"Artillery and Formations" Topic

Travelling Turk,

I did I say that either was a lie?

Agreed Bill,

This is good to get the Russian perspective.

Russian 2nd Division

From the Pavlovskiy Grenadiers regimantal history:
- the regiment is in the second line or reserve of the division
- at 7 in the evening, the division is coming under attack by Marchard and Bisson's divisions of Ney's corps
- the first line of the division is beginning to "crumble" under the fire of Sénarmont's guns
- the regiment is led forward to counter-attack the French with the bayonet
- Dupont's division is seen advancing to join fight
- the order to withdraw is received
- casualties for the battle are 2 officers killed or mortally wounded (including the chief) and 86 other ranks, 16 officers and 335 other ranks wounded (officer wounds not described), total about 33%

Rostovskiy Musketeers
- "short format" regimental "memory" book, not a detailed history
- no details at all

Sankt-Peterburgskiy Grenadiers
- description similar to that found in Pavlovskiy Grenadiers regimental history
- casualties given for Heilsberg and Freindland combined : 327 other ranks killed, wounded or missing, 4 officers killed and 6 wounded, total about 25%

Yeletskiy Musketeeers
- same as for Rostovskiy Musketeers

Thanks Alexandre, very interesting. In some ways , not that different from the French accounts, although with the elements of the ordered Russian counter-attack then ordered withdrawal.

Regards

Alexandre:

Here is my thoughts on what you've presented. First off, I tend to be rather sceptical of maps in general, because they often fudge for various graphic reasons without telling the reader, and have the identical interpretation problems that any contemporary narrative offers.

The von Lettow-Vorbeck shows the 2nd Division covering more than 1000 meters of front. I assume the two blocks represent the two brigades. Now with only 3600 men in three ranks, plus 24 guns, that means the division is strung out in a single line with no supporting line. Not the typical deployment. The 1st division is shown in four blocks, but only representing 2400 men.

The Russian cavalry didn't normally attack in column. Line was the combat formation. However, if following the norms found in other battles, the cavalry would have been in two equal lines of 2.5 squadrons or two squadrons with the fifth in a third line. That gives a 450 yard front more or less. The French division would have been in line also, with a similar series of lines at full distance. Again the norm, and presenting a similar front. They could have still been in column, but if they were, it would have still been at least two lines deep at distance. All of which is to say, that the French first line could have been taken in flank, but not the whole division, for the French and Russian deep formations was specifically designed to provide a counter to that.

Senarmont is supposed to have attacked, according to the ICorps report, to force the Russians to retreat. However, nowhere does anyone say they did. Second issue is Senarmont forming one line because of the restricted front. The front only becomes restricted very close to Friedland itself, about where the Russian 1st Division is shown on the map. If it was that restricted, there is no way Dupont could have done anything to support Senarmont or defeat the Russian guard infantry.

It still isn't clear where Dupont is. According to Senarmont he has already started advancing when the Artillery General has lent support with 12 guns and wants to commit the rest. And the guns are first set up on each flank of Dupont's division. Only afterward to they move forward ahead of Dupont. Senarmont advances several times, but the distances given are not something that Dupont's division could easily have kept pace with overall, particularly if the guns are being manhandled forward at the end. For Dupont not to be at least close to Senarmont for the entire enterprise means he stopped, but there is no indication and certainly given Dupont's response to Ney's retreat, no reason to think he did stop.

The problem is space and time. If Senarmont was so restricted by space before the Guard attacks, then I fail to see how Dupont could have done anything to the front at all, let alone find space to maneuver north later. However, IF Dupont was in the middle, stopped the Russian Guards [for whatever reason], then moved off to the north, it would be natural to attach five guns of the right artillery battery to his right flank, and with Senarmont still in place, have his rear and flank covered by the gun battery.

That allows Senarmont to blast away at Friedland streets on a narrow front, with Dupont on his left, and Ney on his right.

Again, whateve sequence is given, it has to be able to reasonably fit in the space avaiable, and assuming that the map shows the terrain accurately, leaves only a few interpretations that work within it. One obviously is to leave Dupont out of the engagement entirely, as you have suggested, only that is contrary to the French reports, which claim spectacular successes [however assisted by the withdrawal order] against the guards by his division…that wasn't engaged at all?

