigorous on the march and full of dash when under fire, were emaciated, bloodless, filthy as chimney-sweeps, and as feeble as specters. To us these others, less exhausted and better nourished, less begrimed by bivouac fires, seemed like men of another race. They were alive. We were shadows," 245

Then there is an account by Victor's command: "the Emperor himself turning his back to the enemy. Then we too became demoralized. The monstrous disaster had been hidden from us. The idea had never crossed our minds that Napoleon could be defeated," 245 – This is regarding the campaign and the state of the army's morale, not specifically of the battle at the Berezina, but defeated & demoralized appear to be the create tones which I had stated in my previous post.

Your unqualified statement that the Berezina is a French victory baffles me. The French & their allies accomplished something amazing, awe-inspiring that they got away at all, but to say it is an unqualified victory while the Russians received an unqualified defeat… Shoot man, considering how badly the ‘victory' went, would defeat have required *all* the French & their allies to die?

Austin's account seems to reflect the reality that the French were in *bad shape* and it wasn't looking to get better, how you spin this to claim victory… I know I just keep saying this but I am awe-struck by it. I too will ask where you pulled these two quotes from because I've got all three of Austin's books and I've got Caulaincourt's account all handy so I'd be happy to match them up with what you posted…

Cheers,

The Bandit

This old thread covers a lot of the same ground (but with more vitriol!): TMP link

If you see at the great picture, the Berezina was inconsecuential. Its relevance came later, when re-writing the history of the wars, when the French were looking for some bright spots in what had been the worst disaster suffered by any French army since the Imperials captured Francis I at Pavia.

Basileus I completely disagree with this, and the overall position you have taken on this thread.It is precisely the "big picture" that makes the events at the Beresina so consequential. A big Russian win at the Beresina and the French are finished, and maybe Napoleon is even captured. What could be more big picture than that?
The relevance of the Beresina is AT THE BERESINA. The relevance doesn't come later during some "re-writing" effort, to use your phrase. Napoleon admitted during the days before Beresina that the situation had become very serious indeed. You should get hold of the Britten-Austin book that Bandit mentioned, its a great read and it describes very well how important the Beresina was, not just to the Commanders, but many thousands of soldiers and camp followers too. The passage of the river wasn't inconsequential, by any strech of the imagination. Like I said before, it is unlikely that the thousands who managed to get across, or the thousands that did not, thought that there was anything inconsequential about living to fight another day (or not).

Bandit, Alexandre,

I think everyone here is aware of the context of the Beresina. It is precisely this context that makes the battle such a huge victory for the French. Its one of Napoleon's greatest victories BECAUSE of the context, not in spite of it.

By the way the Britten-Austin book is a great one and I recently re-read it. I'm sure I could take it off my shelf and come up with even more quotes to support the idea that the battle was a very important victory, given the context of the situation. Your quotes do as much to support Kevin's view as they do your own, and/or Alexandre's.

TW,

I think everyone here is aware of the context of the Beresina. It is precisely this context that makes the battle such a huge victory for the French. Its one of Napoleon's greatest victories BECAUSE of the context, not in spite of it.

Huh?

By the way the Britten-Austin book is a great one and I recently re-read it. I'm sure I could take it off my shelf and come up with even more quotes to support the idea that the battle was a very important victory, given the context of the situation.

Please do because I just don't see it and neither it seems did Austin, the titles of his chapters should tell us *something* – "The Holocaust at the Berezina," isn't the name for a chapter about how great what the French accomplished was, it is the name of a chapter telling the reader how bad it was despite being able to escape.

I think what the French & allies accomplished at the Berezina was amazing, but that doesn't make it a victory. You and Kevin seem to say, "great accomplishment = victory" but it doesn't.

Your quotes do as much to support Kevin's view as they do your own, and/or Alexandre's.

I understand the perspective that long odds = potentially greater accomplishment, but at a certain point the odds aren't long, the reality is bad.

Whirlwind and I have both mentioned that if we apply this same standard of 'failing to meet your own goals = defeat' to other battles, then Napoleon has a lot of defeats – care to speak to that?

Cheers,

The Bandit

Kevin,

The Berezina was a French victory and a very bad defeat for the Russians.

