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"Life in Custer's 7th Cavalry" Topic


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Bad General29 Dec 2013 10:28 a.m. PST

What was this like on campaign? I ask on two counts --

For the men… Pay, rations, living conditions, uniforms, hygiene, etc. How well trained were they? Small ams. horsemanship, military bearing?

For the horses… How were they treated? Cared for? (I recall reading that Napoleon's cavalry were dashing in battle, but poor horsemen otherwise. Didn't care for their mounts.) How were horses fed on campaign? Bedded down, etc? On the hard rides across the plains how were the watered? How often?

And why did Custer box sabers before the battle?

What books do you recommend?

liborn29 Dec 2013 10:47 a.m. PST

The best insight into life under Custer that I have read is:
Nathaniel Philbreck's "The Last Stand." Very well researched and many insights into the campaign life leading up to and after the battle. He's a great author and predominately focuses of historical events. Another great work by him is "Mayflower." I highly recommend his works.

SECURITY MINISTER CRITTER29 Dec 2013 10:58 a.m. PST

Libby Custer also wrote a book who's name escapes me.
Edit:
There were 3.
Her first book was Boots and Saddles (1885), followed by Tenting on the Plains (1887) and Following the Guidon (1890).

martin goddard Sponsoring Member of TMP29 Dec 2013 11:04 a.m. PST

I believe the sabre thing was because the noise/clatter they made whilst riding?

martin

Norman D Landings29 Dec 2013 11:28 a.m. PST

Philbrick's 'Last Stand' is a very good read. It's quite partial, though – Philbrick pushes the idea that General Terry was largely to blame for the defeat, not being willing to rein Custer in and manage him properly.

I reckon Evan S. Connel's 'Son of the Morning Star' is a more balanced view.

Cavalry recruits went to a holding depot called Camp Jefferson, in Missouri, before being allocated to a regiment.
Their initial training consisted only of basic drill – no combat training, no riding, or fieldcraft.

Custer's men were well-drilled in riding, formation changes and manoeuvres. This was largely due to the efforts of Custer himself – the 7th was noted to be a well-drilled unit at the time.

But they were not well-trained in use of arms. Firearm instruction did not form part of the basic training at all. Once a recruit was despatched to their serving unit, they may or may not be trained in shooting – it was up to their commanding officer.
Some of the new recruits in Custer's command were said to have never fired their weapons before.

Custer's decision to box sabres was entirely normal. They were not usually carried on campaign.
If he had decided to take them – they would have been completely useless.
Like most cavalrymen, Custer's troops were completely untrained in their use. They were mainly a parade-ground item.
Also, sabres were issued blunt. Even if you had some way of sharpening them, it took a lot of work to put a cutting edge on them, and to keep them sharp in the field.

The treatment of the horses was one of the factors contributing to the defeat – the hard pursuit of the Indians left the cavalry horses in a very poor condition, and many went lame along the way. (Of course… if Custer hadn't pushed so hard, the Little Big Horn encampment might well have dispersed before he reached it!)

For a good overview of cavalry service, Osprey's 'US Cavalryman: 1865-1890' is pretty useful.

PKay Inc29 Dec 2013 11:28 a.m. PST

A great book on exactly the subjects you are asking about is "Life of a Soldier on the Western Frontier" by Jeremy Agnew. I would imagine that there wasn't much difference between conditions/experiences in the 7th vs. other units.

Iowa Grognard29 Dec 2013 12:12 p.m. PST

All decent suggestions.

Another book, not directly on the 7th, but a good daily account within the campaign is March of the Montana Column by Bradley. Includes some good perspectives of the conditions etc.

Researching this battle was a big hobby of mine for 15+ years before I put my own thoughts on paper and was full on the subject…unless something new comes to light.

Many years ago I joined a group that gained permission, from private land owners, to track the movements of the 7th cavalry during the campaign. The conditions were much like those noted in 1876. Having been a marine I knew a lot of dust, but that fine soil on the 7ths trail is choking to say the least. Inches of the stuff accumulated quickly on your person or your vehicle. One could imagine the added fatigue this would place on mounts via their respiratory systems. Small gullies, little wind, hot…nasty business. We also had found what we believed to be the real crow's nest, not the one commonly referred to from the park itself. Once you go to those locations you can see or not see what was impossible to spot etc. Interesting stuff.