Bill

‘…that does not answer my question…I dispute your position in that argument that it was Senarmont who took and held ground and do so with citation from Arnold as well as quotations you had posted. From both Arnold and your citations, it appears that Senarmont beat up the Russians and then supporting French forces took the ground from those Russians who had been hurt but had not yet left. I asked you to respond to this, as yet, you haven't addressed my question specifically. Whether the infantry & cavalry were supporting Senarmont or not is not the question, the core of the question I posed was who took the ground. Per Arnold and your source material, it was the infantry & cavalry, not Senarmont, yet you state over and over that it was Senarmont. This is what I am pressing you to clear up.'

First, I suggest getting a good map of the battle, especially showing the location of Friedland, the Russian bridges, the Muhlen Fluss and the bridge crossing it, and Senarmont's positions. Using both Maude's map and those in the Esposito/Elting Atlas will help immensely.

I believe that your question has been answered, and whether or not you ‘dispute' what I've written you've not shown anything to the contrary. The narrative in the Atlas definitely shows that Senarmont moved forward after destroying the Russian center and defeating the Russian cavalry counterattack and that Dupont was on his left when he defeated the Russian Guard infantry.

It seems to me that you can't understand what happened on the ground and what close range artillery fire was capable of doing. They were almost too close to miss.

Again, you should read all of the sources and not just rely on Arnold. Both Arnold and Maude tend to stop the narrative on Senarmont after the Russian center's destruction-the Atlas carries it further to the end of the action.

It is also noteworthy that there were only three French infantry divisions involved-Dupont's, Marchand's and Bisson's-the other two divisions of I Corps were in reserve and were not engaged. The French infantry certainly advanced into Friedland and the artillery did advance after the main action in order to help complete the victory.

That, in effect, he took the ground he dominated with his artillery fire. Did the infantry advance? Sure, that was their mission, under aggressive division commanders.
Did Senarmont inflict the number of casualties that he mentioned in the letter to his brother? I have seen nothing to contradict what he stated, and the Russian losses were very heavy.

Bennigsen led his army into a trap and the Russian troops paid the price for his blundering. And, no, I do not agree with, nor do the different casualty numbers support, your idea that Senarmont's report of 4,000 dead amount to over half of the Russian dead on the field.

Plotho's numbers are probably closer to the mark. The Russians were whipped, and whipped badly, and heavy casualties, especially with the traffic snarl in Friedland and the bridges set afire (and badly sited to begin with) undoubtedly contributed to the heavy losses. But so did Senarmont's action. Firing over 500 rounds of artillery at close/point blank range at close-ranked infantry is going to cause very heavy losses.

As for accuracy or not, I would suggest reading Bennigsen's after action reports not only for Friedland, but for the campaign as a whole. Further, Bennigsen would be reluctant to admit failure to the Tsar as he undoubtedly wanted to cover up his own incompetence and the magnitude of the defeat. You can read his after action reports in Wilson.

I would recommend, but I have no idea whether or not you have read the sources or not, that you do read the complete list of source material and then comment. You should read Arnold, Marion, the after action reports, Elting, and the narrative in the Atlas, as well as Yermelov, the Zhmodikov's books on Russian tactics, and Wilson before coming to a logical conclusion.

I absolutely understand that no matter what is written or what I may say, your opinion won't be changed, nor will anyone else's who has already made up their minds. However, you should also be cognizant that presenting demands on the forum to have your questions answered may or may not be done. You can ask, but have no right to demand; if that was not your intent, then I'm mistaken in that assumption. However, answering the same questions repeatedly is redundant and accomplishes nothing in the long run.

Relying on opinions such as Rory Muir made in his excellent volume tend to be incorrect and may be written because artillery employment and effect on target just are not understood.

So, in the end, we undoubtedly will have to agree to disagree with each others' conclusions on the action.

B

Kevin,

Here is the chain of events in this thread between us, broadly speaking:
• You made a claim and posted a bunch of evidence.
• Bill disputed your claim.
• You strongly reiterated your claim and made it clear there was no ambiguity to your meaning.
• I pointed out that some of your evidence does not support your claim and Arnold's conclusion differs from yours.
• I asked if you disputed Arnold.
• You said no.
• I asked you to explain the inconsistency between your conclusion, your evidence and Arnold's conclusion.
• I posted outlining the inconsistencies in specific.
• You said there was no inconsistency.
• I pressed you to address what I see as an inconsistency.
• You say I need to read more and look at maps, you conclude I haven't and won't do either.