I definitely agree with the first part of the sentence. As for it being a very bad defeat for the Russians, I am in two minds. If on the one hand, we accept the idea that the Russians were trying to trap Napoleon, then the Beresina represents a huge failure for the Russians. But if on the other hand we entertain the idea that Kutuzov did not want to totally destroy Napoleon, because he thought a weak France would be terrible for Europe, then it is not a failure from a Kutuzovian point of view.
But Kutuzov was not Russia, just one man in Russia, and I suppose the wish of most Russians at the time (i.e. after an invasion of their country) would have been to destroy Napoleon for ever. This did not happen, and the huge opportunity at the Beresina was lost. In that sense, I think you are correct in your statement that "the Berezina was a French victory and a very bad defeat for the Russians".

TelesticWarrior,

If on the one hand, we accept the idea that the Russians were trying to trap Napoleon, then the Beresina represents a huge failure for the Russians.

…This did not happen, and the huge opportunity at the Beresina was lost. In that sense, I think you are correct in your statement that "the Berezina was a French victory and a very bad defeat for the Russians".

I don't believe I am changing your intent by sticking those two chunks together.

If I apply this criteria to 1807 – Napoleon lost at Eylau, 1812 – Napoleon lost at Borodino, 1813 – Napoleon lost at Bautzen.

Cheers,

The Bandit

If you're going to make a statement such as the one above, then I suggest that you at least support it.

You, by those statements, are distorting history as well as thoughtful and logical discussion.

B

If I apply this criteria to 1807 – Napoleon lost at Eylau, 1812 – Napoleon lost at Borodino, 1813 – Napoleon lost at Bautzen.

I don't accept the comparison, because you are not in fact applying the same criteria. Eylau and Borodino were pitched battles between two evenly matched opponents. There was simply no question of trapping and completely destroying Bennigsen or Kutuzov at either of those two battles. Yet at the Beresina the forces were not evenly matched (in terms or both numbers and the dire strategic situation), and the Russians had the very real opportunity to annihilate the French. They did not. So it was a loss. A lost opportunity, as well as a lost battle.

At Eylau Napoleon and Bennigsen were fairly evenly matched, (relative to Beresina, in terms of numbers and the strategic situation), and the same is true of Napoleon and his adversary at Borodino. At Borodino for example Napoleon had nowhere near enough men to annihilate Kutuzov (that is why he vetoed Davouts request for the wide flanking manouvre). We cannot suggest that Napoleon "lost" either Eylau or Borodino, unless we use some perverse double-standards whereby any time Napoleon doesn't achieve something of near supernatural brilliance, we have to call it a loss!

By the way Britten-Austin also calls his chapter on Borodino, "Holocaust at Borodino". Its a word that he seems to like. And it is apt on both occasions, it's a great turn of phrase from a great author. But it says nothing at all about whether Austin believed Beresina was a win or a loss for either side.

TW,

Agree and that is an excellent analysis of the issue of those two battles and the outcome, as well as the Berezina.

B

Kevin & TW,

The criteria that Kevin put forward and that you (TW) further articulated and supported was that the Russians failed to meet their objectives, therefore it was a Russian defeat.

If that is the criteria for judgment and I apply that criteria to Eylau, Borodino & Bautzen then Napoleon was defeated because he did not accomplish his objectives at those battles.

I don't agree with that criteria and am pointing out that it leads to very strange conclusions. It is your criteria, I don't have to defend it, I don't even agree with it! :-p

Cheers,

The Bandit

Basileus I completely disagree with this, and the overall position you have taken on this thread.It is precisely the "big picture" that makes the events at the Beresina so consequential. A big Russian win at the Beresina and the French are finished, and maybe Napoleon is even captured. What could be more big picture than that?

Because, precisely, only the capture of Napoleon would have been decisive in any way. What was acomplished at the Berezina? That a few remnants were saved from Russian captivity. Nothing else. Napoleon understood it better than you or Kevin, apparently. After the crossing he went back to France to rise new armies, with cadres formed by his veterans of Spain. The Armee de l'Elbe was the only organized force able to make any resistence to the Russian advance, which was more hampered by their own exhaustion and loses than by any that the French did.

Yes, if Napoleon would have been captured there, the Berezina would have been relevant. As he wasn't, the Berezina was just another tragedy in an already horrific disaster.