When we walked the Reno advance area along the river, what struck me is that with fatigued mounts, how difficult the retreat back up the bluffs must have been.

Mick O29 Dec 2013 12:30 p.m. PST

Check out "Ten years with Custer's Cavalry"
Written by Sgt. John Ryan

Ryan served with M company.
He participated in both the Washita and LBH.

In my opinion a very good resource.

Mike

solosam29 Dec 2013 1:16 p.m. PST

Check out "Forty Miles a Day on Beans on Hay." Great book. I'll address the bits I can remember:

Pay: Crap. Immediately spent on booze or gambled. Often in debt to the quartermaster.
Rations: Mostly crap. You hoped to get stationed in an arable area where you could grow vegetables and keep livestock to supplement the Army's starvation diet.
Living conditions: Mostly crap, but really no worse than anywhere else on the 19th century frontier. Again, if you were close to a town and had enough free time to improve your shelter, it could be pretty nice. If you were out in the boonies you were screwed.
Uniforms: Almost entirely Civil War leftovers, unless you were rich enough to buy your own. There was very little standardization, and on campaign they pretty much wore whatever they wanted.
Hygiene: Ha.
Training: In Custer's day, there was minimal training of any sort. Mostly they just trained in marching drill and inspections. It wasn't until the 1880's that the Army introduced a series of training reforms to improve combat skills.

And why did Custer box sabers before the battle: There was a major disconnect between the people who thought up weapons and the people who actually had to use them. Ever since the white man first encountered plains indians, they recognized that sabres were outmatched by the longer spears and lances the indians used. When six-shooters became common, many military officers began to perceive their swords as essentially ornamental. Custer also catches a lot of flak for leaving behind his Gatling Guns… Artillery of all sorts was great for defending forts, which the indians recognized as basically impregnable, but just couldn't move fast enough to follow indians on the hoof.

Keep in mind that the Sioux massing by the thousands to fight a decisive battle, rather than using small hit-and-run raids, was a totally unexpected development and contradicted decades of Indian-fighting experience.

Iowa Grognard29 Dec 2013 1:38 p.m. PST

And why did Custer box sabers before the battle: There was a major disconnect between the people who thought up weapons and the people who actually had to use them.

Aye, like doctrine for more range over rate of fire when it came to rifle choice.

Bad General29 Dec 2013 2:51 p.m. PST

Very interesting.

One thing I keep coming back to: why didn't the Indians follow up their victory? Roll up Terry's whole column?

Norman D Landings29 Dec 2013 3:42 p.m. PST

Couple of thoughts on that point – the first was that the Indians had no centralized command structure to assemble a force and send it off to fight.
The LBH encampment was a conglomeration of different tribes – forming a combined force out of the tribes and agreeing on warriors to lead it would have taken a major council which might have lasted for days.

The second thing is that the Indians did not know, in detail, the larger strategic picture. David Humphrey's Miller, in "Custer's Fall", recounts how word spread gradually through the Indian encampment that they had actually fought Custer. Until then, many of the Indians thought they had been fighting Gen. George Crook, the 'Gray Wolf', whose force was thought to be in the area.
The Lakota had fought him at the Rosebud 8 days earlier, but they did not yet realise that Crook had withdrawn after that fight.
This shows that they did not know exactly which US forces were in the field, where they were, and what their intentions were.

Thirdly, the Indians were ready to disband anyway.
In the Osprey campaign series on LBH, Peter Panzeri points out that many of the Indian families had started to break camp when Reno first attacked. By the end of the fighting, much of the camp was packed up and ready to move, and many of the Indians spent the night of the 25-26th in temporary shelters.
Even before the attack, the Indians had known that it was time to disband the encampment and go their separate ways anyhow. Such an unusually large assembly of people and horses had taken their toll on the hunting and grazing in the area.
By dispersing, the Indians were sticking with a decision they had already made.

Bad General29 Dec 2013 6:38 p.m. PST

Thank you, fascinating stuff.

solosam29 Dec 2013 6:47 p.m. PST

Norman D explains it very well.

