"Artillery and Formations" Topic

forwardmarchstudios,

Contrary to most miniatures rules, the late Craig Taylor and I spent 8 years designing and developing Napoleon's Battles, including quite a bit of time on artillery and command, including grand batteries.

I most earnestly advocate you read the rules regarding artillery and grand batteries. Even if you disagree they may help put you on the right track regarding artillery command.

I no longer have a horse in the race as I sold the rules to Captain Games which will publish Napoleon's Battles, Marshal edition this year.

Cheers,

Bob Coggins

forwardmarchstudios,

I meant a ruleset where the described events could actually occur in the context of a game. I like for anything that did occur to at least be possible in a game- a lot to ask for any rules writer and probably impossible to achieve, but it gives me something to puzzle over.

Well, here is what I think needs to be able to happen:

• Well commanded, high quality artillery, numbering approximately 30 guns.
• Able to displace forward, closing from about 500 yards to about 100 yards to its target while firing.
• It must have enough firepower that between the salvos fired while closing and the prowess of the artillery between 0-100 yards (for when the enemy infantry counter-attacks) it is possible to inflict 75% losses against two regiments (or its equivalent in a combat effectiveness loss).
• The deflected infantry (presumed highly elite) should be able to halt but not rout.
• The artillery should still be effective enough to also halt a cavalry attack.
• The deflected cavalry should be able to halt but not rout.
• All of these needs to happen in between 20-40 minutes (Senarmont said, "the next twenty-five minutes" was the worst canister fire ever, this was a letter written 12 days after, we don't know from what points he started and stopped his time estimate or how exact it is so I figure some slush isn't bad).

I think that is actually easier to replicate with a higher scope game than a lower scope game. That might be because it is what I'm working on but it seems to me that with a lower scope game you'll be providing a higher level of detail. At a lower level of detail you're going to increase the number of variables that are directly (rather than abstractly) represented. Each of the more directly modeled variables would need to align for you to get the historical outcome and you'd have to judge the probability of all of them so it gets more and more difficult to pull off.

Thus, my thinking is that all this needs to happen within two turns with the infantry turned back on the first turn and the cavalry turned back on the second (otherwise the infantry player just shoots the gunners if given the chance right?).

Cavalry have to be allowed to flee through their own infantry (Arnold notes the Russian infantry formed square when their own cavalry were chased through them by Lahoussaye's men).

If morale is given too high an influence then the Russians end up routing – which according to this account they didn't, they became completely ineffective but they didn't flee until pushed…

Other things that could be likely overplayed would include ammunition – the French guns had no problem with ammo, they did come under counter battery fire which at one point they returned and another point they ignored…

My question about the distance of the cavalry when the engagement started had to do with the relative speed of the repositioning of the guns compared to the deploying/charging guard cav.

I figured. I can't say anything definitive to that. Arnold provides a map of the estimated positions at something like 120-300 yards (which is kinda a big span in the context of the question) and at that time the Russian cavalry is behind the Russian infantry so my thinking is their vector of approach would have been direct at the front of Senarmont…

Cheers,

The Bandit

'You seem to feel the evidence has the artillery completely destroys the enemy, takes the ground they were defending while the Infantry and cavalry stand around watching.'

That is something of a silly comment, when the Russian counterattacks are described.

Again, you've shown nothing to counter anything that I've posted.

B

Bandit,

I didn't use Arnold as a source in my posting, but thanks for reminding me of his contribution, which is substantial.

I'll have a look again.

B

Kevin,

That is something of a silly comment, when the Russian counterattacks are described.

I think he means after their counter-attacks failed. At that point, Arnold has the Russians literally just standing there but notes that they are swept forward by French forces other than Senarmont's guns.

Cheers,

The Bandit

I think to fully attempt to understand the artillery action you also have to understand what else was going on.

And to do that using only one source when there are a few more available, including primary sources, is not the way to proceed in the investigation of the battle as a whole and the action in particular.

I do think enough source information has been provided to do that.

B

'You seem to feel the evidence has the artillery completely destroys the enemy, takes the ground they were defending while the Infantry and cavalry stand around watching.'

That is something of a silly comment, when the Russian counterattacks are described.

Yes, I thought so too.

Again, you've shown nothing to counter anything that I've posted.

Assuming you've actually read what I posted, or even Bandit, You really aren't getting the gist of the discussion, are you? [And all the 'counters' to what you posted, if that is what they are] are all based on the quotes you provided.]

The discussion, at least my part of it, is based on research with multiple sources on the action concerned.

What sources have you used for your 'conclusions'? I don't see any references, merely opinion and conjecture. And, yes, I've read your postings and they are long on supposition and short on factual material.

'I have always wondered why Victor received far more recognition from Napoleon for the engagement than Senarmont, even though the artillery attacks were done with Napoleon's permission and the subsequent action observed by him.'

Napoleon had no idea what Senarmont was up to. Senarmont asked his corps commander's (Victor) permission to employ the entire corps artillery complement, but I haven't seen anything that states he told Victor what he wanted to do.

When Senarmont began his advance, Napoleon sent Mounton, one of the Imperial ADCs, to find out. When Mouton confronted Senarmont, Senarmont told him to mind his own business. When Mouton reported back to Napoleon, he also told Mouton to then leave Senarmont alone.

Victor was promoted to marshal after the campaign, so it seems he was rewarded for his part in the campaign.