The relevance of the Beresina is AT THE BERESINA. The relevance doesn't come later during some "re-writing" effort, to use your phrase.

Actually, it is not. The Berezina was understood as a disaster for those who survived the crossings. It was in the re-writing of the story in late XIXth Century when the heroism of Victor's men became the relevant part of the narrative. Before, it was a horror story, meant to scare the hell out of those who thought of war as something glorious instead as the bloody mess it actually is.

Bandit,

I am not at all sure if I understand or agree with the criteria you are applying. To repeat, the Beresina and the examples you gave (Eylau/Borodino) are such different situations that trying to apply the same criteria to them is going to lead to all sorts of problems.
Eylau and Beresina are pitched battles with very different considerations (in terms of the numberical and strategic balance). Beresina cannot be compared to them in the manner your are attempting to do.
If we really must compare Beresina to other Napoleonic examples then we have to look for battles/campaigns where a smaller force is in a very bad strategic pickle and is trying to force a passage (not necessarily over a river) or otherwise escape a numerically stronger enemy. Lets look at some of these;
Ulm – the Austrians are outnumbered overall and are in a bad situation. They fail to force a passage during a series of battles and eventually surrender. These battles are a clear LOSS for the Austrians.
Corunna – The Brits are outnumbered and in a bad way. They manage to hold of the French and get the vast majority of the army evacuated. Historians mostly agree that Corunna was a WIN for the Brits. (note that whilst the British lost the campaign, the battle itself was a success in achieving the required objective – it is battles we are discussing here, not campaigns).
Baylen – The French are outnumbered and in a bad shape. They fail to force a passage and surrender. A clear LOSS for Dupont, a clear win for Spain.
Hanau – Napoleon is outnumbered and an enemy is trying to block his retreat to France. Napoleon forces a passage. A clear win for Napoleon, a clear loss for Wrede.

Do you see the pattern here? Napoleon is in a bad way at the Beresina and outnumbered, with three enemy armies closing in. The French get the vast majority of combatants across to safety*. A clear win for Napoleon, a bad loss for the Russians, who also lost a massive opportunity. They would need to mobilise for war three more years in a row because of this failure.

*Lots of stragglers on the eastern bank are captured by the Russians. However, these were folks who arguably would never have reached total safety anyway. The Officers tried to get these people moving yet they could not, so clearly they were no longer classed as combat effectives. There is every indication that these poor souls would have been captured even if they somehow got across the Beresina. If you cannot even get up when ordered to do so, your'e not going to last much longer anyway (regardless of which side of the Beresina you are on).

Basileus

What was acomplished at the Berezina? That a few remnants were saved from Russian captivity. Nothing else.

You are joking right? Because of the Beresina Napoleon survived to fight again, free to return back to France to raise armies for 3 more years of history changing events. Ney, Murat, Victor, Oudinot and scores of other high-ups also got across the Beresina, along with most of their effectives (i.e effective at the start of the battle).
The Russians could have prevented all this, but failed. So it's actually one of the most important battles of the era. I would rate it far above Borodino in terms of its strategic consequences.

TW; The relevance of the Beresina is AT THE BERESINA. The relevance doesn't come later during some "re-writing" effort, to use your phrase.

Basileus; Actually, it is not. The Berezina was understood as a disaster for those who survived the crossings. It was in the re-writing of the story in late XIXth Century when the heroism of Victor's men became the relevant part of the narrative. Before, it was a horror story, meant to scare the hell out of those who thought of war as something glorious instead as the bloody mess it actually is.

As I keep saying, the relevance for the people who fought at the Beresina was at the Beresina, because it was a matter of life and death for them. At the time, in the raw frightening present, I doubt very much if those people cared very much about what people like us way in the future were going to say.
For those who crossed, it was a victory. For those who did not, it was a "horror story". Are you sure that the survivors we referring to the battle itself as a "disaster", and not the retreat from Moscow in its entirety? I would need to see hundreds of eye-witnesses testimonies to be as convinced as you seem to be.

By the way, as a side point, if people need events like the Russian campaign to think of war as something horrible rather than "glorious", then they don't get any sympathy from me for exhibiting such niavety.