Every Indian battle plan ever:
1) Guy with the biggest balls rounds up some of his buddies.
2) Go whack some people. You can club them upside the head to show off your manliness, or you can just kill them and get it over with.
3) Steal the horses and guns, and show off your new scalps to the ladies.

I'm being facetious, true, but that's pretty much how it went. The very idea that one single person would have strategic command authority and could dictate AORs and tactics to sub-commanders ran completely contrary to the Indian's entire way of life and concept of warfare. They had no written language and no way to communicate orders.

The other major obstacle was largely psychological. Notice that the Universal Indian Battle Plan did not include exterminating the enemy or winning strategic victories. The idea of an "apocalyptic" battle in which the enemy was completely annihilated was a foreign concept. Part of the reason folks like Red Cloud and Sitting Bull were so influential is because they were the first Indians to realize they were in a war of annihilation and try to resist in an organized manner… (as mentioned before, another reason Custer was so surprised… this was not the Universal Indian Battle Plan that he had expected).

Old Contemptibles30 Dec 2013 12:09 a.m. PST

Random Thoughts:

Last summer I visited Fort Union National Monument in New Mexico. One of the largest frontier forts west of the Mississippi. Got a tour from one of the park rangers. Nice visitor center and the views are spectacular.

I always thought that the horses were treated better than the men. You didn't eat until your horse had, you take care of your horses needs before yours. Your very life depended on the condition of your horse.

What most people never realize is there was a significant number of infantry (some of which was mounted) and some artillery personnel (although more often than not cavalry or infantry were trained in its use) stationed in the west. At Fort Union they had all three branches represented. Same at another great place to visit Fort Concho in San Angelo.

I took a class from their present Museum Director at Fort Concho who at the time was in charge of their reenactment program. He taught the class wearing his 1870s infantry sergeants' uniform. He attempted to teach us close order drill from the 1870s. Very different from the drill I was taught in the service. Some of the forts in Texas formed a baseball league. So he tried to teach us how to play baseball late 19th century style, which is a little different from what we play today.

Books I would recommend:

"Forty Miles A Day on Beans and Hay" by Rickey
"Crimson Desert" by Faulk
"War Cries on Horseback" by Stephen Longstreet
"Carbines of the U.S. Cavalry 1861-1905"by McAulay
"One Blanket and Ten Days Rations" by Meketa
"Voices of the Buffalo Soldier: Records, Reports, and Recollections of Military Life and Service" by Schubert
"The Most Promising Young Officer; A life of Randall Mackenzie" by Piercw
"US Army in the Plains Indian Wars 1865-1891" By Clayton K. S. Chun

link


Someone mentioned the haphazard way enlisted men were trained. At West Point most of the cadet training was in European warfare. It was focused on conflicts with a European adversary. You rarely had any officer from the Frontier give a lecture on how to deal with the conditions and the enemy they were mostly likely spend most of their career facing.

They were taught conventional warfare but not Indian warfare doctrine, what we would call today "Asymmetric warfare." They had to learn on the job and sometimes they or the soldiers they commanded would pay for the learning curve.

Rudi the german30 Dec 2013 3:35 a.m. PST

link

I am surprised that noone has yet mentioned th accounts of Frank Finkel?
The survior and deserter of little big horn?

Greetings

Norman D Landings30 Dec 2013 3:57 a.m. PST

'Survivors' of the LBH were a huge 1870's phenomenon.
There are over 100 documented claims, some outright ridiculous, almost none which bear scrutiny.

Vincent Genovese's "Billy Heath" presents a credible-sounding case, and also gives a good overview of the whole 'Lone Survivor' craze.

For a good contemporary account from a cavalryman, I'd recommend 'I Fought with Custer', by Sgt. Charles Windolph, who was with Benteen's command at the battle.

Bad General30 Dec 2013 5:29 a.m. PST

Rallynow, Could you talk a bit about how the drill differed from modern training? Marching drill?

Major General Stanley30 Dec 2013 5:39 a.m. PST

Very poorly trained in horsemanship. Several accounts mention rider being unable to control their horses or others being unable to control their horses. The horses had been ridden all day the day before the battle, then had a few hours rest before being ridden all night and all the next morning. the only water they received was at the bog just short of the battle. Several accounts mention horses just stopping because they were played out and all the indian accounts note that their ponys were faster than the cavalry horses.