B

I'd just like to say that there is so much fascinating information here, whatever the conclusions might be, I have learned much. Thanks.

James

Kevin,

I posted some questions for you to respond to, instead you're telling us that Victor was promoted. I'm not holding up Arnold as the definitive source, I even said so multiple times, what I am doing is asking you to account for some statements he made, based on what sources you have available, how do you account for the claim that other French forces (Lahoussaye's cavalry) and not Senarmont's artillery pushed the Russian infantry and cavalry (who we all agree were really hurt by Senarmont's guns) back into Friedland?

Do you think Arnold is flat wrong?

I went back and re-read the quotes you posted, I've picked out a couple that I think pertain [bolded emphasis is mine]:

In his able and eager hand the artillery succeeded where the infantry had failed; closing up to the Russian infantry he placed an overwhelming barrage on the selected spot until all resistance had been broken down and the French infantry were once more ready to attack, then the guns ceased firing and the infantry immediately delivered their assault.

This was something you took from AF Becke. It indicates there were still Russian troops ahead of Senarmont as the French infantry assaulted after Senarmont stopped firing and there logically had to be something for them to assault.

It also doesn't say that Senarmont advanced any further, it says once he was done firing the French infantry assaulted forward…

but that same ghastly battery halted their gallant assault and the regiments turned back

This is from what you quoted of Alexey Yermelov. He doesn't say the Life Guard Izmailovsk and Pavlovsk Grenadier regiments were pushed into the town, he says they were "turned back" – we all agree on that.

Further more you also quoted him saying [again bolded emphasis is mine]:

The only way to reach the main bridge was through the city itself. Chaos reigned in the narrow streets and this was further increased by the enemy artillery. Based on the direction of the enemy columns, it was obvious that they intended to cut us off at the crossing…

So it seems that the French infantry was again moving and assaulting toward the city at this point, though it is unclear which infantry or which artillery Yermelov is referring to when he mentions the city itself.

The quote from Elting seems odd to me [one last time, bolded emphasis is mine]:

‘In this bloody respite, Ney-fairly frothing at the mouth in his fury-damned and led his corps in a howling assault. Dupont had followed Senarmont…Bennigsen desperately committed his last reserve, putting in the infantry of the Russian Imperial Guard against Dupont, and ordering the Guard cavalry against Senarmont's flank. Senarmont swiftly changed front, blowing the Czar's picked cavalrymen off the battlefield with two quick volleys. Simultaneously, Dupont met, and broke, the Russian Guard infantry with the bayonet, seizing the temporary bridges across the Muhlen Fluss.

So according to Elting Senarmont does not turn back the Russian Life Guards – Dupont does. This is in direct conflict with my account from Arnold and your quote from Yermelov who both say that Senarmont halted the attack of the Russian Life Guards. On top of this Elting then says that Dupont hit the Russian Life Guards and took a bridge, he says this act is simultaneous with Senarmont turning back the Russian cavalry. If this is the case, Dupont must be advancing ahead of Senarmont at that point so it is again infantry taking ground.

Can you please account for these things?

Cheers,

The Bandit

We also need to account for that ammunition expenditure, because, as Rory Muir noted in Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon:

Such at least is the traditional story, based on Senarmont's own account of the battle. In broad outline it is probably fairly accurate, but there are problems with it which suggest that the details are exaggerated, and in particular that the ranges quoted are far too short. Senarmont's thirty guns fired a total of 2,516 rounds, of which only 368 were canister. It is hard to believe that his guns would really have closed to within 150 or 250 yards and continued to fire roundshot when canister was specifically designed for use at these and even longer ranges. Nor do Senarmont's casualties support the idea of his closing within musket range, for he lost only one officer and ten men killed and forty-two men wounded. It may be that the Russians passively waited to be slaughtered, but it seems more likely that the tale of Senarmont's daring grew with the telling, encouraged no doubt by Napoleon, eager to inspire his gunners with a spirit of emulation.

With firepower, you need to look at the math. As much as some hate the old school tables and charts games, there was math behind them (I know, multiplication and division are bad things). Assume one gun firing one round shot round per minute at 800 paces. Further assume that your crew has found the range and neither the target or the battery moves except for recoil. Further assume that the gun hits the target with every shot and going through a three rank line, the shot will kill or injure between 7 and 10 men. A 15 minute bombardment by one gun will result in 150 casualties under perfect conditions. An eight gun battery will kill or injure 1200 men in 15 minutes under perfect conditions. This is your outlyer max at three standard deviations. If you assume that bouncing the ball across the ground, recoil, etc., and you hit 50% of the time and you get a pattern of hits that looks like this as the ball skips through, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,7,7,8,8,9,9,10,10(zeros are misses)you're going to average 4 hits per shot with a standard deviation of one casualty when you hit. An eight gun battery firing 15 rounds each tube will cause 480 casualties on average with a low of 360 and a high of 600. A 100 gun grand battery will cause, on average, between 4500 and 7500 casualties per 15 minutes with an average of 6000. If you assume they hit the target only 25% of the time then you're averaging 31.875 hits per tube, 255 per battery, and 3,187 per 100 guns per 15 minute turn. That's still very deadly.

Major Snort,

Muir is an excellent academic and has greatly added to the understanding of Napoleonic battles. Your quote of Muir regarding Senarmont at Friedland is his opinion. With great caution, I disagree.

