"Defending France in 1815" Topic

TW,

Can't follow the link between difficulty achieving a schwerpunkt with a new army administered by a new staff led by a short fat Corsican who have had no integration training and PROBABLY unwinnable campaign???? Apologies, I now see that they are the same, I must have been too silly to see it!

Can't see Flectarn referring to my post on bravery at all…so fail to see why you call him up on it?

Accept (and have commented on) Flecktarn's occasional bombast (and expect others to do so to me) but feel that this may be a case of not seeing the wood for 327 trees?

(Especially as you and he are within 0.4 posts per stiffle)

Adam

If you feel I am overly enthusiastic in defending Flecktarn, your comments on armchair revisionism and 'chaos of battle' really, really annoyed me. I'd go so far as to say I took them personally.

TW

I don't think your being very fair to flecktarn and possible your previous encounters are causing you to be overly critical and pedantic.

I lean more towards your line of thinking. He could have won the campaign of course lots of what if involved in that. I think the odds were against success, with hindsight of course, but not impossible.

I don't think calling him ignorant is at all fair. He's well read, and can read English and German sources, having a more rounded view than our "Anglo centric" or "Anglophobic/Boney Fanboy" English sources. He's also a serving soldier with battlefield experience… Compared to me and you, monolingual (well I speak some Japanese which isn't important) and civilian hobbyists he is likely to be less ignorant than us. His conclusion, I'm sure he has come to after long thoughts on the matter over years.

As I said I, personally agree with you, I think he could have won though he was probably doomed from the moment Gniesenau began marching in the right direction.

Be careful TW, you were always a more rational poster, you seem to be turning into a new ….. Well I don't dare invoke his name lest he returns to the forum with his crap insults, childish attempts at sarcasm and failure to communicate normally. Attack the argument not the man.

Adam,

I did write a longer riposte to TW, pointing out the many inconsistencies in his posts, using your bravery post as an example; I then deleted 90% of it as I felt that it was going too far towards giving him the heated argument that he seems to so desperately want.

I am actually slightly glad that someone else saw the armchair revisionism and chaos of battle comments in the same way that I did.

I looked up the word bombast and can see how it might apply to some of my posts; it is something else that I will try to avoid, except when discussing Prussians.

Jurgen

What does "Schwerpunkt" mean by the way?

Edwulf,

A literal translation would be something like "heavy point", but it means the point of focus of massive coordinated force in an attack to overwhelm the enemy.

In the case of the Waterloo campaign, I would characterise it as an all out attack by a force which would quickly and totally destroy one of the Allied armies.

One could argue that the attack on the Prussian/Saxon army in 1806 was a Napoleonic schwerpunkt on a strategic scale and that Macdonald's attack at Wagram was an attempt at an operational one.

I would also point out that I could, if I was not being entirely serious, claim to be trilingual, as my native language is the elegant and beautiful Obersächsisch, which is not, as most Germans believe, something that was invented to ensure that German comedians can still make racist jokes without offending real foreigners:).

For the English among you, think of it as Geordie.

Jurgen

"Power at a point"

Schwerpunkt is my new word for the day.
Cheers.

TelesticWarrior,

You and I agree on a lot of things but in this thread you're doing all the things which "we" normally complain about the "other guys" doing.

The man said something was unlikely and you latched onto it like he declared the earth was flat and mankind descended from microfiber couch cushions. This is course of action is foolish.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Edwulf,

I'm not trying to argue with Flecktarn's definition of schwerpunkt – after all, it's from his language – but it's not just the denotation that is important, but also the connotations. Just to decide on a schwerpunkt for a campaign is not sufficient. The statement that defines the schwerpunkt must be clear and be understood by all the significant participants, so that they can all work together to achieve it.

In the Waterloo campaign, by their actions, Grouchy, Ney and D'Erlon demonstrated a lack of understanding of the aim. Napoleon chose these commanders, knowing their strengths and weaknesses. They were the people on the spot, making the wrong decisions. `Ifs' and `buts' are interesting but irrelevant. It seems to me that Flecktarn's statement is accurate.

John,

You are correct in your view of the nature of a schwerpunkt; I should probably have emphasised the coordination element a little more strongly.