The Finkel story is BS. He may or may not have been with Custer, but his story is BS.

79thPA Supporting Member of TMP30 Dec 2013 8:19 a.m. PST

Another vote for "Forty miles a day …"

Personal logo The Virtual Armchair General Sponsoring Member of TMP30 Dec 2013 1:14 p.m. PST

I'm frankly appalled that no one has even mentioned the one book that sweeps all the works on LBH off the shelves and into the dumpster, 1993's "Archaeology, History, And Custer's Last Battle," by Richard Allan Fox.

The synthesis of the 1984 dig on the Custer battle sites, the book not only provides a more nearly correct picture of what really happened there based on the actual artifacts and human remains, but provides the perspective of how the troops were trained.

Three of the best titles to bring anyone into the subject are available at very reasonable prices through Alibris.


Rickey's "Forty Miles A Day On Beans And Hay" link

Utley's "Frontier Regulars," and link

S.L.A. Marshall's "Crimsoned Prairie" link

Not all of what appears prior to this post is accurate, and much of the rest is true, but necessarily not thorough. What follows is meant to turn a harsher light on some elements of Army life during the 11 years from the end of the Civil War to LBH.

First, it must be understood that this was still the era in American History where Congress--and most of the people--saw the US Army as a leper colony kept only because it was mandated by the Constitution. No where was it made mandatory to be kept modern, prepared, and cared for as the guardians of the nation's borders. It was controlled, regulated, and marginalized as if it were the Country's crazy Aunt chained in the attic.

The presence of armies and soldiers in the Recent Unpleasantness did nothing to make them more attractive--though there was a growing sentimentality for the hundreds of thousands of dead ones--always a great comfort to the living ones.

Consequently, it is true that the post-war Frontier Soldiers were dreadfully unprepared for the sort of combat they had to face. Fully 25% of Custer's command had been in the Army about six weeks prior to marching off to LBH. Weapon's training at some posts was basically for one day a year--partly from indifference to limited ammunition stores.

Promotion was glacial, Seniority of actual rank (not the wonderfully sounding Brevet's largely gained in the Civil
War) being the rule for assignments. The exact number of Lieutenants in the Army, for example, was limited by Congressional order. Not until one resigned, invalided out, or died could the next soldier have a chance for a commission. That is, after the next Class from West Point go their assignments.

Promotions--real and brevet--could still be gained in combat, and the unofficial motto when heading into combat was, "Here goes for a brevet or a coffin!"

Some 89 Officers alone got the coffins before the wars ended.

Many soldiers were in terrible physical condition, with back and leg injuries frequently suffered before and during their service. The Army pretty much accepted--and kept--anyone who could walk up to the rolls to sign his name or make his mark. It must be remembered that--very much as in Britain--a man joined the army only because he had no prospects, no education, knew no trade, was incapable of regular manual labor, was alcoholic, etc, and for whom the only remaining alternative was crime.

Oh, and many volunteers actually were criminals on the run who by signing up under assumed names had a chance to escape.

The beautiful sentimentality of John Ford's version of the Frontier Army must--sadly--be similarly swept into the dumpster. Conditions were harder than any 20/21st Century man could possibly accept for more than a few days, and definitely not for life.

Sabres were commonly left behind for the simple reason of weight. They served no practical purpose in the field, and minimizing the load on a mount was everything. The troopers themselves tended to be smaller than the Infantry, but don't think of jockey's--though they would have been ideal!

Army horses (Morgans) were fed grain as much as possible, giving them weight and endurance, but not top speeds. In the field, they ate the grass they could find with a serving of grain as long as it lasted. Indian ponies were entirely grass fed, and though very fast and light, they did not have the capacity for long running fights or constant marches.

Each man carried a 1 quart canteen, and this had to be shared by him and his mount between better sources. At 8 lbs per gallon, water was a vital necessity usually left to the choice of march route and luck as it just could not be carried along as needed. By modern standards, most soldiers and horses in the field would be seriously dehydrated most of the time. Rivers and streams were crucial when crossing well known country, and a primary object for advance scouts. Marching from watering place to watering place was the preferred practice.