The normal allotment of canister per gun in the French army was no more than 10 to 15% of the ready ammunition. Thus the number of canister rounds fired is not an indicator of the range to the target but rather its effectiveness especially when fired from small caliber guns. The reason more canister wasn't carried was it wasn't the killer gamers have been led to believe.

According to numerous artillery generals including General Hunt, expected casualties at 0 degree elevation was 1/per round. Thus, whether the range was 150 yards or 400 yards the Inherent Military Probability (IMP) is the battery would cause about the same number of casualties.

Cheers,

Bob Coggins

Various points:

Regarding the OP, I can't think of any tactical innovation pioneered by Napoléon. He certainly wielded the army – reformed in theory in after the SYW and in practice during the Revolutionary Wars – well. Grand batteries were adopted after encountering them at Eylau but more specifically Aspern.

The French army of the Glory Years was marked by an enthusiastic infantry, flexibly lead in column and skirmish order, and well drilled in the camps of Boulogne who could close with the enemy and overthrow them. Austria's mis-deployment allowed Napoléon to capture half the Austrian army at Ulm before the Russian could get there, then the Russians made the same mistake attacking at Austerlitz before their third mobilization arrived. Finally the Prussians completely bungled things, first rejecting the Coalition, then declaring war on their own and getting bested at Jena/Auerstedt. Eventually Napoléon caught the rest of the Prussians and Russians overreaching at Friedland, but not before Auerstedt, Eylau, and the battles in Poland really sapped the Grande Armé'e.

In 1809, in the battles in Bavaria and all the peripheral actions, the French infantry still consistently bested the Austrians. But at Aspern, the Austrians, unable to close and overthrow the French, used their excellent artillery to bombard their way to victory. At Wagram, the battle reached stasis until Davout could work around the flank and force the Austrians to withdraw. Meantime the enormous bombardments caused huge and equal casualties. The French, with greater resources could sustain that, while the Austrians ran out of strategic depth at Znaim. But it was a harbinger of things to come. The ability of the French infantry to close and overthrow their opponents was negated by the ability of artillery to fight at a distance, and the battles became increasingly attritional.

The battles of 1812 and 1813 (1814 was more of a scramble) and 1815 saw long gun lines backed up by infantry. (BTW at Borodino after Kutaisov was lost, he was replaced by Kostenetsky who was also a general, while the II Army had their own Artillery Chief who was also a general. I believe this held true for the later battles as well.)

One question is, why didn't the armies just advance the gun lines to 400 yards with infantry behind them? – Well indeed they seemed to do that at Waterloo once the French took Mont St. Jean, but it was too little too late. Otherwise I think the answer was that the other guys were using their artillery to prevent just that. So I think the common wisdom that counterbattery fire was a waste is quite incorrect. I think we need a much better understanding of those dynamics. I also think it very much limited the mobility of the targeted batteries by killing the horses. We also have little understanding of how one would site a battery and what could be expected in any given battlefield of dead ground or cover and how quickly that could be recognized and exploited by the troops. I think both counterbattery fire and fields of fire are tough things to get right on the tabletop.

I agree that it is quite incorrect to call couner battery fire as a waste, there it happened all the times.
In case one is reading memoires of artillery officers – counter battery fire, destroyed guns by enemy artillery etc. are a predominant story.

It could be used in rules, where you have to throw a dice – to determine how many guns of a battery are bound for counter battery fire, which leaves the wargamer for less guns for those targets he would like to be fired at.

As for canister versus ball shot, there were quite a few artillery officers who believed that ball shot was more effective, especially against densly packed units, there the ball shot would penetrate all ranks.

Mathematics in this case could be misleading, because if I would apply them for infantry fire according to the Scharnhorst trials – a fire fight would be over after 5 vollies at about 200 paces.

In case of all that maths, why did batteries need protection either from infantry or cavalry??

Bob,

Muir's assessment of the situation, or more importantly the ammunition consumption figures, are important because the traditional view of the situation is, as posted by Kevin quoting Elting;

At 120 yards, he halted. Ignoring the heavy Russian artillery fire, Senarmont blasted Bagration's infantry with canister for twenty-five minutes, knocking over 4,000 of them and sending the rests streaming back into Friedland's choked streets.

It is quite obvious that there was no twenty-five minute blasting with canister, unless the shooting took place at a very leisurely pace and I would imagine that if artillery had rolled up within 120 yards of enemy close order troops, the situation would have been anything but leisurely.

With the majority of fire being roundshot, the devastation was more likely due to the density of the Russian troop formations. As George Cathcart wrote, after serving with the allied armies in Germany in 1813 where there was plenty of artillery:

In a general action, when opposed to troops who have been in many battles, the fire of artillery ceases to intimidate, and its real effect, except in certain accidental circumstances, where crowded defiles or villages disputed with obstinacy place an unfortunate mass of infantry at their mercy, is in fact far less destructive than that of musketry at point blank range

For the purpose of wargames rules, it isn't a solution just to increase firepower of artillery to unrealistic levels, it is a case of identifying what special circumstances made artillery very effective.

Time!

6 gun battery 3 rounds a minute firing at troops from 1200 yds who take 10 minutes to close get the attention of 18 rds a minute or 180 rds which is 180 ( 1 man per round)to 540 (3 per) men down over a flat field. so small Russian battalions would fail large Prussian or Austrian would take the battery and the French in the middle.

So cut the time subject to fire or the terrain is against (rolling, broken up by hedges swamps ect) you and the battery is under greater threat.