What I need is to read an answer from you that addresses the inconsistency but you don't want to provide that. Instead you are now claiming that my mind is made up and that it can't be changed and I am relying on too little information and I must not look at maps. None of those things are accurate statements about me or my opinion. I'm plenty happy to hear you address what I pointed out on… page 2 I believe it was, roughly center in the page *I think*.

If you decline to participate in the conversation, claiming that I won't change my mind is assuming your own conclusion. I'm not denying your claim, I'm giving you a repeated opportunity to explain and justify your claim so that I can understand it – that might very well cause me to accept your conclusion. Right now I have no idea if your conclusion is right or not, I just not it doesn't jive with the conclusions of others or with portions of your own evidence as I understand it.

Cheers,

The Bandit

I've always been leery of colonel Brechtel's report because of his 'genuine reverence' for Senarmont and his conclusions which were then provided as a AAR. Having said that, he does provide some fascinating information. And again, issues concerning all the reports so far detailed.

Here is what he says concerning the early events:

The intrepid Marshal {Ney} pushed his two divisions in the space between the wing and the ravine formed by the mill stream. [That means right in the same area that Senarmont and Dupont later act.] The Right, Merchand's division, left the division Bisson gain ground in front, but are soon exposed to a terrible fire of artillery. The Russian batteries placed with the Russian left wing, take these troops of flank, and because of their position, causing havoc. A Russian cavalry charge ends the advance of Bisson's division. At this critical moment, the l Corps is in support. Dupont's division advanced along the ravine; his artillery, commanded by Captain Ricci, goes into battery with the same parade-ground composure and stops by the Russians wiht his fire, who are at the same time reduced by the dragons of the Tour-Mauliourg.

Now this all occurs before Senarmont makes his famous advance. The Russians bring up reinforcements.

Now, is one of the interesting parts. The 1st Corps artillery was actually parceled out to the divisions.

In the report it gives:

Dupont two 12lbs eight 6lbs two howitzers
Lapisse six 6lbs two 4lbs two howitzers
Villatte six 6lbs two 4lbs two howitzers
Art Res two 12lbs two 6lbs two howitzers

That is 38 guns. I would imagine that the six guns held in reserve were the reserve guns. What Brechtel says is this:

With the consent of general Victor, and despite objections of the generals of division, Senarmont brings together all the artillery of the army corps under his command; leaving six pieces in reserve, he formed two batteries of fifteen pieces within 400 m of the enemy.

Now, the 12 guns with Dupont obviously were his divisions 12 guns and Senarmont was asking for command of all Corps artillery, something he hadn't had up to that point, rather than permission to attack with them… and from Napoleon's response, what he then did with them appeared reckless and unexpected.

Now, Senarmont in his letter to his brother, describes his advance. Unlike Brechtel, who had the batteries first firing from 400 meters, Senarmont says 250 toises, or about the same. Brechtel has Senarmont close to 120 meters, Senarmont say far less

I pushed the two batteries forward to take position 60 toises [120 yards] at most of the Russian line.

Then he writes:

The land is triangle, [between the river and mill stream] and we walked towards the tip, we found ourselves together. It was then that we did for twenty-five minutes the most terrible fire of grape-shot I ever saw.

Now, here is an issue or two. The first is that Senarmont had to be fairly close to Friedland to be forced to combine the two lines of artillery [a gun line of about 450 yards] And if so, where were the Russians, let alone 4,000 of them, plus the guard counter-attacks?

The second issue is that Senarmont states that he sat 120 yards from the Russians for 25 minutes firing canister, but only fired the reported 300 canister shells. With thirty guns at two shots per minute [conservative for 6 and 4 pounders…the are capable of 2-3 shots per minute] that means five to six minutes of canister fire possible. One shot a minute is less than half that 25 minutes. So….

I mentioned that no damage to any guns were reported, even though the Russian guns would still have been flanking Senarmont's move as they had Ney's, let alone those facing him.

Brechtel's report does say this:

Artillery, arrived at approximately 250 toises of the enemy, made one or two forward movements, whereupon the pieces, until the end of the fight, constantly stood 150 toises and 100 toises from the enemy, using more than canister until the enemy had made his retirement after a huge loss of men. The day's damage pieces remained in position on the edge of the ravine left, and near the town, after which they returned to the [artillery]Park.

