"Good Review of the Recent WWI books" Topic

I found this to be a good review of the recent WWI books

link

With Respect
K.Travlos

It's worrying that these writers don't seem to have read the work of Fritz Fischer , if they have then they don't seem to have refuted his theories and it's possible they may have simply ignored them. Books like 'The Sleepwalkers ' are creating a new myth about the Great War that ' no-one was to blame ' despite Fischer having shown that the German General Staff in 1914 were eager to provoke a reckoning with Russia as quickly as possible before Russia became too powerful. Reading the linked review , bizarrely one of the authors ( McMeekins ) seems to have written one book suggesting Russia was responsible for WW1 and then written another book suggesting something different ! I have the horrible feeling some of these books have been written to ' cash in ' on the centenary and that they are simply retreading old ground out of ignorance or laziness. The 1913 book is interesting though.

Clark has read Fritz Fischer and does a good job of debunking it.

Having read both the Fischer thesis (through the works of Copeland, Van Evera, and some articles) and the new historians (Clark, Pointing) I can only claim that Fisher wrote what he wrote driven more by politics than actual history.

If some modern historians grasp for straws for things like the Russian guilt (and there is abundant information to support such a position once Kokovtsov was kicked out of office ), Fischer did so for the German guilt.

Fischer far far too much operated under the picture of German politics created during the War, in which the General Staff was the dominant political player rather than the more nuanced picture that arises if someone actually studies the decision making and political system of Germany before the war. A dominant position of the General Staff is not evident. Indeed the Chancellor has more important. This is always the problem when a historian (or social scientist for that) permits recent events to cloud judgement, or sees decisions from their aftermath rather than the lead-up.

Because the new historians do not let themselves be blindeed as much by what happened during the war, we get a picture of how the war started that is much more nuanced.

And yes that picture does not permit an easy assumption of German guilt. Across the German "blanck check" of 1914 you have the earlier French one to Russia which essentially meant that France would fight for Balkan issue. There was Russia's support for Serbian irridentism. If German generals wanted war, so did Russian, French and Austrian ones. And some of those general staffs were much more powerful politically by 1914 than the German General Staff(the Russian war party was dominant after Kokovtsov was kicked out).

" I have the horrible feeling some of these books have been written to ' cash in ' on the centenary and that they are simply retreading old ground out of ignorance or laziness."

I cannot speak for the books I have not read, but the Clark book is most assuredly not this case. And it is unfair to criticize historians for trying to take advantage of centenaries and anniversaries to publish. It is such anniversaries that increase the possibility of publication.

" Books like 'The Sleepwalkers ' are creating a new myth about the Great War that ' no-one was to blame ' despite Fischer having shown that the German General Staff in 1914 were eager to provoke a reckoning with Russia as quickly as possible before Russia became too powerful."

No, what they do is give a more complete picture. One that is not very merciful to Fischer's position that only Germany is too blame.

I do not care about historians passing moral judgments. I do care about them presenting as much information as they can so I can make my own moral judgement. The new history shows information that Fischer either ignored or did not know about (though Alberitni's work had touched some of these themes). That information points in my opinion to a higher criminal moral culpability for the decision makers of Austria-Hungary , France, Russia, some for specific parties in the UK (Grey, Wilson, the Tories), and culpability through incompetence for the Germans.

You may make different conclusions, but a Fisher thesis in my opinion would really require ignoring everything else happening in Europe in 1909-1914m, and conflating the Germany of Hinderburg and Lunderdorf for the Germany of Wilhlem I and Bentham-Hollweg.

And ultimately what Clark's information shows is that the war=parties that would lead to war only became dominant in domestic politics during 1914. Which is very very important for explaining the in-congruence between the generally stable atmosphere in 1913 with the outburst of the war a year later.

Kokovtsov who is the main peace-party anchor in Russia s kicked out of office after machinations of Sukholimov and Krivoshein , the most vocal war-party supporters, in February 1914

Poincare wins the Presidency in 1913, and ushers an ascendancy of a war party in France

And the murder of Franz-Ferdinand in 1914 destroys the Austrian peace party.

These are devilish coincidences that happened in rapid succession and completely altered the balance between war-parties and peace-parties in Europe in 1914. No explanation of why the war happened when it happened can stand if it ignores these events.