If skirmishers take 1/5 the rate as a line unit then the battery is under the same threat as from a battalion. combine a skirmish line with a supporting battalion and the battery can stop one or the other. Wow this fact I never really groked why until this discussion.

Cav would cover ground in 1/2 the time.

Now this is where the other rules like moral come in.

If you are the artillery and are attacked by a battalion your chances good to see them off. unless the ground is not perfect, you are ammo out ect. so we get results like the 40 or so guns at Waterloo when the French Cav attacked pack up and left (tiered and ammo out) or the

Dear Lord Ghee,

Sparker, these same Russian stated that the Russian used all of the artillery reserve at Bordino and sighted Russian records.

True. For me the best modern work on Borodino is that of Mikaberidze, 'The Battle of Borodino – Napoleon against Kutuzov, London 2007' and whilst he mentions this cite by Larionov, who believes that only 2 Russian reserve batteries remained unemployed throughout the battle owing to the gallant Kutaisov's early demise, he also mentions that several participants who suggested that his demise:

….was the reason why many of our batteries remained uselessly in the reserve…

(Pages 134-136)

So we have conflicting opinions on whether a significant proportion of the Russian artillery reserve was left out of battle. Whilst Mikaberidze concludes that the impact of his death has been exaggerated, on balance at least some of the Russian artillery was unemployed…

So I believe my point still stands…If despite some Russian Guns not being used, the Red God of War held Napoleon to a stalemate, imagine the impact if it had all been used…Borodino was a Gunner's battle!

Guys,

Most senior artillery officers agreed a ROF of greater than one round/minute was a waste.

Guns did not fire 3 rounds/minute for any length of time. Lest we forget, those guys were handling bags of black powder and one mistake could cause disaster.

In any event, the heat generated would cause bronze barrels to fatigue, touch holes to distort and rounds to blow off due to the heat in the barrel and this doesn't even address the fatigue to the crews.

For skirmishers to do any damage to artillery, which was a skirmish target, they would have to have a thick screen and get close enough to score significant hits, making them a target for canister fire. Ergo, skirmishers had very little effect on artillery. By the ACW all things changed with the advent of the rifled musket which often suppressed or forced artillery to retreat. As for the British Rifles or for that matter continental rifle armed units, to my understanding they were not committed in large enough numbers to affect artillery.

The French had artillery generals attached to the staff of each corps. The allies did not.

Cheers,

Bob Coggins

Ergo, skirmishers had very little effect on artillery

Evidence to the contrary?

Guns were a particular target of skirmishers and most treatises on the subject, from the Russian 1798 Jager manual, the Prussian 1788-9 Schutzen and Fusiler regulations as well as the French 1769 /1792 Light infantry instructions specifically mention artillery crews as a target.

In just one battle, Salamanca, there are several instances of British light infantry being assigned to, and successful at driving off artillery or forcing them to reposition within infantry protection, winning respite for the British troops. Both Divisional commander Leith and Wellington on separate occasions specifically ordered light infantry to target artillery, which would be rather pointless if skirmishers hhad very little effect on artillery.

The Russians were also unable to see the arty due to smoke, according to the narrative in the Osprey history I have- this may have quite a lot to do with the artilleries success.

Major Snort has pointed out the psych issue also- the effect of arty is also psychological. Probably large scale, more abstract games handle this better than nuts and bolts battalion level games.

What sources have you used for your 'conclusions'? I don't see any references, merely opinion and conjecture. And, yes, I've read your postings and they are long on supposition and short on factual material.

Again, Kevin, repeated for the third, or is it the forth time. Your sources, repeating quotes you provided. I am not sure you even know what conclusions I am making when you say such things, but here is a source mentioned by you supporting my conclusions:

The Sabretache: Journal of military history retrospective, Volume 5

{The translation is mine, so it is rough.]

Battle of FRIEDLAND (extract from newspaper operations of I Corps of the Grand Armée.) 1807

General Victor, arriving at the head of the 1st Army Corps on the field of battle at Friedland, received His Majesty, the Emperor's order to establish his troops as a reserve in front of the village of Postheuen behind the battle line.

Each division, taking up its order of battle, was formed on two lines, Dupont's division having the right, the Lapiese's centre, Villatte's left.

The first line deployed. The second remained in battalion columns; a battalion towards the end of each wing of the line and two battalions towards the centre.

The 4th division of dragons was placed into battle behind Dupont's division.

Light Cavalry was detached by order of Napoleon to support the left wing of the army at Heinrichsdorf.

In this position the I Corps formed the army reserve and had to support, if necessary, the VI and VIII corps at the orders of Marshal Lannes, who was responsible for the attack.

General Sénarmont, having received General Victor's order to bring up the artillery and send it forward with the front of the line, formed two batteries and a reserve that he placed behind the village of Posthenen.

The right battery was composed of ten pieces of 6 pdrs, two of 3pdrs and three howitzers. Commanded by colonel Forno, Chief of staff of the artillery, and under him, Bernard, the guns were served by the 6th company, 1st regiment of foot artillery, half of the 1st company of the 2nd horse artillery regiment by half of the 2 company of the 3rd horse artillery.

The right battery was composed of the same number of pieces and commanded by major Raulot. It was served by the 2nd and 6th companies of the 8the foot artillery, the 3rd company of horse/light artillery and half of the 2ne company of the same regiment.

