"Artillery and Formations" Topic

Bandit,

I deeply apologize for not answering your question(s) and will get to them presently.

I see no problems with Arnold's material on Senarmont as I have already stated. He is an excellent historian and has provided excellent material for all of us to use.

B

MichaelCollinsHimself,

It shouldn`t be a "cop-out" to rate some troops higher in morale or motivational terms than others – but I don`t think it`s a case of rating Russians higher, or better than other nations` troops – their reactions at the may be considered either good or bad.

I didn't say it was a copout, the quote was from Matthew:

But outright national characteristics are a copout.

And frankly, he didn't say that differing morale ratings are a copout, he said that providing characteristics that are explicitly for one nationality and no others is a copout. I tend to agree with that because all one is accomplishing is lots of special-case rules rather than writing a general case rule that allows for the differentiation.

Applying a modern sensibility of "political correctness" to the subject may lead one to false conclusions about how men behaved and were expected to behave in the past.

I don't think anyone has done this.

Perhaps there are more subtle ways of representing this historical expectation and behaviour in a rules mechanism rather than simply making all their infantry elite class?

Sure, the potential criticism was simply that it shouldn't be a special case "Russian rule."

Kevin,

Senarmont was there and walked the ground and his assessement of the casualties caused by his artillery bombardment is not negated or contested by any other source.

The key argument framed against the accuracy of his count that was brought up in this thread was that his count accounted for over half the losses the Russians received during the battle.

Thoughts?

I deeply apologize for not answering your question(s) and will get to them presently.

I see no problems with Arnold's material on Senarmont as I have already stated. He is an excellent historian and has provided excellent material for all of us to use.

No worries, just trying to mesh your position as I understand it with the citations you've provided and Arnold's account.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Bandit,

Unsure why you decided to put one poster`s remarks up against another`s – still, you came out in disagreement with my own…

It is though a specific case of Russian troop behaviour under heavy fire which was well-noted by observers at the time.

If you feel that all nations must be treated the same, can you indicate which other nations` troops actually had the exact, same, stoic quality as the Russians?

Kevin:

I hope you aren't suggesting that Senarmont walked around with a clipboard and counted 4,000+ bodies, while determining the wounds were all caused by his artillery. It was neither sarcasm nor condescension. It was a funny image of something that obviously didn't happen.

You have not addressed any of the issues raised by me or Bandit, nor the source material that supports it, both quoted by you or me. You simply have ignore all the arguments.

The I Corps after action report speaks to the issues that been placed before you, which Senarmont's narration does not…different level of the action, different perspective on the action as Senarmont's advance relates to previous and subsequent actions in defeating the Russians.

Further, if you're going to use the 1st Corps after action report, you should also use Senarmont's after action report of 15 June 1807. His ammunition expenditure report is undoubtedly more accurate, as he also had to replenish the expended ammunition.

Senarmont's after action report can be found in Grands Artilleurs by Maurice Girod de l'Ain, pages 224-226. In this report, Senarmont states that 2,516 rounds were expended, of which 368 were canister.

I have used Senarmont's numbers previously. Or were you suggesting I correct the I Corps report? I have read Senarmont's report, and as I said, the I Corps report places Senarmont's action in perspective in relation to all the Corps and surrounding actions. Which were the issues raised lie.

There is little reason for Senarmont to move his guns to 150 yards if he were simply firing shot, as the ball isn't going to do more damage than at 300 or 250 yards--it is still a point blank/level barrel range. And as canister is the perferred ammo for those ranges, one would assume a larger expenditure of canister. He was moving closer to a line that obviously was stationary [because he was moving closer to it], so what was the point of being that close if not to use canister? Senarmont doesn't say other than to get a better range.

And yes tois and fathoms are different. The translation app I was using translated it that way and I didn't catch all of them, changing them to toise. But then six feet linear and six feet depth, is still six feet.

I haven't seen you present any evidence to counter what we have presented.

Bill

'The key argument framed against the accuracy of his count that was brought up in this thread was that his count accounted for over half the losses the Russians received during the battle.'

But the 'argument' is without merit as there is nothing to back it up except for the opinion (again without documented support) of one author.

And, no, Senarmont's action did not account for 'over half the losses the Russians received during the battle' as the Russian losses of over 10,000 killed and wounded from one report (to Berthier), 18,000 from another (from the Prussian Plotho). Neither report, no matter how you do the math, gives the 4,000 reported by Senarmont in the letter to his brother to be over half of the Russian casualties. So based on those two reports (found in Arnold's book on page 258) Senarmont's number is less than half, and that was the decisive action on the field.

B

'I haven't seen you present any evidence to counter what we have presented.'

I have already given you the evidence and referenced both after action reports.

You don't know, and neither do I, the ammunition mix that the guns in Senarmont's large battery employed. The most common sense conclusion is that it was a mix of roundshot, shell (as there were howitzers present) and canister. Canister was most certainly employed against the Russian cavalry counterattack.

Roundshot most certainly can be effective at short range and the French, as voiced by General Foy (who had been a horse artilleryman) was to get up close and shoot fast.

The cannons employed by Senarmont had a sustained rate of fire of two rounds per minute (which may be why he left the 12-pounders in reserve, whose rate of fire was one round per minute). A 6-pounder caisson load was 140 rounds with the coffret holding 21 rounds. So, each cannon had 161 rounds available for the action. Howitzer loads were smaller, as the rounds were larger, about 50 rounds, 11-12 of which were canister. Long gun loads were usually about one-third to one-half canister, depending on the caliber. Howitzer ready ammunition in the coffret was about 4 rounds.

So, unless you actually have material evidence of what you're posting, your point is moot and all I see you trying to do is to denigrate Senarmont's achievement. What he did is documented and at the ranges stated, as well as the amount of casualties that he caused. And you have provided nothing to counter it except skepticism and attempting to sow doubt.

B

Is there any primary source other than Senarmont which corroborates the details (timings/casualties/ranges) of his attack? Either in terms of the casualties or the effect? Particularly a Russian source?

Regards

'I haven't seen you present any evidence to counter what we have presented.'

I have already given you the evidence and referenced both after action reports.

Gosh, I just said that to you…

You don't know, and neither do I, the ammunition mix that the guns in Senarmont's large battery employed. The most common sense conclusion is that it was a mix of roundshot, shell (as there were howitzers present) and canister. Canister was most certainly employed against the Russian cavalry counterattack.

Roundshot most certainly can be effective at short range and the French, as voiced by General Foy (who had been a horse artilleryman) was to get up close and shoot fast.

The cannons employed by Senarmont had a sustained rate of fire of two rounds per minute (which may be why he left the 12-pounders in reserve, whose rate of fire was one round per minute). A 6-pounder caisson load was 140 rounds with the coffret holding 21 rounds. So, each cannon had 161 rounds available for the action. Howitzer loads were smaller, as the rounds were larger, about 50 rounds, 11-12 of which were canister. Long gun loads were usually about one-third to one-half canister, depending on the caliber. Howitzer ready ammunition in the coffret was about 4 rounds.

Fascinating. We already went over this and came to the same conclusion you did and you still felt the need to say it again.