Human amenities on Frontier posts were essentially non-existent. No libraries (even if someone could read), no newspapers, and no PX. There might be a Sutler's store, but most posts had so few soldiers in them, with little or no money to spend, these were scarce, and about all they had besides some canned items not provided by the Army was alcohol.

Some Post Commanders--or their Wives, if present--did attempt to improve conditions locally, but neither the Army nor Congress showed any concern for the soldier's welfare.

Monthly pay for a Private ran around $17.00 USD a month. In Civilian life, that compared nicely to a skilled laborer's wages. However, this money was frequently late, and by various means, usually less when actually doled out.

Men gambled--Paymaster's frequently ran the games in order to indebt the soldiers and take their pay--or drank to keep up a numbed semi-sobriety in the face of the awful sameness of day-to-day life. Outright drunkenness put men in jail ("Company Q"), and could also rate physical punishments.

If there was any money left in a soldier's pocket, it frequently went to the prostitute(s) who frequently set up shop in the back of a wagon (covered if it was an "up-scale" operation) outside the post boundaries. The Nymphes-du-Prairie were inevitably diseased and shared the gift that keeps on giving with their clients. Venereal diseases skimmed off a constant percentage of soldiers, either in hospital or discharged to social oblivion.

And don't even ask about the quality of medical care. However, just keep in mind that in an era when there were never enough Doctors in Civilian life, those that couldn't make a comfortable from St. Louis to Back East were only the ones too incompetent/alcoholic/diseased to cut it--but who could still find steady employment by the U.S. Army.

Throughout the period of the Plains Indian Wars, annual desertion rates ran between 20% and 25%. In practice this meant that only a very small percentage of Private Soldiers completed more than five or six years in the ranks before having his fill of the Army and going over the hill. Deserters were rarely pursued, and even more rarely brought back or punished in any way.

It was the rare Soldier, indeed, who spent years in the Army and actually learned his craft and, therefore, as an NCO at least, give his fellows the benefit of that experience.

Under such circumstances, it would be nothing less than miraculous if the Army was ever really the "professional" fighting force it was supposed to be.

Mind, almost as an historical aberration, Congress had decades before allowed the Army a top notch Officer's training facility--West Point--and, by and large, the graduates were professionally minded, well educated, and proved themselves in the Mexican War. Unfortunately, the greatest opportunities for these men were to be turned against one another in the Civil War.

Many surviving Officers, both West Pointers and Volunteer Army veterans, stayed in service and, many of these eventually went out West. By and large, these Officers were able to hold the Army together sufficiently to go on campaigns against a wide variety of Native American's and, in a remarkably short time, kill thousands and force the survivors onto Reservations.

In some ways, dealing the Native Americans was the ultimate "dirty detail," for which they were unrewarded--and rarely supported--by the Government that gave them the job, and commonly also the whipping boy of the Eastern Press and much of the Public which sympathized with the Indians--but didn't want any living within sight of them.

In short: The Frontier Army was not quite a rabble, generally professionally led, but with a greater distance between Officers and men beyond just the necessary, a distance that largely left the soldiers to their own devices, which were few and largely degenerative. Ruled by a parsimonious and largely contemptuous Congress, they barely had the wherewithal to meet their assignments. Likely motivated more by fatalism than patriotism, they did, however, open the West for settlement and development, and in retrospect for a bargain price to the dominant culture.

TVAG

solosam30 Dec 2013 4:01 p.m. PST

I love lamp.

John Leahy Sponsoring Member of TMP30 Dec 2013 11:41 p.m. PST

I won't comment on the life of a soldier. I am much more versed in the facts and events of the LBH. Plus there has been some good info provided above.

The archaeology books does provide some valuable insights. However, like everything it has to be carefully considered. The book makes a very definitive statement about cartridges (number and location) giving info about what happened during the battle. However, the fact is that souvenir hunters and visitors to the battlefield had for years taken spent shell casings lying on the ground.

Another often discussed item about the battle is of the battlefield layout. However, it is not generally well known that the current look of the LBH is sometimes extremely different than what it was in 1876. In fact, some details like the location of the river Reno's command crossed are no longer even present. This has altered various parts of the battlefield to one degree or another.