The reserve consisted of 6 guns and the ammunition supply.

Thus prepared artillery quickly moved to 200 fathoms (390 meters) of the enemy and, after five or six rounds, closed to to 100 toises, [190 meters] and began a rolling fire that was pushed with vigor.

As soon as the artillery was committed, general Victor ordered the division of dragons to support the left of the corps.

General of the artillery [Senarmont], noticing the terrible effect he was producing and wanting to force the retreat of the enemy, gave the order to no longer fire on enemy guns equal to ours in number and which took some damage, he proceed to 60 fathoms (117 meters) from the Russian front two batteries to train on only one and then fire more than canister.

The [Russian?] masses were thinned and reinforced.

Finally, enemy cavalry charged the battery; The artillery general made a change of front and by this maneuver, fired on the cavalry, who disappeared after receiving two discharges.

At the time when the enemy cavalry charged, Victor, seeing the movement, sent squadrons fo the 4th Division of Dragoons to support Senarmont.

However, the Commander in Chief, [Napoleon]realized the enemy had obtained an advantage over the VI Corps, forcing it to reploy, [to the rear] ordered general Dupont to support it with his division, which the general did with his usual boldness and skill.

The Russian general, sent elite troops and part of the Imperial Guard to hold the center. Dupont's division came forward supported by light cavalry brigade of general Durosnel, that his Majesty had put at the disposal of Victor, and the enemy was driven back to the River, and on Friedland where he was harried.

Dupont's division covered itself with glory in this memorable day and the Russian suffered significant loss, the battle field covered with dead bodies.

The division was supported in its advance by five guns detached from the right battery and colonel Forno who directed them himself. It was at the end of the action that this brave officer crowned his career with a glorious end, being swept away by a Cannon ball while ordering the advance.

The head of artillery Bernard and lieutenants Ondard and Marcillac were wounded. General Sénarmont had his horse killed under him.

General Sénarmont gave the highest praise to Major of Artillery Raulot, who, though overwhelmed with pain of rheumatism which have left him bent in two, wanted to make this batt;e. He led the battery's left with the greatest coolness and the firmness provided by experience.

Artillery troops lost on the day, killed or wounded, 4 officers, 52 men; 53 horses, having been casaulties in less than three hours, The fired 2,600 gun or shells, including 400 canister.

Dupont's division had 2 officers and 54 men killed, 24 officers and 569 wounded men.

Brave colonel Semellé, of the 24th ligne, was injured and had his horse killed under him.

The 4th Dragoon Division had 3 officers and 39 men killed, seven officers and 51 wounded men.

Divisions Lapisse and Villatte, who remained in their exposed positions in front of Posthenen for the duration of the attack, suffered the loss of 4 off1ciers and 24 soldiers killed and 4 officers and 96 wounded men from artillery fire.

Napoleon was pleased to pay tribute to the I Corps.
"Officiers, généraux, officiers et soldats du 1" corps d'armée, tous ont fait leur devoir. Il se loue particulièrement du général d'artillerie Sénarmont, qui a rendu les plus grands services, de son chef d'état-major, le général Maison, qui a continué dans cette journée de mériter les bontés de S. M. par ses talents militaires et sa rare bravoure, et de la manière distinguée avec laquelle les officiers de son état-major ont executé les différents ordres qu'il leur a donnés."

(Archive history of the war.)

And another source:

Rory Muir, Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon, pp. 39-40

The most famous occasion when artillery is credited, not merely with defending itself, but with taking the attack to the enemy, was at the Battle of Friedland. Here General Senarmont, commander of the artillery of I Corps, acting on his own initiative, though with the approval of the corps commander General Victor, hastily collected most of the artillery in the corps, including divisional batteries, into a single force of thirty guns. [assuming here Muir did not count the reserve. BH] With these he first checked the pursuit of Ney's corps, which had been broken, and then advanced against the Russian line, unlimbering his guns and opening fire at 450 yards. The Russians stood firm but cold make no effective reply, and after a few rounds, Senarmont again advanced, this time to within 250 yards. Even Napoleon was astounded at his audacity and sent an aide-de-camp, General Mouton (later Count Lobau), to ask for an explanation, but senarmont replied, ‘Leave me to do it with my Gunners, I will reply to all', and Napoleon let him have his way. Again the French guns advanced until they were only 150 yards from the Russian line; the Russian cavalry attempted to overrun them but were repulsed with terrible losses and the whole Russian left wing fell back in chaotic disorder.

Such at least is the traditional story, based on Senarmont's own account of the battle. In broad outline it is probably fairly accurate, but there are problems with it which suggest that the details are exaggerated, and in particular that the ranges quoated are far too short. Senarmont's thirty guns fired a total of 2,516 rounds (an average of eighty four per gun), of which only 368(roughly one in seven) were canister. [OR 12 per gun. BH] It is hard to believe that his guns would really have closed to within 150 or 250 yards and continued to fire round-shot when canister was specifically designed for use at these and even longer ranges. Nor do Senarmont's casualties support the idea of this closing within musket rrange of the enemy, for he lost only one officer and ten men killed, three officers and forty-two men wounded. It may be that the Russians passibely waited to be slaughtered, but it seems more likely that the tale of Senarmont's daring grew in the telling, encouraged no doubt by Napoleon, eager to inspire his gunners with a spirit of emulation. After all, ‘to lie like a bulletin' was proverbial in the Grande Armée.