If the fire was two shots per minute and 386 canister rounds were fired by the thirty cannon [some 3 pounders which could have a faster rate] that is 12 rounds of canister or only six minutes of canister fire in the whole action of @25 minute including repulsing the cavalry attack

So, unless you actually have material evidence of what you're posting, your point is moot and all I see you trying to do is to denigrate Senarmont's achievement. What he did is documented and at the ranges stated, as well as the amount of casualties that he caused. And you have provided nothing to counter it except skepticism and attempting to sow doubt.

Why don't you articulate what you *think* are our points. Because so far, you haven't even addressed them. It certainly isn't an effort to enigrate Senarmont's achievement or the amount of casualties he caused [I never questioned them…only wondered how he came up with them.] He was there, not me. And as I said, I doubt that he stood around counting 4,000 bodies, picking out the ones who were killed by artillery.]

Roundshot most certainly can be effective at short range and the French, as voiced by General Foy (who had been a horse artilleryman) was to get up close and shoot fast.

And this is an example of what I am talking about--stating things that do not address the question or anything I disagreed wtih. Yes, Foy said to get up close and shoot fast. The French did it all the time. The question was why Senarmonet continually moved closer, from 390 to 150 yards with shot? The moves only interferred with shooting fast. If the idea was to use canister, which is perfectly reasonable, not much canister was used. Less than 1 in 7 loads per gun… If the batteries fire 2 times a minute for onver 25 minutes, then that is @ 3 minutes of that time.

Part of the problem is that Senarmont's artillery was firing before and after his 25 minutes of advance, so that is skewed too.

And of course, the questions we had in understanding Senarmont's accomplishments had to do with the wholly inadequate description of the Russian center being 'virtually destroyed.' It seems to try to understand what that actually meant, show any skepticism about the image of a big hole where the Russian center was, is to denegrate Senarmont.

Bill

Certainly it can be effective at short range. The QUESTION is why he had to get even closer if firing round shot because whether at 390 yards, 250 yards or 100 yards, the ball is going to do the same damage and for round shot, those ranges are all pretty much all point blank for ball.

MichaelCollinsHimself,

Unsure why you decided to put one poster`s remarks up against another`s – still, you came out in disagreement with my own…

To frame the conversation.

It is though a specific case of Russian troop behaviour under heavy fire which was well-noted by observers at the time.

If you feel that all nations must be treated the same, can you indicate which other nations` troops actually had the exact, same, stoic quality as the Russians?

I would agree it is perhaps more common among Russians but it is not exclusive to Russians. At Aspern-Essling the French Guard infantry stood there getting shot waiting for orders to attack. At Golymin Lassalle trotted his cavalry brigade into Russian artillery range and then made them just stand there because he was mad they had not charged home on a prior occasion.

Are these "exact" I should hope not, no two examples will be exact, the question is, is this "stoic discipline" exclusive to the Russians? No. Is it more common / prevalent / intense among the Russians? Perhaps. Can rules demonstrate the latter without making a "special Russian rule." I think so.

Flames of War is really big on special case rules for unique units or nationalities. Their perspective appears to be that these add color and interest. I suppose that is true, I think choosing to do this through special case rules does make it more of a caricature than developing a rule that does not require special conditions unique to one nationality. I'm not sure that either method is wrong but it is easier to write a special case rule while harder to play with one. So I disfavor using them.

Kevin,

But the 'argument' is without merit as there is nothing to back it up except for the opinion (again without documented support) of one author.

I think the point of the argument was to say that Senarmont's account appears to presume too high a portion of the Russian losses to make sense. That is a sensical thing to consider rather than just dismiss out of hand and it is supported by documentation, your selection from Arnold's work does not accurately reflect what he wrote:

And, no, Senarmont's action did not account for 'over half the losses the Russians received during the battle' as the Russian losses of over 10,000 killed and wounded from one report (to Berthier), 18,000 from another (from the Prussian Plotho). Neither report, no matter how you do the math, gives the 4,000 reported by Senarmont in the letter to his brother to be over half of the Russian casualties. So based on those two reports (found in Arnold's book on page 258) Senarmont's number is less than half, and that was the decisive action on the field.

Actually what page 258 of Arnold's account says is a little different, he quotes the following numbers from Plotho:
"may well amount to 6,000-8,000 killed and 12,000 wounded."

Plotho's estimate that pertains to our conversation is 6,000-8,000, not 18,000 because we're talking about *killed* not killed & wounded. Based on this if Senarmont's account is accurate and we apply it to Plotho's numbers then Senarmont's inflicted losses account for 50-67% of all Russian dead.

Added to this Arnold notes that Berthier received a report nine days after the battle that 6,438 Russian dead were burried on the field and 2,000 were found dead in town. Arnold has a typo (apparently) on that page stating that 6,438 + 2,000 = 10,804. It does not, it equals 8,804. Thus, based on Berthier's report the total Russian dead are under 9,000 and Senarmont's work would have accounted for 45%.

In broad strokes it doesn't seem sensical, based on these numbers Senarmont's guns did nearly 50% or well more than 50% of the killing which just seems high.

Are you still going to speak to the questions I raised previously between your expressed position and Arnold's account?

Cheers,

The Bandit

Yes, I'll reply to those questions probably tomorrow as I'm in the middle of a project.

What I didn't post is that the Esposito/Elting Atlas states that 11,000 dead were left of the field.

And it does make sense that close-range artillery fire for about 25 minutes would cause that many casualties.

Senarmont's attack was the French main attack because he launched his artillery when Ney's assault on the Russian left, which was the assigned main attack, failed and was repulsed.

Senarmont's action was the decisive action of the battle and it was what won the action. Dupont supported Senarmont and after Dupont finally caught up with Senarmont after the Russian center was destroyed they advanced together, with Dupont on Senarmont's left flank. Ney had to reorganize his corps, which with the exception of three regiments that formed square, had been routed by Russian artillery fire and a cavalry attack which caught the VI Corps in the open and not deployed properly.

I really don't understand why you cannot believe that 30 artillery pieces firing about 2600 rounds at short range in 25 minutes couldn't cause that amount of damage and casualties among close-packed infantry who attempted to stand and take it.

Again, take a look at Coignet's description of what they had to withstand at Essling in 1809. It is eye-opening.

B

Bandit,

As a prelude to a longer answer, I don't see the differences, at least not major ones, between what James Arnold wrote and what I have. I believe that I have already stated that as a matter of fact.

B

Kevin,

Yes, I'll reply to those questions probably tomorrow as I'm in the middle of a project.

No worries.

I really don't understand why you cannot believe that 30 artillery pieces firing about 2600 rounds at short range in 25 minutes couldn't cause that amount of damage and casualties among close-packed infantry who attempted to stand and take it.

I don't believe that it isn't possible for artillery to cause that many losses, I'm saying that it seems odd that it accounts for roughly 50% of the dead (maybe as high as 67%). Wounded typically are another 100% or more the number of dead in a given battle, we see this with the numbers from Friedland as well as others. Those won't be evenly spread across the field but they will be spread. I haven't looked up the strength of the available targets to Senarmont's guns but 4,000 is a lot, it is also an even number which means it is definitely an estimate and not a count. My presumption is that it is a high estimate. Did Senarmont do terrible damage? Definitely. Did his guns kill 4,000 men? Eh, I think it is a suspect point.