[which is where damaged guns would go to be repaired.]

I still see the major issue to be space and time with Dupont's division.

I have also been thinking about the Russian losses. It *could be* that Senarmont, seeing the Russian 2nd division of 3600 plus guns could have easily come up with a rough estimate of the numbers he was facing and worked off that. I am also wondering how the Russians came up with how many officers were killed and wounded by what means when they were basically routed way from the battlefield. How would they know? The French didn't do such detailed returned when they won the field and they had a far better staff and quartermaster system than the Russians. Just wondering.

Bill

Bill,

While generally agreeing with all your comments, and shairng your unaswered questions, would it be OK if I offered some comments?

"they were basically routed way from the battlefield."
I would not be so sure of this, especially for Guards units and Grenadier infantry. I don't see these doing much routing, ever.

"they had a far better staff and quartermaster system than the Russians"
I would not be so sure, especially at the lowest levels of organization.

For example, a Russian Guards or Grenadier platoon would have 2 artel'shchniki, a kind of commissary, with carts, plus a corpsmen and and either a doctor's aide or a barber. Overall, the Russian medical service was quite well developed. Also, all officers were provided with at least one personal servant (more for higher ranking officers or those bringing there own serfs to attend them).

Officers were noble, and engaged in a "holy" assignment of defending the realm of the Emperor. They could also be socially rather important. You could get in real trouble if you neglected Staff-Captain Ivanov, and he turned out to be a distant relation of the Repnin's. So, noting the exact nature of their wounds or the manner of their death would not be a surprise at all.

Amicalement,
- Alexandre

Whirlwind,
Thank you for your kind words.
I agree with you.
I think if we work only from the original documents, and carefully compare them, and pay very close attention to the "synchronicity" of each relation to the time line in the other relations, that then we might get pretty close to what happened.
It is actually not a simple task. But working together without preconceived notions or biases, I think we get closer and closer to seeing how things really happened.
Amicalement,
- Alexandre

I guess I missed this one, but who is Colonel Brechtel?

I know who Captain Brechtel was, but not Colonel Brechtel, especially in 1807.

B

"they were basically routed way from the battlefield."
I would not be so sure of this, especially for Guards units and Grenadier infantry. I don't see these doing much routing, ever.

Alexandre:
I am sure there were a number of behaviors in the retreat, and not all would be called a 'rout.' On the other hand, many of the descriptions of the Russian retreat weren't anything close to an organized withdrawal either.

"they had a far better staff and quartermaster system than the Russians."

I would not be so sure, especially at the lowest levels of organization.

For example, a Russian Guards or Grenadier platoon would have 2 artel'shchniki, a kind of commissary, with carts, plus a corpsmen and and either a doctor's aide or a barber. Overall, the Russian medical service was quite well developed. Also, all officers were provided with at least one personal servant (more for higher ranking officers or those bringing there own serfs to attend them).

You aren't describing something unique to the Russian army. THe British army officers all had a 'batman' for instance. Higher ranked officers could have an entire 'mess' in attendance.

What you are describing as a commissary is fairly sparce compared to Britain or France. Even so, the question would be more about how they performed and what they did, rather than whether they existed. All armies had general staff of some sort, some very large retinues, but all staffs were not equal in quality.

Officers were noble, and engaged in a "holy" assignment of defending the realm of the Emperor. They could also be socially rather important. You could get in real trouble if you neglected Staff-Captain Ivanov, and he turned out to be a distant relation of the Repnin's. So, noting the exact nature of their wounds or the manner of their death would not be a surprise at all.

While I can see that being a possibility, it still requires a servant or fellow officers to note their death and manner of passing in the midst of combat and then a retreat. Then, of course, it could be that there was a serious exchange of prisoners, officers dead and alive. The question is whether that happened. At Borodino, the Russians failed to ever find the bodies of some rather important generals.

Bill

guess I missed this one, but who is Colonel Brechtel?

I know who Captain Brechtel was, but not Colonel Brechtel, especially in 1807.

Kevin:
If you think about it hard enough, I am sure you will figure it out. I mean, how many Brechtel's associated with Senarmont can there be? Even if they did keep the same rank their entire career.