Your second paragraph sets out very clearly what I was implying; the ability to deliver the type of coordinated and sustained effort that the schwerpunkt requires was not present in the French army of 1815.

Jurgen

Edwulf,
you make some good points.

I don't think your being very fair to flecktarn and possible your previous encounters are causing you to be overly critical and pedantic.

That's probably true, although previous encounters with people always inform the way I think people are behaving.

I lean more towards your line of thinking. He could have won the campaign of course lots of what if involved in that. I think the odds were against success, with hindsight of course, but not impossible.

I agree. It is also the traditional view of Waterloo that is probably shared by most historians and enthusiasts.

Adam,

If you feel I am overly enthusiastic in defending Flecktarn, your comments on armchair revisionism and 'chaos of battle' really, really annoyed me. I'd go so far as to say I took them personally.

Why did they annoy you? I should not have used the word "armchair", that was very silly of me because it was inflammatory, and in any case everything we say on TMP is from the comfort of our chairs (arm or otherwise). So I can see why that might be annoying. But it IS revisionism. Nearly all historians have focused on the near-run nature of the Waterloo campaign. So to say that it was un-winnable for the French due to one factor IS pure revisionism. You can keep quoting the word "probably" all you want but Flecktarn made other comments (that you keep avoiding) BEFORE this "probably unwinnable" comment that show that he was being quite declarative. Von W was even more outspoken.

Also, chaos is part of life and military events are no exception. And you should re-read page two to see that it was Flecktarn who was calling me up on the bravery thing, not me. I said it was demeaning to the achievements of Wellington & Blucher to suggest that Waterloo was unwinnable for the French. You said something like soldiers can still exhibit bravery even if they are on the dominant side, I said that I was not talking about bravery, I was talking about "achievements" at the command level. Flecktarn tried to misrepresent my argument, I defended myself by explaining what I meant.
I am right about these three things, even if I am in the wrong on the other points. It is you who are now dragging out the discussion.

Adam name not long enough, not much turns on it but I think it is only fair to point out that Flecktarn did make a post to TW on COURAGE (he used capital letters). He also invited TW to correlate two apparently conflicting statements concerning the "demeaning the commanders and soldiers" issue.

On reading the thread back I cannot find this post, which I assume has been edited into a much more straightforward:

"I have repeated my statement; I am not playing games. If you choose not to understand, that is up to you."

but not before TW replied to the original.

I merely offer this up to avoid any mistaken belief that TW has lost his marbles.

Just to point out that TW stated:

"It is a tiny bit demeaning to not only the French who fought so hard and came within a whisker of victory on a number of occasions, but also the Anglo-Allied and Prussian armies that had to fight so well just to avoid being wiped out during those 3 days, to suggest that there was only one fixed outcome."

That does not correlate with:

"I said that I was not talking about bravery, I was talking about "achievements" at the command level."

Colonel,

I did indeed edit that post about 30 seconds after I had posted it in order to avoid giving TW the fight that he seems to want.

Jurgen

Flecktarn, you should have just left it up.

Perception is everything on a forum, and I maintain that, "a lack of awareness when it comes to understanding the nature of military conflicts and other complex things", plus "totally demeaning the commanders and soldiers" and "It displays an ignorance of the chaos inherent to real world military events." were potentially inflammatory remarks given your background and I have invited TW to explain why he used them.

I didn't include "armchair revisionism that stems from an agenda", as I regard it as niff naff and trivia.

I think I have got the undercurrent right.

As regards the point of the "argument" I think it is entirely your choice to regard the Waterloo campaign being probably unwinnable for the French from the outset, and you gave your 8 point thoughts on page 1, though of course TW points out:

"In fact, that is why there is not a trained historian in the world that would ever state that a campaign like Waterloo was un-winnable for either side, for reasons that should be obvious by now. The real world doesn't work like that."

I suppose the invitation is for you to address why you are at odds with these historians (and I am assuming TW is right and have only read English language sources myself).

I would reverse the situation somewhat and ask how someone who has an awareness when it comes to understanding the nature of military conflicts and other complex things and a full understanding of the chaos inherent to real world military events holds the view that you do?

I would point out that I ask purely as a matter of interest for discussion.