I can believe that 30 guns did that much damage but I am suspect that 30 guns did 35-70% of all the Russian killed that day because I likewise find that easy to question.

What I didn't post is that the Esposito/Elting Atlas states that 11,000 dead were left of the field.

He does but I don't see any citation of where Elting got his numbers for this, I admit my look at the Atlas to check for this was brief but I don't see any citation on that page for it at all. It isn't crazy out of line with others but we are beginning to debate the letter rather than spirit of the challenge that someone raised in considering Senarmont's estimate.

As a prelude to a longer answer, I don't see the differences, at least not major ones, between what James Arnold wrote and what I have. I believe that I have already stated that as a matter of fact.

But your statement:

It clearly demonstrates that Senarmont did not stop after destroying the Russian center, but took the ground and moved forward. Bagration's command was crushed, and that portion that faced Senarmont was destroyed. That is quite clear from the material posted.

Is contradicted by both Arnold's account and portions of the citations you gave. I won't repeat them here as I listed them when I asked last page and I trust you'll find them just fine. In short, Arnold's account and your citations both support the alternate conclusion that the ground was taken by supporting units (French infantry & cavalry).

Cheers,

The Bandit

I used the word "copout" for national characteristics in wargames rules because I see wargames as being tool for historical analysis, as well as an entertaining hobby (or more correctly – historical analysis is part of the entertainment value). In analytical terms, mere national characteristics are an insufficient explanation. We need to understand why troops or generals behaved as they did. I am sensing that most people on this thread think that way too.

Which leaves the interesting question of the Russian generals' tolerance of heavy casualties. I am happy to accept this as a fact, because the course of so many battles seems to point to it – not just Freidland, which could have been down to exceptional circumstances, as has been pointed out. And particularly the tension between Prussians and Russians in joint commands in 1813.

I think a lot of it boils down to men being "cheap" for Russians in a way they weren't for Austrians or Prussians, or still less the British. The French seem to be somewhere in between. Losses could be replaced relatively easily. Not a great deal was invested in training. Add this to the stoic nature of the men themselves, and perhaps a lesser ability to manoeuvre and fine-tune deployments and you may have enough. In wargames terms this points to not having a single quality rating that covers both capability and stamina – Russian units tend to be low on the former and high on the latter. Putting extra "friction" into Russian command ratings (subject to exceptions, of course) may be appropriate.

Of course the tendency to disregard casualties should apply to the attack as well as holding ground. Suvarov apart, the Russian generals of this era are more noted for stubborn defence than determined attack though.

How about a "stalwart" rule, that allows any unit with the rule to re-roll failed morale checks.
The stalwart rating (or whatever else you want to call it) represents a units stubborness and would be given to most guard units and any other units that behaved that way historically. So it's on a Regimental case by case basis, rather than a National characteristic. Of course, you could give it to a big wedge of the Russian infantry, if that's what you wanted to do. The good thing is that it is still independant of other factors such as training and ability, so you could have a unit that was less likely to retreat but still pretty poor in other respects.

What do you think? Still a cop-out? Still too "gamey"?.

I think that's the right sort of approach. Or to vary it slightly you give each unit a rating for stamina (stalwart, normal, fragile, etc), and for manoeuvrability/training, and skirmish ability, etc.

It then gets a bit more interesting if you suggest that ordinary line infantry can be stalwart or manoeuvrable, but not both. To get both requires veteran, highly trained or specially recruited troops.

What a long way from the OP!

In our rules we rate units individually for:

Officers tactical ability (change of formation – doctrine)
Combat value (willingness to close)
Training (drill – movement)
Skirmish ability
Morale (resistance to casualties)

This takes away the need for special national characteristics.

I think if your rules presently don't allow you to refight Friedland as a wargame then you need to find a new set of rules.

Obviously you may need some scenario specific rules to duplicate what actually happened, but anything beyond that should not be required.

The Russian army was not the best offensively and seems to have been slow to react at times. An acknowledgement of this seems to be all that is required to help formulate a good scenario.

I used the word "copout" for national characteristics in wargames rules because I see wargames as being tool for historical analysis, as well as an entertaining hobby (or more correctly – historical analysis is part of the entertainment value). In analytical terms, mere national characteristics are an insufficient explanation. We need to understand why troops or generals behaved as they did. I am sensing that most people on this thread think that way too.

But even ignoring the importance that contemporaries placed on the differing characteristics of various nations, at least some serious contemporary military analytical search has found a 'nationality factor' at work in warfare.

Regards

"I think if your rules presently don't allow you to refight Friedland as a wargame then you need to find a new set of rules.

Obviously you may need some scenario specific rules to duplicate what actually happened, but anything beyond that should not be required."

Fortunately we do just fine without scenario specific rules. That was sort of the point.

Hello Sparta!

My comments only applied to those who can't.
That was the point!

Best regards,

Glenn

Just some infromation. In refighting the battle of Freidland I learn an intresting bit of information. I could not get Russian deployment to match what they got across the river. This was started as a raid, the Russian left on the far side of the river their trains and 12pdrs which allowed them to get twice the rate of units across the river over the narrow river bridge. this is why the Russian artillery slacked at noon do to ammo running (it was left behind) low which Napoleon notice and started his attack.

Lord Ghee

I have been noddling around Senarmont's Artillery Charge:, in regards to formations, space and time. Here are some of the issues I see based on Senarmont's and the ICorps reports including Kevin Kiley's dramatic account of the action based on Senarmont's report:

According to the I Corps after action report, [which I posted] the I Corps was placed in reserve. "…,the Emperor's order to establish his troops as a reserve in front of the village of Postheuen behind the battle line… In this position the I Corps formed the army reserve and had to support, if necessary, the VI and VIII corps at the orders of Marshal Lannes, who was responsible for the attack." This was the specific role given the Corps in the battle.

According to the report, the I Corps was formed up with Dupont's division on the right, the Lapiese's in the centre, Villatte's on left closest to the center of the French battle line.

Then "General Sénarmont, having received General Victor's order to bring up the artillery and send it forward with the front of the line, formed two batteries and a reserve that he placed behind the village of Posthenen." According to the report, this was done long before Sénarmont went into action rather than quickly just before the advance. The right fifteen six and three pounder guns in the battery were commanded by Colonel Forno, Chief of staff of the reserve artillery. The left fifteen of the same caliber were commanded by Major Raulot. As there were only thirty guns in the I Corps reserve, it is not clear where the reserve six cannon came from.

Here is the first set of conflicts with the different reports. Sénarmont gives a different timeline than the I Corps report. Dupont moves forward ‘smartly' to support Ney's corps on his right that is falling back in disorder after a failed attack. This seems to be on his own initiative, in keeping with the I Corps supporting role. Only then does Sénarmont asks Victor to support Dupont's move with the Reserve artillery. He places Forno's fifteen on the right of Dupont's division and Raulot's fifteen on the left. As Dupont's Division of 10 battalions are in two lines, this is a front of between 800 and 900 yards. The guns would have added another 420 yards or so to that. or about 1300 yards. The distance between the river on the right and the mill stream on the left was about 2000 yards, though from the charge of the Russian Cavalry on the left flank later, the stream was fordable.