Thus the number of canister rounds fired is not an indicator of the range to the target but rather its effectiveness especially when fired from small caliber guns. The reason more canister wasn't carried was it wasn't the killer gamers have been led to believe.

Bob:
Uh, no. The reason more canister wasn't carried is because artillery was rarely that close and often saved for defensive actions. As the numbers and types of artillery guns mentioned in the The Sabretache has @200 rounds available, that means 20 canister rounds per gun and the reported number of canister rounds fired per gun was @7% or 12 rounds.

The sources I have seen do agree that firing one round a minute is more likely, and an extended cannonade would see an even slower rate.

According to numerous artillery generals including General Hunt, expected casualties at 0 degree elevation was 1/per round. Thus, whether the range was 150 yards or 400 yards the Inherent Military Probability (IMP) is the battery would cause about the same number of casualties.

Your calculations would put Senarmont's 30 guns, six and 3 pounders way below the 4,000+ casualties that Senarmont says he caused in about 25 minutes. Not saying you are wrong, only adding to the debate.

McLaddie,

Thanks for your input. Even when I disagree it's always valuable.

I thought 4lb caissons carried 150 rounds plus 28,000 or so infantry rounds. At over 100 yds. with light guns I'd much rather fire ball. Absent the intercession of Senarmont or a battery commander the choice was with the section commander.

A few posts back, someone wrote that soldiers tend to exaggerate. The claim of 4,000 is 20% of all of the Russian casualties suffered during the entire battle. The target for the guns was also attacked by Dupont and Ney so most likely Senarmont put the best light on the artillery effects. Finally, the rounds fired belie the casualties claimed.

Cheers,

Bob Coggins

Bob:
I have seen different numbers of rounds at different times, depending on year and equipment, but I was thinking of the immediate cassions/cars assigned directly with the guns. Even with 150 rounds that means 15 rounds of canister per gun. I agree about the 4,000 casualties and Dupont's attack.

I can see Senarmont out there walking the ground going 1, 2, 3, 4,…. oops, no, that's a French dragoon. 1, 2, 3,…

Bill

Major Snort:

I didn't see your quote of Muir's until I posted mine. Mea Culpa.

Regarding the casualties, Senarmont claimed 4,000 dead, not dead and wounded. The whole thing is obviously blown out of all proportion.

Regarding the rate of fire, I agree that in general both infantry and artillery probably fired at a much slower rate than the theoretical maximum, but let's not get carried away by thinking that the barrels melted or powder was automatically ignited by hot barrels if the guns fired three rounds per minute.

In recorded tests, British 6 pounder guns fired 13 or 14 rounds in under 2 minutes on several occasions. Premature ignition was the result of embers left in the barrel, not barrel temperature.

Major Snort,

Thanks for the information. Barrels didn't melt they fatigued or sagged if bronze/brass making it difficult to hit anything. If iron they had the nasty habit of exploding without warning.

Having read numerous representations by senior artillerymen that a greater ROF than one round/minute was a waste of ammunition I'd have loved to know the purpose of firing 7 rounds a minute. And agree or not that powder flashed off due to the heat of the barrel I cannot help to think it is tremendously dangerous to fire and swab a gun 14 times in 2 minutes. Did they state the purpose of the exercise?

Cheers,

Bob Coggins

Bob,

The purpose of the experiment was purely to determine how fast a gun could be fired. At the same time, either infantry or cavalry were advancing towards the gun from a set distance. Presumably the gun was not pointed directly at the target, even with blank charges. Similar experiments showed that veteran British infantry could achieve a maximum rate of fire of around 3 rounds per minute when shooting as individuals with both blank and ball cartridges out of formation.

I agree that this rate of fire was probably never achieved in action and with all that rushing about it was potentially dangerous.

I am sure that most shooting was at a much slower pace, but when the occasion demanded, this rate could be increased, for example as recommended in Kutaisov's instructions for Russian artillery, where he advises firing faster as the range closes.

Major Snort,

I am speechless.

Cheers,

Bob Coggins

Interesting how the discussion has come to it, but Friedland is one of the very few instances where we do have a record of casualties/ammunition used and some indication as to the ranges at which these were fired.
It`s one of the examples that I used to determine the effectiveness of artillery in my rules.
Russian formations and battle arrays may have been the key to the high level of casualties claimed.
Given possible arrays and artillery effects, I estimated that casualties may have been closer to 3,000 in this action.

If you`d like to see my final estimations for artillery effectiveness there… and the first stage in my artillery rules (which had several more range-bands than I have in the rules now and a "hit/casualty" system) please drop me a line at:

contact@grandmanoeuvre.co.uk

What I found instructive about Senarmont´s attack is not so much the artillery shooting and maneuvering, it is the passivity of the russians. Most wargame rules would allow the russians to start counterattacking immediately, the batteries would have been swamped with infantry and cavalry – no wargamer would willingly allow a relatively unsupported enemy battery to maneuver freely in front of his troops at that proximity while he was being blown to bits.
Most rules to not represent the friction and obeyance to orders, that made the russians stay put and suffer.

Yes, then you do need an add-on morale ruling for that special Russian quality to withstand fire and casualties.

This passivity of the Russians keeps coming up. It was a major cause of tension between The Russians and Prussians in 1813, as I understand it. The Prussians did not like their valuable men to be put under the tactical control of Russian generals because they exposed them too much to enemy artillery (contrast this with alleged Prussian insouciance to artillery exposure at Ligny, reported by Wellington!).