@TW:

Make of it what you will, but the wiki entry for Berezina link states that :

Since then "Bérézina" has been used in French as a synonym for "disaster."

Not that my French is good enough to know.

My Collins Robert French-English dictionary offers

"c'est la Bérézina!" as "It's a complete disaster!"

p98 eighth edition 2006

So it would appear that it still has some modern currency.

Historical perspective is not a strength of either Wikipedia or a dictionary.

And the Berezina has been portrayed as a disaster because of the stragglers and human suffering, especially as the stragglers died or were taken prisoner by the Russians and they were looted by the Cossacks. The prospect of becoming a Russian or Cossack prisoner was not the most positive of the period.

What is usually overlooked, and in a degree that is being done here, is the fighting was savage, serious, and decisive. The Russian armies were continually thwarted in their objective of cutting off the French and capturing the bridges. In short, they were outfought. And that isn't the first thing many look at when the Berezina is brought up.

B

I am not at all sure if I understand or agree with the criteria you are applying.

I am taking your criteria (yours and Kevin's) and applying it.

The Berezina was a French victory and a very bad defeat for the Russians.

OK, why? The answer given by Kevin was:

So, in conclusion, the Russians failed to trap the French at the Berezina and the French clearly outfought two Russian armies, while the third failed to engage, undoubtedly because Kutusov didn't want to get beaten once again.

Then after being challenged on this Kevin offered:

You either win or you lose in combat. The Russians attempted to stop the French getting our of Russian and failed, and the French definitely outfought the two Russian armies they engaged.

That's a win, no matter how you wish to look at it.

…

The bottom line is that the Russians missed an opportunity at the Berezina and were badly defeated in the crossing operations and the heavy fighting on both sides of the river.

Then you chime in with these statements:

A big Russian win at the Beresina and the French are finished, and maybe Napoleon is even captured.

If on the one hand, we accept the idea that the Russians were trying to trap Napoleon, then the Beresina represents a huge failure for the Russians

…

and I suppose the wish of most Russians at the time (i.e. after an invasion of their country) would have been to destroy Napoleon for ever. This did not happen, and the huge opportunity at the Beresina was lost. In that sense, I think you are correct in your statement that "the Berezina was a French victory and a very bad defeat for the Russians".

I read those statements to indicate:

The Russians attempted to stop the French crossing and didn't (Kevin), the Russians missed their opportunity to destroy the French Army (Kevin), the Russians could have captured Napoleon (TW – I, Bandit, have no idea where you even got this as a remote possibility), the Berezina represents a huge failure of the Russians to capture / destroy Napoleon's Army (TW).

And from that I understood that the Russian aim was to destroy the French Army at Berezina, since they didn't do so, it was a Russian defeat.

That is the criteria I'm applying to other battles: The army wants to do X, if it accomplishes X, then victory, if it does not accomplish X then defeat.

That criteria seems ridiculous to me but it is what I understood you to be applying.

On a semi-related note:

Because of the Beresina Napoleon survived to fight again, free to return back to France to raise armies for 3 more years of history changing events.

Can you fill me in as to when and why Napoleon was in any real danger of being captured?

Cheers,

The Bandit

'Myth: the attack on Hougoumont at Waterloo was meant as a diversion.'

Since the main attack was by d'Erlon's corps, how would you characterize the French attacks on Hougoumont?

B

So, a bit of a disaster for the chaps who did all the dying, but a great victory for Napoleon then?

un homme comme moi se dérange peu des vies d'un million d'hommes

Quite

daubere,

So, a bit of a disaster for the chaps who did all the dying, but a great victory for Napoleon then?

This is why I disagree with Kevin and I suspect part of the reason others do as well. Napoleon isn't bettered by this statements but harmed. If you're biased towards Napoleon, declaring that his disasters which hurt so many were actually great victories for him personally just lowers him in everyone's esteem. We should call a defeat a defeat and a disaster a disaster, then when we call something a victory we won't be laughed at and disregarded.

Cheers,

The Bandit

'Can you fill me in as to when and why Napoleon was in any real danger of being captured?'

The Russians took Borisov and burned the bridge across the Berezina.

One Russian army was in front of the French on the west bank of the Berezina (Tshitshagov).

Two Russian armies (Wittgenstein and Kutusov) were in the rear of the Grande Armee and approaching from the east.