Is is the scenario that Kevin gives in his article on Sénarmont's charge.
link

He writes:
"As Ney's attack fell part, one of Victor's infantry divisions, Dupont's, advanced 'smartly' on the Russian center without orders. Senarmont, Victor's chief of artillery, supported this advance with twelve guns and immediately requested permission to advance with the remaining 24 that belonged to the corps."

The I Corps report has the guns going into action before Dupont is ordered to support Ney's retreat and meet the Russian counter-attack. This might be work if this is long-range fire, which a number of artillery units were engaged in.

Here it is confusing, because in Sénarmont's version the guns obviously begin their movement to support Dupont, with 12 guns and then Sénarmont requesting the rest. The I Corps Report seems to have Dupont ordered to move long after Sénarmont begins his attack. Here Sénarmont's version is more detailed and he is the immediate observer, while the I Corps report may have simply compartmentalized the various actions as received, rather than put them in a coherent timeline.

Sénarmont says he moved forward past Dupont's infantry, but what Dupont does after that point to where Dupont repulses the Russian Guard Infantry and hits the Russian Center's flank north of his position is not clear at all. Did he continue to advance? Supposedly…that was what he was doing when Sénarmont joins him and he is in position to meet the Russian Guard.

The IC Report has "General of the artillery [Senarmont], noticing the terrible effect he was producing and wanting to force the retreat of the enemy, gave the order to no longer fire on enemy guns equal to ours in number and which took some damage, he proceed to 60 toises (117 meters) from the Russian front with two batteries to train on only infantry and then fire more canister."

Kevin has Sénarmont "completely ignoring the Russian Artillery." There were six batteries in the Center and three on the left, more than 100 guns, many in the front ranks.

From here the general movement of Sénarmont's attack agree about the continue advance closer to the Russian lines. Whatever disorder and carnage the French artillery caused, there is no indication that they retreated before Sénarmont's advance.

There is the question of what the French artillery was attempting to achieve advancing so close, if they did fire mostly shot. Two thoughts come to mind. 1. With thirty guns firing twice a minute, that is a lot of smoke, so moving forward would be partly masked and moving beyond it would clear the batteries for aimed fire. And 2. With so much Russian artillery returning fire, constantly moving kept the Russians from finding the range easily. That was a common technique used by infantry and cavalry.

In any case, this advance took up some 25-30 minutes and ended with the French guns within 150 yards or less of the Russian lines.

In his article, Kevin's writes "Senarmont's gunners had suffered 50% casualties", though a far greater number than the reported by the IC Report: "Artillery troops lost on the day, killed or wounded, 4 officers, 52 men; 53 horses, having been casualties in less than three hours." That is less than two men per gun. However, how many guns were put out of action is not reported.

At this point Kevin writes "Dupont caught up with Senarmont as the Russian Imperial Guard counterattacked. Dupont led his infantry against the Russian Guard infantry, defeating it in a savage bayonet fight, the shorter, more expert French infantry killing their opponents with lethal upward thrusts. The Russians bolted for the bridges and relative safety of Friedland."

Apparently at about the same time:

"The Russian Guard cavalry made an attempt to silence Senarmont. Advancing against Senarmont's left flank, they had a chance to silence the French guns. Seeing the impending threat, the quick-witted Senarmont immediatley ordered 'Action Flank.'

Accepting that this is the sequence of events, there is another set of questions. This is within about a 2000 yard front with the left flank on the mill stream. We have elements of two Russian infantry division, or about 8,000 less casualties, 1600 or more Guard cavalry, 2400 Russian guard infantry attacking Dupont's 6800 men and Sénarmont's 30 guns, plus the 4th Dragoon Division in support.

Kevin writes that before this: " At 150 yards the terrain narrowed so that both batteries had to combine into one."

Okay. The Russian guard cavalry attacks from the left flank. Sénarmont's has his guns change front to meet them. So where is Dupont and how is he able to meet the Guard Infantry attacking from the front?

I would suggest from the evidence that Dupont didn't ‘reach' Sénarmont's guns in time to meet the guards, but had advanced between the French batteries as close as possible during their cannonade and faced the Russian counter-attack from the middle of the line of guns and his division. The artillery moved from 400 yards down to 120 or less in 25 minutes. As Dupont began his advance before Sénarmont's request to support him, there isn't any reason to believe Dupont's Division would have stopped or couldn't cover the 350 yards at 14 yards a minute, particularly if the French artillerists were manhandling the guns forward. That means Major Raulot's fifteen guns repelled the Guard Cavalry and a possible reason for Sénarmont's later singular praise.

If the two French batteries joined, it was after the Russian Guard was defeated and Dupont had moved forward beyond it is that the IC Report then says "The division was supported in its advance by five guns detached from the right battery and colonel Forno who directed them himself. It was at the end of the action that this brave officer crowned his career with a glorious end, being swept away by a Cannon ball while ordering the advance." If Dupont was behind a single gun line, he would have had to displace directly left over 300 yards to pass by the single French gun line that supposedly formed because there was no space. If Dupont was behind or to the left of a single French gun line, the far right battery was not where you would detach the guns because Dupont moves forward and off to the left.

As for the amount of ammo expended, the history of the 1st artillery regiment reports that the artillery of the 5th Corps at Jena with a similar number of guns fired 1764 round shot and 300 shell. Casualities: 1 officer and 4 men, dead, 23 wounded; 3 guns damaged, 1 ammunition waggon blown up.

So Sénarmont's casualties are double that as is their canister expenditure, while they fired 1000 more ball. If that damage ratio holds true for the guns, Sénarmont had six guns, or one in five damaged.

I think that Sénarmont's accomplishment at Friedland is singular and his recognition well-deserved, but I also think the combination of infantry, cavalry and artillery made his successful attack possible, and in the beginning, without it, why Napoleon was sure he would lose his guns. Later Sénarmont and the French do, on occasion, experience lost guns and much less success with attempting the same aggressive tactics..

I forgot to add an interesting part of the IC Report:

Divisions Lapisse and Villatte, who remained in their exposed positions in front of Posthenen for the duration of the attack, suffered the loss of 4 off1ciers and 24 soldiers killed and 4 officers and 96 wounded men from artillery fire.

In other words, they seem to have remained as passive as the Russians before Senarmont. My guess would be because of the lack of maneuver room.