Colonel,

As I have repeatedly pointed out, I stated that I felt that the Waterloo campaign was "probably unwinnable" for the French; I have not stated that it WAS unwinnable despite TW's claims to the contrary.

Why do I believe that? For the reasons in my now notorious 8 points and my belief that the only real hope that the French had, short of killing Wellington or Blucher or aliens beaming one of them up to an orbiting spaceship, was to organise and carry out a schwerpunkt attack, which is something that I believe they were incapable of because of their very poor staff work and leadership, and the lack of understanding among senior commanders of what was happening and what was intended or required.

I also said, back on 8 December, in response to TW:

"From that perspective, there was a possibility of a French victory but, apart from the Wellington and Blucher related ones, all of them were dependent on the French, and in particular their commanders, being different from what they were, which renders them pretty much invalid."

It seems to me that I have never said that the French could not win the Waterloo campaign, only that there were, in my opinion, very specific and limited conditions under which they could do so, as long as one assumes that the characters of the commanders and their armies and the prevailing conditions remain as they were. For example, if one was to replace Soult with Berthier, Grouchy with Murat, Ney with Davout and Napoleon with the Napoleon of 1805-06 etc, then the French have a much better chance of winning, but that is to ignore the conditions of 1815.

I hope that answers your question.

Jurgen

Flecktarn, yes my question was specifically about "probably unwinnable" and I think you have answered it more than adequately as far as I am concerned.

Flecktarn; "It seems to me that I have never said that the French could not win the Waterloo campaign"

Erm…how about
"A schwerpunkt was his only option, but it was not one that either he or his army were capable of executing any more."
and
"neither Napoleon nor his army was capable of the kind of quick and decisive action that was required."
and
"I believe that the campaign of 1815 was probably unwinnable for the French army as it was in June 1815"

But I am glad that Fleck has finally stated that he thinks the campaign was winnable for the French, in contrast to the three earlier quotes that I just listed. I now thank him for clarifying his position after 6 days and scores and scores of posts. Hopefully we can move onto something else now.

One final question from me, not just for Flecktarn but for everyone else that agrees with his revisionism; What did Wellington and Blucher actually achieve then, from a command perspective, if they were so sure of winning in the first place?

I am actually genuinely interested in the answer to this question. If we can get a good answer then we can potentially roll it out and expand it to cover other campaigns that were actually genuinely one-sided, such as the 1806 Jena-Auerstadt campaign. So if ColonelTA, Edwulf, Bandit etc would like to give it a crack, I think it could lead to fruitful conclusions.

TelesticWarrior, since when has accepting a rational explanation for an opinion involved agreeing with it?

Put another way, as far as I'm concerned the campaign was very winnable for the French, I have just accepted Flecktarn's explanation for why he thinks differently, so what?

TelesticWarrior,

your last question

"What did Wellington and Blucher actually achieve then, from a command perspective, if they were so sure of winning in the first place?"

implies that both Wellington and Blucher were sure of winning.

I have not read anything in this thread who has said they think that.

I have read views in this thread of modern people right now who think it was unwinnable but no-one who has suggested that the historical figures shared that view.

It's a shame because it seems that the last two paragraphs are deliberately aggravating/baiting and the reason, imho, would be that you want people to put their views as to why they might have achieved something so you can tell them how and why they are wrong.

If you want people to agree with your view, which I think is what you want, then you do not, again in my opinion, do a very good job of persuading them. And given your (seemingly, as I am not in a position to judge ) detailed knowledge of the period it is a shame as it is likely that you will be unable to persuade members of your point of view simply because of your communication skills rather than the actual issue in hand.

You clearly feel very strongly about things and have a good knowledge but your methods of argument cast your views into a bad light :(

It's not that people think badly of you, although they might, it's that your own views suffer unduly as a consequence of your style so you are doing them a disservice.

thanks
m

Sungam,

I'm not getting involved in that again. I can bring the horses to water, but I can't make you guys drink. Flecktarns position is clear, as you can see from the three quotes that I listed in my last post, and from his clarification in his last post. He feels that it was more or less un-winnable for the French, which means that it was more or less un-loseable for Wellington and Blucher. You can't avoid this, and have it both ways. You don't have to address this, but if you decide not to then I can't see why you would expect me to address any of your points, or even read them.