How to reflect this in wargames rules is a bit tricky. This may be evidence for Russian "stoicism" under fire – i.e. that they have a higher tolerance to casualties than you would expect from the quality of the men.

More generally, it seems that to Russian generals the men were a cheap line-filler, and their careers would not suffer if casualties were high (I don't think that is unique to Russians of this era). The Russians seem to have less inclination/capability to fine tune their troops deployments. This could be represented by extra command friction in some rules. This is opposite to the British situation where there would be questions in the House if casualties were high.

Guys,

At Friedland, once Napoleon and the reserves showed the order to all Russian formations was, to withdraw across the Alle or "GET OUT OF THERE." So, whatever passivity was displayed was encouraged by orders.

Cheers,

Bob Coggins

MichaelCollinsHimself,

Thanks for your observation.

I would demur. Well designed rules should not need special rules for the Russians or any other nationality for morale or casualties.

Cheers,

Bob Coggins

Dear Bob,
So how then should a well-designed rule represent this?
With Regards,
Mike.

Well designed rules should not need special rules for the Russians or any other nationality for morale or casualties.

It seems that this predisposes that morale etc. was equal between the nations: Same circumstances will produce the same behaviors, reactions, results?

I did not mean that this was a special russian attribute, instead I meant to imply that troops on wargame tables often react to quickly to new challenges – regardless of nationality. Often troops of all nationalities stood under fire of closeby artillery because that was their order, whereas the wargamer would either immediately withdraw or counterattack. There is plenty of examples of this from all nationalities.

What I found instructive about Senarmont´s attack is not so much the artillery shooting and maneuvering, it is the passivity of the russians. Most wargame rules would allow the russians to start counterattacking immediately, the batteries would have been swamped with infantry and cavalry – no wargamer would willingly allow a relatively unsupported enemy battery to maneuver freely in front of his troops at that proximity while he was being blown to bits.
Most rules to not represent the friction and obeyance to orders, that made the russians stay put and suffer.

Well, I suppose I have two questions on this:

1. What do the Russian sources make of all this?

2. "Most wargame rules would allow the Russians to start counterattacking immediately…" Was there something preventing the Russians (or anyone else in similar circumstances) counterattacking immediately? Or is this a variation of the OFM's 'Stupid McLellan TMP link rule?

Regards

I would agree Bob in the sense that I would be against any rules specifically for Russians, British, etc. However, having a system flexible enough to cater for the differences often displayed by different nations is something worth doing. But that needs to be built on the idea of what caused any national tendencies, rather than the nationalities themselves.

For example, there might be a "passive" general type, which would not cover all Russian generals, and would cover some generals of other nations. I'm not sure if that actually gets to the heart of this particular issue (Russian generals were passive in some circumstances, but necessarily others), but that would be the principle.

If possible, it also worth trying to eliminate "free lunches" – every positive characteristic has a negative aspect and vice versa. So "passivity" might also imply stubbornness under pressure. The whole "British good, Austrian bad" tendency needs to be avoided – after all the Austrians are pretty much what the British would have looked like if they were trying to run a continental scale army.

The tension between the Russians and Prussians at Bautzen and Lutzen owing to the different tactical preferences should be represented somehow if trying to replay combats of that period. But outright national characteristics are a copout.

Matthew

This passivity of the Russians keeps coming up. It was a major cause of tension between The Russians and Prussians in 1813, as I understand it.

I wonder whether the Russians would characterize their behavior as 'passive' in those instances…

Considering the flatness of the Russian terrain--even that of Southern Germany, using the reverse slope may not have been an option, let alone a serious consideration most of the time. Spain, on the other hand, offered a wide variety of slopes, steep and gradual. Lots of opportunities to find slopes when you needed one. Why the slopes at Waterloo drew Wellington to the ground around Mt. St. Jean.

p.231 of Adam Zamoyski`s March to Moscow:

"Frederick the Great is alledged to have said that one first has to kill the Russian soldier and then to push him over. Napoleon`s troops were reaching the same conclusion after fighting at Krasny, Smolensk and Vaultina Gora….
Clausewitz, who had the advantage of observing the phenonmenon from within the Russian army, put it down to "motionless obstinacy"….
"I could never have imagined that kind of passive courage which I have seen a hundred times in the soldiers of that nation, whi8ch stems, I believe, from their ignorance and credulous superstition." wrote Lubin Griois, who had watched them stand impassively as his batteries pounded them at Krasny, "for they die kissing the image of St. Nicholas which they carry with them, they believe they will go straight to heaven, and almost give thanks for the bullet which sends them there."

It seems to me that there was a difference in motivation which needs somehow to be represented in a war games rules.

The tension between the Russians and Prussians at Bautzen and Lutzen owing to the different tactical preferences should be represented somehow if trying to replay combats of that period. But outright national characteristics are a copout.

vs.

It seems to me that there was a difference in motivation which needs somehow to be represented in a war games rules.

I think difference we're talking about here is the difference between:

"Russians have a higher proportion of units rated as 'X'."
vs.
"All Russians and only Russians are rated 'X'."

If I'm understanding it right, I'm in the first camp with Matthew & Bob.

Cheers,

The Bandit

It seems to me that there was a difference in motivation which needs somehow to be represented in a war games rules.