Regarding the different approaches to artillery between the Russians and French:

"After the 1806-1807 campaign, Major General Sievers, commander of an artillery brigade, wrote a report on artillery tactics and equipment. He wrote that the French artillery equipment was not better than the Russians, but French commanders used their artillery more skillfully; they chose better positioins for artillery batteries,a dn the actions of their whole army helped their artillery to be more effective. This was because they usually outflanked the Russian Army, so that their artillery fire was concentrated at the Russian lines, and the Russian reserves were under a crossfire (though, at the same time, Sievers noticed that the French liked to fire at long range, elevated the barrels of their pieces too high in order to do that, and so their fire was not very effective). Comparing the ways of selecting artillery positions, Sievers wrote that the Russians usually placed their artillery on every hill in their position, so that the enemy could count almost all Russian guns. In contrast, the Frnech placed their batteries of howitzers in depressions or behind hilocks, so that their artillery pieces could not be observed by the Russians. He also wrote that Russian artillerymen often fired at enemy batteries, adn that senior commanders were partly responsible for that, because some of them liked to give orders to 'silense the enemy battery.' In order to perform this counterbattery fire, the Russian artillery expended too much ammunition and time.'

Alexander and Yurii Zhmodikov, Tactics of the Russian army in the Napoleonic Wars Volume I, page 71.

"…it is easier to write a special case rule while harder to play with one. So I disfavor using them."

I think understand what you`re saying now Bandit.

Regarding what should be included in rules, I think this is why I have either made most rules of this type optional, or have left them out altogether.
I do feel it is the gamer`s choice to apply such things to the rules they use.
Anyhow I thought that it would be far too confusing to make rules which apply to troop classes, and then apply modifiers, conditions and exceptions to all the rules for all situations.

But, in this I wanted to concentrate each of the european nation`s line infantry`s reactions to artillery fire… because of their class, experience and status one would almost expect infantry of the French Imperial Guard to stand up to fire, but was any other nation`s line infantry equally as stoic?
I don`t think so, and so I`ll be adding a special case to my own rules presently. This will be optional, or recommended to be used "to taste" for anyone who has invested in Grand Manoeuvre rules.

Thanks everyone for the lively and thought-provoking discussion !

But, in this I wanted to concentrate each of the european nation`s line infantry`s reactions to artillery fire… because of their class, experience and status one would almost expect infantry of the French Imperial Guard to stand up to fire, but was any other nation`s line infantry equally as stoic?

Michael:
That is a statistical question… And one of definitions: would the Russians standing up to Senarmont's fire [i.e. not running away] be considered as stoic as the Imp. Guard?

Are there examples of troops routing simply from artillery fire? I understand that the battalions of Belgians at Waterloo under the guns of the French grand battery didn't run until the French I Corps began to advance.

Hello McLaddie!

Okay Bill, that's the best summary I've ever seen of the entire Senarmont's affair at Friedland. I think it's time you changed your name to Sherlock Holmes or perhaps your own TMP page, "Just Ask Bill"! You must have an amazing book and computer library.

Just like your research, proper frontages or unit footprints has always been one of the major keys in understanding Napoleonic warfare. You can't have a proper Napoleonic wargame without proper scaling for all of your units. Everything else is secondary (IMHO).

Best regards,

Glenn

Second Glenn. I´m impressed, it makes much more sense that way. Would be interesting to see it drawn up.

Bill
Well, I guess that the question is partly statistical – certainly we have had an element of the statistical in the questioning of just how many casualties were caused by Senarmont`s battery.
But there is also the more subjective evidence of eye-witness accounts and their general assessment of Russian troops reaction to fire; and this is what I`m talking about – Russian troops in general, not elite status formations French, or otherwise.

Routing purely through artillery fire – actually off the top of my head I can only think of advances being stopped or held up by heavy fire.

MichaelCollinsHimself,

Well, I guess that the question is partly statistical – certainly we have had an element of the statistical in the questioning of just how many casualties were caused by Senarmont`s battery.

I think what Bill is referring to is that you can gather statistics on the number of times different units sat under artillery fire, whether they stood, routed or charged… etc… then make a statistical conclusion from that.

But there is also the more subjective evidence of eye-witness accounts and their general assessment of Russian troops reaction to fire; and this is what I`m talking about – Russian troops in general, not elite status formations French, or otherwise.

Actually the Russian troops that came up in this discussion were elite. Those staring at Senarmont's guns were either members of the Guard or grenadiers that would later be inducted into the Guard so they were all elite status formations…

Cheers,

The Bandit

Michael:

What Bandit said.

I wasn't thinking of a statistical analysis of casualties caused by Senarmont's batteries, but rather the final unit behavior regardless of the number of casualties.

If the question is 'what are the chances of X happening', then it is a purely statistical question. Anyone thinking about it without statistics does what you did:

"actually off the top of my head I can only think of advances being stopped or held up by heavy fire."

You've just recollected all the instances of similar events and made a rough statistical conclusion in your head. However, such mental exercises often don't work, which is why an actual statistical analysis is so valuable. Often the actual results are counter-intuitive or a larger base than what is held in the mind produces a far different result. That has been my experience working with statistics.

Bill

Well done McLaddie…clear and considered. Between you and Bandit I've gone from being aware of a battle to understanding pivotal elements.

As to playing Friedland – I think Napoleon knew the French get more re-rolls and bonuses than anyone else, but doubted Senarmont's ability to roll more sixes than anything else!

Bandit,

A few people have centred on Friedland yes, but how about the Frederick/Lubin Griois statements i posted earlier? These were generalisations.

But do take a look at the OOB`s in Arnold`s book; I doubt if the troops of the Russian first and second divisions at Friedland were homogenously of an elite status – apart from grenadiers, there were quite a few musketeer regiments in there.

Bill,
I`m not too sure that what I did amounted to a rough statistical anything – it wasn`t much of a mental exercise either!
But please note, I did not mention the routing of troops by fire alone either.

Mike.

MichaelCollinsHimself,

But do take a look at the OOB`s in Arnold`s book; I doubt if the troops of the Russian first and second divisions at Friedland were homogenously of an elite status – apart from grenadiers, there were quite a few musketeer regiments in there.

Agreed, but in Arnold's text there is little account of anyone but the Guard & grenadier units vs the guns. I am a bit curious what the *other* Russian units were doing. But it is not clear from Arnold or Elting exactly where the other Russian units were or how they responded to the fire. Those are not necessarily definitive sources, just the sources I have on hand. I suspect to answer that question we'd need some good Russian sources which are sadly no where near as common in the western world as would make them convenient.

Cheers,

The Bandit

I`m not too sure that what I did amounted to a rough statistical anything – it wasn`t much of a mental exercise either!
But please note, I did not mention the routing of troops by fire alone either.

Michael:
Yes. I understand. I was looking at troop responses,not counting casualties. It was your mental 'exercise' rather than its subject, casualties, that I was commenting on.

And no, you weren't doing a statistical analysis. You wer remembering what examples you could and making a conclusion from them. Statistical analysis is the same approach, only counting identifiable examples and more of them, then doing the math. Same kind of process, only statistical analysis is far, far more specific and useful.

Bill

Hello McLaddie!

Okay Bill, that's the best summary I've ever seen of the entire Senarmont's affair at Friedland…You must have an amazing book and computer library.

Glenn:
Thank you. I only used three sources, while there are more, with other details, but I would then be writing a loooong article. The above was quickly written anyway. And my computer library has @6,000 books, but I have friends who have far larger libraries, both books and on the computer. And they are a great help in my research.