To repeat;

One final question from me, not just for Flecktarn but for everyone else that agrees with his revisionism; What did Wellington and Blucher actually achieve then, from a command perspective, if they were so sure of winning in the first place?

I am actually genuinely interested in the answer to this question. If we can get a good answer then we can potentially roll it out and expand it to cover other campaigns that were actually genuinely one-sided, such as the 1806 Jena-Auerstadt campaign. So if ColonelTA, Edwulf, Bandit etc would like to give it a crack, I think it could lead to fruitful conclusions.

…. Always surprised how a genuine question here on this board on something entirely different regarding 1815, ends up with discussing Waterloo….

TelesticWarrior, you seem to have missed my last post as you did not respond to it.

I am agreeing to disagree on an opinion, so what?

Are you suggesting that by doing so I have joined the category you describe as "everyone else that agrees with his revisionism."?

Are you suggesting that by doing so I have called into question the achievements of Wellington and Blucher?

I'm not entirely sure what water I have been led to. What exactly is it I am meant to drink?

Yet…. still fond to learn more and hand me some titles guys, why the French army in 1815 was much better than previous years.

TW,

What did Wellington and Blucher actually achieve then, from a command perspective, if they were so sure of winning in the first place?

I also reject the presumption that Wellington & Blücher were sure of anything or that such is required of either side in consideration of the odds of a given side winning or losing.

Also, I would add that as a given side's objectives are not necessarily directly opposed to that of its adversary it is possible for neither side to accomplish its objective making the perspective that Wellington & Blücher had to win if Napoleon lost a bit outmoded. Blücher lost at Ligny but how much did Napoleon win? The same can be said of Eylau which might be more off topic but more apt. Bennigsen lost at Eylau but Nappy didn't really win.

I can bring the horses to water, but I can't make you guys drink. Flecktarns position is clear, as you can see from the three quotes that I listed in my last post, and from his clarification in his last post. He feels that it was more or less un-winnable for the French, which means that it was more or less un-loseable for Wellington and Blucher. You can't avoid this, and have it both ways. You don't have to address this, but if you decide not to then I can't see why you would expect me to address any of your points, or even read them.

No one participating, including the supporters of your conclusion such as myself, sees this conversation the same way you do. Maybe you're the one standing next to the water but seemingly unable to drink it.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Revisionism…. why use that word in a debate?

What is revisionism in the context of historical debate, research, discussion, and so forth?

Hmmmmm, well here we go: In historiography, historical revisionism is the reinterpretation of orthodox views on evidence, motivations, and decision-making processes surrounding a historical event. Though the word revisionism is sometimes used in a negative way, constant revision of history is part of the normal scholarly process of writing history.

So to conclude:
1. revisionism is a good thing to start with
2. it is also a way to put a lable on someone and shun his opinion

I think I go with option 1, similar as in the bèta sciences new research and thoughts have brought us all the more wiser and further ahead.
I dislike option 2, as it is a trick used by a debater to try to outcast an unprefferable opinion by another debater.

Debate? What is that?
- Debate is a method of interactive and representational argument.
- Although informal debate is common the quality and depth of a debate improves with knowledge and skill of its participants as debaters. The outcome of a contest may be decided by audience vote, by judges, or by some combination of the two.

Heated, passionate, flawed, or whatever… I say guys: keep it real and stay with the original question/matter of the debate, i.e. initial question of this topic.

E Muilwijk,

…. Always surprised how a genuine question here on this board on something entirely different regarding 1815, ends up with discussing Waterloo….

I'm with ya there. All of a partial page and the thread goes to heck on us huh?

Cheers,

The Bandit

Cheers Bandit…. enjoying a glass of superb red wine ;-)

E Muilwijk, you have researched this period, do you have some reason for believing that the French army in 1815 was not better than 1813/14. I think I asked this of you on page 2 but it was easily missed.

Yep you asked me, but I myself lack material to state they were better or inferior. I was just asking others in this debate to hand me such material…. and be (or not) convinced.

However within the context of this thread, i.e. debate, the question if or not the French army was better than in previous years, one should thus ask: was it good enough to defend France and await an invasion?

Let us return to the original question.