Good points made about the general low to fair quality of the US Army troopers. However, that begs the question as to why the Plain's Indians didn't thump the Army in every encounter. Logistics, numbers and the ability to fight year round were all edges for the US.

I noticed some talk about the horses of each side during the LBH. The Indians would often have more than one pony available. They also had interior lines. This combined with the rigorous pace maintained by Custer were big factors.

I have read and agree with TVAG about his book suggestions. Some other very good ones listed. 'Garryowen' will hopefully chime in. The gentleman is an authority on this period. I always pay attention to anything he posts. The LBH Society forum has some very detailed info about the battle and period. Very informative!

Thanks,

John

Bad General31 Dec 2013 6:57 a.m. PST

Great stuff, all, thank you.

Perhaps you gentlemen can help with some 19th century military terms.

Orderly, "Custer's orderly": what did that mean then (and now!)

Adjutant: In Naval OCS we had an adjutant that more or less in charge of training and discipline. What did the regimental adjutant do then? Does the army still have them?

Iowa Grognard31 Dec 2013 9:19 a.m. PST

However, the fact is that souvenir hunters and visitors to the battlefield had for years taken spent shell casings lying on the ground.

One does have to take that into account, but the fire that allowed for such a study in 83 and 84 allowed people to reach a level of artifacts that hadn't been obtainable beforehand. If you look at the archaeological maps the footprints of action are unmistakable even if one factors in loss etc due to visitors. You put this evidence into a detailed time-motion study and you've got some golden material.

A lot more can be said about the state of things at the time etc, but instead of us bloviating here, do some reading, contact some authors and well known professors (I've found them always willing to talk) and come to your own conclusions about everything as I believe, aside from a couple rare gems, most if not all sources have their own inaccuracies.

For a native perspective, if you ever get the chance to speak with or hear him speak, Joseph Marshall is incredible. His books are a good read and the stories of his own military experiences are enlightening.

Chouan15 Jan 2014 5:34 a.m. PST

I have a very interesting comprehensive list of all those in the 7th Cavalry, listing their age, occupation, nationality etc. if anybody is interested.

CorpCommander15 Jan 2014 11:44 a.m. PST

Good stuff here. A few more things to consider:

There were intelligence datum that did not reach Custer, but should have. The Rosebud showed a distinct change in Native American tactics. In particular they were standing and fighting which wasn't something that happened previously. The Rosebud battle showed this definitively. If I were to do another "Intelligence Lessons of …" lecture, I would do one on the Plains Wars because it is so instructive.

The Native Force was part of an encampment that was 30+ times the size of the typical encampment. This was because of building enthusiasm for a prophesy espoused by a very charismatic leader, Sitting Bull. The key participant in the battle was Crazy Horse who 10 years prior had a vision that he was immune to harm from enemy soldiers. Of course that didn't stop a fellow Native from doing him in but that's how visions tend to go.

There was another vision that Crazy Horse had and that was one of World Peace. According to his vision we are now in the final throws of the last war. We will all come together under the spiritual medicine tree and all become brothers. Let me be the first to say I will be greatly surprised and delighted if that happens without an alien invasion force mustering on the moon.

John Leahy Sponsoring Member of TMP15 Jan 2014 6:54 p.m. PST

An interesting item is that an Officer who does Military rides at the LBH regularly has found that the majority of Officers tend to make the same decisions that Custer did.

My own opinion is that the wheel has begun to turn from the Custer was an idiot (popular since the 60's and 70's) in his decision making to a more balanced view of events.

IG, I sorta agree with you. The archaeology does give us another insight into the battle. However, I think proclaiming it as the definitive explanation of what happened would be a bridge too far.

The thing that makes the LBH Campaign so very unusual and has to also be considered as mentioned by a few gents above was that the Indians reacted and fought in a way they had not before. This played a major part in the events of the campaign.

My own thinking is that Crook, Reno and Benteen each deserved serious condemnation for their actions during the campaign. I frankly am shocked that Crook never faced a court martial. His actions are a serious dereliction of duty. Reno was a waste and Benteen only escaped recriminations due to his heroic leadership on Reno Hill. No survivor would have indicted Benteen at that point. The Honor of the Regiment was at stake.

Love discussing the battle! thumbs up

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