Bill

Bill

Thank you very much for your assistance with my question.

B

You're welcome. Actually, to be technical. Brechtel was a lieutenant in 1807 and not officially made captain until 1810 according to his biography.

Has anyone any idea about the intervals between guns and the overall frontage of Senarmont`s two batteries when they were joined?

The usual interval between field pieces in action was twenty yards. However, it would be dependent on terrain and as the terrain narrowed along the line of Senarmont's advance, the interval was probably much shorter. I haven't seen anything that actually gives the interval, unfortunately.

B

Kevin,

The usual interval between field pieces in action was twenty yards.

The subject of spacing between guns has come up on TMP *a lot* and while the dependence of terrain and various other concerns certainly caused it to vary, there have also been several different statements made on TMP as to what was "typical practice" varying from 12 yards to 30 yards. It is a strange thing that there isn't a consensus on. Nafzinger for instance states that he was not able to find anything in all the regulations he has looked at and translated regarding the spacing. Bowden and the others affiliated with the Empire rules have said that they based theirs off the spacing of ACW artillery (which I *think* was ~16 yards?).

When you say the usual interval was 20 yards, is that your conclusion from various use cases you've studied or is that a standard which appeared in a regulation which you've reviewed? If the latter – are you able to indicate the source?

Cheers,

The Bandit

I found it in The Anatomy of Glory in the appendices years ago. It is a handy reference and mentions that 'custom and experience' determined French artillery practice in the field, which would also describe French skirmisher employment.

B

That is 600 yards for the 30 guns, whether separate or together, 300 hundred yards on either side of Dupont who with his division would have had a front of around 900 yards. [in two lines of 5 brigades each].

Bill

Bill,

I think you meant ten battalions each I think as he had ten total in two brigades. 900 yards or so for Dupont sounds about right, figuring somewhere around 200 yards per battalion including intervals between them. Interesting that Seramont's guns would take up a 1/3 the space of Dupont but while that goes against the common "wargaming table experience" it doesn't seem crazy.

Cheers,

The Bandit

The intervals used are important here, as Bill says; a 20 yard interval gives us a 600 yard maximim frontage and Bandit has pointed out maybe a minimum of about 350 yards (given 12 yards interval).

I have tried to calculate the effectiveness of canister and likely casualties at the 117 yards, however the frontage of the batteries limits the target size to about 2-3 battalion widths and so (even with a conservative estimation of casualties possible per canister used and a time period of less than 5 minutes fire) there is quite easily an "overkill" of the numbers of troops in front of the guns, or the casualties are in excess of 50%.
This does not match the Russian casualty rates of 25-33% given by Alexandre.

The point at which the batteries become joined seems to have been quite early, allowing for Dupont`s and other troops (Neys?) to form to the wings of the batteries.
Looking at Elting/Esposito on p.81. that front is about 2,000 yards and is 1,500 yards short of the edge of Freidland.

Let's not forget that Clausewitz stated that an artillery piece had a frontage of seven to eight yards, without qualification as to task. As Kevin says, Lachouque is equally clear when he describes a 20 yards interval, though he is talking about divisional artillery, rather than massed artillery which had a quite distinct doctrine.

Allan

Uh, yeah. Battalions, not brigades…. Thanks Bandit

The point at which the batteries become joined seems to have been quite early, allowing for Dupont`s and other troops (Neys?) to form to the wings of the batteries.
Looking at Elting/Esposito on p.81. that front is about 2,000 yards and is 1,500 yards short of the edge of Freidland.

I am always leery of maps, from seeing how many are fudged or skewed for one reason or another. From instance, the map that Alexandre provides the link to has the Russian 2nd Division not only strung out in one thin line, but as forward and isolated as a division can be thousands of yards from the nearest support in any direction. Really? And of course, the unit positions are a snapshot of a moment in a battle, so when is also a question, let alone the actual distances involved and troop placement.

Bill

According to Paul Dawson : Les Brutal, The Guard Foot Artillery 1797 – 1815, in normal order the space between each gun was 5 m, the gun itself about 2 m, that woule gibe 7 meters frontage for each gun, in close order the interval could be reduced to 2 meters, in extended order the interval was about 8 meters, one should ask Paul, who usually knows his stuff.