"What if France (Napoleon) had chosen to remain on the defensive in 1815? Would they have been able to find a way to prevail militarily within their own borders? How do you think it would have looked from June 1815 on, into 1816…?"

What can we conduct?

Just let me state a few points…. perhaps not all involved…

1. French on the defence? Well, just read Napoleon's 'mémoires' where he clearly demonstrates the (dis)advantages of chossing this option (posted this a few days ago already… I say: read it!)

2. Why ask for the point in time of June 1815? Why June? Well, the month of June has got nothing to do with the defence question of France in 1815. It is the time Napoleon chose, based upon intelligence, this was his last chance to take the offensive against available enemy armies in the north, before The Russians, Württembergers, Bavarians, Austrians & Sardinians were reday to close in upon the borders of France.

3. 1816, or even 1817 & beyond. Why ask such questions that are merely 'what-if' matters. Nice for a wargame, not for historical discussion.

Besides this, it entirely neglects Napoleon's escape from Elba, which I presented earlier and has been well discussed by French historians. By 1816 the Allied Powers would have installed him at St. Helena. Well and truly out of sight and not so close to Europe, at Elba, a choice the European politicians started to regret ever more and more in the early months of 1815.

And when you want to discuss Waterloo and/or if the French could have won that battle, or that campaign…. please do it in another thread ;-)

Erwin,

Revisionism is neither inherently good or bad. Sometimes things need revising. In fact, it is my opinion that MOST important things in history and life need a re-look, and I am talking about far far more important things than Napoleonic history. The things that we have been talking about on this thread are not really important in the big scheme of things.
So revisionism is not a label, and it is not by itself a good or bad thing. But if it talks like a duck, it usually is a duck. If something is revision, why is it so bad of me to state that it is? Nearly all the authors that I have read on Waterloo have emphasized the very close run nature of the campaign (Quelle affair!, as Blucher said at the time), so to suggest that a win was practically impossible for either side is revisionism, pure and simple.

The traditional view is probably that the French army was better in 1815 than it was in 1814. An alternative view would be, dare I say it, revisionism. If you wish to overturn an assessment that is generally accepted then surely it is up to you to bring something to the table? If not sources, then at least some initial remarks as to why we should even question the accepted wisdom. Otherwise, I am not sure why you are bringing up something that I thought we had moved on from. I'm more than happy to discuss this though if somebody can provide some sort of initial focus point.

Talk like a duck, or not. It is not per se revisionism. And if it would be, than counter argue by bringing forward sound arguments and source material to substantiate your claim. That is debate. Not merely counter-arguing and getting nowhere forward.

As such:
"The traditional view is probably that the French army was better in 1815 than it was in 1814."

Fine if it is true, but where does this claim come from?! Simply hand me the authors, histories, sources they have used, so I can look at it myself and make a conclusion.
That is all I want!
What I do not want, is simply adhere to such a traditional view. Why is it traditional? Accepted? By whom? Who intorduced this view?

Sincere questions I say and I really want an answer to.

Accepted view? What the hack do I need with that… if I have been able to write an entirely different view for the Netherlands field army up to now (and not finished as yet) for 1815, instead of that old & boring 'accepted view' of heresay, repetition and too much historians conducting no research whatsoever in archives.

Hence my question, which has not been answered regarding the status of the French army in 1815. And no, in my mind we didn't move on from this.

Yep, revisionism is neither as I already stated and you concur, and (thus in itself) neutral.

But it is not for you to decide in a debate who "talks like a duck". At least not the one and single person in this debate…. is it?

Colonel Toffee Apple,

I am agreeing to disagree on an opinion, so what?

So nothing. You are welcome to agree to disagree, and your policy is very wise. There is no problem.

Are you suggesting that by doing so I have joined the category you describe as "everyone else that agrees with his revisionism."?

No, not at all. In fact you are one of the few people who I feel has got it correct on this particular issue. I think you were spot on when you said that "Put another way, as far as I'm concerned the campaign was very winnable for the French".

Are you suggesting that by doing so I have called into question the achievements of Wellington and Blucher?

No, not at all. I was just hoping that someone, anyone, would tackle my question. I only mentioned your name because you were still active on the thread and because you have never been one to shy away from a difficult question, which is one of the things I like about you.