I'm currently wading my way through the Max Hastings 'Catastrophe'. Hard going at the start, but shows up the faults of all four major participants, political and military.

I was thinking of the Hasting;s book, but I read somewhere that he pushes a specific POV and makes a moral judgmeent, and I am not happy about that. Do tell what you think about it when you are done.

The German involvement in the problem starts as early as November 28th 1912 and the end of the 2nd Balkan War when the Foreign Secretary Kiederlen Wachter announced to the German parliament : " If Austria is forced , for whatever reason , to fight for her position as a Great Power , we must fight by her side ". For whatever reason. It's worth pointing out that the Kaiser was against this position initially but Bethmann Hollweg convinced him to support it. In response , Sir Edward Grey stated that if Germany would not let Austria disappear then neither would Britain let France disappear as a Great Power – this was conveyed to the German ambassador in London by Lord Haldane. This provoked a diplomatic crisis. On 8th December 1912 the Kaiser held an emergency conference in Berlin with the chiefs of staff in response. It was agreed that Britain had made it's position clear and that preparations had to be made to involve the UK in any future war : Tirpitz asked for a postponement for 18 months to widen the Kiel canal and to further develop the Heligoland base while Moltke said ' I believe a war is inevitable and the sooner the better but we ought to do more through the Press 'i.e. to build up anti-Russian sentiment. Moltke also wrote to the Austrian Conrad von Hotzendorf in February 1913 stating that it would be hard to find a rallying cry that would persuade the German public to go to war.
It's clear von Moltke was contriving for a war against Russia here , and plans were being made to deal with Britain when the attack on France went in. The assassination of Franz Ferdinand was merely the excuse , but it enabled a world war as it pushed the Kaiser into the war party and eliminated the major Austrian supporter of peace in a stroke. When Austria declared war on Serbia ( 28th July 1914) Moltke described it as ' a singly favourable situation ' for Germany and ' we shall never again hit it so well as we do now '.
In actuality the alliances system provided a method of restraining the Great Powers and preventing war – France acted as a restraining influence on Russia and vice versa. This all changed when Germany gave Austria the ' blank cheque ' to declare war on Serbia , there was no restraining influence anymore and Austria could do what it liked – and Austria was only prepared to invade Serbia because it was backed up by Germany. The situation in Europe deteriorated. And by the weekend of July 25th 1914 von Moltke and Falkenhayn essentially had control of German policy and exploited it as they wished.
It's hard to see therefore how Clark can disprove Fischer's theories that Germany and Austria were to blame for starting the Great War : I haven't read Clark's book but if I can I will try and get hold of a copy and read it. Perhaps he makes a good argument against Fischer but I am not sure how this can be the case.

Also , after von Moltke had been fired by the Kaiser for the failure of the 1914 Offensives , he wrote to his friend Baron Colmar von der Goltz : " It is dreadful to be condemned to inactivity in this war , this war that I prepared and initiated ". Obviously von Moltke could not have seen all the horrors that the Great War would comprise of , nor foresee all it's consequences. But he knew very well who had started it.

Grand Dragon you are ignoring the much earlier blank check France gave Russia which essentially said " Russia can do anything it sees as required to further its interest in the Balkans against Austria-Hungary. France will fully support Russia in any situation and will fight over a Balkan issue".

That was a huge, huge change from earlier French policy and had a huge impact on the willingness of the Russians to fight Austria-Hungary. And Poincare did it. Also at least since 1910 the war party in Russia had accepted the destruction of Austria Hungary as a legitimate goal. This French willingness came in reaction to Russian unhappiness over the French failure to support them over the annexations.It predates the German blanck check by at least a year.

The German cries of we will stand by Austria were in reaction to the anger of the Austrians over the unwillingness of the Germans to support its positions during the First and Second Balkan Wars. The Germans seriously feared that Austria-Hungary would bolt out, and decided that they needed to show more support. But for Hollweg and the Kaiser this was all part of the diplomacy of keeping Austria tied to Germany. Moltke could have had all the plans he wanted. He was not the main decision maker. Hollweg was. And there are no indicators before 1915 that he was trying to make Russia got to war with Germany.