I did not find casualties reports for Rostovskiy Musketeers and Yeletskiy Musketeeers – the first line of the Russian 2nd Division. It is quite possible that the had more than 20-33% total casualties that were reported for the Horse Guards and and the two grenadier regiments of 2nd Division. It would not have exceeded ~60%, I should think, in either regiment, or there would iikely be some report of battalion consolidations.
Bill, I think, stated before that he thought that ~4000 total casualties (not just dead) from de Sénarmont;s guns might be a good working estimate. I would not disagree. That would be spread among the 4 heavy infantry regiments of 2nd Division, the 2 Guards Foot regiments, Horse Guards, counter-battery fire, and then shooting into the town as the Russians withdrew.
Amicalement,
- Alexandre

By the time of the 'withdrawal' the bridges were on fire and the Russians of Bagration's command were broken and trying to escape. A rear guard had been formed but the situation at that time was disastrous for the Russians.

B

Alexandre – Did the regimental history of Pavlovskiy Grenadiers that you cited give an indication of the timing of that order in comparison to the bridges burning?

Cheers,

The Bandit

'According to Paul Dawson : Les Brutal, The Guard Foot Artillery 1797 – 1815, in normal order the space between each gun was 5 m, the gun itself about 2 m, that woule gibe 7 meters frontage for each gun, in close order the interval could be reduced to 2 meters, in extended order the interval was about 8 meters, one should ask Paul, who usually knows his stuff.'

The problems with that close of an interval between pieces is in emplacing and displacing because you need room to maneuver the gun teams when bringing the pieces into battery. Two and five meters or yards isn't a lot of room.

B

Here is one of the issues. At 7 yards apart, at least, so crews can manhandle the guns forward, that is 210 meters or 228 yards. And if the French were talking paces, that is another calculation.

In any case, when Senarmont says:

The land is triangle, and we walked towards the tip, we found ourselves together. It was then that we did for twenty-five minutes the most terrible fire of grape-shot I ever saw.

This 'found ourselves together' could still be because Dupont is in line with them, making that 'space' or frontage restricted. Earlier in the action, Brecktel states:

"Dupont's division advanced along the ravine; his artillery, commanded by Captain Ricci, goes into battery with the same composure on the field of manoeuvre [as the parade ground] stops the Russians with his fire…"

That ravine is the area of the mill stream on the left, which would make sense if Bisson's division of Ney's corps was being supported by Dupont and he came up on Bisson's left. As Dupont moves to the left to take the Russian Center in flank later, that all would work.

Bill

So according to Senarmont his 30 guns did for 25 minutes the most terrible fire of grape shot (did they have literaly grape shot – or canister, two different things) – also according to Senarmont, they did fire 400 canister , so 30 guns fire 400 canister over 25 minutes??
That would be 13 canister over 25 minutes per gun??

The 1st Corps after action report states 400 canister rounds were fired (the French were not supplied with grapeshot for field artillery by this point in time); Senarmont's states 368 out of a total of 2516 rounds fired. That is undoubtedly the correct amount as Senarmont had to have his artillery resupplied after the action.

As for the number of canister rounds, I would suggest that the French fired a mix of roundshot and canister at the Russian center, not just canister. And canister was fired at the attacking Russian cavalry that attempted to take Senarmont in the flank.

B

368/400. Folks estimate and round up, even in official reports. That still is only 30 divided by 400 rounds of 'grape' and canister, or 13 rounds per gun. If the guns were firing canister/grape for 25 minutes that is one round every two minutes… The one advantage 6 and 4 pounders had over heavier guns was their more rapid fire. I can not see how Senarmont's command fired canister for 25 minutes.

Bill

Bill,

This is just my interpretation of reading Senarmont's account but as I read it they didn't fire canister for 25 minutes, they fired canister over the course of the affair which he estimated as taking 25 minutes. Thus, I'm thinking the action took 25 minutes and during that canister was fired, not necessarily the whole time. That said, my reading of it does not account for the ammunition expenditure in any way, shape or form.

Cheers,

The Bandit

This is just my interpretation of reading Senarmont's account but as I read it they didn't fire canister for 25 minutes, they fired canister over the course of the affair which he estimated as taking 25 minutes. Thus, I'm thinking the action took 25 minutes and during that canister was fired, not necessarily the whole time. That said, my reading of it does not account for the ammunition expenditure in any way, shape or form.