Erwin,
We seem to be spinning in circles. Allow me to repeat; If you wish to overturn an assessment that is generally accepted then surely it is up to you to bring something to the table? If not sources, then at least some initial remarks as to why we should even question the accepted wisdom. Otherwise, I am not sure why you are bringing up something that I thought we had moved on from. I'm happy to discuss this though if somebody can provide some sort of initial focus point.

…. Always surprised how a genuine question here on this board on something entirely different regarding 1815, ends up with discussing Waterloo….

Me too. It seems to be one of the by-laws of TMP.

Bandit,

I also reject the presumption that Wellington & Blücher were sure of anything or that such is required of either side in consideration of the odds of a given side winning or losing.

Yes, me too. That has been one of the staples of my position from the start. Wellington and Blucher were far from certain that they would defeat Napoleon. I am far from certain that the Waterloo was a foregone conclusion. I have said all along that Waterloo campaign was quite evenly matched. It is other people who are holding to the view that the campaign was practically unwinnable for the French. It is to these people that I refer when I said "What did Wellington and Blucher actually achieve then, from a command perspective, if they were so sure of winning in the first place?" (i.e Flectarn and Von W are sure, not me or you, or Wellington or Blucher). Before you jump on that comment let me explain with my next one; I keep saying that Flecktarns position is relatively clear, he feels that it was practically un-winnable for the French, which means that it was more or less un-loseable for Wellington and Blucher. It is this body of water that I am leading people to, and the one nobody wants to drink from. Flecktarn can't have it both ways. If his view is worth taking seriously, then it is a perfectly reasonable follow up question for us to ask "what did Wellington and Blucher actually achieve then, from a command perspective, if we are now being told that they were so sure of winning in the first place?"

Indeed a circular reasoning….. (but not by me).

I feel fine with my question I did not bring up, but was a reaction to what had been brougth forward during this thread. Meaning, I am just sincerely curious. Especially as the question is valid in both cases of either an offensive or defensive army in 1815.

I seem to have been 'ducked' here!
Well, I'll figure it out somehow, somewhere else. No need to bother.

P.S. Clear debate is not governed by what seems to be by-laws on this board. Just stick with the topic and not have it fouled by other arguments. The question by me on the state of the French army was clearly one within the boundaries of the debate on defending France in 1815.

P.P.S. Quack!

TelesticWarrior,

But you made the claim that:

He feels that it was more or less un-winnable for the French, which means that it was more or less un-loseable for Wellington and Blucher.

You concluded that it being un-winnable for Napoleon meant it was un-loseable for Wellington & Blücher, then I said:

I also reject the presumption that Wellington & Blücher were sure of anything or that such is required of either side in consideration of the odds of a given side winning or losing.

… and you said:

Yes, me too. That has been one of the staples of my position from the start.

No, no it has not.

You said something. I disagreed. You said, "yep me too!"

Also, your claim that Flecktarn is "sure" that Wellington & Blücher would win or that they knew they could win – is a claim he's never made. You claim that Flecktarn asserted:

…if we are now being told that they were so sure of winning in the first place…

… but he didn't assert that, you claimed it was his position, in fact I think he may have even posted clarifying it was not his position.

Now E Muilwijk asks you to support your claim of the "generally accepted" view that the French army of 1815 was superior to that of some previous French armies and you don't answer, you reply with statements that it is "generally accepted". You're doing what you are accusing Flecktarn of doing, namely, making a statement of fact and then declining to substantiate the fact. The utterly bizarre part is that while you accuse him of doing it, he hasn't done so in this thread while you, the accuser, is doing it.

What is your end game here – and how does this fanciful bird walk about an opinion advance the topic of the thread?

Cheers,

The Bandit

No ducking from me Erwin, you just refuse to listen to what I am saying; I'm more than happy to discuss this 1814/1815 comparison issue if you can provide some sort of initial focus point. I'm sure Colonel Toffee Apple would be interested to join in too. But if you wish to overturn an assessment that is generally accepted then surely it is up to you to bring something to the table? If not sources, then at least some initial remarks as to why we should even question the accepted wisdom. It's your subject, give me a hook with a nice juicy worm on it to get me involved. Otherwise, I am not sure why you are bringing up something that I thought we had moved on from.