That is a potential trap and the possibility of Napoleon being killed or captured if the French could not bridge the river and fight their way clear was an actuality.

What do you think would have happened if the French could not cross the river and were defeated by Tshitshagov and Wittgenstein (as Kutusov chose to opt out of the fighting)?

It seems to me that Napoleon would have been either killed in action or captured.

You might want to read (if you haven't already) or reread Clausewitz.

B

That is a potential trap and the possibility of Napoleon being killed or captured if the French could not bridge the river and fight their way clear was an actuality.

What do you think would have happened if the French could not cross the river and were defeated by Tshitshagov and Wittgenstein (as Kutusov chose to opt out of the fighting)?

It seems to me that Napoleon would have been either killed in action or captured.

I think Napoleon evaded closer calls so the dispositions of the armies did not lead me to this conclusion.

Cheers,

The Bandit

'This is why I disagree with Kevin and I suspect part of the reason others do as well. Napoleon isn't bettered by this statements but harmed. If you're biased towards Napoleon, declaring that his disasters which hurt so many were actually great victories for him personally just lowers him in everyone's esteem. We should call a defeat a defeat and a disaster a disaster, then when we call something a victory we won't be laughed at and disregarded.'

You're ignoring the historical evidence, some of which has been provided to you and you have to make this personal, instead of historical.

I'm sorry, but that is pathetic on your part and it clearly demonstrates that you have no idea of what you're talking about historically.

The question remains: If the Russians won at the Berezina, how did the French successfully get across the river and fight their way out?

That doesn't describe a French defeat at the Berezina but a victory on the field. If the Russians had won at the Berezina, there would have been no campaigns of 1813 and 1814 as the game would have been over.

B

'I think Napoleon evaded closer calls so the dispositions of the armies did not lead me to this conclusion.'

Really.

Where?

Your knowledge and understanding of the history of the period is sorely lacking. I suggest that you hit the books and actually study the period before you post nonsense.

Further you didn't answer the question that was put-what do you think would have happened if the French didn't fight their way out?

B

'This is why I disagree with Kevin and I suspect part of the reason others do as well. Napoleon isn't bettered by this statements but harmed. If you're biased towards Napoleon, declaring that his disasters which hurt so many were actually great victories for him personally just lowers him in everyone's esteem. We should call a defeat a defeat and a disaster a disaster, then when we call something a victory we won't be laughed at and disregarded.'

You're ignoring the historical evidence, some of which has been provided to you and you have to make this personal, instead of historical.

I don't see Bandit's disagreeing with you in any way 'personal'. The condescension is all yours.

The simple fact is, that the Berezhina notwithstanding – we'll call it a French strategic win if it makes you happy, the 1812 Russian campaign was a disaster for the French. The Grande Armee was repulsed and reduced from ~500000 men to almost a cadre.

That doesn't speak much for Napoleon's leadership.

Kevin,

and you have to make this personal, instead of historical.

You've been calling me an ignorant meddler with nothing to offer for multiple pages in multiple threads now and you're accusing me of making it personal? I don't know what to even say to that.

Where?

Well, there were multiple times during the Russian campaign where cossacks were fended off by Napoleon's staff or by a duty squadron of his Guard Chasseurs à Cheval. Those might, in your mind, have a lesser chance of successful capture but in my mind they were closer scrapes. Heck at Eylau Russian infantry was about to overrun his person and some French Guard were called forward to repulse them. In this situation many of the officers with Napoleon wanted to run because they felt the danger was that impending. There was a lot less room for error in those situations. At Wagram Napoleon refused to remove his HQ from a position that was under Austrian artillery fire with staff and ADCs being killed within several feet or a couple yards of him. Those seem of higher immediate impending danger.

Further you didn't answer the question that was put-what do you think would have happened if the French didn't fight their way out?

Well, so are you in that you are not replying to Alexandre meeting your challenge regarding the quote you attributed to Caulaincourt, but that aside, sure I'll answer your question.

I think if the French army didn't fight its way out then the army would be destroyed, I think that is basically defined in the question and doesn't even require knowledge of the period let alone the specific situation. I do not think that the circumstance of the army being destroyed necessarily dictates the capture or death of Napoleon.

Cheers,

The Bandit