Bandit:

As for the ammo, I agree. Senarmont's account, however, seems pretty straight-forward to me, [aside from any critical analysis.] he moves the artillery forward from 400 to 120 meters and then fires grape/canister for 25 minutes:

I raised my two batteries to take position at 200 toises at most from the enemy, and after 20 rounds, with the enemy moving, and though we saw its ranks supported minute by minute, I walked the two batteries in the extended line and took position at 60 toise at most from the Russian line. The land is a triangle, and we walked towards the tip, we found ourselves together. It was then that we did for twenty-five minutes the most terrible fire of grape-shot I ever saw.

Je portai mes deux batteries pour prendre position à 200 toises au plus de l'ennemi, et après une vingtaine de salves, cet ennemi ne bougeant pas, quoique nous vissions ses rangs s'éclaircir do minute en minute, je fis marcher les deux batteries à la prolonge et leur fis prendre position à 60 toises au plus de la ligne russe. Le terrain étant en triangle, et nous, marchant vers la pointe, nous nous trouvâmes réunis. Ce fut alors que nous fîmes pendant vingt-cinq minutes le plus terrible feu de mitraille que j'aie jamais vu.

Bill

I agree Senarmont and other sources clearly point out that they fired canister only in the last stage of their advance – which makes sense, there canister is only effective at close range.

Agreed, it makes some sense to close the range for canister, but, there was only about 6 minutes` worth of canister (at a rate of fire of 2 per minute), the munition needs some range to spread and roundshot would have been more effective (more likely to kill out-right) on densely packed formations or upon troops caught in a defile.

Roundshot, as mentioned by Kevin earlier was surely used with the canister.

Apparently Senarmont`s estimation of casaulties would have been arrived at by sampling a number of square grids on the battlefield and the total for the area concerned (in this case not the whole battlefield) was generated (multiplied I guess) from these samples.

It was French doctrine to divide massed artillery into three parts: one central and two wings. Only the central portion would fire at the object (or 'target'). Would this have been the case for Senarmont? If so, all the calculations for rounds per piece would need to be revisited, as it is possible that as few as 10 pieces were actually issuing fire against the Russians to their front.

Allan

"The Berezina was a French victory…"

By that standard, Dunkirk was one of the greatest victories of British arms in history.

After all, they managed to escape in the face of constant enemy attacks in the air, on land, and at sea, over a much greater body of water, and saved a far higher proportion of their men than Napoleon saved of his.

So would you agree that Dunkirk was an even greater victory than the Berezina? (Surpassing even their previous triumphs during the evacuation of Gallipoli, Moore's 1809 flight to Corunna, and the retreat from Lexington & Concord.)

Perhaps it's time for a new Osprey title: "Stop Complaining: We Got A Few Out." OR: Running Away To Victory: History's Greatest Skedaddles!

YouTube link

…and, apart from the AWI, the British eventually came out on the victorious side

>double win<

The Traveling Turk,

Did you mean to post that on the myths and outright lies! thread TMP link ?

It sure does fit there.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Comparing the evacuation from Dunkirk with the crossing of the Berezina is not a valid analogy and I would further think it to be an error in logic.

The troops that were evacuated from Dunkirk were defeated. And they had to abandon their arms and equipment while waiting to get picked up by the Royal Navy and any craft that could cross the channel from Britain.

The Russians could not stop the French retreat and were repeatedly defeated in the field when they tried.

The Berezina was a battle, lost by the Russians and won by the French and the French got across the river with the guns and ammunition (only five artillery pieces were lost during the operation).

'It has been said that the bridges presented a hideous spectacle due to the crowding and confusion…In reality, the crossing of the Berezina in the face of the enemy was a very large military imdertaking that reflects further glory on the army and its chief.'-General Baron Pierre Berthezene, French Imperial Guard.

'All honor to the French. Honor to the nation that breed such men! And shame on the cowards who would tarnish the glory they earned-a glory even more precious than the laurels coveted by their descendants, and that of the Europeans who were never able to beat them…'-General Caulaincourt.

Both of the above quotes regard the Berezina operation at which both officers were present.

B

Allan,

Excellent point. That would seem to indicate, then, that the left of the battery, 10 pieces, were the ones that engaged the Russian cavalry when they counterattacked.