The alliances were extremely bad rather than restraining because the fear that Russia or Austria would defect because of the failure of Germany or France to support their Balkan policies led Germany and France to "balk-anise" their foreign policy to a dangerous degree. This is something Clark does a great job of explaining.

And again for every Motlke, there is a Sukholimov and Kirovshien pushing for a final showdown with Austria, or a Poincare giving blank checks. And unlike Motlke, these people had more central positions in the decision making.

And about Moltke's note: Just because a person thinks he started something, it does not mean that he stated something. Are you telling me Moltke knew any of the above information about the beliefs and war-party dynamics in London, Paris and Moscow. I seriously doubt it. The old man could claim all the responsibility he wanted. It means nothing, from the moment that he knew nothing about the decision making in the other capitals.

I won't persuade you, but at the very least you should read the Clark book. And address all the information he puts forward. I cannot see how the Fisher thesis can stand in front of the evidence about the decisions made in other capitals, some of which go far back than any German decisions. But you can judge that for yourself.

On Austria and Serbia. It is very clear that Conrad was willing to go at it alone, even without German help. And his voice had become dominant with Franz-Ferdinand out of the picture.

I think KT has most of it here, Grand Dragon, though I wouldn't ascribe German failings simply to incompetence. But he is absolutely right about the trap of accepting what people (in this case Moltke the Younger) say about their own role in events. Without independent contemporary evidence (and much of that suggests that he was a rather ineffectual chief of staff) his unsupported claim is just that.

On Austria and Serbia. It is very clear that Conrad was willing to go at it alone, even without German help. And his voice had become dominant with Franz-Ferdinand out of the picture.

This is only partly true. According to Hew Strachan Conrad had been proposing Austria invade Serbia since 1906 so that is correct. But Conrad was only the chief of the General Staff , like von Moltke and he was restrained by the peace party and Franz Joseph. The dominant voice in Austria-Hungary after the death of Franz Ferdinand was Count Berchtold and whereas Berchtold wanted a war with Serbia , he was not prepared to move until Germany granted it's ' blank cheque ' on July 6th. On July 7th Berchtold convened the Austrian and Hungarian cabinets to determine how to proceed. A humiliating ultimatum was issued to Serbia , one that the Austrians believed the Serbians could not possibly accept , rather than a direct invasion which might have invited Russian reprisals.
Berchtold delayed until Germany was backing him because he thought that Germany could keep Russia out of a war over Serbia , or failing that at least protect Austria from Russian intervention. In the event Berchtold only got Franz Joseph to declare war on Serbia by claiming Serbian troops had attacked Austrian forces – and this because von Jagow ,the German Foreign Secretary , had cabled Vienna practically ordering them to get on with it and declare war.

KTravlos , I appreciate what you are saying about the French 'blank cheque ' and Russian aims in the Balkans. But there is a difference between what could have happened and what did happen. The difference is that France gave Russia a blank cheque and Russia did not act on it. Germany gave Austria a blank cheque and Austria used it to declare war.
Moltke was very aware that if Germany went to war against Russia then France would intervene , that is why in 1913 he had the German general staff draw up a plan for a two front war based on knocking out France first.
However no country wanted to be the aggressor. This is the key point. After Sarajevo , key players in the Central Powers had their causus belli.
It's very possible that Russia could have caused WW1 by interfering in the Balkans , or declaring war on Austria , or attacking the Ottoman Empire. But Russia did not take this course of action. Besides , French help in a Balkan war would not have extended to attacking Germany – France wanted Alsace-Lorraine back but not at the cost of a war. French relations with Germany were better than they had been for years at the end of 1913.

The alliances were extremely bad rather than restraining

Clark is wrong here. In the Agadir crisis of 1911 Austria and Italy refused to support Germany against France and Britain over the French occupation of Morocco. Germany backed down. Thus the alliance with Austria/Italy acted as a restraining influence on German war plans. Although Russia was sympathetic to France in this crisis , it would not have been in Russia's interests to get dragged into a war with the Central Powers over Morocco ( as similarly it would not have been in France's interests to get dragged into a war over Manchuria or somewhere else on behalf of Russia ). Thus the interests of one power in an alliance would act as a restraint on the other.
Similarly , it could be argued that ' Balkanisation ' acted as a restraint on war : Russia did not attack Austria for fear of German intervention and Austria did not attack Russia for fear of French intervention. A sort of ' Cold War in the Balkans ' if you like , one that kept the peace. The war only broke out because (i) a wild card event broke the status quo ( the assassination of Franz Ferdinand ) (ii) Germany promised Austria it would support Austria if it acted against Serbia (iii) because of this support Austria invaded Serbia. This suggests to me that Germany and Austria are the guilty parties in this matter.