Bill

‘Arnold is not a primary source by any stretch and I am not taking the time to research what sources he used. Nor do I mean to represent Bill's position since you directed this to him. But I read Bill's point to be that "destroyed" is descriptive not quantitative and Arnold notes Lahoussaye's cavalry and some of Villate's infantry moving forward specifically saying that Lahoussaye's cavalry pushed elements of the Russians Senarmont had been fighting into the town of Friedland – at that point Senarmont starts firing into the town. My point is, you're reading primary sources and Arnold is reading primary sources: He seems to conclude that 'destroyed' meant 'combat ineffective but still present,' you seem to conclude that 'destroyed' meant no longer present. My question to you is if your conclusion is correct, who did Lahoussaye's cavalry contact or do you believe Arnold to be in error that Lahoussaye's cavalry struck the elements of the Russians Senarmont had been shooting?'

‘I posted some questions for you to respond to, instead you're telling us that Victor was promoted. I'm not holding up Arnold as the definitive source, I even said so multiple times, what I am doing is asking you to account for some statements he made, based on what sources you have available, how do you account for the claim that other French forces (Lahoussaye's cavalry) and not Senarmont's artillery pushed the Russian infantry and cavalry (who we all agree were really hurt by Senarmont's guns) back into Friedland?'

I don't agree that the term ‘destroyed' is descriptive instead of quantitative. Destruction as a military term does not denote ‘annihilation.' Destruction does mean that the formation or position is no longer tenable and that losses have been very heavy, beyond ‘combat ineffective.' (I also don't agree that a statistical analysis is a viable tool either, witness the old axiom, ‘there are lies, then damned lies, and then statistics). What you have with Senarmont's actions and his artillery attack (and this has been explained at length before) is that instead of being a supporting arm, the traditional role of artillery, Senarmont's action gave artillery the role of the supported arm and the de facto main effort/attack in at Friedland.

It should be noted that both Lahoussaye and Dupont were in support of Senarmont during the action.

It is also good to look at all of the references and statements, both primary and secondary, of the action and come up with a conclusion.

The sequence of events for the action at Friedland went like this:

-Ney's main attack failed and his corps retreated back to the Forest of Sortlack.

-Dupont's division of Victor's I Corps began an advance, with artillery support under Captain Ricci, against the Russian center (Bagration).

-Senarmont, seeing an opportunity, secured permission from Victor to mass all of the artillery of I Corps under his command for an advance with Dupont.

-Senarmont organized his artillery into two fifteen gun batteries with six in reserve and emplaced the two large batteries on either flank of Dupont's division.

-Senarmont's artillery outpaced Dupont's infantry and attacked the Russian center, eventually forming one battery of thirty pieces and closed to within 120 yards of the Russian center.

-Dupont was now behind Senarmont.

-Senarmont fired on the Russian infantry for about 25 minutes and according to Senarmont's ‘count' 4,000 Russians were killed (I would say killed and wounded).

-By this time Ney had rallied his corps and led it in an assault on the Russian left flank. This was now the secondary attack.

-The Russian center and left broke up and began to retreat towards Friedland and the bridges. Ney's artillery came into action and knocked out Russian artillery on the opposite bank of the Alle.

-Bennigsen sent the Russian Guard to counterattack against Senarmont, who defeated the Russian Guard cavalry with two salvoes of artillery, probably canister, while Dupont, now on Senarmont's left flank, met and defeated the Russian Guard infantry with the bayonet.

-As the broken Russians made for Friedland Dupont continued to advance as did Senarmont, and Senarmont supported Dupont with his reserve company. Senarmont fired on Friedland and the bridges, causing further Russian casualties.

‘I think he means after their counter-attacks failed. At that point, Arnold has the Russians literally just standing there but notes that they are swept forward by French forces other than Senarmont's guns.'

Again, I believe that using all of the source material, both primary and secondary, the above sequence of events is quite clear and that the main effort of the day belonged to Senarmont. The key lessons to be taken from the action is that the French artillery arm is now equal to the infantry and cavalry on the battlefield and can be used as a primary weapon offensively and that it can take and hold ground.
Senarmont's introduction of new artillery tactics would be used again at Ocana, Raab, Wagram, Lutzen, Ligny, and Waterloo as well as on other fields.

I don't really see the problems in understanding the action and the importance of what Senarmont accomplished, especially as both Victor and Napoleon had no idea what was going on. Victor's role in the action was to give Senarmont permission to control all of the corps artillery; Napoleon's was to send Mouton to find out what was going on. Senarmont bluntly told Mouton to go away and mind his own business, an answer that Napoleon obviously approved of.

As a final note, another source on Senarmont is Memoire sur le Lieutenant-General d'Artillerie Baron Alexandre de Senarmont by General d'Artillerie Marion. It is available on Gallica.

B

He seems to conclude that 'destroyed' meant 'combat ineffective but still present,' you seem to conclude that 'destroyed' meant no longer present. My question to you is if your conclusion is correct, who did Lahoussaye's cavalry contact or do you believe Arnold to be in error that Lahoussaye's cavalry struck the elements of the Russians Senarmont had been shooting?'

Kevin:
Good question, who indeed? I am quite comfortable with defining destroyed as "combat ineffective." So, any Russian units that offered resistance could not be counted as 'destroyed'. So that raises the question of where Dupont was and what Guard units he defeated if Senarmont had destroyed them. If he didn't destroy them, but other Russian units, then which units were they? And of course, if Senarmont was facing upwards of sixty guns to his front and at some point 'ignored them', how did he avoid destruction himself? Or Dupont for that matter.

They are questions, and only problems if they prove difficult to answer.

(I also don't agree that a statistical analysis is a viable tool either, witness the old axiom, ‘there are lies, then damned lies, and then statistics).

Yes, and Napoleon said, ""History is a set of lies agreed upon." So, here are we just attempting to agree on which lies to accept?

Statistics properly done can be very valuable and trustworthy. Historical analysis properly done can also get us closer to the truth of an event, even if the whole truth is never uncovered. Sometimes it requires sussing out the quantitative meaning behind a descriptive word like 'destroyed', whether military or not.

I don't really see the problems in understanding the action and the importance of what Senarmont accomplished, especially as both Victor and Napoleon had no idea what was going on. Victor's role in the action was to give Senarmont permission to control all of the corps artillery.

So Senarmont didn't act on his own initiative, but got permissin from Victor, though he didn't know what was going on? Does that include Dupont's actions too? IF so, it seems strange that Napoleon, who was present, would make Victor a marshal for that action.

It is especially noteworthy given that Victor was the only marshal appointed after the great investiture of Marshals in 1804 and the appointments made after 1809. Unlike the others, it was a direct result of a feat of arms. As such he was fifteenth on the list of marshals in active service. Victor had no specific relations with Napoleon and received his title simply for his military performance. Very strange if neither Napoleon nor Victor knew what was going on.

Kevin, 'the problems' have to do with who was where when, both Senarmont's guns and Dupont's movements. It isn't a matter of doubting Senarmont's accomplishments, but understanding exactly how they occurred and what they constituted.

Bill

Adam name not long enough,

Between you and Bandit I've gone from being aware of a battle to understanding pivotal elements.