P.S "Accepted view? What the hack do I need with that…". I'm definitely on board with you on that one, LOL well said.

P.P.S Quack, Quack, MOO, MOO!

What is clear is that neither Wellington nor Blucher were "so sure of winning in the first place"; they were fighting against an army and a commander who had been victorious for many years (except against the British) and who, even in defeat, had proved to be formidable opponents. As far as they were concerned, they believed that it would be a difficult campaign. What they could not know was how poorly led the French army of 1815 was and how slow moving and disorganised it would be.

As to what they achieved, they organised and trained their armies and developed a plan and a relationship which would prove beyond the capability of the French to defeat. That is enough of an achievement.

Jurgen

TelesticWarrior, I have read a great deal about the Waterloo campaign over the years, too much to recall as I am not much use at rehearsing what I read. The sum total of it all is that the campaign was eminently winnable for the French at the outset.

Flecktarn has given his opinion and his reasoning behind it. I don't agree with it and I don't see that it brings anything new to the table. It is, by and large, broadly similar to the type of stuff that I have read, one way or another, along the way in many books. This is hardly surprising given the volume of work written on the subject. I would be inclined to think that in fact, it is a case of in spite of everything he has said, it was "the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life".

I have no delusions about the efforts needed on the part of Wellington and Blucher to achieve victory.

Bandit,

Yes it damn well has been one of my staples from the beginning of the thread. Remember when I said this on page 1. "Certainly Wellington and Napoleon never thought in those sort of deterministic ways, especially after the French had achieved the centre position between the two Allied armies.". You have now misrepresented my view numerous times on this thread and I am getting sick of it. But I respect you and I know for a fact that you are not doing it on purpose, so there is no hard feelings.

This is the old internet communication problem again, I feel that I am bending over backwards to explain my position and you keep telling me I am doing the exact opposite of what I am actually doing. Please read my comment again; Wellington and Blucher were far from certain that they would defeat Napoleon. I am far from certain that the Waterloo was a foregone conclusion. I have said all along that Waterloo campaign was quite evenly matched. It is other people who are holding to the view that the campaign was practically unwinnable for the French. It is to these people that I refer when I said "What did Wellington and Blucher actually achieve then, from a command perspective, if they were so sure of winning in the first place?" (i.e Flectarn and Von W are sure, not me or you, or Wellington or Blucher). Before you jump on that comment let me explain with my next one; I keep saying that Flecktarns position is relatively clear, he feels that it was practically un-winnable for the French, which means that it was more or less un-loseable for Wellington and Blucher. If you don't except this last sentence, explain why, or our conversation is totally pointless. It is this body of water that I am leading people to, and the one nobody wants to drink from. Flecktarn can't have it both ways. If his view is worth taking seriously, then it is a perfectly reasonable follow up question for us to ask "what did Wellington and Blucher actually achieve then, from a command perspective, if we are now being told that they were so sure of winning in the first place?"

"Also, your claim that Flecktarn is "sure" that Wellington & Blücher would win or that they knew they could win".
No, that is also incorrect. I claimed the first part of that sentence, not the second part.

Good post ColonelToffeeApple, in my humble opinion.

I'm calling it a night, its time to sort out some OOB's. Goodnight to you all.

Sorry mister TW, you may well say you're open for discussion and handing me some starting point, but that was not the case here at all. You're turning the tables, but not by the agreed rules of debate.

I'll just return to writing my next book, with the sure knowledge I found an entirely unknown & genuine order from Marshall Ney that will upset a lot of knowledge for Waterloo & Napoleon's concerns regarding the presence of Prussian troops nearby.

Happy book reading. I dive into the original documents.
You have lost me for this thread, as you are obviously unable to discuss.

P.S. Moo, moo, TW? Ducks don't moo, it is the cows I see come pass somethimes when every once or twice a year I conduct an inspection of a chain hoist in a slaughtering house, heaving a large bucket into a container of either their bowels, noses, tails, eyes, or ears. But they don't quack…

I am now circuling and spiraling out of this thread in the sure knowledge I seem to be unable to listen to TellesticWarrior's words. And in the wise knowledge everyting on 1815 always in the ends turns to Waterloo…. even when not appropriate.
Fortunately I can decide for myself when I've been 'ducked', rather than someone else decide this for me here & at the same time continue attributing useful material and comment amongst fellow military historians. It was a nice attempt to bring some matters forward the last couple of days in this thread here on TMP for everyone. But is was all to soon taken hostage by a 'waterloo-debate' by some, stating many things as fact but none other than repeated heresay from what was written into one and the next book by so-called experts, i.e. 'accepted views', but not wanting to clarify these.
So good luck in the entanglements.