But it was those very actions in 1911 that led France and Germany to give their blank checks. The restraining in 1909 and 1911, and 1912, by creating rifts between the allies fed the later permissiveness. If you want to say that the alliances used to be restraining and after 1911 became permissive I can accept it, but I think the information Clark points out make the case that they were bad from the get-go.

One more thing on who made the first moves:

Russia mobilized before Austria. Clark points out the mobilization orders were later forged to show Russian partial mobilization following Austrian mobilization, but the original orders were 24 hours before the Austrian mobilizations. This means that technically Russia escalated the crisis first.

So "The difference is that France gave Russia a blank cheque and Russia did not act on it" is not true. Russia began the mobilization process. And while it is true that the Czar thought this would be partial mobilization , the General Staff knew it was impossible for Russia to do a partial mobilization and that it would have to be a full one. They chose to go with it because they wanted war.

"French help in a Balkan war would not have extended to attacking Germany – France wanted Alsace-Lorraine back but not at the cost of a war. French relations with Germany were better than they had been for years at the end of 1913."

Which is contradicted by everything Poincare and the people around him were saying from at least 1911 and after. Poincare was pushing Russia to react with force to any Austrian challenge in the Balkans, and promising full military support. Again you are left with the impression created by French policy in 1911. Things had radically changed in 1913.

"The dominant voice in Austria-Hungary after the death of Franz Ferdinand was Count Berchtold " But Brechtold deferred to Conrad a lot during the crisis. He was not Hollweg, he did not take charge.

Anyway, we can sit here and argue this points forever. I can only suggest you read the book and make your own judgement. But for me after reading it the Fisher thesis is the sense the Austria and Germany are the only responsible parties for the war is untenable.

That Austria bears principal responsibility I accept. That Germany does I also accept. But France and Russia bear as much as Austria, and Russia defiently more than Germany. And the UK is far from the innocent party.

Anyway Clark's information permits to actually put responsibility to specific people. I really do not care that much about states anymore. I know have names, names tied to specific actions and policies. And they are the guilty parties. And few of them are German.

But again be your own judge.

Clark does have his own biases though. I've not (yet) read 'The Sleepwalkers' but it's a theme that Clark has covered before, in 'The Iron Kingdom' and elsewhere. He's somewhat pro-Prussian in his leanings.

An Austro-Serbian War was more or less inevitable in 1914 & had been on the cards for some years. Personally I think that the Austro-Hungarian leadership were spoiling for a fight with Serbia & would have found another pretext even without Ferdinands wrong turn in Sarajevo. They did so in the knowledge that Germany was in their corner & egging them on. They hoped that the threat of Germany would restrain Russia's response. They guessed wrong.

Let's be honest, the 'war parties' in all of the major combatants were in the ascendancy, with the partial exception of Britain. Something was always going to happen…..

And even in Britain Grey was not as innocent as portrayed and you had Wilson crying for war. And in 1914 the Irish Question permitted the war party in the cabinet to find outside allies. So many damnable coincidences on that date (Irish Question, Franz Ferdinand killed of all people, Kokovtsov kicked out of office in Russia, damn damn and more damn)

That said as much as Austria was spoiling for fight, so was Serbia, and it was tolerating some seriously dangerous things in Austria simply because it believed, correctly, that the Russians would back them up.

You have a country fostering terrorism in your territory. It is not a blameless party.

No, the Serbians weren't blameless either!

I would also like to say that I thank all of the contributors of this thread. I very much enjoyed the back and forth!

Indeed Etranger. Of all the players in this drama, Apis for me is the one I would hesitate the least to call "evil". Such words should not arise in an analysis I know. But I will call it when I see it, and that man was evil.