B

Kevin,

The troops that were evacuated from Dunkirk were defeated. And they had to abandon their arms and equipment while waiting to get picked up by the Royal Navy and any craft that could cross the channel from Britain.

The French evacuating Russia were also defeated, that is why they were leaving Russia… had they not been defeated – don't you think they wouldn't have abandoned the campaign?

As to their arms, I *can't find* a strength estimate of the French Army leading up to or at the Berezina that doesn't qualify itself with some form of the statement, "X men still under arms, thousands or tens of thousands of others had already cast theirs away and could be called stragglers." There were whole cavalry squadrons made up of only officers who no longer had men-under-arms to command!

Your two quotes don't address either of these core points and frankly, Caulaincourt (who I think very well of) and a General of the Imperial Guard aren't likely to write about how terrible it was no matter the reality.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Comparing the losses of guns at Dunkirk with the loss of guns at the Berezina is not a valid analogy and I would further think it to be an error in logic.

There is an exact analogy here: the British Army couldn't get its guns and large kit away because of the conditions at Dunkirk, rather like the French Army couldn't get its guns out of Russia because of the conditions at Vilna.

You know Kevin, I think your argument is actually really powerful and then you undermine it yourself by refusing it to apply the logic of it faithfully!!

Berezina, Corunna and Dunkirk were all victories for the retreating side because they did what they had to do and got away . You can be victorious in a battle in a lost campaign (France 40, Russia 1812), you can be victorious in a battle in a campaign which implies retreat from the beginning (British in Spain 1808).

Senarmont`s batteries had "reserves" of six guns. I assumed that these would have been deployed for flank protection?

The 12-pounders were kept in reserve and were later committed in support of Dupont's advance into Friedland after the destruction of the Russian center, and, apparently, after Dupont defeated the infantry of the Russian Guard.

The six guns held in reserve by Senarmont were not committed until then.

B

Thanks Kevin,
So as Allan points out, the 10 six-pounders in each battery would have been the centre divison and the two 3-pounders and the three howitzers provided the flank protection.

"Did you mean to post that on the myths and outright lies! thread"

Yes, another inexplicable TMP bug. Oh well.

"Berezina, Corunna and Dunkirk were all victories for the retreating side"

I prefer Churchill's assessment:

"We must be very careful not to assign to this deliverance the attributes of a victory. Wars are not won by evacuations."

But this is a question of opinion. One can certainly make the case for a successful escape being a "victory"… as long as one is logically consistent in doing so. If the Berezina is a French victory, then Coruña, Dunkirk and the French retreat from Leipzig must certainly also be victories, as you say. (The evacuation of the Red Devils from Arnhem is surely another great victory, n'est-ce pas?)

I haven't seen any two sources that agree on how many were left behind at the Berezina and how many escaped, but if Napoleon got away with about half of his people, then that makes the Berezina almost as great a success as the rescue of the Titanic's passengers.

A couple of contributions to the debate. (Conjecture and IMP)

The calculations on rates of fire and casualties suggest all guns firing more or less equally. If the 12 pounders were held in reserve then they will have fired less and the other guns more over the duration of this moving barrage. Time taken to manhandle the guns forward will tend to reduce the rate of fire.

I think I recall from somewhere that the howitzers were often kept loaded with cannister and placed on the flanks in order to provide close protection to the cannons. This implies a low rate of cannister expenditure by the howitzers and a mechanism for repulsing the Russian cavalry. Another reasons for assuming a higher rate of fire by the non-reserve cannon.

As to the spacing between guns. 20 metres makes sense when you think about the length of the team plus limber plus gun when limbered. If the battery arrives in a single column (follow the lead)then the guns will naturally be spaced some 20 metres apart. All that is needed is to perform a quarter turn of the unlimbered guns and the battery is in position.
When you want to limber up then keeping at 20 metres allows the teams to rapidly limber the guns and leave the position. I know it can be argued that the teams could go forward through the gun line and wheel back but this is very risky if the battery position is under attack.

No problem with considering the guns to be manhandled forward and closed together but this is generating a high risk of loss of the guns if the teams can no longer be limbered up and extracted if things go badly. "I fear he will lose his guns".

As I say this is conjectural so if there is any contemporary evidence to support either the rate of fire or the spacing then that would be good. Alternatively evidence to knock down this "straw man" would be valuable.