That is ridiculously kind. Thank you.

Kevin,

1st – Thank you for the reply, I've been looking forward to your response.

2nd – Regarding your response to my questions, it appears to be summed up by:

Again, I believe that using all of the source material, both primary and secondary, the above sequence of events is quite clear and that the main effort of the day belonged to Senarmont.

Yet, that does not answer my question. You said:

Then Senarmont advanced again to fire on the Russians in Friedland.
That certainly sounds like taking and holding ground on the field.

You and Bill then argued over whether Senarmont [paraphrased for a tense change], 'took and held ground' or if supporting French infantry & cavalry did.

You repeated your position multiple times, generally referring to the material you'd cited previously as quoted here:

It clearly demonstrates that Senarmont did not stop after destroying the Russian center, but took the ground and moved forward.

I dispute your position in that argument that it was Senarmont who took and held ground and do so with citation from Arnold as well as quotations you had posted. From both Arnold and your citations, it appears that Senarmont beat up the Russians and then supporting French forces took the ground from those Russians who had been hurt but had not yet left.

I asked you to respond to this, as yet, you haven't addressed my question specifically. Whether the infantry & cavalry were supporting Senarmont or not is not the question, the core of the question I posed was who took the ground. Per Arnold and your source material, it was the infantry & cavalry, not Senarmont, yet you state over and over that it was Senarmont. This is what I am pressing you to clear up.

Cheers,

The Bandit

If we are to be "using all of the source material", would that not include Russian sources?

For example, the after-action report of the Russian Horse Guards, quoted at length in their regimental histories is rather explicit:
- fresh columns of French advanced from previously hidden positions – with infantry, cavalry and a large battery of no less than 30 guns – Dupont's division was the most threatening
- prince Bagration ordered up the Life-Guards Ismaylovskiy, Semyonoskiy and Konnyy (Horse) regiments
- the Horse Guards advanced very rapidly against French cavalry – assumedly La Houssaye's dragoon division attached to Victor's corps – and this compelled them to turn back despite their larger numbers – which indicates to me that the dragoons were about to get taken by a flank
- the Horse Guards then opened up their formation (from column of half-squadorns or column of squadrons to two divisions I would think, likely operating separately) and took on a French infantry column in co-ordination with bayonet counter-attacks being delivered by the Sankt-Peterburgskiy and Pavlovskiy Grenadiers
- the counter-attacks seemed to be going pretty well, but the Horse Guards received Benigsen's order for the army to withdraw and re-formed to cover this
- they never charged the French guns, and – as their officer casulaties are individually described – only about 1/3 of their casualties were from artillery fire
- these casualties from artillery are listed as contusions and impact wounds from parts of shells – the 4th squadron being the hardest hit – from which I would say that the French howitsers that would be typically posted on the flanks of a French gun line did fire shell at the the Horse Guards as they went in to attack the French infantry, getting some degree of enfilade penetration on the nearest Russian squadron
- the total casualites for the Horse Guards in the battle were rather typical for a major engagement : 3 offcers and 52 other ranks killed or mortally wounded, 13 officers an 64 other ranks wounded, 28 other ranks missing (tpyically un-horsed and captured) – total 160 all ranks all casaualties, about 20-25%

The Ismaylovets saw more of the French battery, and recorded more substantial artillery casuallities. The Semyonoskiy regiment appears to have been behind their colleagues and did not get much engaged before the order to withdraw.

Interestingly, total Russian casulaties as reported in Russian sources, both primary and secondary (and these to include Imperial, Soviet and modern writers) are rather lower than as reported in French sources – the number of killed or mortally wounded for the whole battle is more like 4000 men.

So, if we are to believe that some 4000 men and several Russian units were "destroyed" (however defined) by artillery fire from general de Sénarmont's guns, may I please ask that someone say which Russian units these were? Upon a quick scan of Russian sources, I just could not find any reports which could be readily thus interpreted. But I would be happy to look some more.

Amicalement,
- Alexandre

welcome back dear friend, you were missed

Хвала!
Уважавање за прелеп Србији!
- Александр

Thank-you, that is an interetsing post Alexandre, presumably the truth about the numbers involved lies somewhere between French exaggeration and the rather more conservative Russian estimations of the artillery effects?
I think I`ll return to the question of casualties again with this new information in mind.

"presumably the truth about the numbers involved lies somewhere between French exaggeration and the rather more conservative Russian estimations"

Why would a Russian after action report lie about the number of casualties, especially when officer casualties were named?

Are we saying that we shouldn't believe ANY nation's after action casualty reports? Or that there is some reason NOT to believe the Russians?

The explicit casualty report for the Horse Guards, barring transcription errors, is likely petty close to perfect. It breaks down the losses by killed.mortally/wounded/wounded/missing and by officers/nco's/musicians/troopers, and names each officer and describes his wound as to location, severity and cause.
It is also reported as a contemporary after-action report, meant to inform higher commands, not for publication or even broad distribution.

However, the total 4000 killed and mortally wounded for all units for the whole battle that is often found in Russian sources is less explicit and must be traced to either (i) adding up all the explicit regimental reports, and/or (ii) relying upon a prior summary statement (either a primary or a secondary one). We usually don't know which of these – and there is a huge difference between (i) and (ii)!
Also, such totals are created for the purpose of publication and/or broad distribution, which may tend to color them. And yes, the enemy's casualties tended to be over-reported, and one's own casualties under-reported.

So, that's why I asked that someone please say which Russian units were supposed to be "destroyed", so that i could try to find some explicit Russian casualty report(s) for the same units. I think this would be a necessary step before accepting the French (and French-derived) accounts of general de Sénarmont's actions.

Amicalement,
- Alexandre

@Alexandre,

Looking at the not very brilliant map in Petre, it would appear to be the Russian 1st and 2nd Divisions. Nafziger gives the units here:

PDF link

(the 2nd Div is in the 'left-flank' forces, 1st Div in the 'reserve').

Presumably some of the other 'left-flank' units were there too.

Hopefully that may help

Regards

So, that's why I asked that someone please say which Russian units were supposed to be "destroyed", so that i could try to find some explicit Russian casualty report(s) for the same units. I think this would be a necessary step before accepting the French (and French-derived) accounts of general de Sénarmont's actions.

Alexandre:
That's the question, the who, what, where and when. I am trying to visualize how the Horse Guards maneuvered. They did come in on the flank and if the 4th sqn was the one that took the most casualties from artillery, that would place them on the Russian cavalry's left and probably closest to Raulot's guns.

the Horse Guards advanced very rapidly against French cavalry – assumedly La Houssaye's dragoon division attached to Victor's corps – and this compelled them to turn back despite their larger numbers – which indicates to me that the dragoons were about to get taken by a flank

I am not sure I follow how the French cavalry being 'compelled to turn back' suggests they were taken in flank. It could simply mean that they were stopped in their forward advance. It would be difficult for the Larger force to be taken in flank by the smaller one, particularly when the French cavalry's right flank is covered by French artillery and Dupont's infantry.