Russian recruits were picked out by the village leader. When they left for the army they were counted as dead by their family, never to be seen again. Their one regiment became the recruit's family, one that that they would live in for the rest of their lives. There was no 'leave' for them, ever.

That created almost a Thebian Band kind of relationship between the soldier and their regiment. No one wanted to embarrass their comrades, and if they did, the consequences was far more devestating…they were rejected by the family.

I think it is one thing for the Russian infantry to be stoic in the face of death--which they obviously demonstrated, and quite another for their commanders to simply set them in front of the enemy to be knocked over like tenpins. That seems to be the question here.

There could be several reasons for that, if that is what actually happened rather than the Russians being far more stoic in carrying out the very same maneuvers etc. as the other Allied Armies. Or it could be the Russians simply didn't run when other armies did in the same situation.

Which do you think it is?

Given the opportunity themselves, Russian commanders (Bennigsen included) would prefer to have their men lined up behind their own batteries. But this did not happen at Friedland.
Still however, the expectation of how their infantry would perform stoically must have been with the Russian commander`s at the time.

Bandit,
It shouldn`t be a "cop-out" to rate some troops higher in morale or motivational terms than others – but I don`t think it`s a case of rating Russians higher, or better than other nations` troops – their reactions at the may be considered either good or bad.

Applying a modern sensibility of "political correctness" to the subject may lead one to false conclusions about how men behaved and were expected to behave in the past.
Zamoyski is giving us contemporary views from the Russian army's opponents; they perceived the Russian soldier as very different to themselves.
Perhaps there are more subtle ways of representing this historical expectation and behaviour in a rules mechanism rather than simply making all their infantry elite class?

Whirlwind,

Why did the Russians "sit passively" is an interesting question. I would say it was already partially answered by Bob; "At Friedland, once Napoleon and the reserves showed the order to all Russian formations was, to withdraw across the Alle or "GET OUT OF THERE." So, whatever passivity was displayed was encouraged by orders.".
This is my speculation, open to revision; Bagrations Russians in that sector were already screwed by that point. French troop levels had already built-up to dangerous levels in front of them. If the Russians attacked the guns they had a chance to prevent the horrible artillery fire that was decimating their ranks, but they may have found themselves in an even worse predicament from envelopment from the French Infantry. From the point of view of the Russians at the time, and maybe even in actuality, it may have been more prudent to sit there and wait for extraction. As Bob says, orders at that point were for a phased retreat, and of course they had to wait their turn to actually get to the bridges, to prevent stampede.

Optimal tactics in these most appalling of conditions would probably have been to counter Senarmonts guns with skirmishers and/or artillery of their own. Alas, I lack the knowledge to say whether this was a realistic option at that particular time.
What do you think?

P.S I think Sparta makes a great point above, in relation to this;
"Most wargame rules would allow the russians to start counterattacking immediately, the batteries would have been swamped with infantry and cavalry – no wargamer would willingly allow a relatively unsupported enemy battery to maneuver freely in front of his troops at that proximity while he was being blown to bits.
Most rules to not represent the friction and obeyance to orders, that made the russians stay put and suffer."

Cheers,
TW.

'I can see Senarmont out there walking the ground going 1, 2, 3, 4,…. oops, no, that's a French dragoon. 1, 2, 3,…'

Your use of sarcasm and condescension is noteworthy.

However, Senarmont was there and walked the ground and his assessement of the casualties caused by his artillery bombardment is not negated or contested by any other source. And Senarmont himself is the only source I've seen that classes all of the casualties caused by his artillery as killed. As an artilleryman in combat I have walked the ground and have seen the targets that we hit. One look is usually worth thousands of words of critique.

I have great respect for Rory Muir and his work. I do not agree with his assessment of Senarmont as posted in this thread. I've been studying Senarmont's actions for quite some time and I do believe that the opinions and conclusions from Rory Muir are incorrect. He is, of course, entitled to his opinions.

Your use of the 1st Corps after action report is noteworthy and, despite your comment to the contrary, it does not back up your doubts of Senarmont's performance.

As a sidenote, the French term 'toise' is not translated as 'fathom.' First, toise is linear measure, 6 French feet up to 1812 and then 2 meters from 1812 onwards. The translation of 'fathom' in French is 'fathom.' And fathom is a measure in depth at sea, or used in the length of rope at sea aboard ship.

Further, if you're going to use the 1st Corps after action report, you should also use Senarmont's after action report of 15 June 1807. His ammunition expenditure report is undoubtedly more accurate, as he also had to replenish the expended ammunition.

Senarmont's after action report can be found in Grands Artilleurs by Maurice Girod de l'Ain, pages 224-226. In this report, Senarmont states that 2,516 rounds were expended, of which 368 were canister.

I would suggest that when canister was being employed at close range, it was probably intermixed with some of the pieces firing roundshot, even at close range. And 2,516 is plenty of rounds fired to inflict heavy casualties and I'm surprised that only 4,000 were hit, especially at the ranges from which Senarmont was firing.

If anyone is interested at what massed artillery could do to formed troops, Coignet in his memoir describes the Guard infantry at Essling under fire from Smola's large battery as they were part of the target. One round, especially one roundshot, can take out more than one man per round. And canister most certainly can take out more than one because of the spread of the round upon discharge from the piece.

As to the use of IMP (Inherent Military Probability) I would urge caution, as that is merely a theory, not fact, and has more to do with location than the infliction of casualties as I understand the idea.

B