(To approach the topic whether or not the battle of Waterloo, or its campaign was winnable by the French is such an entirely wrong approach of the campaign/battle, that you clearly have no knowledge on all the available French, Prussian, British, Netherlands and other source material to actualy come to a sensible comment)

So for now, this time: bye, some flying duck poop & quack.

When I was young, we had music on things that are known in English as records.

When one was damaged, the needle sometimes became stuck, playing the same thing over and over again.

TW's posts brought that memory back.

Jurgen

When one was damaged, the needle sometimes became stuck, playing the same thing over and over again.

And then there was Sergeant Pepper's where they did it on purpose with an infinite inner groove …

YouTube link

I look back knowing Bruno's fight against Tyson was unwinnable…didn't at the time, and not did Bruno!

For TW – the problem is that war involves lots of actors and actions. Looking back we see the weaknesses in Napoleon's army, the strength of Blucher and Wellington's relationship, the paucity of senior French command ability, the quality of the Anglo-Allied army.

We see Flectarn's notorious 8 points in a context where it was probably unwinnable for the French. We also see how little needs to have changed for it to be very winnable…not the big movements like Grouchy, but an extra glass of wine at the ball may have been enough.

As to why I got annoyed at you comments on armchairsand command in battle – I have, Flecktarn has, your willingness to use that implies a lack of respect which makes me think you have not.

Hello.
Well, despite actually agreeing with you.. In that I think Napoleon could have won the campaign, I'm not sure what position I'm expected to defend. My main contention wasn't that you disagreed with Flecktarn, just the… heated way it was phrased, which I thought was out of whack with the tone of thread.

My position on the hundred days being winnable or unwind able would go something like this….
The French start off in a good position, the Allies and Prussians are not united, Napoleons men are largely enthusiastic and he has an experienced core to his army. The Allies are patchy, some excellent veteran units and many unknown inexperienced ones. Also many veterans in the allued force are former French allies. While history shows the vast majority show willingness to stand, neither the Allied or French commanders can be sure of this.
His initial plan goes well. He pans the Prussians at Lingly but Ney loses at Quatre Bras. This is the critical point. If the Prussians retreat he has very high odds of winning. If they try and link up his odds are much slimmer.
He thinks they are retreating so he is willing to smash the allies. He doesn't know it yet but to win now he has to sledgehammer Wellington ASAP. Wellington knows that the Prussians got licked and Quatre Bras was far from tidy. He will only stand if he thinks the Prussians are coming.

If Ney had won at Quatre Bras.
If the Prussians had not marched towards the allies.
If Napoleon had attacked earlier.
If Napoleon hadn't ordered Grouchy away. All key points that could have, I stress could, changed the whole campaign and outcome of Waterloo.

As the battle pans out. Every hour the line holds, the Prussisns get closer and Napoleons chances dwindle. I'm sure that, if he himself felt victory was at any point unachievable completely he would have commenced a fighting withdrawal. I think both the sides had valid reasons to be confident of victory given the information they likely had at hand.

If I'd have been in Boneys shoes possibly id have fallen back when it became clear that the Prussians are getting closer and Grouchy isn't. But I'm not a gambler, general or emperor lol.

So yeah. The allies achieved a lot by not breaking. The Prussians even more considering the pasting they took the day before and the congestion on the roads. Wellington gets credit for being where he said he would be and Blucher for going there as he promised. The allies have a poorer quality army in experience level I think so they did fantastically well to hold on so long, and to have so many units left in some semblance of order.

TW,

The reason that there were "6 days and scores and scores of posts" is that you repeatedly either misinterpreted or misrepresented what I said in order to try to have an argument and kept posting the same nonsense over and over again while demanding that I clarify something to your satisfaction and in a way that you could represent as you having won an argument that you seemed to think we were having.

Jurgen