- the Horse Guards then opened up their formation (from column of half-squadorns or column of squadrons to two divisions I would think, likely operating separately) and took on a French infantry column in co-ordination with bayonet counter-attacks being delivered by the Sankt-Peterburgskiy and Pavlovskiy Grenadiers.

Again, space issues are involved. And if Senarmont's guns are there with Dupont, it is stunning that 1. Dupont repelled or at least held against a force of both cavalry and infantry. [without forming square] and 2. The Russian cavalry never report charging the French guns and Dupont never reports defending against the Russian cavalry. It does speak well of the Russians that their counter-attack involved combined arms. I simply don't know how that worked in such a confined space.

- the counter-attacks seemed to be going pretty well,

What does that mean? Your conclusion or the Russian accounts?

but the Horse Guards received Benigsen's order for the army to withdraw and re-formed to cover this
- they never charged the French guns, and – as their officer casulaties are individually described – only about 1/3 of their casualties were from artillery fire

So we can assume 1/3 of the total Horse Guard casualties were form artillery fire? From the report, only Bennigsen's order to withdraw [in the middle of the counter-attack] spares the French? Were things going so badly elsewhere that Benningsen decides to stop a apparently successful drive on the French?

Even assuming that something between 4,000 and 6,000 were killed or mortally wounded, and the enemy's casualties tended to be over-reported, and one's own casualties under-reported, what do you see for the Horse Guards and Guard Infantry with your sources?

From what I have read the 7th & 8th Divisions were in the center of the line and a smaller force on the Left under Bragration had done a great deal of damage to Ney's 6th Corps. So, was facing the French guns and Dupont in before Friedland before the Guards were committed to stablize that area?

Bill

Bill,

Well, the simple answer is "I don't know." But I will see what i can do with your questions.

We have general de Sénarmont's own after action report.
link

We have the after-action report of Victor's Corps, written by the cheif of staff Maison.
link

There are some inconsistencies between these. For example the details of the artillery firing positions and the eventual collection of the guns into a single battery. And nowhere are 4000 casulaties mentioned.
Later French (and French-derived) accounts conflate these two documents and, if "cheering" for the French, add some stirring language from general de Sénarmont's later letter to his brother.

I think the map in the von Lettow-Vorbeck may have the best detail, including terrain elevations:
link

Now, for your questions …

"how the French cavalry being 'compelled to turn back' suggests they were taken in flank"
If the French, in division strength, had been in a position to meet the one regiment of Horse Guards, they would not have turned.
The candidate French formation is La Houssaye's dragoons, who had been sent out on his left by Viktor to support the French artillery. I see them as advancing on a narrow front along the ravine on the left, then inclining to their right. This would present either a narrow of head of column or a left flank to Russian cavalry charging quickly from the direction of Friedland.
I think both Sénarmont and Maison thoguht the target was the left battery. But the Russians were after the French dragoons, and when these turned, the Russian Horse Guards began to re-form to support their infantry.
At this point, Viktor thinks there is a cavalry threat to the guns and orders the dragoons to go back with a battalion from Villate's division to push back this threat.

"space issues are involved. And if Senarmont's guns are there with Dupont"
I do not think Dupont has yet been sent forward. Only one battalion from Villate's division.
I think that the Petersburg and Pavlov Grenadiers (of the Russian 2nd division) counterattack on the 6e Corps was the action that caused Victor to order Dupont to support the 6e corps. The Russian Horse Guards are also engaged here. The French guns are still 150 or 200 or 250 toises from the Russians and still engaged in counter-battery fire.
This would require that the Horse Guards to fall back and advance again on a different line, a detail that was not explicit in their report, only that the regiment opened formation before attacking the French infantry.
Dupont is met not only by the Horse Guards, but also the two regiments of foot Guards.

It is at this point that the Russians get the order to withdraw. Victor's report re-tells this as the success of Dupont's attack.

I think it is at this point, with the Russians withdrawing through the town, that de Sénarmont moves the left battery up the edge of ravine and the right battery directly before the town. This is the position of 100 or 60 toises from the enemy that is reported, as well as the point where there is a converged battery reported by Victor (it is not in de Sénarmont's report). The French artillery fires at the withdrawing Russians, many of them in the congested town, to great effect. This effect was also reported by Yermelov on the Russian side.

"the counter-attacks seemed to be going pretty well,"
This was from the Russian report. I think a bit of prideful optism. There were two uncommitted divisions of Victor's Corps, and there was now very rather little room in front of Friedland.

"From the report, only Bennigsen's order to withdraw [in the middle of the counter-attack] spares the French? "
Yep, that's how they told it. Perhaps an intentional slight on Benigsen.

"Were things going so badly elsewhere that Bennigsen decides to stop a apparently successful drive on the French?"
The usual Russian explanantion is that he realized his forces were not turning the French on either flank, and would have fight a linear battle at even odds or thereabouts but with poor or "false" dispositions. The Horse Guards regimental describes the position of the Russian divisions as "trimming" or "garlanding" the Alle river. So he decided to quit the game.

"have read the 7th & 8th Divisions were in the center of the line"
I think more the 2nd Division in front of Friedland (actually left center of the Russian line), with the large Avant-guard facing Ney on the Russian far left. See the linked map.

But Bill, really "I don't know" was not so bad an answer. I have tried to answer your excellent questions, but would not affirm that I "had it right" and others were "wrong".

Amicalement,
- Alexandre

Alexandre,

I have nothing to add but wish to say I am very excited that you have joined the conversation.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Alexandre:
I was hoping you might have more on the other Russian Divisions and perhaps more casualty counts.

The 2nd Russian Division had 3,600 men and 24 guns

The Russian Guard infantry numbered maybe 2,400 and then the Horse Guards had five squadrons, perhaps 1,000

Facing Senarmont's 30 plus guns and 6800 in Dupont's Division and 1800 in the 4th Dragoon Division, and perhaps the 700 in the Saxon light Cavalry brigade.

I think both Sénarmont and Maison thoguht the target was the left battery. But the Russians were after the French dragoons, and when these turned, the Russian Horse Guards began to re-form to support their infantry.
At this point, Viktor thinks there is a cavalry threat to the guns and orders the dragoons to go back with a battalion from Villate's division to push back this threat.

"space issues are involved. And if Senarmont's guns are there with Dupont"
I do not think Dupont has yet been sent forward. Only one battalion from Villate's division.
I think that the Petersburg and Pavlov Grenadiers (of the Russian 2nd division) counterattack on the 6e Corps was the action that caused Victor to order Dupont to support the 6e corps. The Russian Horse Guards are also engaged here. The French guns are still 150 or 200 or 250 toises from the Russians and still engaged in counter-battery fire.
This would require that the Horse Guards to fall back and advance again on a different line, a detail that was not explicit in their report, only that the regiment opened formation before attacking the French infantry.
Dupont is met not only by the Horse Guards, but also the two regiments of foot Guards.

It is at this point that the Russians get the order to withdraw. Victor's report re-tells this as the success of Dupont's attack.

This is very different from the French accounts. What makes you think this is the sequence of events? Is this the Russian accounts, your analysis or both?

Thanks for the information. It is great to have the Russian perspective.

Bill